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PREFACE 

My purpose in the following pages has been to analyze, so 
far as the fragmentary sources permit, the precise influences 
that urged the Roman republic toward territorial expansion. 
Imperialism, as we now use the word, is generally assumed to 
be the national expression of the individual's "will to live." 
If this were always true, a simple axiom would suffice to ex- 
plain every story of conquest. I venture to believe, however, 
that such an axiom is too frequently assumed, particularly in 
historical works that issue from the continent, where the over- 
crowding of population threatens to deprive the individual of 
his means of subsistance unless the united nation makes for 
itself " a place in the sunlight." Old-world political traditions 
also have taught historians to accept territorial expansion as a 
matter of course. For hundreds of years the church, claiming 
universal dominion, proclaimed the doctrine of world-empire ; 
the monarchs of the Holy Roman Empire and of France reached 
out for the inheritance of ancient Rome ; the dynastic families, 
which could hold their own in a period of such doctrine only 
by the possession of strong armies, naturally employed those 
armies in wars of expansion. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that continental writers, at least, should assume that the desire 
to possess must somehow have been the mainspring of action 
whether in the Spanish-American war or the Punic wars of 
Rome. 

However, the causes of territorial growth cannot in every 
given instance be reduced to so simple a formula. Let us 
imagine a people far removed from the economic pressure as 
well as the political traditions of modern Europe, an agricultural 
people, not too thickly settled and not egged on by commercial 
ambitions; a republic in which the citizens themselves must 
vote whether or not to proclaim a war and in voting affirma- 



viii PREFACE 

tively must not only impose upon themselves the requisite war 
tax — a direct tribute — but must also go from the voting booths 
to the recruiting station and enroll in the legions ; a republic, 
moreover, in which the directing power is vested in a group of 
a few hundred nobles, suspicious of the prestige that popular 
heroes gain in war and fearful of a military power that might 
overthrow its control. In such a nation are there not enough 
negative cross currents to neutralize the positive charge that 
rises from the blind instinct to acquire? Such a nation was 
the Roman republic. 

Obviously the student of Rome's growth must not rest con- 
tent with generalizations that have come into vogue in a later 
day. He must treat each instance of expansion as an individual 
problem and attempt to estimate all the contributing factors. 
He must also give a just evaluation of the opposing factors, 
which have so often been overlooked. Livy naturally did not 
devote as much space to telling of the falterings and the retreats 
as to the glories of the onward charge, but, though less pictur- 
esque, they are equally important to history. An adequate 
analysis must reveal the halting places as well as the victorious 
advances, it must lay due emphasis upon the checks imposed 
by the fetial rules, the hesitation of the senate before taking 
the inviting step into southern Italy and Sicily, the refusal of 
the people to grow enthusiastic over the foreign policy of the 
Scipios, the "hauling down of the flag" in Illyricum, Mace- 
donia, Africa, Syria, and Germany. It will bring to light the 
fact that Rome's growth is far from being comprehended in a 
single formula of modern invention, and it will explain the 
apparent paradox that Rome became mistress of the whole 
world while adhering with a fair degree of fidelity to a sacred 
rule which forbade wars of aggression. 

Unfortunately a detailed study of Roman territorial expansion 
necessarily creates an impression that is misleading. We must 
in such a study deal so constantly with records of war that 
Rome inevitably emerges with the character of an irritable and 
pugnacious state. Only a full record of Rome's success in 
preserving amicable relations with scores of neighbors could 
offset this erroneous impression. One must needs bear in mind 
that ancient international conditions were far more intricate 



PREFACE ix 

than modern. In the days of the early republic the Mediter- 
ranean world consisted of hundreds of independent city-states, 
and in the second century Rome numbered more than a hundred 
allies in her federation and perhaps as many more states in her 
circle of "friends," while on the periphery were countless semi- 
barbaric tribes ever ready to serve as catalytic agents of war. 
When one remembers that modern nations must employ all the 
arts of diplomacy to keep peace with their few neighbors, one 
is surprised not at the number of wars Rome fought but at the 
great number of states with which she lived in peace. 

Notes have been added at the end of each chapter, partly 
in order to aid the reader who wishes to pursue the subject 
further, partly in order to indicate the basis for such new state- 
ments as I have presumed to make, partly to give some little 
measure of credit for excellent work that has been of service. 
In this last respect the notes are by no means adequate. Who 
could record his full debt to authorities like Mommsen and 
Meyer? It is the fate of great historians that their dicta are 
generally taken for granted in space-saving silence and are 
mentioned only on those rare occasions when their followers 
dare to dififer. Nor have I always been able to jot down a 
grateful note when I have accepted the suggestions of other 
historians. The names of Abbott, Beloch, Botsford, Cardinali, 
Chapot, Colin, De Sanctis, Ferguson, Greenidge, Heitland, 
Kornemann, Kromayer, Niese, Pais, Pelham, Rostowzew, and 
many others would fill pages of additional notes if I could have 
recorded all my obligations. My gratitude is especially due 
my colleagues. Professor A. L. Wheeler and Dr. J. L. Ferguson, 
for kindly reading and amending several chapters. Finally, 
the book is inscribed to one without whose incisive criticism 
I should not venture to invite perusal of the following pages. 

T. F. 

Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, 
January 20, 1914. 



CONTENTS 



PAGES 
1-12 



13-29 



30-45 



Chapter I. The People of Rome and Latium . 

The origin of the Roman people, 1 ; occupation, 2 ; polit- 
ical institutions, 3. The fetial law of war, 8. 

Chapter II. Rome dominates Latium .... 
The tribal organization, 13. Origin of the city-state, 14, 
The Etruscans at Rome, 14. Latin colonization, 18. Rome 
the leader of the Latin league, 21. 

Chapter III. Rome creates a Confederation . 

Conditions in Central Italy, 30. Rome's alliance with 
Capua, and the First Samnite war, 31. The wreck of the 
Latin league, 32. Rome creates a federation of Latins and 
allied states, 34. 



Chapter IV. Rome dominates Central Italy . . . 46-58 
The Second Samnite war, 46. Rome's new treaties, 51. 
A Gallic invasion inaugurates the Third Samnite war, 54. 

Chapter V. The Foreign Policy of the Young Democ- 
racy and its Consequences 59-87 

Conditions at Rome, 59. The acquisition of the ager 
Gallicus, 60. War with Pyrrhus incurred by the democratic 
leaders, 61. Rome's reorganization of Italy, 67. Area of 
conquered territory, 80. 

Chapter VI. Rome as an Imperial Democracy . . 88-110 
The First Punic war, 88. Sicily, the firsj tributary prov- 
ince, 93. The organization and government of the province, 
94. The effects upon the provincials, 103. The effects upon 
the Romans, 105. 

Chapter VII. The Federation put to the Test . . 111-137 
The seizure of Sardinia, 112. The settlement of the ager 
Gallicus, 115. Suppression of Illyrian pirates, 116. A Gallic 
raid, 117. The Hannibalic war : its causes, 119. Policy of 
the contestants, 125. The struggle, 126. Results, 129. 



xii CONTENTS 

PAGES 

Chapter VIII, Sentimental Politics 138-162 

The Greeks appeal to Rome against Philip V of Mace- 
donia, 138. The Eastern situation, 138. Party alignment 
on the question of intervention, 145. The war, 151. The 
liberation of the Greeks, 155. 

Chapter IX. The Consequences of Sentimental Politics 163-189 

Antiochus III of Syria attacks liberated cities, 163. Nego- 
tiations with Rome, 168. ^tolians dissatisfied, 172. The 
war with Antiochus and the .^tolians, 174. Rome's policy 
in Greece and Asia, 181. 

Chapter X. Reaction toward Practical Politics . . 190-217 

Dissatisfaction at Rome with the Scipionic policy, 190. 
The rise of Cato and the fall of Scipio, 194. The senate's 
new methods in Greece, 195. Perseus and Rome, 203. The 
Third Macedonian war, 205. Representative government 
in Macedonia, 209. Rome asserts her suzerainty in Greece 
and Asia Minor, 211. 

Chapter XI. Protectorate or Tyranny .... 218-242 

The senate vacillating, 218. Rome's occasional interven- 
tion in Asia, 221 ; in Syria, 222 ; in Egypt, 222. Macedonia 
made a province, 223. Corinth destroyed and the Achaean 
league dissolved, 225. Rome's policy in Spain, 230. Car- 
thage destroyed, 233. 

Chapter XII. The Foreign Policy of a Socialistic 

Democracy 243-260 

The inheritance of Pergamum, 243. The Gracchan meth- 
ods of administering Asia, 247. The Gracchan schemes of 
colonization, 252. The settlement of Narbo, 255. 

Chapter XIII. Senatorial Laissez Faire . . . 261-276 

The senate's aversion to territorial expansion, 261. The 
Jugurthine war, 263. The reorganization of the army, 269. 
The Romans in Asia and Cyrene, 272. 

>^ Chapter XIV. Commercialism and Expansion . . . 277-297 

The commerce of early Rome, 277. The alleged evidence 
of a mercantilistic policy examined, 279. Maritime trade in 
the second century, 284. Capital and investments, 289. 



CONTENTS xiii 

PAGBS 

Chapter XV. Consequences of Laissez Faire . . 298-312 

Rome's allies in Italy revolt, 298. An attempt to form a 
new federal government in Italy, 301. Mithradates invades 
Roman Asia, 302. Sulla's policy in the East, 304. Lucul- 
lus' methods in Asia, 307. 

' Chapter XVI. Pompey's Army in the Service of Capi- 
talists 313-^28 

Pompey's early career, 313. His sympathy with the 
equites, 315. His expansionistic policy in the East, 317. 
New provinces for the publicans, 323. 

Chapter XVII. C^sar and World Conquest . . . 329-347 

Caesar's character, 329. His purposes and policy in Gaul, 
336. His settlement of Gaul, 340. The character of his 
monarchy, 342. 

Chapter XVIII. Conclusion 348-358 

Augustus reverts to senatorial methods, 348. His work 
in Egypt, 350 ; in Thrace, 351 ; in Germany, 352. Claudius, 
354. Vespasian, 354. Trajan, 355. Conclusion, 356. 



ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

CHAPTER I 

THE PEOPLE OF ROME AND LATIUM 

Rome is situated about fourteen miles from the ancient 
coast line of the Mediterranean upon the low hills bordering 
the navigable Tiber. The Latian plain, which the city 
commands, stretches from the Tiber to the Volscian hills, 
and from the Sabine ridges to the sea ; it may be crossed in 
either direction in a brisk day's walk. The soil ^ of the plain 
is productive. It is largely composed of disintegrating tufa 
and lava which flowed from surrounding volcanoes during the 
Tertiary period. Since, however, the land of central Latiimi 
is rolling, and consequently erodes quickly, whereas the basic 
tufa is comparatively hard and disintegrates very slowly, 
the arable soil is apt to wash away when stripped for long 
periods by the ax and plow. Nevertheless, the whole plain 
is so superior in productivity to the ragged limestone ridges 
which border it that its inhabitants were doubtless often 
compelled to defend their title by force of arms. 

Before the Indo-European tribes reached central Italy, 
Latium was possessed by a race of unknown origin,^ men of 
short stature and dark complexion, who had not yet learned 
the use of metallic implements. They are usually classed as 
members of the Mediterranean race. The Indo-European 
invaders began to enter Italy from the north and east during 
the third millennitmi b.c, and continued to come in wave 
after wave until they mastered the greater part of Italy. 
In the marshes of the Po valley the sites of the earlier of 
these immigrants can still be identified in the peculiarly 
formed "terremare" or "pile-dwellings." From a some- 



2 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

what later period date the " Villanova" cemeteries of Umbria 
and Tuscany, which have yielded archseologists so rich a 
fund of treasure. It was doubtless a branch of this immi- 
grating race which took possession of Latium some time before 
the millennium that ended with the birth of Christ. 

The peoples of the terremare introduced the use of bronze 
implements and weapons into Italy. They employed most 
of the domestic animals and cultivated many of the cereals 
and fruits which were found in Italy in Cato's day. The men 
of the Villanova settlements were workers in iron also, and 
adorned their utensils and weapons with many pleasing, 
though simple, designs. Even though the excavations in 
Latium have as yet proved unsatisfactory, we can hardly 
doubt that the immigrant tribe which took possession of the 
lower Tiber valley was also far advanced in the arts of a 
stable agricultural people. 

How these invading Aryans disposed of the previous pos- 
sessors we do not know. In view of the facts that the 
Romans of historical times practiced inhumation by the 
side of cremation, that they employed several different mar- 
riage ceremonies, and that their language contains a large 
number of words not of Aryan extraction, it would be futile 
to insist that the invading Aryan tribe kept itself free from 
racial contamination. It is more likely that the victors, after 
having overcome all armed opposition, incorporated the 
remaining inhabitants, chiefly women and children of course, 
into their own tribe. If this be true, the Roman people were 
a mixed race whose chief elements were immigrant Aryans 
and conquered non-Aryans.^ However this may be, cer- 
tainly the predominant element was Aryan, for the Latin 
language is a close relative of Greek and of Celtic. The 
names of the more primitive deities, e.g. Jupiter, Janus, Diana, 
Satumus, Vesta, Volcanus, Neptunus, contain Indo-Euro- 
pean bases, and the characteristic institutions of family, 
tribe, and city are unmistakably Aryan in type. 

By occupation the early Latins must have been shepherds 
and farmers, as, in fact, their ancestors had been before them, 
if the conditions revealed by the "terramara" and "Vil- 



THE PEOPLE OF ROME AND LATIUM 3 

lanova" cemeteries may be drawn upon for evidence. The 
language * of the Romans fairly smells of the soil : egregius, 
putare, planum facere, saeculum, felix, are all metaphors 
borrowed from the fields. Many of their noble families bear 
names Hke Fabius, Piso, Lentulus, and almost all the gods of 
the oldest calendar, the di indigetes, the hierarchy of Satumus 
and Robigus ("Seed-god" and "Rust-god"), were spirits 
worshiped by farmer and shepherd.^ The gods of arts and 
crafts and commerce, Apollo, Minerva, and Mercury, find no 
place there. Remarkably few traces of elaborate craftsman- 
ship in Latium, native or borrowed, have been discovered, 
although the Etruscan towns near by are storehouses of 
Oriental and Egyptian ware.® Apparently the roving in- 
stincts of a commercial people, as well as the nervous im- 
pulses of a manufacturing folk, were absent or dormant 
south of the Tiber. These people knew nothing of sea- 
craft, for in their native vocabulary most of the words needed 
by seafarers are lacking.' Nor were they notably warlike. 
Their army organization was in almost all respects borrowed 
from their neighbors, and they did not learn the art of making 
strong fortifications until the Etruscans introduced it from 
the East. We may infer that they had not extended their 
conquests far afield during prehistoric times, otherwise they 
would have come into territorial contact with the Greeks of 
Cumae ^ in a way that must have introduced the arts of Greek 
civilization into Rome. It is apparent, therefore, that for 
centuries the Latins were a quiet, unwarlike, non-expanding, 
agricultural and pastoral people, and that, before the day 
when Etruscan conquests began to overcrowd central Italy, 
they had little call to resort to arms except to defend their 
flocks from the occasional raids of the Sabellic tribes which 
possessed less desirable land. 

Regarding the early political institutions of the Latin 
tribe, we have only meager data, but there is little reason to 
believe that the city-state * system which prevailed in historic 
times had long endured. Such a system is not usually found 
in conjimction with social conditions as primitive as those 
which must have prevailed in early Latium ; for it tends to 



4 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

disintegrate tribal imity by creating strong centers of popu- 
lation. Now we know that the Latin tribe must have long 
remained a political unit, for no part of it developed a special 
dialect, and the worship of Jupiter Latiaris, the deity who 
dwelt upon Latium's highest hill, was recognized throughout 
the tribe. Harmony was indeed an absolute necessity of 
existence, since the tribe was small, possessed land much 
coveted, and was surrounded by hungry hill tribes ready 
at any moment to take advantage of civil jealousies in 
Latium. If we keep this fact in mind, we shall understand 
the import of the so-called Latin league. This league,^" 
according to the Roman historians, was based upon a com- 
pact formed by the Latian city-states for mutual protec- 
tion. Such may have been its character in historical times, 
but it must have existed as a mere tribal union based upon 
feeling of kinship and common religion long before it was 
ever expressed in writing. Its origin in fact lies simply in 
the aboriginal tribal government of the Latin gens. What 
we may suppose, then, is that the Aryan invaders who took 
possession of Latium settled the land in village communi- 
ties, as indeed most Aryan tribes have done in other parts 
of Europe, that they built their small clusters of houses 
together on convenient hills, farming the adjacent lands in 
common, and that the tribal government embraced all the 
villages of Latium. Such was the system of settlement still 
in vogue among the kindred hill tribes of Italy at a much 
later date. And if we attribute this system to Latium for 
the earlier period, we may understand the source of the 
tradition repeated by Pliny, that Latium once had fifty 
cities. It' may well be that when the Etruscan invasion 
rendered life in the unprotected villages precarious, many 
of them were abandoned, and only such survived as lent 
themselves to ready fortification. The inhabitants of the 
many vici thus drifted into a few strong cities, and nothing 
remained of the numerous villages but the vanishing names 
of their shrines. Out of these names grew the legend that 
Latium had once been a land of many cities. Common 
ownership of land also gave way to private possession, per- 



THE PEOPLE OF ROME AND LATIUM $ 

haps during the same time of stress — at least at an early 
date — for the decemviral code of the fifth century already 
recognizes free testamentary right /^ a right which presup- 
poses a considerable development from the first recognition 
of private ownership. 

In the social fabric of this early population a fairly rigid 
caste system came into existence, a record of which has 
survived in the well-known words "patrician" and "ple- 
beian." The origin of this class system is still an unsolved 
problem. The Romans ^^ themselves thought it political, 
that, in fact, Romulus had chosen certain elders as senators 
and that the descendants of these distinguished men were 
the nobility of Rome. But Romulus has now vanished 
from serious history, and, even if he had not, we shotdd 
have to explain the natiu-e of the success which designated 
these men as worthy of the distinction. The most widely 
accepted view ^^ discovers a basis for the distinction between 
plebeian and patrician in the racial differences of the con- 
quered inhabitants and the victorious invaders, — a view 
which seems to receive the support of a good historical 
parallel in the Norman conquest of England. In searching 
the evidence for a conquest that might have created this 
difference, critics have referred to the original invasion of 
the Aryan tribe, to the temporary subjection of parts of 
Latiimi by the Etruscans, which apparently took place 
during the sixth century B.C., and to the partial conquest 
by the Sabine tribes recorded by a doubtful tradition. Suf- 
fice it to say, however, that every attempt to prove that 
there were racial differences between patricians and ple- 
beians, whether in ritual and ceremony, or in national traits, 
has been wholly unconvincing. It would seem that the 
people who met in prehistoric Latium were still in the 
social condition in which race amalgamation is quickly 
accompHshed. 

It seems futile to search further for evidence of racial 
differences. A more satisfactory explanation is suggested 
by the fact that economic conditions were such in Latium 
as readily to create class distinctions. In the first place, 



6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the land varied greatly in productivity.^* The Alban hills 
are high enough to attract a greater rainfall than the Latian 
plain secures, while the lands beneath the Sabine and Ro- 
man hills are aided by subsoil moisture from mountain 
springs. These things gave certain farmers a great advan- 
tage over others, since the dry season in Latium is normally 
very long. Secondly, since the central plains were quickly 
washed bare of soil if kept constantly exposed by cultivation, 
the farmers who persisted in agriculture in such places 
must have found themselves reduced to a precarious exist- 
ence. The ciu-e for the evil lay in using such fields for 
winter grazing and acquiring summer pasturage on higher 
and less parched ground. But this remedy required both 
large capital and native wit. Under the circumstances it 
was inevitable that some men became lords of extended 
fields and persons of influence in the state, while others 
were reduced to economic and political dependence upon 
them. Eventually, the influential men took the legal steps 
necessary to secure predominance for themselves and their 
descendants ; they stereotyped the caste system by ordain- 
ing that they alone, the patricii, could hold offices of state, 
they alone could consult the auspices in behalf of the city, 
and that their ranks should not be contaminated by inter- 
marriage with plebeians. 

There is, however, a striking peculiarity in Rome's caste 
system which deserves attention. In other states under 
conditions resembling those of early Latium, economic laws 
usually worked without check until a feudal system grew 
up in which the lower class was reduced to serfdom. Such 
serfs were the helots of Sparta, Crete, Thessaly, and other 
states of early Greece, the subject tenants of ancient Egypt 
and of medieval Europe. In early Rome the plebeians 
seem never to have become serfs ; they were not, so far as 
we know, bound to the soil.^^ This circimistance may be 
due to a certain sense of equity which is so prominent a 
characteristic in the legislation of this people. But it is 
more likely that local conditions saved the Romans from 
the paralyzing effects of a feudal system. A period of 



THE PEOPLE OF ROME AND LATIUM 7 

Etruscan rule checked the normal development of oligarchy 
at Rome, and, after the nobility succeeded in ridding itself 
of this,^® new methods of warfare had been introduced which 
made a real feudal system obsolete. The old — we may say 
the Homeric — military methods of single combat were 
being displaced. On the north the Etruscans " had intro- 
duced the Greek armor and hoplite army. On the south, 
the Greek colonies were teaching the new methods to the 
neighboring Italic tribes. The Roman nobles were therefore 
compelled in self-defense to discard their ancient manner 
of warfare and to form solid legions for which the inclusion 
of the plebeian soldier was a necessity. But in bringing the 
plebeian host into the line they made it aware of its own 
worth and gave it an opportunity to demand poHtical rights. 
Tradition ^^ is probably near the truth when it asserts that 
the populace of Rome saved its civil rights and won polit- 
ical privilege by means of military boycotts. But what- 
ever it was that saved Rome from the feudal system, 
which established itself for a period at least in almost 
all other ancient states, the fact that she did escape is 
very important to an imderstanding of her later military 
successes. 

Finally, the pecuhar characteristics of the Roman people 
can be noticed in various legal institutions which it is well 
to bear in mind from the very beginning. A sense of fair 
play and a respect for legal orderliness permeates the whole 
early history of this people. The Romans were always 
unusually liberal in their practice of emancipating slaves 
and of giving the privileges of citizenship to freed slaves, 
whereas the Greeks consistently refused to incorporate 
freedmen into the citizen body. Again, the Romans early 
established a distinct court of equity — that of the praetor 
peregrinus — for cases in which foreigners were involved, so 
that strangers who did not know the Roman mos maiorum 
might find equitable treatment in their business dealings 
with citizens. Of the same general nature is the ancient 
custom of prohibiting the sale and employment of debtor 
slaves within the borders of Latium, and the practice of 



8 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

exacting a treaty of federation from conquered enemies 
rather than a proof of subjection in the form of tribute. 

Most striking of all is the fetial ^^ institution, an institu- 
tion which has a special significance for the study of Roman 
imperialism, since it reveals the spirit of Rome's ius belli 
as nothing else can. From time immemorial a semipolitical, 
priestly board existed whose province it was to supervise 
the rites peculiar to the declaration of war and the swearing 
of treaties, and which formed, as it were, a court of first in- 
stance in such questions of international disputes as the 
proper treatment of envoys and the execution of extradition. 
When any complaint arose that a neighboring tribe had 
committed an act of war it was the duty of this board to 
investigate the matter for the senate, and, if it found the 
complaint just, to send its herald to the offending state with 
a demand for restitution. His formiila reads: "If I un- 
justly or impiously demand that the aforesaid offenders be 
surrendered, then permit me not to return to my coimtry." ^^ 
If restitution was not made, a respite of thirty days was 
given, after which the herald notified the offending states 
that force would be used, employing the following formula : 
" Hear me, Jupiter and Quirinus, and all other gods, I call 
you to witness that this nation is imjust and does not duly 
practice righteousness ; and our elders wiU consider by 
what measures we may secure our dues."^^ The same 
fetial board supervised the rites of treaty making at the 
conclusion of wars, using the following form of oath : "If 
the Roman people break this treaty, then do thou, Jupiter, 
so strike down the Roman people as I now strike this offer- 
ing, and so much harder as thou art stronger." ^^ 

Now if the practices of the fetial board were observed in 
good faith, it is apparent that peace must have been the 
normal international status assimied between Rome and 
her neighbors,^^ and that war was considered justifiable 
only on the score of an unjust act, — for example, the breach 
of a treaty, a direct invasion, or the aiding of an enemy. 
None of the phrases or formulae of the fetials presupposes 
for a moment the conception of international policies that 



THE PEOPLE OF ROME AND LATIUM 9 

possessed Solon when he advocated conquest for the sake 
of national glory, or Aristotle when he justified the subjuga- 
tion of barbarians on the score of national superiority, or 
that actuated oriental nations to fight for the extension of 
their religion, or modem statesmen to employ war as a 
means of furthering commercial interests. The early Roman 
practice rested rather upon the naive assumption that tribes 
and states, being collections of individuals, must conduct 
themselves with justice and good faith, even as individuals. 

Of course, no one would make the claim that the fetial 
rule invariably secured justice.^^ Grievances usually appear 
more serious to the offended than to the offender, and a 
casus belli can readily be discovered when intertribal enmity 
reaches the breaking point through an acctimulation of 
petty offenses, or through natural antipathy. But the 
important point after all is the fact established by the exist- 
ence of this institution that the Roman mos maiorum did 
not recognize the right of aggression or a desire for more 
territory as just causes for war. That the institution was 
observed in good faith for centiuies there can be Uttle doubt. 
The use of flint implements in the ceremonies proves that 
it dated from the earliest times. The fact that Jupiter, 
who was guardian of the solemn fetial oath, was also the 
supreme deity of all the tribes adjacent to Latiimi must 
have tended toward a careful observance of the terms covered 
by the oath. In these circtmistances the Romans could 
hardly imagine themselves as the god's favorite people, 
possessing an exclusive monopoly of his protective power 
in the event that they chose to disregard the treaties which 
he had been called upon to witness. Finally, the respect 
that neighboring peoples showed for Rome's pledge of faith 
during the Punic war and the high praise which Polybius,^^ 
the first Greek observer of Roman institutions, accords the 
Roman rules of warfare, testify to the fact that the fetial 
law was by no means a dead letter in historical times. 

Now we need not suppose that it was a peculiar predis- 
position for morality that induced the Romans to inaugiu-ate 
this important custom. Law and order were particularly 



lo ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

profitable in Latiiim, which was a plain much coveted by 
the tribes who eked out a scanty livelihood upon the Sabine 
and Volscian ridges. It is a commonplace that tribes of 
the plains have always discovered the advantages of peace 
before the highlanders. For centuries conditions were such 
that the Latins had all to lose and little to gain by recog- 
nizing practices of brigandage and lawlessness. They ac- 
cordingly reached the conviction naturally that neighbor- 
ing tribes must dwell in peace, that brigandage must be 
suppressed, and that the rules of equitable dealing which 
are observed by well-balanced individuals must also hold 
between neighboring tribes. And if their less fortunately 
blessed neighbors did not understand this perfectly apparent 
truism, they were ready to issue their quos ego ! through the 
mouth of the fetial priest. Whatever the origin of the in- 
stitution, it had a profound influence upon Rome's inter- 
national dealings, for it encouraged a calm deliberateness of 
action and spread the respect of Rome's word, two factors 
which combined to make Rome's organizing power irre- 
sistible. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER I 

1. For the geology of Latium see Sir Archibald Geikie's entertaining 
chapter on the Campagna in Landscape in History; and G. vom Rath, 
Zeitschr. d. d. geologischen Gesell. vols. XVIII and XX ; for climatic 
conditions, see Philippson, Das Mittelmeergebiet. The relative pro- 
ductivity of Italian lands was about the same in Cicero's day as now. 
While Tusculum and the Anio valley were considered fertile (Strabo, 
V, 238-9), the main part of Latium was not found to be very weU 
adapted to staple products (Cic. de leg. agr. II, 96, Pliny, Nat. Hist. 
XVIII, 29). On the other hand, Campania, then as now, produced 
three crops per year by the aid of irrigation (Strabo, V, 250). Cato 
considered cattle raising as the most profitable occupation near Rome 
in his day (Pliny, Nat. Hist. XVIII, 29) ; grain takes sixth place in his 
list of important products (Cato, de ag. cult. I, 7). 

2. On ethnology, see Modestov, Introduction d I'histoire romaine, 
1907; Montelius, La civilisation primitive en Italie; Peet, The Stone 
and Bronze Ages in Italy; Grenier, Bologne Villanovienne et Etr usque, 
1913 ; and Munro, Palceolithic Man and Terramara Settlements (19 12), 
ch. XII. 



THE PEOPLE OF ROME AND LATIUM ii 

3. It is a striking fact that while the inhabitants of Umbria, the 
makers of the Villanova cemeteries, regularly incinerated their dead, 
the inhabitants of Latium employed both cremation and inhumation. 
Pinza in his excellent survey of early Latian culture {Monumenti Antichi, 
XV, p. 730) finds that the early cemeteries of Alba Longa reveal a larger 
number of incineration than of inhumation graves, while those of the 
Roman forum and of the Esquiline hill reversed the ratio. It is usually 
conceded that cremation was an Aryan custom. On Indo- Germanic 
origins in general, see Hirt, Die Indogermanen. 

4. Weise, Charakteristik der lat. Sprache^, pp. 14 and 23. 

5. Wissowa, Religion und Kultus der Romer^, ist chapter. 

6. E.g. the Regolini-Galassi tomb of Caere, cf . Pinza in Rom. Mitth. 
1907, p. 35. See also Bolletino d'Arte, 1909, p. 161, and Pollak in Rom. 
Mitth. 1906, p. 329. 

7. See Mercantilism and Rome's Foreign Policy, in Am. Hist. Review, 
1913, p. 233. 

8. From Cumas they acquired the alphabet but little else. Cumasan 
traders were doubtless the intermediaries, and they may also be the 
source of Hesiod's knowledge of the Latins, see Eduard Meyer, Geschichte 
des Altertums, II, 315 ; and Leo, Gesch. d. Rom. Lit., p. 9. Since 
Faliscan, a dialect very closely related to Latin, was spoken even under 
Etruscan dominion in Falerii, north of the Tiber, it may be that the 
Latin tribes originally extended somewhat north of the river. However, 
excavations reveal "Villanova" cemeteries at Veii and Cometo not far 
from Rome, and these seem to be of non-Latin origin ; see Notizie degli 
Scavi, 1907, pp. 51 and 350. 

9. Eduard Meyer, s.v. Plebs in Handworterb. der Staatswissenschaften, 
holds that the city-state must be posited for early Latium, but the 
village community is more consonant with Aryan custom. See Vino- 
gradoflf, English Society in the Eleventh Century, and Wilamowitz, 
Stout und Gesellschaft der Griechen, p. 41. Strabo, V. 241, informs us 
that certain Sabellic tribes still lived kw/j.tiS6v in historical times. The 
institution of compascuus — common pasture grounds — which still 
survived at a later day in Italy is doubtless a survival of the system. 
For probable survivals of the old village governmental system see L. R. 
Taylor, Cults of Ostia, p. 18 (Bryn Mawr, 1913), and more recently, 
Rosenberg, Der Staat d. alten Italiker. 

ID. Dionys. IV, 49 ; V, 61 ; Diod. VII, fr. 3 ; Plin. Nat. Hist. Ill, 
68. Seeck, Rhein. Mus., XXXVII, and Mommsen, Ges. Schriften, 
V, 69, have discussed the traditional lists of communities which once 
existed in Latium. Since these lists are not dated they are of little 
service to history. 

1 1 . See Bruns, Pontes juris. Leges XII tahularum, V, 3, uti legassit 
super pecunia tutelave suae rei, ita jus esto. 

12. patres ah honor e, patriciique progenies eorum appellati, Livy, I, 8. 



12 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

13. Ridgeway, Who were the Romans, 1908, has ably, though not 
convincingly, developed the view that the patricians were Sabine con- 
querors. Cuno, Vorgeschichte Roms, I, 14, held that they were Etrus- 
cans. Boni, Notizie degli Scavi, 1903, p. 401, believes that the patricians 
were the descendants of the immigrant Aryans, while the plebeians 
were the offspring of the aboriginal non-Aryan stock. Fustel de Cou- 
langes, in his well-known work, La cite antique, proposed the view that 
a religious caste-system alone could explain the division. Eduard 
Meyer (cf. article Plebs in Handwbrterbuch der Staatswissenschaften) 
and Botsford {The Roman Assemblies, p. 16) have presented various 
arguments in favor of the economic theory. See Binder, Die Plebs, 
1909, for a summary of many other discussions. 

14. See Am. Hist. Review, XVIII, p. 239, for a fuller treatment. 

15. Neimiann's attempt to prove that the plebeians had been re- 
duced to serfdom (Die Grundherrschaft der romischen Republik, 1900) 
attracted much attention and even gained the partial assent of Eduard 
Meyer. But it is based upon an imagined parallel to German condi- 
tions and has no foundation in known facts. 

16. See next chapter. 

17. Frohlich, Beitrdge zur Geschichte d. Kriegsfiihrung d. Romer; 
Helbig, Sur les attributs des Saliens, 1905. 

18. Livy, III, 52. 

19. See The Import of the Fetial Institution, Class. Philology, 1912, 
P- 335. for ^ fuller discussion of this question ; also Holtzendorff, Hand- 
buch des Volkerrechts, I, 242. 

20. Livy, I, 32, 7. The event here narrated is probably not histori- 
cal, but since Augustus was reviving the old ceremonies with antiquarian 
care when Livy wrote, we may suppose that his version of the formulae 
is an accurate copy of the ancient one. Augustus, himself a fetial 
priest, claims in his Res Gestae (V, 13) that he has observed the rules, 
nulli genti bello per iniuriam inlato. 

21. Livy, I, 32, 7. 

22. Livy, I, 24, 8. 

23. There seems to be no foundation for the frequently repeated 
generalization that in ancient times the normal international status 
was that of hostility, whereas in modem times states are normally 
assumed to be at peace with each other. 

24. The letter of the law was observed at times without regard to 
the spirit ; notably in the Spanish affairs in 137 B.C. Fowler, in his 
brief account of Rome (Home University Library), has recently marked 
out "slimness" and treachery as characteristic of Roman diplomacy, 
illustrating the point by reference to Livy's account (IX, 10) of the 
Caudine treaty. Nissen, however, has proved Livy's account unhis- 
torical : Rhein. Museum, XXV, i . 

25. XIII, 3, and frag., 157. 



CHAPTER II 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 



In the preceding chapter we have dealt with the institu- 
tions and practices of the whole Latin tribe rather than 
with those of Rome, for the imperial city was not yet a 
separate political power. In fact, it would seem that the 
Latins acted in tmison under tribal laws and customs for 
centuries before disintegrating forces set to work to elevate 
one community above the rest. And even when certain 
cities sprang up and began to gain predominance over large 
parts of the tribe, feelings of kinship, respect for common 
worship, and fear of common enemies still continued for 
added centuries to preserve a certain unity of action within 
the tribe. In this chapter we shall observe how Rome 
becomes the strongest city within the league. 

Roman tradition preserved in the first book of Livy pre- 
sents a very circumstantial account of the several battles 
by which Rome supposedly razed the Latin cities one after 
another until she was supreme mistress of the Tiber valley. 
Needless to say, if the Latin tribe had lived in such civil 
discord as legend assumes, it would quickly have succumbed 
to the inroads of the mountain tribes, which were eagerly 
watching for opportunities to raid. Of coiuse legend had 
to account somehow for the abandoned shrines and old 
place names scattered over Latium, and being unable to 
comprehend the slower processes of civilization, it took a 
more picttuesque route, attached a rumor of war to a hero's 
name, and made the villages disappear in fire and blood. 
How the original village communities were actually absorbed 
by cities growing up in more favorable locations can be 
illustrated by the transformation of various parts of Italy 
and Sicily in more recent times, when, in order to escape the 
brigandage which they were unable to suppress, the peasants 

13 



14 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

abandoned their small villages and crowded together in a 
few well-fortified hill cities, even though by so doing they 
were compelled to live several miles away from their own 
fields. Something of the same nature must have occurred 
in central Italy when, during the seventh and sixth centuries 
B.C., the rapidly expanding Etruscan people began crowding 
the SabeUic tribes in upon Latiimi, and finally pushed their 
own way over the Tiber. The villages upon the plains had 
to be abandoned, since they could not be made defensible, 
and as a result, communities like Rome, Tibur, Prasneste, 
and Aricia, which could readily be fortified, and which had 
an imfailing water supply within their walls, secured an 
accretion of popiilation and grew into strong cities. It is 
to this redistribution and the aggregation of the population 
at certain favored points that we trace the beginnings of the 
Latin city-states. Before long, when these new cities made 
up their contingent in the tribal army, they became aware 
of their own power, and then they began to exert this power 
in the furtherance of such policies as favored their own in- 
terests. Henceforth they acted more and more as individual 
units, regardless of the wishes of kindred cities. 

A further step toward the dissolution of the tribe was 
taken when the Etruscans eventually secured a foothold 
in various parts of Latium. The mystery surrounding this 
interesting people^ is only now yielding in some small measure 
to patient research. It seems that about the eighth century 
an Oriental tribe, once closely connected with Babylonia,^ 
came overseas, settled upon the Italian coast north of the 
Tiber, and subdued a part of the Umbrians, mingling with 
them in marriage. There are several ancient sites, e.g. at 
Tarquinii, Clusiimi, and Volci, where it is evident that the 
"ViUanova" cemeteries ceased to be used in the eighth and 
seventh centtuies. In the immediate vicinity of these 
cemeteries new ones sprang up containing rock-tombs made 
for the inhumation of the dead. This change clearly re- 
cords the arrival of the Etruscan conquerors, who bmlt their 
splendid cities upon the sites of the subjugated Umbrians, 
and the new race, half Oriental, half Italic, spread with such 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 1$ 

remarkable rapidity that before the sixth century it had 
taken possession of all that region of western Italy which 
lies between the Tiber and the Alps. Presently various 
groups, pushing southward, succeeded in gaining a strong 
foothold in the richest part of Campania. Orthodox Ro- 
man historians never admitted that the Etruscans conquered 
Latium, but archaeological evidence of a temporary occupa- 
tion of parts at least of this territory is now fairly over- 
whelming. Many of the military practices and some of the 
political and religious ceremonies of historical Rome are 
demonstrably Etruscan. A large nimiber of the old family 
names that appear in the early legends * have Etruscan bases. 
The great Capitoline temple was btiilt in the Etruscan style, 
and the conception of deity itself — of gods possessing 
himian form * and living in temples — seems to have come 
from Etruria, for the native Latin deities were spirits which 
manifested themselves in varying shapes and aspects. Tus- 
cultmi surely must have been a city of Etruscan foundation, 
if the name has any real significance. Etruscan remains 
are found in abundance at Palestrina and Velletri, and the 
remains of an Etruscan temple have been discovered on the 
ancient site of Satrictim, between Alba and the sea. Finally, 
the Emperor Claudius, an antiquarian of wide reading, re- 
cords the fact that the ancient Etruscan authorities identi- 
fied the Roman king, Servius Tullius, with an Etruscan 
prince, Mastama;^ and this identification seems to be con- 
firmed by an Etruscan tomb painting ^ of about 400 b.c, 
which represents Mastama slaying a Roman chieftain, a 
chieftain who, furthermore, is represented as surrounded 
by an Etruscan bodyguard. To be sure, each individual 
piece of evidence might be explained as indicating nothing 
more than a temporary commercial and military contact, 
but the cumulative effect of the whole mass is so great that 
the historian must at least admit the likelihood of a brief 
period of political domination. 

Now in order to understand the effect of this conquest 
upon Rome and Latium, it becomes necessary to take into 
account the methods of procedure of the Etruscans. These 



i6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

strange conquerors seem to have operated in a manner 
peculiar to themselves. They had apparently come over- 
seas in ships and in relatively small numbers. Mere bands 
of adventurers, they subjugated city after city, pressing 
the native population into service as subject clients. They 
did not destroy the cities they foimd, but took possession, 
organized the populace into effective armies, grafted their 
own ceremonies upon the native religion without wholly 
displacing it, introduced new architectural and artistic 
methods, developed crafts and commerce for their own 
profit, levied tribute on their subjects and thus transformed 
the cities of the conquered into strongholds of their princely 
power. The effect of such a conquest upon various Latian 
cities, including Rome, must have been revolutionary. 
Consciousness of tribal unity in Latium could not but suffer 
severely after several of the more important cities had fallen 
into the power of separate non-Latin princes, each of whom 
was concerned solely with the development of his particular 
possession. There can be little doubt that the overlords 
of the cities attempted to extend the boundaries of their 
own power as far as possible, and it is not at aU improbable 
that some of the Latin communities in the vicinity of Rome 
were taken by her and destroyed during this period of regal 
Etruscan domination. The persistent tradition of Rome's 
destruction of Alba, a place which seems to have been the 
center of the old tribal worship of Latium, can thus be ex- 
plained, and can hardly be explained in any other way. At 
any rate, owing to the combined effects of the slow natural 
process of city growth which had early set in, and the ag- 
gressive policy of the Etruscan princes, Rome, by the be- 
ginning of the fifth century, when the foreigners were finally 
driven beyond the Tiber, had become the metropolis of 
almost a third of the Latian plain. 

It is not probable that the Etruscan domination lasted 
more than a generation or two, or that it ever brought a 
large number of Etruscans into Rome, for the Latin language 
suffered very little contamination, and there is no evidence 
that new deities were introduced, even though new cere- 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 17 

monies were taught. Moreover, excavations have laid 
bare relatively few objects of Etruscan workmanship or 
style within Rome, and we know that all important political 
institutions remained Latin in type after the departure of 
the strangers.^ 

The revolution which drove the foreign lords out of Latium 
was probably that which tradition places in the year 509 
and credits to the efforts of Brutus to avenge the disgrace of 
Lucretia upon the tyrant Tarquin the Proud. What truth 
there is in this picturesque legend we shall never know, but 
we may well believe that the date is not far from right, for 
nations have always proved to be fairly tenacious of the 
dates which mark their most important revolutions. The 
contest itself had a twofold cause, if we may judge from 
subsequent events. It was partly a patriotic uprising of 
the Latin peoples against foreign rulers, since Etruscan in- 
fluences seem to disappear from the whole of Latium about 
this time, and since we find the Latins again acting in har- 
mony ^ afterwards. Partly, in Rome at least, it must have 
been a movement led by the aristocracy against a monarchi- 
cal rule which, relying upon the support of the populace,* 
oppressed the nobles. This we may infer from the fact 
that the new government formed after the revolution was 
strictly oligarchic in character, recognizing the political 
rights of the patricians only. 

At the beginning of Rome's republican period the situa- 
tion of the Latin peoples was as follows. The Latin tribe, 
although Latium was now broken up into a few city-states, 
again worked in harmony in face of a common danger. Its 
strongest cities were Rome, on the Tiber ; Prasneste and 
Tibur on the Sabine slopes, guarding the eastern edge of the 
plain ; Tusculum and Aricia, holding the central Alban ridge ; 
Laurentum, Ardea, Antium, and Tarracina,^" commanding 
the coast-lands. On the north of the Tiber were several 
Etruscan towns, notably Caere, Clusium, and Veil, whose 
princes long entertained the ambition of regaining the pos- 
sessions in Latium which they had lost. On the east, in 
the Apennine hills, were several Sabellic tribes, ever on the 
c 



i8 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

watch for booty. The ^^qui, on the southeast, were con- 
stantly using the Trerus valley as a convenient raiding route 
into Latium. On the south, in the Volscian mountains, 
that broken-off spur of the Apennines now called the Lepini, 
lived the hardy Volscian peoples. They held several strongly 
fortified cities, like Cora, Norba, Setia, and Privemum, upon 
the heights and sought to extend their possessions in the 
fertile plains which bordered upon the Latian fields. The 
Sabines, the JEqm, and the Volsci were tribes closely akin 
to the Latins in origin, and spoke Italic dialects that might, 
without great difficulty, be understood by the Latins." But 
it is probable that all consciousness of kinship had been lost 
in the centuries of separation, and that the pressure of eco- 
nomic circumstances had made each tribe the natural enemy 
of every other. Latium was obviously the goal for all of 
them, and her people, under the constant pressure from 
without, slowly developed an endurance and an organizing 
faculty which eventually, when aggressively applied, proved 
irresistible. 

When the Latins had rid themselves of the Etruscan princes, 
they next met their common enem}'- of the south, the Volsci, 
and, talcing possession of several of their strongholds, planted 
Latin colonies upon the captured sites. ^- This event is 
significant because it inaugurates ^^ a scheme of colonization 
which was later adopted by Rome as the comer stone of 
her federal policy. A Latin colony, then as later, was com- 
posed of citizens of the various Latin cities, and it became 
at once a member in full standing of the league of Latin 
cities. It therefore serv^ed as an outpost of the league, 
protecting the frontier and, since its citizens were drawn 
from all the members of the league, as a unifying factor 
within that body itself. This colonization is furthermore 
significant because it proves that after the disturbing Etruscan 
element had been removed the Latins were again ready 
to act in harmony. The sites selected for settlement were 
excellently chosen : Signia commanded the Trerus valley, 
the gateway of the .^qui, and Velitr^e and Norba, the 
fertile plain behind the Alban hills. This plain, to be sure, 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 19 

is to-day marshy and malarial, and was so in Cicero's time, 
and many visitors who have seen Norba's extensive walls 
have wondered how the marshy valley below could have 
supported so large a city. The explanation ^* apparently 
lies in the fact that the Lepini, which now stand so bare 
and ragged, were probably covered by forests in Volscian 
days. When later the inhabitants began exploiting these 
forests, the usual results of deforestation ensued. Rains 
washed down the soil, choking up the streams with torrents 
of alluviimi, and, once the water had gathered in stagnant 
pools, the malaria-bearing anopheles invaded the region 
with the disastrous effect apparent to-day. But this destruc- 
tion of the fertile plain seems not to have been an immediate 
result of the Roman colonization, for the land was still con- 
sidered very valuable a centtu-y and a half later. Deforesta- 
tion probably dates from a time when timber nearer 
Rome had been used up and limiber merchants, in order to 
supply the needs of the metropolis, were obliged to resort to 
the Volscian mountains. 

After the successful colonization of Signia, Velitrae, and 
Norba, the league met with severe reversals.^^ Just why 
the league should have failed to hold its own at this time we 
are not told. Perhaps it had been weakened past quick 
recovery by the wars of the Etruscan revolutions, or perhaps 
the aristocracy, which was now in power at Rome, proved 
unable or unwilling to carry on the successful military 
leadership which that city had acquired under the aggressive 
foreign princes. Certain it is that the iEqui, whose native 
home was in central Italy, succeeded in making their way 
down the valley between Prasneste and the Hemican towns 
and in seizing Labici and Tusculum on the very Alban hills, 
while the Volsci swept past the new colony of Norba, which 
they completely isolated by taking Velitrse, Ardea, and all 
the seacoast from Antium to Tarracina. In other words, 
the league lost fully a third of its territory and population. 
The loss, however, was in some measure compensated for 
by the fact that the advances of the ^qui and Volsci so 
endangered the existence of the Hemican tribe southeast 



20 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

of Latiiim that it made common cause with the Latins. 
From this time on these two tribes acted in harmony against 
the common enemy. 

The recovery of the groimd which they had lost proved 
a tedious task for the Latins. Diodorus/^ who generally 
follows an earlier — and therefore less interpolated — 
tradition than Livy, gives the following steps in the process. 
Tusculum ^^ was retaken from the -<:Equi in 480, Labici in 
418, and Bola in 415. By the end of the century, therefore, 
the ^qui had been driven back over the Trerus valley into 
their mountain fastnesses. Ardea was retaken from the 
Volsci and settled as a Latin colony in 442, Tarracina was 
recovered by the league in 406, and Velitrse recolonized in 404. 
It is probable, however, that many of the Volscian inhabitants 
were left in possession of their lands, since pro-Volscian sjrtn- 
pathies repeatedly came into evidence in the region south of 
the Alban hills later, and a Volscian inscription has been 
found at Velitrae.^^ 

It is apparent that these gains, losses, and recoveries of 
territory concerned the Latin league as a whole. Rome had 
doubtless shared in aU the contests, but had not, so far as we 
know, been subjected to any alterations in her own bound- 
aries.^^ It was, however, much to her advantage that by 
her position she had been saved from the harrowing raids 
visited upon the other Latins, and we may therefore assume 
that the fifth century ended with a balance of advantages 
in her favor. 

At the opening of the fourth century we find the Romans 
engaged on their own account in a mortal struggle ^^ with 
Veii, an Etruscan city twelve miles north of Rome and an 
old-time enemy. This city, if we may judge from the re- 
mains, was at one time fully as large as Rome. Its forti- 
fications were certainly as good, its territory was equally 
extensive, and the personal wealth of its citizens was prob- 
ably greater. The struggle is said to have lasted eleven 
years. When the Romans finally won they incorporated ^^ 
the enemy's territory into the Roman city-state, dividing 
it into four Roman wards, and reallotting it in small 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 21 

citizen holdings, a procedure which seems to indicate that 
Rome did not here have the support of the league, and that 
the league's constitution at this time was so loose that in- 
dividual members might carry on wars independently. 

A very important result of this victory was that it doubled 
Rome's territory, making her without question the largest 
city-state in Latium. Another result, ultimately of far- 
reaching consequence, was that the allotment of the extensive 
Veian territory in small holdings immensely increased the 
force of the Roman army, since soldiers of the line had to be 
men of property. Finally, since the allotment of land placed 
a fair competence in the hands of hitherto uninfluential 
plebeians, it gave an irresistible impetus to the democratic 
movement. In fact, within twenty years after the distri- 
bution of this land the plebeians gained the right to hold the 
highest office of state. The importance of this circumstance 
for the question of Roman imperialism lies in the fact that 
in the future it was usually the democratic element at Rome 
which favored a policy of expansion. 

The conquest of Veii was, however, followed by a disaster 
that nearly destroyed Rome , A Gallic horde from the Po region 
made a successfiil raid through Etruria, defeated the Roman 
army at Allia in 387, sacked and burned the greater part of 
Rome, and laid siege to the Capitoline fort, the only portion 
of the city that remained standing. Fortunately the in- 
vaders were recalled by the urgent necessity of defending 
their own homes before they had succeeded in capturing 
the Roman citadel. They accordingly bargained for as 
high a price of ransom as possible and departed well laden 
with booty. 

The city therefore survived, but it was for the time being 
terribly weakened, not only in resources, but also in prestige, 
and Rome's old enemies, the Volsci and -^qui, naturally 
chose this occasion to renew their raids upon Latium, and 
some of the Latin cities, apparently through a growing dread 
of Rome's supremacy, seem to have made terms with the 
enemy. At least Praeneste is placed in the list of Rome's 
foes by our best authority .^^ The enemy, however, was re- 



22 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

pulsed and new Latin colonies were placed at Satricimi (385) 
and at Setia (382) in territory wrested from the Volsci. An 
invading troop of ^qui was also repulsed, after which these 
people disappear from Latiinn. 

The next forty years was a period of ferment within the 
league, caused apparently by the mutual jealousies of the 
various city-states, and especially by their common jealousy 
of Rome, now rapidly repairing the losses of 387. Rome's 
rapid growth is not diffictilt to explain. Her citizens had 
been taught valuable lessons in arts and crafts, in trade and 
political organization, by the Etruscan princes, and had re- 
ceived from them an ambition and impetus which they had 
not before possessed. The recent doubling of Rome's 
territory enabled the city to absorb a far greater population 
than hitherto, Rome had a fairly safe harbor which at- 
tracted traders from Sicily, Carthage, and Etruria, and by 
commanding a bridge over the Tiber she became the natural 
emporiimi for the products of both sides of the river. Rome 
thus offered the amenities of a more heterogeneous urban 
life than other Latin cities could afford, and the races of 
Italy have always been sociable. When we add that Latin 
immigrants to the city immediately secured all the civil 
rights of citizens because of their common membership in 
the Latin tribe, we can readily imderstand how Rome might 
attract the surplusage of Latian population and grow doubly 
fast at the expense of less favorably situated or less progres- 
sive communities. 

But this rapid growth could only have created a con- 
sciousness of superiority at Rome and a feeling of envy and 
insecurity among the other league members. The restdting 
discord was aggravated, moreover, by increasingly divergent 
social ideals which made it diffictdt for the Latins to imder- 
stand one another. The accumulation of wealth, and the 
new advance in political and military ideas growing out of 
highly diversified activities developed new practices in the 
leading city that could hardly have arisen in the smaller 
villages. For instance, Rome, because of her rapid material 
progress, had early recognized free testamentary rights, a 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 23 

proof of an advanced conception of civil law. She was 
already breaking up her caste system by a series of tribuni- 
cian compromises and entering upon a career of liberal 
poHtics with which the rest of Latium could hardly sympa- 
thize. Furthermore, in her contact at the harbor with Greek, 
Carthaginian, and Etruscan traders, Rome had learned many 
new lessons in the school of diplomacy through the necessity 
of making trading treaties with men of higher civilization — 
lessons which the cities of the interior had no opportunity 
of learning. Natiu-aUy the force of the old feeling that 
kinship of blood, worship, and language constituted the 
sole bond of friendship and alliance — a feeling so persistent 
with primitive peoples — must have been diminished at 
Rome. The Romans soon discovered that political and 
trading alliances — alliances carved on stone and based 
only upon a mutual consent dictated by considerations of 
common advantage — rather than of reputed kinship — 
were the rule among civiUzed peoples. In fact they con- 
ceived the idea of reducing the ancient tribal imderstanding 
to writing, thus placing the Latin alliance on the same plane 
as any other treaty. After that had been done, the pact 
became a mere record of the duties and privileges between 
bargaining states ; the old bond of sentiment disappeared ; 
the letter of the agreement took the place of the spirit. 
Obviously the days of the old Latin league were nimibered. 
The actual written treaty,^ inscribed upon a metalHc colttmn 
which stood in the Roman forum in Cicero's day, was by no 
means a simple expression of the old tribal customs of co- 
operation. This treaty in fact recognized Rome, not as 
unus inter pares, but as the equal of all the other Latin cities 
combined. Rome signed as one of the two parties to the 
agreement, and therefore became practically the leader of 
the league. Nor were Rome's powers of expansion curtailed, 
for although the treaty stipulated that both parties must 
call out their forces in defense of any invaded city, it did not 
prevent either party from conducting a war on its own ac- 
count. The alliance also perpetuated the old practice of 
dividing the booty among league-members, an important 



24^. ROMAN IMPERL\LISM 

point, since it thereby preserved the custom of creating 
Latin colonies upon territory taken in any war conducted 
by the league. 

There are several fairly well-authenticated events of the 
half centiu^' before the final disruption of the league which 
indicate the trend of its fortunes. The fact that in 3S3-2 
two Latin colonies, Sutrium and Nepet, were planted north 
of Rome's newly acquired Veian lands seems to prove that 
Rome at that time was willing to let herself be completely 
surrotmded by Latin communities, that, in other words, she 
had no idea of ever extending her own territory farther, and 
that the oligarchy then in power was exercising the conserv- 
atism for which it was always noted. But shortly after 
367, the year in which the plebeians succeeded in winning 
their long-fought battle for the privilege of holding the 
constdship,^^ a pohcy of expansion set in, a policy doubtless 
to be explained by the new democratic influences at work in 
Rome. In 357 Rome and the Etruscan city, Falerii,-^ went 
to war, with the restdt that a few years later an alliance was 
made between that city and Rome, in which apparently the 
league had no part. Other indi\'idual alliances of a similar 
character were signed (354) with the Samnites, at that time 
the most powerfid people of Italy, and (3 48) with the Car- 
thaginians. But the most striking proof that Rome was 
ready to extend her own influence apart from that of the 
league was her formation of two new city wards (tn'bus) , the 
PubliHa and the Pomptina, in the very center of the Latin 
possessions below Norba, thus creating a Roman island, as it 
were, severed from the old ager Ramanus by a wide strip of 
Latian territory. How this came about we do not know, 
and we hear of no dissatisfaction at the act.-^ It may be 
that there was still tmallotted Volscian land in that region 
which Rome secured by friendly agreements or in pa}-ment 
for good services. The important point, however, is that 
Rome was now ready to extend the confines of the citj'-state 
a considerable distance from home. Such readiness to ex- 
pand may well have made the Latins apprehensive, and, 
what is more pertinent, the presence of Romans on the 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 25 

southern confines of Latittm could not but bring within the 
Roman sphere of interest the region that had hitherto con- 
cerned the Latins alone. Rome immediately became a 
neighbor of the Aurunci, and presently (345) fotuid herself 
involved in disagreeable complications with them,^^ In 
order to support her claims she had to send her armies across 
Latin territory, and within a few years the whole of Latium 
was up in arms against Rome. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER II 

1. The best single account of the Etruscans is that of Korte and 
Skutsch in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopadie, art. Etrusker. 

2. Thulin, Die Etruskische Disciplin, 1905 ; Bowerman, Roman 
Sacrificial Altars, p. 62. 

3. This point has been apparently established by Schulze, Zur 
Cesch. lat. Eigennamen. However, his material must be used with 
great caution. Etymology based upon verbal similarities in an un- 
known language makes extremely uncertain ground for historical 
deduction. 

4. A point much emphasized by Carter, The Religious Life of Ancient 
Rome. ^ 

5. See Dessau, Inscriptiones Lat. Sel. I, no. 212, 11. 18-23, and Tac. 
Ann. XI, 24. 

6. Found at Void. It represents Mastama (Macstma) liberating 
a Caelius Vibenna (Caile Vipinas) from the guards of Gnaeus Tarquinius 
Romanus (Cneve Tarchu Rumach). For its interpretation I follow 
Korte, Jahrb. des k. d. arch. Instit. 1897, 57, as corrected by Schtdze, 
Lat. Eigennamen, p. 96. 

7. The tendency which has prevailed since Schulze's book was 
pubUshed, of attributing the foundation of Rome and aU its early suc- 
cesses to the Etruscans, is far from justified by the evidence. The 
linguistic evidence produced by Schulze cannot be estimated till we 
can read the Etruscan inscriptions. At present a large part of it seems 
inapplicable to the question. The value of the architectural evidence is 
frequently overestimated. Architectural styles spread quickly even over 
coimtries not politically connected, as the rapid advance of the Gothic 
style during the middle ages can teach. Too much has been made of 
similarities in mere masonry. A comparison of the masonry of Yucatan 
and of Latiiun will point out the danger of inferring imitation from 
mere similarities in such matters, and a comparison of the walls of Rome, 
Norba, and Ferentinum will show that styles of masonry may owe more 
to the nature of the building material available and the purposes of the 



26 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

builder than to the model. The most significant fact is that the Romans 
profited but little in the essentials of civilization from their proximity 
to the Etruscans. The historian who will compare the materials 
excavated from the early sepulcretum of the Roman forum and the other 
sites of early Rome with finds from the tombs of Tarquinii, Caere, and 
Veii, a few miles north of the Tiber, can only be amazed that the prod- 
ucts of the two regions are so immensely diflEerent when the peoples 
dwelt so near together. 

8. See below on the foundation of the first Latin colonies. 

9. It is a commonplace that strong monarchs appeal to popular 
favor in their contests with the nobles. In this way the Egyptian kings 
of the twelfth dynasty overthrew the feudal system of their day; so 
the Greek tyrants of the seventh and sixth centuries, and the European 
monarchs of the seventeenth century elevated the regal power over a 
strong nobility. 

10. The first Roman-Carthaginian treaty, dated by Polybius 
(III, 22) at the beginning of the Republic, seems to imply that the 
Latins held the coast-lands as far as Tarracina. Polybius' version 
makes the coast towns "subject" to Rome, but he may have mistrans- 
lated. The forum "stele" which dates from about the same time 
shows that the Latin of the sixth century must have been well-nigh 
incomprehensible by Polybius' day. I believe that Rome in making 
this treaty was acting as spokesman of the Latin league. A word of 
caution is in place against using this document as proof of certain 
political conditions or of commercial activity at Rome. It was a docu- 
ment drawn up by the Carthaginians, then a great trading nation, 
for their own benefit and against all future contingencies. It there- 
fore pictures Carthaginian conditions and ambitions rather than 
Roman. Rome had no maritime commerce at the time of this treaty ; 
see Amer. Hist. Review, XVIII, 235. I accept Nissen's defense of 
Polybius' date (Neue Jahrbucher, 1867, 321), but not Kahrstedt's 
interpretation of its contents in Klio, XII, p. 471. Mommsen {Rom. 
Chronol. 320) dates the treaty at 348 because of a statement of Diodorus, 
XVI, 69. 

11. See Buck, A Grammar of Oscan and Umhrian, and Conway, 
The Italic Dialects. 

12. The traditional date for Signia is 495 B.C. (Livy, II, 21), for 
VeUtrae, 494 (Livy, II, 30, 31), for Norba, 492 (Livy, II, 34). These 
dates have often been questioned, and are rejected by Eduard Meyer, 
Geschichte d. Alter. V, p. 134. It must be admitted that the first five 
books of Livy are far from being reliable history. Records of colonial 
foundations deserve some credence, however, because they were kept 
for patriotic reasons by the citizens of the colonies and were not de- 
stroyed in the Gallic catastrophe as were the early records of Rome. 
Furthermore, excavations on the sites of Norba and Signia lend proba- 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 27 

bility to the traditional dates in these instances. Delbriick (Das 
Capitolium von Signia) points out that the style of the architectural 
fragments of Signia's temple accords well with Livy's date. He also 
reasons that since the masonry of the city walls is the same as that of 
the temple foundation, and since the walls — being retaining walls — 
must have been built at the settlement of the colony, we may safely 
assign the same date to the whole colony. Recent excavations at Norba 
seem to prove that it was the site of an ancient Italic city which was 
rebuilt on a larger scale at the beginning of the fifth century (Notizie 
degli Scavi, 1901, p. 514; 1904, p. 407; 1909, p. 241. See also Froth- 
ingham, Roman Cities, etc., 1910). 

13. Tradition considered Ostia as the oldest colony of Rome ; but 
Dr. Taylor, Cults of Ostia, 1913, has shown that Ostia was probably 
not a colony until the third century. The method of colonization 
carried out so successfully by Rome was probably an invention of the 
Latin league and not of the Etruscan princes. Nowhere do we find 
that the Etruscans employed this peculiar system. They exploited 
cities already built instead of creating new ones. 

14. W. H. S. Jones {Malaria, 1907, p. 61) believes that the mos- 
quito. Anopheles claviger, did not arrive in Latium till the second 
century B.C., since he finds no proof before this time of its destructive 
effects there, whereas malaria was known in Greece several centuries 
before. But the Romans ofEered sacrifices to a goddess Febris in the 
earliest days (Wissowa, Religion und Kultus^. p. 246). It is probable, 
however, that the anopheles did not find many favorable breeding 
grounds in Latium until the deforestation of the Sabine, Alban, and 
Volscian hills resulted in the creation of extensive marshes. De la 
Blanchere, s.v. Cuniculus in Daremberg et Saglio, discusses an interesting 
system of underground drainage found below Velitrae, and proposes 
that this system kept the region wholesome in the early days. But the 
argument does not apply to the most infectious region of the Pomptine 
marshes. Any final discussion of the question must also consider the 
possibility that the whole coast may have sunk since prehistoric days. 

15. Roman patriotic annals kept no record of these revolutions, 
except possibly in the famous story of Coriolanus. We know of them 
only from records of the recapture of lost cities. 

16. Diodorus indolently copied large portions of Fabius, the earliest 
Roman annalist, or some writer who depended closely upon Fabius, 
and therefore kept a more trustworthy tradition than Livy and Dionys- 
ius. See Mommsen, Rom. Forschungen, Fabius und Diodor. But 
it must be admitted that even Fabius' account of fifth-century events 
could hardly have rested on reliable sources, since Rome's early records 
were probably burned in 387. Sigwart, Klio, VI, 269, has succeeded 
in proving several inaccuracies in Diodorus. Beloch, Einleitung in die 
Alterumswiss. Ill, 187, also disagrees with Mommsen. The early 



28 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

dates of Diodonis are not to be accepted as absolutely accurate, but 
they doubtless report a relatively reliable tradition which was early 
incorporated in the priestly annals restored soon after 387. 

17. The passages in Diodorus are: Tuscultun, XI, 40, Labici, XIII, 
6, Bola, XIII, 42, Ardea, XII, 34, Tarracina, XIV, 16, Velitrae, XIV, 
34. Drachmann's Diodors Ramische Annalen, 1913, is a convenient 
edition. Diodorus regularly speaks of the Romans (not the Latins) 
as victors, but the fact that the conquered cities became Latin and 
not Roman territory proves that the whole league was acting in 
harmony. 

18. Zvetaieff, Inscr. Ital. dialect. 47 ; Conway, Italic Dialects, p. 267 ; 
Skutsch, in Glotta, III, 87. 

19. The city was early divided into wards, tribus; the twenty-first 
was called Crustumina, and embraced the territory of the ancient village 
of Crustumerium, which had apparently ceased to exist by the fifth cen- 
tury. The twenty-first tribus was apparently formed before the year 
500. Since no new tribus were formed for over a century after that, we 
may infer that Rome's own territory grew very little, if at all, during 
this period. 

20. Diodorus, XIV, 16, 43, 93, 102. For the ruins of Veii, see 
Dennis, Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria. 

21. Diodorus, XIV, 93, says that the Romans destroyed the city and 
sold the citizens into slavery. We know that the city was not de- 
stroyed, and we may doubt whether its citizens were enslaved. It is 
very difficult to tmderstand how the meager priestly annals — even if 
they existed from this time — could have contained such details. The 
later historians may have supposed that since the land became Roman 
the inhabitants were enslaved, but, as we have seen, the Romans left 
many Volscians on captured territory in southern Latium. The fact 
is that the Romans of the fourth century were not in a position to 
employ many slaves, particularly rebellious war captives (see Meyer, 
Die Sklaverei im Altertum, Kleine Schriften, p. 169). Beloch's asser- 
tion {Der Jtalische Bund, p. 31) that new wards were made only of land 
given wholly to Roman citizens has proved incorrect : Klio, XI, 367. 

22. Diodorus, XV, 47. For a later treaty see XVI, 45. 

23. Since the text was in existence (Cic. pro Balb. 53) there is no 
reason to doubt the authenticity of Dionysius' report of its contents 
(VI, 95. See also Livy, II, 33). There is, however, good reason to 
doubt the tradition that it was made as early as 492 : Schwegler, II, 
307; Pais, Storia critica di Roma (1913), I, p. 366; De Sanctis, 
Storia dei Romani, II, 96. It shotdd probably be placed between 387, 
the sack of Rome, and 338, the wreck of the league, possibly at 358, 
when according to Livy (VII, 12) the treaty was renewed. Perhaps 
the Cassius whose name it bore was not a constd but rather the fetial 
priest who conducted the diplomatic arrangements. 



ROME DOMINATES LATIUM 29 

24. For the lex Licinia-Sextia, see Diod. XV, 61, 75; Livy, VI, 35, 
and E. Meyer, Rhein. Museum, XXXVII, 610. 

25. War with Falerii, Diod. XVI, 31, 36 ; Livy, VII, 22, 38. Treaty 

with the Samnites, Livy, VII, 19 ; Diod. XVI, 45. Treaty with Car- v 

thage, Diod. XVI, 69. Diodorus calls it the first. If Polybius (III, 'i 

22) is correct in placing a treaty about 508, this may well be the one 
quoted in extenso by Polybius, III, 24. 

26. Livy, VII, 15. Since these wards were created in the year in 
which, according to Livy, the Latin league was renewed, the land may 
have been given to Rome by the terms of the treaty. 

27. Livy, VII, 28. 



CHAPTER III 

ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 

During the centuries when the Latin group was struggling 
to hold its own and adjusting itself to new internal condi- 
tions, the rest of Italy was experiencing great changes. The 
Etruscans, arriving about the eighth century, had, by the 
sixth, mastered most of western Italy from the Alps to Naples. 
Then Celtic invaders had taken most of north Italy from 
them ; Latium had driven them out of its cities ; and, finally, 
in the fifth century, Samnite mountain tribes had taken 
Capua from them. The Etruscans were thenceforth con- 
fined to the land that later bore their name, Etruria. The 
mountainous central Italy was all the while held by the 
rapidly growing tribe of Safini, commonly known as Sam- 
nites. These peoples quickly spread southward through 
the Apennines. Each new horde of them, advancing into 
a separate valley, severed from the rest by some mountain 
ridge, adopted a distinct name and soon developed its own 
dialect, its own customs and traditions apart from the 
kindred tribes. In historical times we find in the separate 
valleys of the central Apennines the Marsi, Paeligni, Prae- 
tuttii, Vestini, Marrucini, and Sabini, — all hardy clans of 
this same stock. The group which kept the Samnite nanie 
spread through the south-central mountains ; then a part of 
them went westward over the fertile Campania, where they 
drove out the Etruscans from Capua,^ the Greeks from 
Cumae, and with surprising readiness adopted the life of 
their new neighbors, the Greeks of Naples. Other branches 
of the same race pushed on into southern Italy, and under 
the name of Hirpini, Lucani, Bruttii, and Mamertini popu- 
lated the land as far as the very Greek cities of the southern 
coast. 

These tribes were all jealous of their liberty, courageous 

30 



ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 31 

in battle, and persistent in defense, and might well have 
become the possessors of the whole of Italy, if they could 
have been united. But the mountain barriers which divided 
them precluded the preservation of tribal unity. The sep- 
arate groups soon lost consciousness of their kinship with 
one another, and in the fourth century, the Samnites of the 
mountains are constantly foimd plimdering their more for- 
tunate Campanian brethren. 

It was a struggle between the Samnites and the Campa- 
nians that finally involved Rome in extra-Latian politics and 
induced her to make her first defensive alliance of far-reach- 
ing consequences. The Campanians — or Capuani, as the 
Greeks called them from their city — were, as we have seen, 
Samnites in origin, and at this time they had lived in the 
plain not more than a century. But they possessed the 
richest land of Italy, land which, because of favorable climate 
and the practicability of irrigation, yielded three crops of 
garden produce per year. Besides, the nearness of Naples 
and Pompeii with good harbors insured the people a profit- 
able market. In a word, they had grown very wealthy 
and possessed a city which was probably as large as Rome.^ 
In their success, however, they seem to have grown indolent, 
neglecting their army, and exposing themselves to the on- 
slaught of the mountaineers. What they needed was a 
strong ally whose power would be more respected than their 
own. Rome was just such a state, but Rome was one 
hundred and forty miles away, separated from Capua by 
the Volsci and Aurunci. What could have induced the 
Romans to form entangling alliances so far afield it is now 
difficult to comprehend. Perhaps her statesmen argued 
that it would be desirable to have friends beyond their 
ancient foe, the Volsci, and their new enemy, the Aurunci. 
They may also have been looking for friends in case the 
Latins should some day break out into revolt against the 
terms of the Cassian treaty. At any rate, the alliance was 
made, and with serious consequences to both signatories, 
for it imposed upon Rome the duty of policing the frontier 
of the unruly Samnite tribes and aggravated the discord with 



32 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the Latins, while on the other hand it subjected the Capuans 
to the orders of a strong power soon destined to overshadow 
them. 

The Roman historians say that Capua purchased this aid 
at the price of her own independence ' and that Rome sent 
her armies into Campania to help drive the Samnite motm- 
taineers back. The former statement seems to be incorrect, 
for later events indicate that Capua remained an independent 
state. The latter statement, though probable, has been 
doubted * because Diodorus makes no mention of it. This, 
however, is no adequate reason for doubt, since Diodorus 
omits several important battles from his narrative of the 
events of this period. However, it concerns us little whether 
there was or was not a "first Samnite war." The main 
facts remain undisputed that after the year 340 Rome had a 
very vital interest in her alliance with Capua and that in 
her efforts to secure her Campanian interests she was soon 
involved in wars which did not end imtil she was mistress of 
the greater part of Italy. 

The first of these wars came in 340 with the revolt of the 
Latins, a civil outbreak the causes of which are not far to 
seek. Community of interest had long been waning, and 
it disappeared entirely when the Gauls ceased to threaten 
central Italy after 348.^ The danger to Latin independence 
that lay in Rome's possession of the Pomptine and Publilian 
wards near Norba became apparent when Roman troops 
marched through Latium against the Aurunci in 345. And 
now that Rome had become the arbiter of nations as far 
south as Capua the position of the Latin allies was growing 
intolerable. The aUies, of course, were compelled by the 
terms of the league-treaty to aid Rome in war, and so 
although every new alHance that Rome made gained her 
individually an increase of prestige and new practical ad- 
vantages, it merely involved the Latins in ftirther obligations 
and potential wars. Rome's maneuvers, moreover, prac- 
tically tied the hands of the Latins, for they dared not at- 
tempt to increase their domain at the expense of Rome's 
new allies. Rome had, to be sure, only exerted her full 



ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 33 

rights throughout her new course of diplomatic expansion, 
but the Latins had all unwittingly been put into a vise by 
her course, and unless they were ready to become helpless 
subject villages without ambitions for the future, they must 
struggle to break the old treaty and demand terms dictated 
by the lessons of recent experience. Rome naturally de- 
clined to hear of a substitution of new terms, ^ and war broke 
out. The Latins were aided, as was to be expected, by some 
of the Volsci and Aurunci, and also by some of the Campa- 
nians. The latter were probably not citizens of Capua,' but 
a branch that lived on the Falemian fields near the Aurunci, 
and that may have been displeased with the Romano-Cam- 
panian alliance. 

When it came to the actual contest the Latins found them- 
selves in bitter discord and without efficient leadership, the 
penalty of having followed Rome's dictates for so long. 
Diodorus informs us that the Romans decisively defeated 
the disaffected allies at Sinuessa in 340. The several cities 
laid down their arms one by one, and the war was completely 
over when Antium yielded in 338. 

But the details of this contest are of little importance 
compared with its results : the political reorganization of 
the defeated allies by some far-sighted statesmen,^ who, for 
the first time in history, showed how a republican city-state 
might build a world-empire, and who thus shaped a policy 
that endured for centuries. The central idea of this states- 
manship was that a prudent liberality should bind the con- 
quered and the conqueror for the sake of their mutual in- 
terests. Its method was to remove as quickly as possible 
all the disabilities usually entailed by subjection and by 
carefully graduated stages to elevate the subject to ftill 
citizenship and thereby arouse patriotic interest in a common 
national welfare. The idea dominating Greek states that 
conquerors had a perpetual right to a parasitical life at the 
expense of the conquered, an idea which precluded a healthy 
and permanent growth of the state, was rejected entirely at 
Rome.^ A more revolutionary policy history can hardly 
display. The specific methods evolved for the appropriate 



34 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

incorporation of the defeated states were in each case adapted 
to the behavior, the position, the strength, the race, the 
capacity for Roman civihzation, and the remoteness of the 
particular tribe or city concerned. 

The nearest Latin towns Hke Nomentum, Tusculum, 
Aricia, and Lanuvium were incorporated in the Roman 
state outright, but were at the same time allowed to con- 
tinue their former municipal government. These were 
municipalities ^° (mumcipia) with full Roman citizenship. 

A temporary probationary stage of citizenship was de- 
vised for towns that contained a less friendly population, 
like Velitras," which was half Volscian, and for cities farther 
off, whose loyalty was not yet tried, like the Auruncan 
Fundi ^2 and Formiae. Such peoples were given citizenship 
at Rome which entailed regular citizen service in Rome's 
army ; though, on the other hand, they were denied the 
right to vote or to hold oflfice at Rome. To these cities 
Rome sent a prefect to administer Roman law. Cities of 
this class were called civitates sine sufragio — Roman mu- 
nicipalities without stiff rage. All of them were sooner or 
later, according to their individual behavior, elevated to full 
citizenship. 

For most of the Latin cities a modified form of the old 
Latin-league alliance was provided, and such socii Latini 
nominis remained nominally on the same footing as Rome. 
This type of federation which put upon the cities no outward 
evidence of their subjection was, of course, highly respectable 
and eagerly accepted. The reasons for bestowing it varied 
in specific cases. The old Latin colonies (Signia, Norba, 
Setia, Circeii, Ardea, Sutrium, and Nepet) secured the 
advantage because they had partly been settled by former 
Roman citizens and had doubtless given little encourage- 
ment to the Latin revolt. Rome was afterwards so pleased 
with the behavior of these colonies that for centuries to come 
she adopted the Latin colonization scheme as her own favor- 
ite device for holding doubtful frontiers. In this same 
class of "Latin cities" were placed Tibur and Prasneste, 
two cities which were still so strong that they were able to 



ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 35 

dictate favorable terms for themselves.^^ The treaty given 
this class was called a foedus aequum, "an alliance on terms of 
equality," and it stipulated mutual aid in time of danger. 
But it must have been apparent to the cities that, since 
they individually were far inferior in strength to Rome and 
since Rome's interests in foreign affairs now extended much 
beyond theirs, the allied armies would in the future fight 
the battles of Rome, not those of the allies. This disadvan- 
tage was inherent in the nature of the case, not in any word- 
ing of the treaties. One disability, however, was actually 
imposed by Rome. In order that the Latin cities which 
retained their old position might at the same time not re- 
tain the old esprit of the Latin league and unite once more 
against Rome, they were bound for an indefinite term to 
sever certain commercial relations and rights of intermar- 
riage with each other, while keeping them with Rome. 
When the purpose of this imposition had been attained, the 
clause was struck out.^^ 

A fourth type of government was devised for Antium, a 
Latin seaport town of no mean pretensions. The inhabit- 
ants of this town had engaged in that primitive kind of 
commerce which is hardly distinguishable from pirating,^^ 
and they had been able to build a navy which did good 
service to the Latin cause in the war. Accordingly, when 
the Romans captured the town, they destroyed the fleet 
and bolted the prows of the ships to the front of the public 
platform in the Roman forum as trophies of victory. Not 
satisfied with this commemoration of their act, which sur- 
vives to this day in the word rostrum, they stamped the 
picture of a ship's prow upon their rude bronze coins — the 
first of which were issued about 335. How to dispose of 
Antium was a problem of particular importance, since the 
city might readily afford a harbor of entrance for foreign 
enemies, and the presence in it of unfriendly inhabitants 
would necessarily force Rome to construct an expensive 
fleet to guard against such a contingency. Why Rome 
did not take full possession and reallot all Antium's lands 
to trustworthy citizens we do not know. The later behavior 



36 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

of Rome in such matters suggests as a probable reason the 
presence of some clause in the Latin treaties whereby Rome 
bound ^^ herself henceforth to share, with a few definite 
exceptions, all captured territory with her allies. Be that 
as it may, the Antiates were left in their city, a small group 
of Romans was allotted a portion of their land in order to 
safeguard Roman interests, and after a few years a new ^^ 
kind of government was devised to serve the purposes of all 
similar Roman maritime colonies. The citizens of such 
colonies were given full citizenship at Rome and home rule 
in their own municipal affairs. In these respects they re- 
sembled the inhabitants of the Roman municipia like Lanu- 
vium and Aricia. They differed from them, however, in one 
respect, for, in lieu of their service as guardians of seaports, 
they were excused from military duty. A few years later 
Tarracina ^^ and probably Ostia were placed in the same 
class as Antiimi. Before the First Punic war Rome had 
ten ^^ citizen colonies at important seacoast points. 

We have seen that Rome attempted to preserve the for- 
mer status of the colonies which had been founded by the 
Latin league. Later she adopted outright the Latin coloni- 
zation scheme for use on the frontier of the rapidly expand- 
ing federation. Cales,2° the most remote city of the Au- 
runci, over a hundred miles from Rome, was captured when 
it refused to lay down arms with the other belligerents in 
338. Rome took complete possession and invited the allies 
to make up a colony of twenty-five hundred souls for this 
place. The city was situated in a strategic position between 
two of Rome's allies, Teanum and Capua on the north and 
south, and between the semihostile Samnites on the east 
and the Roman possessions on the west. Furthermore, it 
commanded the valley trail between Latium and Campania. 
This was obviously just the position for a fort. But the 
Romans considered the old device of a Latin colony better 
than military occupation, which would have entailed a serious 
waste of productive power, for Rome's soldiers were citizens 
who tilled their farms between battles, not a guardian' class 
which had to be supported during the whole year by public 



ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 37 

ftmds. A settlement of Roman citizens alone might have 
been possible, but it might also have aroused much enmity 
and a charge of conquest for the sake of booty, even sup- 
posing that Rome could have induced enough men to leave 
the safety and advantages of Rome for a distant city in a 
dangerous locality. In a "Latin" colony all allies ,2^ in- 
cluding the neighboring Capuans, were allowed to share. 
It therefore stimulated friendly relations and served to 
make Rome and her various allies better acquainted with 
each other. As a special honor this first "Latin" colony 
of Rome's foundation was given the right of coinage. ^2 The 
later history of Gales, prospering and always faithful through- 
out the vicissitudes of the long Samnite wars, proves the 
immense importance of this foundation. 

After all this reorganizing had been done there were stiU 
two strips of land not disposed of. One was a section about 
twelve miles long and six wide lying a few miles north of 
Tarracina in the Pomptine valley immediately below the old 
Volscian city of Privemimi. It was probably taken from 
Privemimi when that city was made a civitas sine suffragio. 
The Romans apparently were at a loss how best to dispose 
of it, and left it alone for the time being. About ten miles 
northwest of Capua there was another piece of land of nearly 
the same size which had presumably belonged to the Cam- 
panians who left the Capuan league to aid the Latins and 
Auruncans in the revolt of 340. It apparently was the site 
of the battle where the allied troops were routed.^^ Rome 
took full possession of this, the ager Falernus, also. These 
patches of Roman public property seem to have remained 
fallow imtil 318, when they were finally assigned in small 
lots to Roman citizens ^ by what has been called the "Ameri- 
can homestead system." These Roman citizens built no 
new city with a distinct government, for they were supposed 
to exercise the duties and privileges of citizenship at Rome. 
Since, however, the ager Falernus was a hundred miles from 
the city, its judicial concerns were placed in the care of a 
quaestor ^s who was annually sent to the neighboring Latin 
colony of Cales. 



38 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

The striking success of Rome in saving Campania from 
Samnite raids, her proof of efficiency in the conduct of the 
Latin war, and her demonstration of UberaHty in the reor- 
ganization of the subdued peoples called the attention of 
several distant cities to the desirability of an alliance with 
the rapidly rising state. Cumae, the famous old Greek city 
which had been in the possession of the Oscans since 417, 
entered the Roman federation ^s as an ally in 338, and 
Suessula, a Campanian city ten miles beyond Capua, became 
an ally in the same year. Acerrae, fifteen miles beyond 
Capua, followed a few years later.^^ But the most impor- 
tant addition to the Roman alliance was Naples, a strong 
Greek city which had kept its liberty, even when its metrop- 
olis, Cumae, fell to the Oscans in 417. Naples did not 
reach this decision without creating a fierce factional con- 
test among its citizens, for there was a strong Oscan ^s settle- 
ment in the city. It appears that the Greeks, who were the 
wealthier element, were not averse to having their property 
and their trading routes insured against Samnite raids by 
a Roman alliance. The Oscan faction opposed the pro- 
posed alliance, however, certainly not for love of the Sam- 
nites, whose kinship they must long ago have forgotten, but 
possibly by way of opposition to the aristocratic party. 
Whether the struggle ended in an armed contest as Livy 
reports 2^ (VIII, 22) we do not know, but in 326 the Greek 
party proved superior and Naples signed a treaty with Rome 
of the same intimate nature as had been given the other 
Campanian cities. One unusually liberal clause, however, 
was added, a clause borrowed from the constitution of 
Antiimi and later regularly incorporated in treaties with 
Greek seaport towns. In return for the service of guarding 
the harbor ^^ in behalf of the Roman federation Naples was 
excused from military service. 

Such were the political institutions devised and adopted 
during the reconstruction period that followed the Latin 
war. They were not all characterized by undeniable wis- 
dom. For instance, the distribution of the distant Faler- 
nian land to citizens without providing some form of munici- 



ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 39 

pal government or otherwise taking cognizance of the fact 
that these citizens must go a hundred miles to exercise the 
right of suffrage was of course an anomaly. Perhaps the 
arrangement was devised as a temporary makeshift at a time 
of stress when the vacant land needed most of all to be 
occupied quickly against Samnite invaders. However, the 
arrangement remained permanently and served as a baneful 
precedent for later legislators.^^ 

But some mistakes were to be expected of these untutored 
bourgeois empire-builders who were setting out on the 
task of amalgamating tribes and cities of every race and 
stage of culture. The clear vision displayed in most of 
their enactments is revealed by a comparison with the in- 
stitutions which Greek states possessing a far richer body of 
political precedent to draw upon devised in similar circum- 
stances. The institutions of Sparta have often been com- 
pared with those of Rome because of a certain formal like- 
ness. However, Sparta lacked just that sympathetic in- 
sight into the psychology of nations which made the Roman 
state builders successful. The Spartan warrior class kept 
its helots in serfdom till they became a drag upon the state 
and dangered its existence; the Roman patrician, on the 
other hand, yielded to the plebeians by a series of timely 
compromises until the state enjoyed the benefits of a strongly 
amalgamated citizen body. The Spartans kept their con- 
quered cities, the perioeci, in a condition of half citizenship 
from which generous patriotic service could never be ex- 
pected, whereas the Romans opened the doors of full citizen- 
ship at once if possible, or at least after a season of probation. 
The Spartan colony, if founded in a foreign land, simply 
drained off a part of the state's population without extend- 
ing its political dominion; if the settlement were nearer 
home, it became merely an abode of half citizens who had 
little genuine interest in the state's welfare. The colonies 
founded by Rome, however, were placed at serviceable 
points on the state's frontier and became an integral part of 
the state. They were made up of men from all parts of the 
Roman federation, who thus served as a unifying element 



40 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

at home and abroad. Moreover, by extending Roman citizen- 
ship to some of the old Latin cities Rome held out to the 
new colonies a visible promise of full incorporation into the 
state when that should prove desirable. 

Rome's policy of making alliances can best be compared 
with that of Athens, the Greek state which went furthest 
in attempting to build up a federation. The government 
of Pericles had the same opportunity as Rome to establish 
a strong empire by means of close defensive alliances. But 
a certain political myopia which blinded it to its own wel- 
fare caused the government to substitute the payment of 
certain moneys into the Athenian treasury for naval serv- 
ice in behalf of the whole federation. This payment of 
money degenerated into an annual tribute which was used 
by Athens for her ovra. embellishment and became a mark 
of subjection, breeding ill will and revolt among her allies, 
and ultimately causing the ruin of Athens herself. Roman 
statesmen yielded to no such temptation. The citizens of 
Rome themselves paid all the taxes necessary to support 
both citizen and allied troops. Even at times of greatest 
stress the allies were not called upon for anything but the 
requisite quota of troops which their treaties stipidated. 
It was, in short, to the liberal policy inaugurated by the 
statesmen of 338 that the Roman city-state owed its capacity 
to unify Italy and make it one people. 

NOTES TO CHAPTER III 

1. The Samnites drove the Etrascans out of Capua in 445 (Diod. 
XII, 31). For convenient lists of references regarding the sources of 
this chapter see Dessau's introductions in C. I. L. XIV, Mommsen's 
in C /. L. X ; also, Beloch, Ital. Bund, and Lange, Rom. Altert. II, p. 64. 

2. Capua seems to have been the head of a Campanian league which 
included Atella, Calatia, CasUinum, and Puteoli. The chief magis- 
trate in Capua was called meddix tuticus, in the other cities, meddix; 
see Beloch, Campanien, 314. The language of these Campanians of 
Samnite descent was Oscan. There were other important Oscan towns 
like Nola and Acerrae which did not belong to the Capuan league. 

3. Livy, VII, 29 ; VIII, 2 ; Dionys. XV, 3 ; Appian, Samn. 1, hold 
that Capua at once gave up her independence, becoming a civitas sine 



ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 41 

suffragio of Rome. This, hpwever, seems to be an erroneous conclusion 
drawn from Capua's later status. At any rate, there was in the Pyrrhic 
war still a Campanian legion under its own general, which implies inde- 
pendence. For a ftdl statement of the evidence see Niese in Gottingische 
Gel. Anz. 1888, 962; Pais, Storia di Roma, I, 2. p. 230; De Sanctis, 
Storia dei Romani, II, 285. Haeberlin has recently furnished strong 
support for the tradition that Capua became a dependency by proving 
that the earliest Romano-Campanian silver coins bearing the legend 
Romano were made in Capua about 335 B.C., that they belonged to 
Rome, and that Capua from that time on struck no silver coins of her 
own {Berliner Munzbldtter, 1905-07). The argtunent seems at first 
sight irrefutable, but it rests after all upon a misconception of Rome's 
early methods of mintage. It is true that at a later day Rome was 
' jealous of the right of coinage and considered it a mark of autonomy, 
but there is clear proof that at the beginning it was not so considered. 
Critics forget that Rome long had a branch mint at Luceria also which 
issued silver marked Roma; and Luceria was a "Latin colony," that 
is to say, an allied, autonomous city of very great privileges. If Rome 
could make a business arrangement with a Latin colony to issue Roman 
coin, why could she not have such a business arrangement with Capua 
and stiU consider Capua an allied city ? All I would claim is that 
Capua had an alliance of as good standing as a "Latin" city. There is 
other evidence that in the early days mintage contracts were let on a 
purely business basis without reference to political status. It is more 
than probable that Capua herself had such an arrangement with Naples 
before the Roman alliance, for the Neapolitan mint long issued coins 
marked KATTTTANO, KAMTTANOM, etc. (Imhoof-Blumer, Numis. 
Zeitschr. 1886, 222). Furthermore, the coins of the Latin city of Cora were 
probably struck in Naples, and here there was surely no idea of the sub- 
jection of either city to the other. It is highly probable that the indi- 
vidual Capuans enjoyed the rights of civitas sine suffragio when in 
Rome, and hence later Roman historians placed the Capuan state in 
the wrong class of allies. 

4. Mommsen's early theory expressed in his Rom. Gesch. that "Rome 
and Samnium came to an agreement by which Capua was left at the 
disposal of the Romans" has been widely accepted as an established 
fact (cf. Niese, Rom. Gesch.*, 53), although Mommsen himself later 
rejected it ; see C. I. L. X, p. 365. This theory assumes a total disre- 
gard of the letter and spirit of the fetial institution, and can therefore 
not be accepted unless some proof is oflFered. 

5. The Gauls had repeatedly threatened central Italy after the raid 
of 387. The Romans and Latins united against the common foe for 
the last time in 348, Polyb. II, 18. 

6. Livy narrates that the Latins demanded the right to share in 
the consulship at Rome (VIII, 3). This seems to be a legal impossi- 



42 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

bility and Livy's speeches of this period are, of course, pure invention. 
Probably his alleged reason for the war is also without foundation. 

7. To be sure, Diodorus says "Campanians and Latins" (XVI, 90), 
but the only Campanians who seem to have suffered punishment in 
consequence of the war were the inhabitants of the ager Falernus. 
Unfortunately, even Diodorus is following a late tradition here, cf. 
Pais ad. loc. cit. p. 229, note. 

8. Livy gives the consul of 338, L. Furius CamHlus, grandson of the 
great hero of 387, some of the credit. It is natural that the consul 
must have had some influence, and his reelection to the consulship in 
325 shows that he was highly respected. However, Livy's sources 
could hardly have contained any information about senatorial discus- 
sions. The most highly respected senator of the time was the famous 
patrician, M. Valerius Corvus, who held the consulship four times 
(348, 346, 343, and 335). T. Manlius Torquatus was also a man of 
great influence (consul 347, 344, and 340) ; so was the popular plebeian 
leader, Q. PublUius Philo (consul 339, 327, 320), who, in his first consul- 
ship, secured the passage of a law destroying the vetoing power of the 
patricians in legislation and granting legal force to the ordinances of 
the plebeian assembly. The success of the democratic movement was 
bringing new and vigorous blood into the Roman senate in those days, 
and one is tempted to attribute the new policies of the time to this fact. 
However, the fasti show that the men most relied upon in time of danger 
were stUl bearers of patrician names. The noble families of Rome did 
not quickly lose their grip on the faith of the Roman populace. 

9. Eduard Meyer, Gesch. des Alter. V, 146-7, has an excellent para- 
graph on this subject. See also Reid, The Municipalities of the Roman 
Empire (1913), PP- 25-7. 

10. Festus (Lindsay, p. 155) s.v. municipium seems to imply that 
some of these cities were not given full citizenship at once, but, in any 
case, they soon received it, since the tribus Maecia into which Lanuvium 
was placed, was formed in 332. Some time was necessary to carry out 
details. Mommsen, Staatsrecht, III, p. 573, follows Festus. The 
source of Festus was ^lius Gallus, a jurist of the Augustan time — not 
always reliable. Most authorities to-day hold that the invention of 
the municipium of Roman citizens was of earlier date, and was first 
bestowed upon Gabii before the Latin war. Cf. Beloch {Ital. Bund, 
p. 118), Mommsen (Staatsrecht, III, 615), and Ed. Meyer (Gesch. des 
Alter. V, p. 135). All that we know, however, is that Rome very early 
had a treaty with Gabii (Dionys. IV, 58) and that the augural law rec- 
ognized the ager Gabinus as different both from ager Romanus and from 
ager peregrinus (Varro, L. L. V, 33). This seems to me to prove that 
the Gabini were, then, not Roman citizens, but closely allied. It is 
probable, therefore, that the famous institution of the Roman munici' 
pium was an invention of about 338. 



ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 43 

11. Caere has regularly been called Rome's first municipium civi- 
tatis sine suffragio on the miserable authority of Gellius, XVI, 13, 7. 
See Mommsen, Siaatsrecht, III, 572, for the usual view. GeUius, whose 
statement is crammed with inaccuracies, says that Caere was the first, 
but does not give any date. Now Livy (VII, 20) says that a treaty was 
signed with Caere for a hundred years in 353. Cassius Dio (frag. 33, 
Bois.) teUs how Caere warded off war by surrendering half of her terri- 
tory in 273 — a circumstance that would probably not have arisen if 
Caere had been a Roman municipium before that. Finally, Livy at 
least believed that Caere was a socius in 205 B.C. (See Livy, XXVIII, 
45 1 I5> where Caere is included in a list of Etruscan cities which gave 
special aid to Rome.) I think Roman historians drew an unfounded 
inference that Caere was the first city of this class because in later 
popular parlance it became the custom to caU the lists of half citizens 
tabulae Caeritum. Was the list alphabetical and at one time headed by 
Caere ? See Klio, XI, p. 377, for a fuller treatment of the subject. 
It would seem, then, that this institution was also an invention of the 
sagacious statesmen of 338. 

12. Livy, VIII, 14, says that Fundi and Formiae were brought into 
the Roman state on these terms at their own request. This is not 
improbable. In 329 (Livy, VIII, 19) the Volscian Privernum was 
taken, deprived of some of its land, and placed in this class, and later 
very many Italian cities and tribes were introduced to full citizenship 
through this probationary stage. 

13. Cora seems to have secured this position for good behavior if 
we may judge from the fact that she alone, so far as we know, of the 
old Latin cities was allowed the right of coinage. Cf . Mommsen in C. I. L. 
X, p. 645. Laurentum, apparently, was another ally of this class 
probably because of her religious connections with Rome. Cf . Dessau, 
in C. I. L. XIV, p. 186. 

14. See Mommsen, Siaatsrecht, III, p. 632. 

15. Strabo, V, 232. 

16. For the next one hundred and fifty years Rome almost invari- 
ably colonized captured land by means of "Latin" colonies in which 
the allies shared equally with the Romans. There are only apparent 
exceptions to this rule. The "Roman" citizen-colonies were few, and 
to such colonies only 300 men were sent, and even some of these might 
be allies. In a few cases viritane assignments were made to Roman 
citizens alone, but so far as we know, only upon land acquired from 
peoples bound to Rome before the Latin war. The cases in point are 
the lands which later made up the Oufentina, Falerina, Aniensis, and 
Teretina wards. The Maecia, Scaptia, Velina, and Quirina were probably 
made up of native population. See Klio, XI, p. 370, for the argument. 

17. Ostia has regularly been called the first Roman citizen colony, 
but I think erroneously. Had Ostia been founded in the fifth or sixth 



44 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

century as tradition holds (Polyb. VI, 2, 9), it is likely that the city 
would have had dictators or praetors as magistrates rather than the 
late duumviral system. Note also that Rome experimented for some 
time with the government of Antium before a satisfactory form was 
devised (Livy, IX, 20). It is most likely that the duumviral system 
which was the regular form for maritime colonies was shaped for Antium 
and applied to Ostia when that place was colonized somewhat later. 
The excavations of Ostia have not revealed any remains earlier than the 
third century, and I do not believe that the site contained anything 
but a village of salt workers and fishermen before that date. See L. R. 
Taylor, The Cults of Ostia, p. 3. If this be true, the invention of the 
Roman maritime colony was also subsequent to the Latin war. 

18. Tarracina was colonized in 329 (Livy, VIII, 21), but it probably 
did not receive its final form of government until Antium did in 317 
(Livy, IX, 20). 

19. See Komemann, s.v. coloniae, Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopadie. 

20. See Mommsen in C. I. L. X, p. 451. 

21. Beloch, Ital. Bund, p. 217. 

22. See Head 2, Historia Numorum, p. 31. 

23. Diodorus says "near Sinuessa," XVI, 90. 

24. This seems to be the only assignment which does not conform to 
the principle that allies should share booty with Romans, but it must 
be noticed that the Romans probably took both pieces of land before 
such an agreement to share was made. It is usual to assume that the 
tribus Maecia and Scaptia also were formed from viritane assignments 
to Romans in 332 (Beloch, Ital. Bund, p. 31), but the assumption is 
not probable, since these two wards were situated in the middle of 
Latium, and since Lanuvium, a city not resettled, belonged to Maecia. 
When several Latin cities were made Roman in 338, some were added 
to old Roman wards ; for others the two new wards were created. 

25. This institution seems to be an old one, but we do not really 
know the date of its origin. See Mommsen, Staatsrecht, II, 571. 

26. Livy says Cumae and Suessula were incorporated on the same 
terms as Capua, which, to be sure, he thought a civitas sine suffagio 
(VIII, 14). But Cumae at least seems to have had its own government 
during the Punic war (Livy, XXIII, 35, 3). The Delian inscription of 
about 180 B.C. {Bull. Corr. Hell. VI, p. 45) which refers to a certain 
Mivaros 'Pw/iatoj iK KiJ/iTjy has been supposed to furnish proof that 
Cumaeans were Roman citizens in 1 80. But it must not be forgotten 
that the Greeks called aU Italians in the East " Romans." 

27. In 332, Livy, VIII, 17. 

28. Strabo, V, 246. 

29. Livy reports severe battles in which the alleged besieging Roman 
army shared. But Livy's assumption of two cities in one at Naples, 
of a fixed garrison of Satnnite troops stationed there, of a Roman settle- 



ROME CREATES A CONFEDERATION 45 

ment in the Falemian lands eight years too early, and of Tarentine 
aid, prove the account apocryphal. Mommsen's identification (C. I. L. 
X, p. 350) of Livy's mythical " Palaeopolis " with Cumae only makes 
confusion more confounded. The favored position granted Naples by 
Rome precludes the hypothesis of a siege, and I have ventured to re- 
construct the Livian report accordingly. 

30. This is not explicitly reported but follows from the usual clause 
of foedera aequa that neither socius should permit the enemies of the 
other to cross his territory. Later the Greek allies of seaport towns are 
called the socii navales, since they furnish ships instead of troops, but 
such a clause could hardly have been incorporated as early as 326, for 
in the First Punic war Rome still borrowed ships from the Greek towns, 
she did not exact them by right of a treaty stipulation (Pol. I, 20). 
See Evans, "Horsemen" of Tarentum, p. 192. 

31. It seems to-day that the introduction of representative govern- 
ment was the logical solution required, but such a proposal would 
hardly have been greeted with favor at the time. Apart from the fact 
that Rome could not be expected to give up her old constitution resting 
upon the primary popular assembly in favor of a system that might be 
a trifle more just to far-distant citizens, there were practical considera- 
tions in the way. The populace had hitherto participated directly 
in aU political questions and were naturally not ready to vote away 
that privilege even to elected delegates. What government has ever 
given up its power voluntarily ? Secondly, the populace had for two 
hundred years struggled to gain control over the oligarchical tendencies 
of the senate, and had almost won the battle. They would, no doubt, 
have feared that a small representative congress might develop the 
conservative tendencies of the senate. Thirdly, if Rome was to be 
liberal in the extension of the franchise, the day would not be far dis- 
tant when a system of proportional representation would bring the 
government into the hands of non-Latin peoples. In fact, under such 
a system Rome would probably have lost control of the government 
within a few years, and an inharmonious and futile federation would 
have displaced the strong state which showed such organizing power 
and so consistent a policy. The representative principle might have 
been introduced to advantage in the Gracchan days when the allies 
had been thoroughly Romanized, but it would have paralyzed the state 
if tried before. A better proposal was one offered later by Augustus, 
but rejected, that distant municipalities might express their vote by 
written ballots which should be counted at Rome. But even this 
plan is open to the objection that with the cumbersome means of com- 
munication of those days, distant citizens could hardly be well informed 
regarding men and issues without participation in the discussions of 
the Forum. Later, under more favorable circumstances, Rome appar- 
ently tried representative government in Macedonia ; see Ch. X. 



CHAPTER IV 

ROME DOMINATES CENTRAL ITALY 

In 326 a border quarrel broke out between Roman settlers 
on the Liris and the neighboring Samnites which spread 
until the Roman state was engaged in a life-and-death 
struggle with the united strength of Samnium. This is 
the so-called "second Samnite war," which occupies so 
many pages of Livy's most dramatic decade. The first 
part of Livy's account must not be taken too seriously. 
One cannot help suspecting misplaced vaticination in the 
picturesque warrior who, according to Livy/ ushered in 
the struggle with the histrionic announcement: "The 
question is whether the Samnites or the Romans shall be 
masters of Italy." What did those farmers and shepherds 
know of Italy? They were bent on supporting their re- 
spective claims to a few acres of disputed land on their 
common frontier, and nothing more. 

A struggle was, of course, inevitable, for both peoples 
were expanding rapidly, and they had not yet developed an 
art of diplomacy that could mitigate the danger of an im- 
pending clash. And they were expanding in ways so diverse 
that there was little hope that either would learn to under- 
stand the other. The Samnites were a prolific and hardy 
race, unwittingly obejdng the Mosaic precept to increase 
and multiply. The old custom of sending off each year 
the surplusage of population to find new homes is still known 
in the histories of institutions under the name of ver sacrum, 
which the Sabellic peoples applied to it. The Samnite 
tribes simply broke through their boundaries because of 
overpopulation. The migrant hordes cleared a homestead 
wherever they could, whether with mattock or with sword 
mattered little to them. They took possession by right of 
the circumstance that they were there and must live.^ 

46 



ROME DOMINATES CENTRAL ITALY 47 

Rome was also expanding, but in a different way. Here 
was no overcrowding of population. She actually lacked 
men to settle the frontier colonies and had to borrow home- 
steaders from her allies to hold her acquisitions. In fact, 
at Rome expansion was an accident rather than a necessity, 
— a by-product of Rome's insistence upon good order on the 
frontier and perfect regularity in all international transac- 
tions.^ She pacified the periphery in order to protect the 
center, and since the new frontier exposed her to strange, 
lawless tribes, that is, lawless from the point of view of 
Rome's mos maiorum, her thoroughgoing insistence upon 
her conception of government drew her into a progressive 
game of pacification and organization. 

It becomes a question of minor importance, therefore, 
what the ultimate cause of the quarrel may have been, since 
the tension was bound, in any case, to give way sooner or 
later. Livy, whose sources could hardly have contained 
any authentic discussion of causes, believed that Rome's 
alliance with Naples awakened the ill will of the Samnites, 
and that this enmity was aggravated by the establishment 
of a Latin colony at Fregellae on land claimed by the moun- 
taineers. The Neapolitan alliance can safely be disregarded 
as an element in the quarrel.'* All that has been written in 
recent histories regarding Rome's encroachment upon the 
Samnite "sphere of influence," and upon Samnitun's trade- 
route through Naples is quite beside the point. The scar- 
city of Neapolitan coins in the Samnite region is proof 
enough that the hill tribes had no commercial relations 
worth mentioning with this seaport.^ And as for "sphere 
of influence," they probably concerned themselves little 
about a thing so abstract. As a matter of fact the Samnites 
had been excluded from the plain for more than a century. 
However, we are not left wholly to conjecture in searching 
for the cause of the war. In the treaty which Rome was 
forced to sign after the famous disaster at Caudine Forks 
in 321 — a copy of which must have survived until his- 
torical times — Roman colonies (it is not specified which) 
were mentioned as the grievance, and they were ordered 



48 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

withdrawn.^ The inference, therefore, is safe that the war 
began with a dispute about ownership of land on the Liris, 
where Rome had planted the Latin colony of Fregellae in 328. 
The actual merits of the case are now difficult to determine. 
The Romans had driven the armed Volscians across the 
Liris during the Latin war. They may have thought their 
claim to that valley sound. On the other hand, the Sam- 
nites asserted that they had destroyed the Volscian Fregellae 
and were, therefore, entitled to the site. History is full of 
such disputes, and in this case we are wholly disqualified 
by lack of knowledge to adjudge the claims. 

For several years little was accomplished on either side.'' 
The Romans were still employing the old Doric phalanx, 
which was adapted for heavy warfare on the plains, and 
their army hardly dared enter the mountain passes. The 
Samnites, apparently not yet united, were satisfied to keep 
up a haphazard guerrilla warfare so long as that sufficed to 
ward off the enemy. They had no large cities to lose, and 
even if some of their isolated valleys were devastated, the 
loss was not serious. Finally, in 321, the consiils decided 
to strike a telling blow. The Roman army was reorganized 
on the more pliant Samnite system^ which worked with 
the maniple of 120 men as a unit. Accompanied by their 
reorganized army, the consuls marched to the southern end 
of Campania and entered the Samnite mountains at the 
Caudine pass, hoping to strike the enemy from the rear 
in a place where the country was comparatively open and 
where friendly Apulians might be counted on for aid. But 
the Samnites were now united. A strong force of them 
caught the Roman army in the pass and compelled it to 
surrender. With the army at their mercy they then forced 
Rome to cede the Liris valley and sign articles of peace. 
Thus ended the most inglorious war in the annals of the 
Roman army. 

Rome kept ^ the peace and surrendered Fregellae, but her 
next maneuver shows that she had no intention of acknowl- 
edging that the principle underlying her policy had been 
wrong. In a word, she began to strip the Samnite tribes 



ROME DOMINATES CENTRAL ITALY 49 

of their power to harm by surrounding them with a chain 
of alHances. The task was naturally difficult for a nation 
which had just lost prestige by defeat, but it was made 
possible by the fact that the hill tribes for their part had 
incurred the hostility of all their neighbors by their lawless- 
ness. In Apulia, southeast of Samniimi, a district peopled 
by old Italic tribes that had been pushed back by the Sa- 
bellian expansion, Rome naturally fotmd a friendly recep- 
tion.^" By securing the allegiance of the Frentani, the 
Samnitic tribe on the Adriatic coast, and of the Lucanians 
on the south, Rome had her enemy hemmed in upon three 
sides. The hardy Sabellic peoples of central Italy should 
naturally have been friendly with their own kind, but they 
apparently were not, for some remained neutral during the 
next war, while others gave the Roman army a right of way 
through their territory. 

These were maneuvers that the Samnites had never 
learned to employ, and yet they doubtless understood the 
import of Rome's diplomacy. It was probably because 
they saw the fruits of the Caudine victory fast disappearing 
that the Samnites seized a Roman stronghold in 315, thereby 
gaining possession of Sora. Diodorus ^^ simply records 
the fact without explanation. This time both sides fought in 
full earnest, mustering all the strength they could command, 
and both were equally ready to try aggressive tactics. The 
Romans first broke through the Caudine pass, marching 
into Apulia to strike the enemy from the vulnerable side 
and draw them as far afield as possible. The Samnites, 
refusing to be drawn off, struck boldly into Latiimi, com- 
pletely crushed Rome's army of defense near Tarracina,^^ 
and devastated Latium to within twenty miles of Rome. 
So near success did they seem to be that the Campanian 
cities began to consider means of conciliating the apparent 
conquerors. The Romans, however, quickly recalled their 
southern army and at the same time, with that characteristic 
doggedness which so often amazed their enemies, sent a 
Latin colony to Luceria, south of Samnium, to serve as the 
frontier post of the empire they felt sure of estabHshing. 



so ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

The recalled army attacked the invaders successfully, drove 
them back to Samnium and pacified the hesitating allies of 
Campania. Then the Romans took up the war with more 
deliberation, and for the next three years struck from the 
home side with teirific energy. They recaptured Fregellae, 
the original cause of the dispute, cleared the upper valley 
of the Liris, bringing Sora and Arpinum into their alliance ; 
they next seized the strong Campanian cities of Nola, 
Atella, and Calatia, which had sympathized with Samnium, 
and, finally, invading Apulia again, they administered two 
telling defeats to the armies of Samniimi. Thus by 311 the 
enemy were nearly subdued, and the Romans had every 
reason to expect an early cessation of hostilities. But the 
Samnites had learned from Rome what diplomacy could 
accomplish, and instead of yielding in despair they secured 
the aid of several strong Etruscan cities. Accordingly in 
310, while the Samnites again struck at the foe in Apulia, 
an Etruscan force laid siege to the Latin colony of Sutrium. 
For the first time the consuls of Rome had to separate and 
lead divided forces. Fabius, making a daring march through 
unknown Etruscan forests and Umbrian mountains, attacked 
the northern enemy from the rear, compelled the important 
cities of Arretium, Cortona, and Perusia to join the Roman 
alliance, defeated the army besieging Sutrium, and relieved 
the colony. In a second j'-ear's campaign he compelled the 
Etruscans to revoke their alliance with the Samnites and 
sign a truce for a term of years. Meantime, the Samnites 
were driven out of Apulia, but in 306 they again tried an 
aggressive policy and repeated the same tactics in 305. 
This time they advanced as far as the Falemian fields, but 
were soon driven back. The Romans finally succeeded in 
storming their central stronghold, Bovianum, and in cap- 
turing their general. Gains Gellius, whereupon they made 
peace, and signed an alliance apparently upon the basis of 
the Roman claims of 327. 

It has seemed worth while to give these details of the cam- 
paign because they are the first fairly well-authenticated 
records of Rome's art of attack. The care with which she 



ROME DOMINATES CENTRAL ITALY 51 

sought out exposed passes, the boldness and rapidity with 
which she struck into distant regions in order to surprise 
and disintegrate the enemy, the dogged faith with which 
she planted far distant colonies, even in the face of apparent 
defeat, show those qualities already well developed which, 
a century later, play so conspicuous a r61e in the story of 
the Hannibalic war. 

Samnium came out of the struggle with her territory 
practically unimpaired, if Livy,^^ who seldom belittles Ro- 
man success, is to be trusted. And Livy seems here to be 
following a good source, for the Latin colonies settled during 
and after the war barely touch Samnite territory. What 
then did Rome gain by her desperate warfare ? Little from 
Samnium, except that she turned the tables upon her enemy. 
At Caudine forks the Samnites had dictated the terms; in 
304 they asked for peace. 

But in other ways the war had far-reaching consequences, 
for it tested Rome's friends and allies, indicated the weak 
spots in the federation that called for reorganization, and — 
of foremost importance — it forced every tribe and city 
from the Amo to Magna Graecia to align itself, at least 
temporarily, for or against Rome. 

After the war we again find Rome reconstructing and 
building up her political organization, skillfully adapting 
her methods to the material at hand. In Etruria, raided 
by Fabius for almost two hundred miles, no extension of 
the ager Romanus took place,^^ no municipality was enfran- 
chised or even placed in the class of half citizens ; no land 
was taken for distribution to citizens ; no Latin colony was 
settled. Even the treaties with Etruscan cities were of an 
un-Roman type: Rome usually made her treaties "for all 
time," but in Etruria they were signed for a term of years, 
after the Etruscan fashion. Nothing could be more ap- 
parent than that Rome was pursuing a peculiar policy of 
laissez faire with these peoples, and there were good reasons 
for doing so : she needed their friendship because they might 
do good buffer service against the booty-hungry Gauls of 
the Po valley. Furthermore, she did not desire too hasty 



52 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

an incorporation of citizcMis of an entirely uncongenial 
civilization. We sluill find this policy consistently pursued 
beyond the Tiber for many years to come. 

Among the Sabellic tribes of central Italy Rome's methods 
were wholly different. The war had revealed the fact that 
Rome must control this region. The road to the Frentani, 
Rome's new friends on the rear of Samnium, had to be kejit 
passable in case the Campanian route shoultl be blocked as 
it had been twice diunng the war. Then again Samnimn 
ought by all means to be severed from Rome's potential 
enemies in northern Italy. Now the trail to the Adriatic 
lay through territory occupied by the .^qui, the Marsi, 
the l\cligni, the Vestini, and the Marrucini. These tribes 
nuist have been frientls of Rome dmnng the war, for we do 
not hear of their blocking the road when the consul took 
the eastern route to Apulia. After the war the senate 
signed treaties of pennanent alliance with all of them ex- 
cept Rome's old-time foe, the .^qui. This little tribe, 
accordinjj to Livy, was attacked in 304 on a charge of 
treachery. It was treated with extreme severity, for most 
of the people were driven out of their confined mountain 
home. The land was then appropriated for the two Latin 
colonies of Alba Fuoous "' (foimded 303) and Carsioli (208). 
Livy's expkuiation of Rome's action on the ground that the 
iEqui had been treacherous is not unreasonable in view of 
the tribe's past history, but we may still be :illowed to ques- 
tion whetlver tlie pmiishment would not have been lighter if 
the land in question had not been exceedingly desirable for 
military pm-pt>ses. It is probable that here, as at Cales 
in 334, the fetiaJ law was read through glasses colored with 
a tint of expediency. Be that as it may, Rome's two solid 
Latin cok)tiies on the Adriatic road, together with her "e\er- 
lasting" alliances with the JSabellie tribes farther east, effec- 
tively cut Italy into two parts, and after the tliird century 
Rome cotitrolled the dividing segment. 

South of RiMiie, the trials aiul vicissitudes of the war 
necessitated not a little reorganization. The Hemican 
league of cities which commanded the valley road to Cam- 



ROME DOMINATES CENTRAL ITALY 53 

pania had simply shifted its friendship from the Latin league 
to Rome in the settlement of 338. During the Samnite 
war the league had not acted in absolute unity, for some of 
its cities had allowed "filibustering" in the Samnite army. 
The senate found Anagnia and Frusino guilty of this mis- 
conduct and incorporated them as Roman cities without 
the franchise (civitates sine suffragio). The loyal cities, 
Aletrium, Verulas, and Ferentinum, were allowed to re- 
main independent with the status of such Latin allies as 
Praeneste. In the old Latin towns nothing but faithful co- 
operation had been encountered. These peoples fought side 
by side with the Romans throughout the war, which had, in 
fact, served to amalgamate former enemies with the federa- 
tion. Thus at an early date Rome's policy of incorporation 
was tried and found not wanting. 

In a portion of the Auruncan tribe some calamity, of which 
we now know nothing,^^ necessitated readjustment. 
Whether the Samnites in their daring raid of 315 devas- 
tated Suessa and the neighboring country, or whether the 
Suessans favored the enemy and were accordingly punished 
by Rome, the land was at any rate soon used by Rome for 
colonization. Suessa received a Latin colony in 313, and 
in 296 Roman maritime colonies, of the peculiar type in- 
augurated at Antium, were planted at Mintumas and Sin- 
uessa. 

Finally, the federation of allies was extended beyond 
Capua by the inclusion of the strong Campanian city of 
Nola, not to speak of the Lucanian and Apulian tribes which 
had apparently been more loosely attached to the federation 
by temporary treaties. Samnitmi, as we have said, bound 
herself to the Roman federation without appreciable loss of 
territory and ostensibly with the preservation of her sover- 
eignty, but the situation of the Latin colonies placed during 
and just after the war tells a significant story not recorded 
in any clause of the treaty. It proves Rome's unmistakable 
purpose to exclude her foe from an independent foreign 
policy. Besides Alba ^^ and Carsioli in the country of the 
iEqui, Sora, an old Volscian town on the Liris, was colonized 



54 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

(303) to guard the northern Samnites. Interamna (312) 
was placed near Fregellae to guard a critical pass on the 
Latian side. Suessa (313) lent support to Cales in com- 
manding the road into the Aunmcan coimtry. Saticula 
(313) held open the Caudine pass, and, finally, Luceria ^^ 
(315), full eighty miles beyond Capua, was designed to keep 
together the anti-Samnite sentiment in the south. 

Unfortunately for Rome a Gallic invasion stopped the 
work of peaceful reconstruction at this point (299) and 
tempted the Samnites into a desperate revolt. It seems 
that some Gauls ^^ from central Europe, who had entered 
the Po valley in search of land, were there diverted by their 
kinsmen and directed against Rome. Together with some 
Cisalpine Gauls and Etruscan free lances they succeeded in 
reaching Roman territory and carrying off rich booty. The 
Samnites seized the occasion to attack the most vulnerable 
point of the Roman federation, which was Lucania. Scipio,^'' 
the first great consul of that name, drove them back, where- 
upon they invited the whole of northern Italy to make a 
combined attack with them upon the power that had begun 
to outstrip them all. The allied forces of Gauls, Samnites, 
Etruscans, and presimiably even some Umbrians and Sa- 
bines,^^ met in Umbria in 296. Rome lost the first battle 
of the contest, but, attacking again a few days later under 
the veteran Decius Mus, won a decisive and long-remembered 
victory at Sentinum, the news of which even reached Greece, 
and which Rome's greatest dramatist, Accius, later glorified 
in a chronicle play. Rome chose to make light of the offense 
committed by the northern peoples and turned all her atten- 
tion to the pacification of Samniimi. There she found but 
scattered groups carrying on a petty warfare, and, in 290, 
peace was reestablished, apparently with a renewal of the 
terms of 304.^^ 

In 291 a new and very large Latin colony was sent to 
Venusia ^ in Apulia, on the border of Samnium and Lu- 
cania. That the area of Roman dominance in central Italy 
might be widened, the Sabines 2* were deprived of autonomy 
/ X and incorporated into the Roman state as half citizens, an 



ROME DOMINATES CENTRAL ITALY 55 

act which can hardly be looked upon as punitive, since 
within a few years they were adopted into full citizenship. 
However, a few square miles of land bordering upon the 
Adriatic were taken from them for a Latin colony which 
might serve to guard the coast road.^^ 

The contests of Rome during this period, then, brought 
her very Httle new territory, but they made her the pre- 
dominant power throughout the greater part of Italy — an 
area at least twenty times the size of the state's domain. 
It would be interesting if we cotild but know what this 
young upstart state intended to do with this power. There 
is little evidence that Rome had grown ambitious for empire 
and looked forward to grasping the whole peninsula. Her 
actions tell a different tale. Beyond doubt the senate had 
decided to remain master of the central ItaHan strip as far 
as the Adriatic; it had also decided to keep Samniimi at 
all costs separated from any neighbor that might aid her in 
a revolt. So far as we can now read Rome's intentions 
from her actions, this seems to have been the limit of her 
ambitions, and indeed it is probable that the senate Actually 
did not desire to go further. If it had, there was an irresis- 
tible army at its service and near at hand were several 
Etruscan towns which would have been easy of conquest 
because internal dissensions had left them inadequately 
protected. But it can be laid down as a general rule that 
Rome studiously kept "hands off" beyond the Tiber after 
the fall of Veii, even as the Etruscans and Umbrians were 
generally very little concerned about Rome. It was only 
when the Gatils broke over the Apennines and invited those 
peoples southward on a raiding tour as an alternative to 
being plundered themselves, or when the Samnites urged 
them to a division of spoils that the Etruscans and Umbrians 
fell into dispute with Rome. 

In fact, it was perhaps this characteristic self-restraint, 
this ability to withhold covetous eyes from "the longing 
backward glance" that ultimately won Rome her greatest 
gains. It certainly was something else tH^n fear that turned 
hardy motintaineers like the Marsi, Vestini, Paeligni, and 



X 



$6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Sabini away from their own kindred, the Samnites, to be- 
come loyal soldiers under the Roman standards. There 
must have been respect bred of the knowledge that the 
Romans were able to keep a pledge, to restrain grasping 
hands, and to bestow favors, as well as to strike and pimish. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 

1. Livy, VIII, 23, 9. Livy, even in this period, is extremely un- 
trustworthy. Diodorus is not wholly reliable history, and he willfully 
omits all records of the first nine years of the war ; but I have followed 
his account of the campaign so far as he gives it, since the movements 
of the armies as he records them are tactically plausible. Those of 
Livy are not even possible. Burger, Der Kampf zwischen Rom und 
Samnium (1898) ; Nissen, Rhein. Museum, XXV, I ; Kaerst, Neue 
Jahrbucher, Supp. XIII, 725 ; and De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani, II, 
305 ff., have helpful discussions of the sources. 

2. Mommsen's classic praise of the Samnites for their struggle in 
behalf of Italian liberty is well known: "History cannot but do the 
noble people the justice of acknowledging that they understood and 
performed their duty" (Eng. Tr. I, p. 467). Why should history praise 
or blame in this instance ? The Samnites were as yet simply following 
the primitive instinct to acquire meat and drink. They were surely 
not fighting for Italy. Samnite victory meant an Italy of the old type, 
a disintegrated mass of barbaric tribes ; Roman victory meant, at least, 
an organized Italy led by a directing intelligence. ICaerst (Hist. Zeit- 
schrift, 191 1, p. 530) has well pointed out how Mommsen frequently 
misinterpreted Italian history because of his enthusiasm for the nation- 
alism which held sway in Germany in his own day. 

3. In this day of economic history it may seem presumptuous to 
make such claims. The fact is that the economist has overstepped 
his bounds in Roman history. The critic who tries to understand the 
growth of Rome from the point of view of material needs will never 
solve the problem. Primarily, Rome did not expand because its citizens 
needed land ; it would be nearer the truth to say that the Romans 
became landholders — an agricultural people — because they expanded 
and had to hold their frontiers. The Roman annalists fell into the same 
mistake as the modems have done in giving so much room to the cry 
for land and to agrarian laws. The ancient Roman conquerors did not 
expropriate a tenth of the land that the annalists supposed they did. 
The theory that conquest bestowed ownership has now proved to be 
un-Roman, an Oriental theory which did not reach Rome until the 
time of the First Punic war. 



ROME DOMINATES CENTRAL ITALY 57 

4. On the Neapolitan alliance, see preceding chapter, note 29. 

5. Of 63 Campanian silver coins found in a treasure in central 
Samnium, only three were Neapolitan, yet there were five Tarentine 
pieces: Mommsen, Rom. Miinzwesen, p. 119. 

6. Livy, IX, 4, coloniae abducerentur. Fregellae must be referred to 
and possibly contemplated colonies on the Liris. If the Neapolitan 
alliance had been the cause of the war, the Samnites would have de- 
manded its nullification at this time. 

7. Livy records picturesque battles only to add that some of his 
sources failed to mention them. Cf. VIII, 30, 7 of a battle where 
•'20,000 of the enemy were slain"; but in quibusdam annalibus tola 
res praetermissa est I Again, after an alleged raid into Apulia — hostes 
nee hie nee illie inventi, VIII, 37. In 322 the dictator seems to have 
compelled the enemy to sue for peace, but irriia fuit deditio, VIII, 38, 39, 
This is the kind of history the late annalists drew from family legends. 

8. See the Ineditum Vaticanum in Hermes, XXVII, 121. The date 
of the army reorganization is, however, not given in any ancient source. 
See also Stein wender, Ur sprung des Manipular systems, 1908. 

9. Nissen, Rhein. Museum, XXV, i, has shown that Livy's account 
of the alleged breach of this treaty was a late invention and that Rome 
actually abided by the treaty. Niese {Rom. Gesehichte,* p. 66) and 
Burger- (/oc. eit.) have interpreted the data most clearly. Diodorus' 
account of the recapture of Fregellse in 313 (XIX, loi) would seem to 
prove that Rome had surrendered it. 

10. With a part of the tribe they apparently fell into a dispute and 
employed force to make the country sure, if we may accept the words of 
Diodorus, XIX, 10. 

11. Diodorus, XIX, 72. 

12. Diodorus, XIX, 72, at Lautulse, the pass through the Volscian 
ridge which commands Latium. Strabo, V, 232, mentions a sack of 
Ardea which should probably be dated here. 

13. Foedus antiquum Samnitibus redditum, Livy, IX, 45. A copy of 
this treaty was probably accessible to annalists later, but we must 
confess that they often neglected to look up the original tablets. 

14. See Klio, XI, p. 377, for a discussion of Rome's behavior towards 
the Etruscans. 

15. I am inclined to think that the two new wards of Roman citi- 
zens, the Aniensis and the Teretina (at least, the former), were first 
confined to land taken from the iEqui at this time. They were estab- 
lished in 299. Niese places them in Campania {R'&m. Geschichte,* p. 69) 
and Mommsen in the Hemican lands, but the name Aniensis seems to 
connect with the river Anio, and inscriptions seem to bear out the 
attribution (C. I. L. XIV, nos. 3442, 3460, 3466). Possibly the northern 
portion of the Hemican land was taken and included in the same dis- 
tribution. 



S8 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

i6. Livy's story (IX, 25) is negligible, since it disregards the fact 
that the Samnite army had won the victory at Lautulae in 315 and 
devastated the coast region. Roman tradition had a short memory 
for Roman defeats. 

17. I omit Narnia in southern Umbria, which Livy dates at 299 
(X, 10). I cannot bring myself to believe that Rome invited trouble 
in Umbria until after the battle of Sentinum in 295. It is interesting 
to find that Pontia, the Volscian island off Tarracina, was seized and 
colonized by "Latins" in 313 (Diodorus, XIX, loi). The inhabitants 
had apparently engaged in piratic raids upon the Latin coast. 

18. Judging from the presence of an Oscan sacred inscription in 
Luceria, we may perhaps infer that the majority of the colonists were 
drawn from Campania. See C. I. L. IX, 782, and Ephem. Epigr. II, 
p. 205. Cf. C. I. L. XI, 4766, for dialect words in a colonial inscription. 

19. Polybius, II, 19. It is usual to attribute the Gallic uprising to 
the influence of the Samnite insurrection (e.g. Niese, Rom. Gesch.* 
p. 70). This places the cart before the horse. The Gallic invasion 
originated in a vast migratory movement in central Europe and touched 
northern Greece also. Besides, the best evidence implies that the 
Gallic invasion preceded the Samnite uprising. 

20. The Scipionic inscription, Dessau I. L. S. no. i, proves that Livy 
has totally misplaced the campaign of this year (X, 12). On the 
other hand, the inscription — written about fifty years after the event 
— is somewhat too encomiastic in its claim that Scipio suhigit omne{m) 
Loucanam. It is probable that Rome seized for permanent occupation 
the land of Taurasia in Samnium, which Scipio captured in 298, for 
in the year 180 this land was given away by Rome (Livy, XL, 38). 

21. Diodorus, XXI, fr. 6, says "and other allies." This statement 
apparently refers to the Sabines, since Rome took away their independ- 
ence after the war. 

22. Beloch, Hal. Bund., p. 53. 

23. That it contained twenty thousand colonists as Dionys. XVII, 5, 
says, is hardly plausible. The Latin colonies of this period usually 
received four thousand settlers, or less. The Oscan that appears on 
the coins points to a large Campanian element among the colonists. 
Conway, Italic Dialects, p. 171. 

24. See Chapter V. 

25. Hadria was planted about 290 on land that had belonged to the 
Praetuttii, an offshoot of the Sabines, Livy, Epitome, XI. 



CHAPTER V 

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE YOUNG DEMOCRACY AND ITS 

CONSEQUENCES 

In 290 Rome had grown to be a power of great prestige 
throughout Italy; but if an Athenian had visited the city 
and, knowing nothing of Rome's recent successes in arms, 
reported what he could see in a casual survey, his tale would 
have been brief and prosaic. At that time the city con- 
tained perhaps two hundred thousand inhabitants,^ most 
of whom lived in small and ugly " adobe " huts. There 
were a few temples of coarse, gray tufa with terra-cotta 
trimmings, which the merest Greek village with its tasteful 
marble structures would have scorned to own. A Greek 
visitor, with his memories of the Acropolis, would have 
been amazed to find at Rome no statues and no paintings, 
except for the few treasures brought as booty from Etruscan 
cities. Instead of the extensive docks of the Piraeus, where 
ships from every eastern and western port were to be found, 
the Roman harbor of the time boasted merely a gravel 
bank where river craft could be drawn up, and where, near by 
on an unpaved area set off by stakes, primitive bartering of 
farm products and trade by means of copper coins could be 
carried on. The state mint at Rome had as yet felt no de- 
mand for silver coins. 

If the Athenian had desired to learn something of the 
history of the city before him, he would have had to inter- 
view the town gossip, for in 290 no history of Rome had yet 
been written. There was, in fact, no writing of any sort, 
except the recording of laws and treaties — no poetry, no 
drama, nothing that might be called literature. 

And the occupations of the Roman people were as simple 
and unconsciously monotonous as the external appearance 
of their city. There were no factories like those of Athens. 

59 



6o ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

The Romans were still farmers, and little else. Their women 
spun all the cloth that was needed in their households, 
the men themselves made their own farming implements, 
and even the Roman senators did not disdain to drive the 
oxen between sessions ! If the Greek visitor had remained 
to view the growth of the Roman federation throughout 
Italy during the next two decades, he must have marveled 
how such power could emanate from the simple folk of that 
homely and insignificant town. 

That state of peasants, however, contained things which 
even a Greek could not help but admire. It had leveled, 
graded, and paved a road to Capua which was to stand the 
test of centuries of wear. It had brought wholesome water 
from the hills several miles away for the poor of Rome who 
could not afford to sink wells. When its legions were en- 
camped, every man knew his appointed place, and the 
picket passed the watchword with machine-like precision. 
In a sitting of these farmer-senators the business at hand 
proceeded with deliberation : the members did not lose their 
heads with every oratorical outburst. 

The form of their government would not have been alto- 
\ gether tmfamiHar to the Athenian visitor, for in 290 Rome 
was fast becoming almost a pure democracy. Three years 
later the plebeian assembly (in which all men's votes were 
equal) finally seciired full legislative power, and henceforth 
the popiilace could, if it chose, override or disregard the 
counsel of the senate. 

In the decade that followed the Samnite treaty of 290 — 
years that were to be devoted to the work of conciliation 
and unification within central Italy — two important in- 
cidents occurred which resulted in a complete revision of 
Rome's foreign policy, for they proved to Rome that peace 
and order in international dealings were not attainable until 
the natural boimdaries of the peninsula were reached. The 
first of these was a new Gallic invasion in 285.^ The Se- 
nones, a Celtic tribe which had established itself south of 
the Rubicon on the Umbrian and Picentine coast, attacked 
the Etruscan Arretium, now a Roman ally, defeated the 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 6i 

Roman army sent to relieve the besieged city, and finally 
slew the Roman envoys sent tmder a flag of truce to confer 
with them. Cnrius Dentatus, one of Rome's most efficient 
generals, was then hurried north to administer appropriate 
pimishment, and he did so with more than characteristic 
thoroughness. He drove the Senones entirely out of their 
coimtry and took full possession of their land for the state.' 
Thus vengeance was meted out in full measure to the very 
tribe that had sacked Rome a century before. A citizen 
colony of the maritime class was at once planted at Sena on 
the coast to act as a garrison of the region until the state 
should dispose of it in some suitable manner. However, 
this did not end the war. The Boii, a Gallic tribe friendly to 
the Senones, took up the quarrel, secured the aid of several 
Etruscan towns, notably Volci and Volsinii,* and apparently 
of some Umbrians also, and marched southward. They 
were met at Lake Vadimon, only 50 miles from Rome, and 
defeated. The next year they made one more attempt 
which ended with a similar disaster, after which the Celts 
sued for peace and confined themselves to upper Italy for a 
half century. The Etruscan cities which had joined the 
enemy were forced to surrender in 280, and Rome was ac- 
knowledged arbiter of the whole region as far as the upper 
Apennines and the Rubicon. We shall presently consider 
the details of the reconstruction undertaken as a consequence 
of these three Gallic raids. 

The second incident to which we have referred was of a 
more dangerous nature and incurred even more serious con- 
sequences. It brought Rome into war with Pyrrhus — her 
first trial of strength with the Greek phalanx. This war was 
the result of a very involved series of circumstances. The 
Greek cities of southern Italy had for a htmdred years suf- 
fered from the encroachment of Lucanians and Bruttians, 
the southernmost Sabellic tribes. On the western coast 
only Elea had survived out of a long list of famous cities. 
The rest had been destroyed or had acknowledged defeat 
and received the conquerors as fellow-townsmen. The 
southernmost cities, richer in material wealth than in armies 



62 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

and in courage, had adopted the weak policy of relying upon 
mercenary aid. Tarentum, the strongest and wealthiest of 
the southeastern group, had repeatedly employed Greek 
generals with their troops to repel the barbarians from her 
sphere of interest : the Spartan king, Archidamus, in 338, 
Alexander of Epirus, in 334, and the Spartan, Cleonymus, 
about 304. Later, about 299, Agathocles of Syracuse under- 
took a pretended defense of the western cities, but he devoted 
more energy to the subjugation of the Greeks to his own 
empire than to the repulsion of the barbarians.^ When, 
in 282, the attacks of the Lucanians did not cease, Thurii, 
unable to resist them longer, appealed to Rome for aid. 
This coiirse seems to have stu-prised the other Italiote Greeks 
who had been accustomed to class the Romans with the 
barbarians. But Thurii apparently understood the situa- 
tion better than the rest. The Thurians knew that Taren- 
tum's pretended protectorate over the southern coast cities 
had never been of service to any one but Tarentum and her 
subject city, Heraclea.^ The present Syracusan tyrant, 
even granted that he could be trusted, was engaged else- 
where. Rome, now a name of weight throughout Italy, 
had shown by her generous terms with Naples that she 
respected and was willing to protect Greek institutions. 
Such were the considerations that induced the Thurians to 
apply to Rome. The request was granted after a thorough 
discussion of the dangers and proprieties of such a course, 
and a Roman contingent soon relieved the besieged city. 
Tarentum, however, with her pretensions as protector of 
Greek cities, was naturally angered ; and when some Roman 
ships stationed at Thurii appeared off Tarentum, they were 
sunk with the explanation that according to an old treaty 
Roman ships were forbidden to sail in those waters.'^ A 
Tarentine troop next attacked Thurii and drove out the 
Roman garrison. Finally, when the Roman embassy sent 
to demand reparation was refused a hearing,^ Rome declared 
war against Tarentum. 

The Greek city quickly secured the aid of the neighboring 
Messapii, the Lucanians, and the Samnites, who were eager 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 6^ 

for any excuse to attack Rome. The Italiote Greeks, how- 
ever, did not respond to her call, even though she proclaimed 
the war a defense of their independence. The first onset 
resulted in a Roman victory. Tarentum therefore appealed 
to Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, who came at once (280) with 
a veteran army of over twenty thousand, hoping, it seems, 
to win an empire in the West as Alexander the Great had 
recently done in the East. The Romans met him at Heraclea 
and were thoroughly whipped, whereupon most of the 
Italiote Greeks went over to Pyrrhus. The victorious gen- 
eral dashed northward as far as Latium in the hope that the 
Roman federation would desert to him, but here he found, as 
Hannibal did later, that Rome had built a solid political 
structure upon which she could rely. He therefore with- 
drew to friendly coimtry again in order to clear the ground 
as he advanced. The next year a second Roman army 
marched down to meet him and was again driven from the 
field. Pyrrhus, however, now eager to return home because 
of complications in Macedonia, made overtures of peace,' 
and the senators, we are told, were ready to cut short their 
disastrous excursion into foreign affairs and accept a re- 
striction of their power in southern Italy. However, the 
aged Appius Claudius, who may have been the author of the 
Thurian expedition,^" urged vehemently against accepting 
terms from a victorious enemy. He carried the senate 
with him, and the war was continued. 

Pyrrhus, unable to return home because of the refusal of 
his terms, crossed into Sicily (278), whither he had been 
invited to lead the Greeks against the encroaching Cartha- 
ginians. The Romans improved the occasion by winning 
over the Italiote Greeks and forcing the Samnites and Lu- 
canians into renewed submission. And this time the Sam- 
nites were destined to pay for their revolt. Pyrrhus re- 
turned to Italy after an absence of three years and attempted 
to regain the lost groimd, but he was defeated by the veteran 
general, Manius Curius, and driven back to Tarentum. 
When, in the next year, Pyrrhus sailed home, Rome drove 
the Epirote garrisons out of Italy. 



64 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

This war taught Rome a lesson with unmistakable em- 
phasis. The Samnites and Lucanians could not be reckoned 
with unless the Greek cities beyond were considered, and the 
Greek cities could not be controlled so long as their harbors 
were open to receive mercenaries from Greece. The senate 
accordingly decided to assume control over the whole end 
of the peninsula — which it cotdd now readily do, partly by 
right of conquest, partly on the basis of alliances made 
diuing the war — and it set to work immediately to reach 
a definite and satisfactory conclusion with every city and 
tribal organization as far as the coast. Here punishment 
was meted out, there rewards distributed, in every case a 
settlement was made, and recorded on bronze or stone to 
endure for "time everlasting." However, before we examine 
this work of organization, let us revert to the question why 
Rome should have chosen to involve herself in the war, for 
it is apparent that her alliance with Thurii, which caused it, 
was by no means a necessity. In fact, we may assert, that 
since the Romans must have known that the Thurian alli- 
ance would lead to a battle with the Lucanians, they were 
infringing the spirit of the fetial law when they made it. 

It is usually assumed that Rome desired to become in- 
volved in a war with Tarentum so as to extend her power to 
the very end of the peninsula. But this is after all a daring 
hypothesis, for Rome knew of the Tarentine habit of inviting 
Greek armies to help her, and it is questionable whether the 
senate could have contemplated with equanimity a struggle 
with the famous Greek phalanx which had attained such re- 
nown under Alexander the Great. In fact, there seems to be 
evidence to prove that when the question of the Thurian 
alliance was first broached at Rome, the senate, which was 
well enough informed to foresee possible consequences, 
rejected the offer, and that it was the plebeian assembly, 
which, having just attained full legislative rights in 287, took 
matters into its own hands and voted for the alliance. The 
evidence is found in a chance reference made by Pliny " to 
a statue at Rome erected by Thurians in honor of the 
plebeian tribtme, .^lius, who had secured the passage of 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 65 

the plebiscite which relieved Thurii of siege. Since up to 
that time the senate had had control of foreign affairs, and 
the centuriate assembly, largely controlled by the aristo- 
cratic party, was the legislative body which regtdarly voted 
on such matters, the intervention of a tribune can only mean 
that the plebeian assembly took matters into its own hands 
after the senatorial leaders had rejected the offer of alliance. 
The consular lists show that a group of strong plebeians 
practically had control of Roman politics during this period ; 
these were, in fact, the very heroes that later history honored 
above all others: Decius Mus and Conmcanius, Curius 
Dentatus and Fabricius. With them worked the aged Ap- 
pius Claudius and Aimilius Papus, who, although patricians, 
favored the popular cause. Decius was consul for the foiirth 
time when he "devoted" himself to death at Sentinimi. 
Curius, quem nemo Jerro potuit superare nee auro, served as 
consul three times, and while censor followed Claudius' 
example and built an aqueduct for Rome. Fabricius was con- 
sul three times during the war and was intrusted with the diffi- 
cult task of carrying on peace negotiations with Pyrrhus. In 
fact, almost all the critical campaigns and the difficult diplo- 
macy of this war were intrusted to the strong plebeian nobles 
who stand out so distinctly in the history of this period. 
When we keep in mind that the war was brought on by a 
plebiscite, that Fabricius, the leader of the democratic party, 
was elected consiil to conduct the first campaign, and later, 
when the war seemed about to fail, was sent on the disagree- 
able errand of making terms with the enemy, and that 
finally it was Appius Claudius who held the senate from yield- 
ing when it became discouraged with a quarrel it had tried 
to avoid, we may safely attribute the Thurian embroglio to 
the democratic party and its leaders. It is significant that 
the first instance, so far as we know, of Rome's departure 
from the intents and purposes of the fetial institution oc- 
curred but five years after Rome had accepted the principle 
of popular sovereignty. 

Was the democratic party, therefore, more eager for em- 
pire than the senatorial ? Not a word of the discussion that 



66 ROISIAN BIPERLVLISM 

preceded the decision has come down to us, but there is 
reason to beHeve that it was. And we sliall repeatedly find 
in following the events of succeeding epoclis that the popu- 
lace was ready to enter the dangers of imperialism when the 
senators held back. 

The senators, of course, were brought up to read the scores 
of treaties that the state had signed in the past and they were 
bred in the legislative atmosphere that smrounds treaties. 
Upon the plebeians, past obligations wliich they had not 
assumed and of which they knew little weighed lightly; 
they Hved in the present and in the futiu-e. The senators 
respected the orderly conduct of state affairs by their fore- 
fathers and the mos maiornm created by their o\\ti highly 
lauded ancestors, of whose honorable traditions they con- 
sidered themselves the guardians; the plebeians, who had 
had Httle share in the making of these traditions, failed to 
appreciate their sacred character. The senators loiew some- 
thing of the strength of neighboring states, thej^ had to count 
the cost in tribute which they must pay to defray the ex- 
penses of war, and the loss to their properties if the enemy 
succeeded in raiding their lands. The plebeians, who knew 
less of the circumstances, were free to indulge hopes of vic- 
tory based upon past success, and to count upon the booty 
that was distributed after battle and on the new lands opened 
for colonization after conquest. The plebeians also remem- 
bered that such improvements for their benefit as the aque- 
duct, which brought them wholesome water, and the Appian 
way, which lowered the price of grain, were undertaken more 
readily after wars, for then both tribute and booty might 
be available, whereas in ordinary times of peace no one cared 
to propose a tax levy. And in this calculation they were 
not mistaken, for no sooner was the Pyrrhic war over than 
Curius as censor devoted the booty to the expenses of a new 
aqueduct, the Anio vetus, which brought an abundant flow 
of cold water from the Apennines, tliirty-seven miles away. 
Finally, it is a commonplace that the popular imagination 
catches at the vision of expansion, victory over distant 
peoples, and mere bigness, and vaunts itself in the dribble 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 67 

of glory which a dreaded nation shares with the meanest of 
its citizens. The senate, burdened with the actual responsi- 
bilities of government, had little time for such dreams. 

The three Gallic invasions of 285-3 a-nd the Pyrrhic in- 
vasion of 280 had involved almost all the peoples of Italy. 
When Rome came out victorious in every contest, she had 
the obvious task thrust upon her of arriving at a final un- 
derstanding with all the cities and tribes which were not 
yet fitted into her federal structure. Fortunately for Italy, 
it was the senate rather than the now sovereign populace 
which undertook the task of organization. The people had 
been frightened by the disasters into which their daring 
political excursion had thrust the state, and they diffidently 
yielded the reins of government to the senate during the 
half century after the vote on the Thurian alliance. In 
reviewing the reconstructive work of the senate it will be 
convenient to survey at the same time the political condition 
in which the various peoples of Italy found themselves after 
their permanent incorporation into the Roman city-state. 

The Etruscans, as we have noted, occupied a peculiar 
position in the history of Rome's expansion. The Romans 
did not seem to know just how to treat those neighbors who 
"neither spoke nor lived as other men." At times they 
showed the deepest respect for the Etruscan ceremonials 
and institutions, knowing well how much they had learned 
from these neighbors, but, at other times, an impatient dis- 
gust seemed to break out against a civilization that was 
essentially alien — an impatience which behaved suspi- 
ciously like race prejudice : Vos Tusci ac harhari ! shouted 
Gracchus with scorn at the Etruscan priests. For over a 
century after the Veian conquest the Romans concerned 
themselves very little about the Etruscans. Elsewhere 
they made their alliances with a view to permanent relations : 
their treaties were "for all time," but in dealing with Etruria 
they pursued a policy of laissez faire, or, perhaps rather, they 
had no definite policy at all, for they adopted the Etruscan 
form of alliance in dealing with these people. Even the 
Gallic and Samnite raids which from time to time se- 



X 



68 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

duced various Etruscan cities led to but few serious con- 
sequences. 

However, after the battle of Lake Vadimon (285), in which 
several Etruscan cities joined the Gauls, despite the fact 
that Rome had incurred the war by aiding Arretium, laissez 
/aire was at an end. Rome punished the participating cities, 
Volci,^2 Volsinii, Csere, and Tarquinii, by seizing a part of 
their territory. The rest of the Etruscan towns were ap- 
parently brought into the federation without any loss of 
property, though they seem to have acknowledged Rome's 
sovereignty in foreign affairs for all time. So far as we 
know, the only ^^ Etruscan city that received Roman citizen- 
ship before the first century was Csere, and she was granted 
citizenship of the inferior class. Some of the territory that 
the state had acquired by confiscation was used for maritime 
colonies,^* partly, we are told, in order to suppress Etruscan 
piracies, partly, we may infer from their date of settlement, 
in order to hinder the Carthaginians from gaining a conven- 
ient landing place near Rome. Since maritime colonies 
received only 300 settlers each, little territory could have 
been used up in this way. The larger amount of the new 
acquisition was shared with the allies when the Latin colony 
of Cosa was planted in 273. However, some land was also 
left open as public property, doubtless to be rented out for 
the benefit of the state treasury. ^^' After this settlement it 
would seem that about 12 per cent of Etruria was ager Ro- 
manus. The rest belonged to confederate cities and re- 
mained in their possession imtil the social war (90 B.C.) 
extended Roman citizenship throughout Italy. 

Unfortunately, Etruria did not prosper ^^ under Roman 
rule. The blame, however, rests upon a people who would 
not adapt themselves to their times. The Etruscan nobles, 
who had years before grown wealthy in commerce, mining, 
and military conquests, and who ruled like medieval barons 
over their clients and serfs, would not realize that ancient 
conditions had passed away. Commerce had taken other 
routes after Alexander the Great opened up the Orient; 
the mines of Etruria had been worked out and were no 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 69 

longer profitable; Rome had put a barrier to further con- 
quests. With the estabhshment of peace the feudal system 
had also become obsolete, for there was no longer any raison 
d'etre for large troops of retainers. So the nobles lost their 
wealth, and the serfs, pressed into uncongenial work upon 
the soil,^^ repeatedly tried to revolt. Only a few of the 
Etruscan nobles seem to have been capable of adapting them- 
selves to the new order of things. The factories of Arretium 
turned successfully from metal work to pottery ,1^ and some 
men became successfiil plantation owners ; but, on the whole, 
these people never again found themselves. Roman citi- 
zens, more abreast of the times, gradually bought up a large 
part of the bankrupt estates, much of Etruria was recolonized 
by Sulla and Augustus, and, finally, under the paternalism 
of the empire, it regained some appearance of prosperity. 
But then it could no longer be called Etruscan. 

The Umbrians were too disunited and too diffident to 
cause Rome much concern. They were the people, who, if 
we are correct in identifying them with the bearers of the 
"Villanova" culture, had once possessed half of Italy. The 
Etruscans had taken from them first the territory west of 
the Tiber, and then the Po valley. The Sabellian tribes 
captured the southern half of their land upon the Adriatic ; 
the Celtic Senones, the rest. Scarcely one fifth of their 
former empire remained to them at the end of the fourth 
century, and that was poor, mountainous country. It is 
probable that the ease with which they won their early suc- 
cesses caused their ultimate weakness, for in spreading over 
so vast a territory the tribe, not yet culturally capable of 
the requisite cohesiveness, fell apart into segregated groups 
which eventually pursued individual policies and preyed 
upon each other. The very earliest inscription of Umbria, 
a war curse of about the fourth century e.g., betrays the 
secret of their feebleness. It is a part of the ritual of Igu- 
vitim,^^ one of their chief cities, and it calls upon Mars to 
destroy their enemies : the men of Etruria, of Tadinum, of 
the Nar, and the lapudes. They curse kinsmen and strangers 
alike. It is not surprising that Umbria fills so insignificant 



70 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

a place in Roman annals. The unreliable triumphal tables 
record some victories over the Umbri during the "second" 
and "third" Samnite wars, but it is improbable that these 
people ever acted in unity. There are no old coins of united 
Umbria as of the Vestini and Frentani. These people, 
unlike the Sabellic tribes, did not later receive Roman cit- 
izenship in one group or in one ward. In fact, after the 
Social war, their towns are found inscribed in at least a 
dozen different wards — which would indicate that the Ro- 
mans had found no unity among them. It is probable 
that after the terrible battle of Sentintim, whatever com- 
munities were still outside of the Roman federation hastened 
to ask for admission. Two commimities only, Nequinum 
and Spoletium, lost their territory to "Latin" colonies; the 
rest, to the number of about twenty-five, apparently secured 
iberal treaties of alliance with Rome. Some of the nearer 
ones gained full Roman citizenship during the following 
century,^" the more distant ones had to wait until the Social 
war. The two Latin colonies planted upon confiscated 
territory were Namia, about 290,^^ and Spoletium, in 241. 
So far as we know,^^ Rome acquired no territory in Umbria 
for her own public land. 

The ager Gallicus — sometimes called ager Picenus be- 
cause of its former owners — was a district of about 1000 
square miles which had been taken from the Senones in 284 
because of their raids during the preceding year. Rome at 
once sent a small citizen colony to Sena on the Adriatic, and 
in 268, a larger "Latin" colony to Ariminum on the Rubicon, 
the northern boundary of that region. The rest of the land 
seems to have remained fallow for a long time. But in 232, 
when Rome had begun to forget her old obligation to share 
all conquered lands with her allies, the democratic leader, 
Flaminius, secured the allotment of this district to Roman 
citizens, and at once built the Flaminian road from Rome 
to the newly settled country. It is probable that this very 
ager Gallicus was the first imassigned public land — of which 
we hear so much in Gracchan times — and that its distribu- 
tion to Roman citizens in 232 was the first serious breach of 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 71 

Rome's old-time agreement to share all booty equally with 
her allies. 

South of the ager Gallicus dwelt the Picentes,^^ a tribe 
with which Rome apparently had not come into contact 
before the end of the Pyrrhic war. After the war, Rome, 
bent on securing a compact federation, undertook to obtain 
their allegiance. Their principal city, Asculum, and the 
half-Hellenized seacoast town, Ancona, became allies of 
ordinary standing ; with some rural clans, however, there 
was difficulty. The consul used military suasion, took a 
strip of land on the seacoast for a "Latin" colony at Firmum 
(founded 264) and enrolled the rest of the tribesmen as 
Roman citizens without suffrage. A prefect was then sent 
to them from Rome to administer justice. So worthy of 
their position did they prove themselves, that within a few 
years they were accorded full citizenship and enrolled in a 
new ward, the Velina, created for them in 241. The Picene 
episode clearly shows the senate's determination after the 
Pyrrhic war to fit every tribe of Italy into a definite place 
in the federation; it reveals also a striking faith in the 
adaptability of distant Italic tribesmen for citizenship. It 
would have been well for Rome if the statesmen of a century 
later had been equally open-minded, and granted Asculum 
the same privileges when she desired them, for it was their re- 
fusal that led to the outburst of the Social war in that city. 

Central Italy, the cradle of the Sabellic peoples, was in- 
habited by a number of democratic peasant tribes, the 
Vestini, Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, and Frentani. These 
were so far removed from the cultural states that they long 
retained their tribal organization and their primitive in- 
stitutions. No cities emerged to claim preponderance over 
the surrounding peasantry as in Latium. The simple and 
sturdy people dwelt in small villages,^* cultivated their 
narrow valleys, and used the hillsides for pastvuage. Letters 
were but slowly introduced, and commerce was so insig- 
nificant as to call for but the most sparing use of coins. We 
have already commented upon the fact that these tribes 
favored Rome rather than their kinsmen, the Samnites, 



72 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

in the great wars, and we have attributed this preference 
partly to the Samnitic lawlessness, partly to Rome's superior 
diplomacy. Be that as it may, they became members of 
the Roman federation before the "third" Samnite war, 
securing terms that accorded them their autonomy and demo- 
cratic tribal govemment,25 the full possession of their lands, 
and probably also whatever privileges of coinage were then 
in vogue; and in this condition they apparently remained, 
till the Social war. 

The Sabines,^^ a kindred tribe bordering upon Latium, 
and extending to the Adriatic, were somewhat differently 
treated. As we have already noticed, Curius found cause to 
invade the Sabine territory in 290 after the Gallic-Samnite 
war, and forced the people to accept Rome's sovereignty. 
The state appropriated a strip of the Adriatic coast upon 
which it at once settled the two "Latin" colonies of Castrum 
and Hadria. On all the rest of the Sabines, so far as we 

"N^, know, Rome at once bestowed citizenship ^^ without fran- 
/ x^hise, and in 268, full citizenship. The people nearest Rome 

/ were enrolled in one of the old Roman wards ; for the rest, 
a new ward, the Quirina, was created in 241. The Sabines 
from that time on constituted one of the sturdiest and most 
reliable elements of Rome's citizen-body. 

If we pause at this point and compare the senate's methods 
of reorganization as revealed in Umbria, Picenum, Sabinum, 
and the Sabellic tribes, we shall notice an apparent incon- 
sistency which may betray some facts that our sources have 
not preserved for us. It will be remembered that in Umbria 
Rome made her alliances with the individual cities and not 
with the tribes as a whole, while on the other hand her 
treaties with the Vestini, Marrucini, Paeligni, Marsi, and 
Frentani were signed with the governments of the whole 
tribal league. The Sabines and Picentes were treated in 
neither fashion. Their countries were subjected to a rapid 
raid, a strip of land was taken upon which a Latin colony 
was planted, and the whole tribe was incorporated into the 
citizen body of Rome. The reason for this diversity of pro- 
cedure seems to lie in the varied social and political condi- 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 73 

tions of these three classes of tribes at the time when Rome 
first had to deal with them. 

The Umbrians, for instance, were not a united people. 
They had separated into several groups during their rapid 
expansion and most of the groups had developed city-states 
which were independent of the tribe. They were too weak 
to resist pressiire from Rome singly, and it was too late to 
reunite. Accordingly, individual cities of Umbria fell 
quickly, one by one, into the Roman alHance, at very little 
cost and on excellent terms. 

The tribes of the second class, the Marsi, Vestini, etc., 
were in a wholly different state of civilization. Even in 
Strabo's day they lived largely in villages. When Rome 
met them during the early days of the Samnite war, no cities 
had yet emerged to create separate pohties for themselves. 
Their primitive tribal governments, however, were compact 
and thoroughly capable of making agreements with a foreign 
power and of holding their individual members strictly to 
the observance of such agreements. Now Rome may have 
preferred not to encourage such tribal unities ; she may have 
preferred to sign her treaties with individual cities as she did 
in Umbria, but the history of these Sabellic tribes shows that 
if only there was a responsible government with which she 
could deal in good faith and, which could hold its members 
to the observance of the obligations that a treaty involve, 
Rome was satisfied and made no effort to dissolve the tribal 
organization. 

Now Picenum and Sabinum, and we may include the .^qui, 
lay halfway between the representatives of these two classes. 
Sabinum, near the Umbrian and Roman border, and Picenum 
along the coast seem to have begun evolving respectable 
cities, but the process had probably gone just far enough to 
weaken the former tribal coherence without creating ade- 
quate substitutes in the new urban forms. More or less 
political confusion resulted. It is easy to imderstand what 
must have occurred during the heavy strain of the Samnite 
war. The Sabines, ^qui, and Picentes were officially allied 
to Rome, but when their governments no longer were re- 



74 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

spected by the members, individual adventurers must 
constantly have volunteered for the Samnite army, and 
whenever a war was over, Rome invariably found a niunber 
of citizens of these supposedly friendly tribes among her 
captives. This is why Rome took the shortest way toward 
dissolving the native governments of these three tribes. It 
was not land that was wanted, it was a stable and responsible 
government which could hold its individual citizens answer- 
able to the promises of the state. Since these peoples would 
not act together as did the eastern Sabellic peoples, and had 
not yet developed responsible city-states within the tribe, 
Rome simply swept away their crumbling governments, 
incorporated them into her citizen body, and divided them 
into prefectures through which to act in her administration 
of ItaHan affairs. She found them, when thus organized, 
excellent individuals, and therefore gave them full citizen- 
ship early ; and later, as their cities grew, she shifted the 
local government more and more upon their own municipal 
organizations. 

The insight of Rome's statesmen into the social and po- 
litical conditions of these Italic peoples and their versatility 
in finding methods of procedure appropriate to the varied 
circumstances accoimt in large measure for the success of 
the organization of central Italy which alone saved Rome 
from destruction in the Hannibalic war. 

The Samnites, who had risen against Rome for the fifth 
time when Tarentum called for aid in 282, had little to 
expect after the war was over. And they were punished, 
though not as severely as might have been expected. The 
victors confiscated a valley tract which commanded the 
northern approach to the Samnite capital and there planted 
the "Latin" watchdog colony of ^semia, wisely choosing 
Oscan-speaking 28 colonists for the place. They also took 
possession of a segment straight through from the old colony 
of Saticula to Luceria so as to sever the main Samnite tribe 
from its kindred, the Hirpini. On the best portion of this 
territory the splendid "Latin" colony of Beneventum was 
immediately placed (268). The rest — undesirable mountain 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 75 

country, unsuitable for colonization — was left unclaimed 
until a century later, when it was given to a Ligurian tribe. 
The Hirpini were allowed their own government, probably a 
democratic tribal form. The Samnite city of Telesia seems 
also to have gained autonomy at this time and must have 
had an advantageous alliance with Rome, for it henceforth 
struck coins of its own.^^ The main part of Samnium once 
more signed an alliance with Rome — this time presumably 
surrendering to the victor its rights to an independent in- 
ternational policy. But the people retained their own demo- K^ 
cratic tribal government ^° as before, and prospered as they 
deserved. In 225, at the time of the threatened Gallic 
invasion,^^ they could furnish 70,000 foot and 7000 horse ! 
Henceforth they were loyal allies, and the repeated invita- 
tions and coimtermarches of Hannibal had little effect upon 
them, even when Capua yielded to the enticement of the 
enemy after Cannas. To be sure, the mountain villages of 
the tribe did not grow to be great cities. But the Oscan 
cities and the Latin colonies near by, placed more advantage- 
ously along the highways, throve for centuries, and their 
prosperity was in large measure due to constant accretions 
of sturdy Samnite mountaineers. 

The Lucanians, who throughout the Samnite wars had 
in general befriended Rome — chiefly because of their fear 
of the Samnites — were bitterly enraged by Rome's defense 
of Thurii in 282, and strongly supported Pyrrhus. After 
the war they yielded like the rest to the victor, and were 
taken into the federation with apparently no punishment 
but the forfeiture of P^stimi, an old Greek city which they 
had conquered. Here Rome immediately (273) founded a 
"Latin" colony. The Lucanians retained their democratic ,/ 
tribal government ^^ and even continued to issue communal 
coins. Apulia was of old the home of Messapians and 
lapygians into whose territory Samnites had wedged from 
the north and Greeks from the east. The cities of Teate 
and Ausculum, for example, spoke Oscan, most of the other 
cities employed Greek, while in the interior villages various 
native languages still prevailed. Apparently no bond of 



76 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

unity prevailed among these peoples except their common 
dislike of the Samnites. Luceria ^^ and Venusia had been 
appropriated for "Latin" colonies during the Samnite wars, 
which might indicate some pro-Samnite sentiment among 
them at that time, but it would appear that these various 
peoples took no vigorous part in behalf of Pyrrhus and 
Tarentum, and some are known to have aided Rome. At 
any rate, we hear of no confiscations in this region after 272, 
and the coins issued from so many of the Apulian mints ^* 
after that date reveal a continuance of the alliance which 
had been formed during the "second" and "third" Samnite 
wars. They also demonstrate the continued prosperity 
of this fertile region up to the time of the Punic war. Then 
the territory suffered so severely from the Hannibalic raids 
that it never again regained its former prosperity .^^ 

The Bruttians bear the distinction of being the only strong 
Italian people that Rome neglected to bring into a definite 
position in her federation after the Pyrrhic war. They lived 
among the forest-clad, granite mountains of what is to-day 
called Calabria, and were apparently an offshoot of the 
Lucanians,^^ from whom they had gained their independence 
in 356. They destroyed several of the old Greek colonies 
of the coast, grew rapidly into a strong people, formed some 
kind of a stable government with a capital at Consentia, 
and struck tribal coins bearing the legend B P ETT I Q N . Rome 
first came in contact with them during the Pyrrhic war, when, 
according to the evidences of the triumphal /as^^ they fought 
Rome bitterly. Our sources say nothing regarding Rome's 
settlement after the war, but there are two or three peculiar 
circumstances which shed light upon the problem. Firstly, 
Polybius (II, 24), in giving a list of Rome's allies in 225, does 
not mention the Bruttii; secondly, the Bruttii alone of 
Italian tribes continued to issue silver coins through the 
third century ; ^"^ and, thirdly, two cities of Greek origin, 
Petelia and Terina, which were subject to the Bruttii before 
Pyrrhus' arrival, were autonomous allies of Rome after the 
"^ , war. These facts seem to indicate that Rome — whether 
because she scorned the Bruttii, or because she knew they 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 77 

were too thoroughly hemmed in to do any harm — neglected 
to take them into her federation ; that while she invited the 
ex-Greek cities of Bruttium into her alliance, securing au- 
tonomy for them, she dismissed the rest on good behavior .^^ 

On the south Italian coast were a nimiber of Greek cities 
which before the days of Pyrrhus had dwindled to a mere 
shadow of the Magna Grsecia of the sixth century. Internal 
factional fights and bitter interstate jealousies had destroyed 
several of the most famous of them, and weakened the rest. 
The typically Greek temper, over-individualized and utterly 
lacking in cohesive clannishness, began its work of disintegra- 
tion just as soon as the various cities came into close relation 
with each other. The poison of seLf-assertiveness was elim- 
inated only by the destruction of the stronger element in 
factional strife, and then there remained only a weak and 
passive population, too feeble to withstand foreign enemies. 
Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, helped on the work of 
devastation in his attempt to gain an empire for himself. 
He destroyed Caulonia (388), subdued Croton, and weakened 
Rhegium and Hipponion beyond recovery. He was succeeded 
by the Lucanian and Bruttian conquerors. Poseidonia, 
Laos, Tempsa, Terina, and Hipponion, in fact, the whole 
western coast as far as Rhegium, with the exception of 
Elea, were now permanently lost to the Greeks. Of the 
few surviving cities, Tarentum alone retained some of her 
former splendor, but even she had not enough vigor left to 
fight her own battles ; and she was disliked by her neigh- 
bors. This was the situation when Thurii finally changed 
the course of events by appealing to Rome against the bar- 
barians. 

During the war Heraclea, Elea, and Rhegium sympathized 
with Rome, while Croton, recently pillaged by Agathocles, 
and Locri, long used to servitude, veered with every gust of 
wind that blew. After the war Rome treated these Greek 
cities, whether they had been friendly throughout or not, 
as irresponsible dotards that deserved kindness for what 
they had once been. Most of them were given treaties 
which dignified them as Rome's "equals." Rome under- 



78 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

took to protect them, without asking for miHtary service 
in return. It was enough if they closed their ports to the 
enemies of Rome. Several of the Greek cities that had fallen 
under the sway of the Bruttians and Lucanians were restored 
to autonomy and admitted as members of the federation. 
But most markedly did Rome prove her friendliness towards 
the Greeks in her treatment of Tarentimi, the city which 
had brought on the whole wretched war. Some captives 
were apparently taken in Rome's attacks upon the city, 
since we are told that Livius Andronicus — Rome's first 
dramatist — came to Rome in captivity from Tarentum. It 
is probable too that the honorary title of foedus aequum was 
withheld in the treaty with Tarentum. In other respects, 
however, it is difficult to see how Tarentum suffered. She 
was accorded the right of coinage ,^^ a concession usually 
made only to the most privileged, her citizens were not dis- 
armed or deprived of their ships, nor were they put under 
military or naval obligations to Rome. No clearer instance 
of the prudent employment of conciliatory tactics could be 
found. It all proved a paying investment a generation 
later, when Rome needed the aid of a trained marine against 
Carthage. Even for the present it was a good bargain for 
both sides. Rome could feel confident that the southern 
ports were closed against invaders, and the Greeks were 
protected against the raids of the barbarians. The Greek 
towns also profited materially a little later when Rome's 
power began to spread, for the sovereign city stipulated 
in her treaties that her allies should enjoy the same com- 
mercial rights as her own citizens. And since the people of 
southern Italy were engaged in commerce to a greater extent 
than the Romans, they were the first to profit. Thus it 
came about that the privileged class which called themselves 
"Italici" while trading in the East under the provisions of 
Rome's treaties were largely Campanians and Italiote 
Greeks.^" 

This survey of Rome's reconstructive work demonstrates 
that the senate of 270 followed in the main the policies orig- 
inated by the first empire-builders of 340. The "Latin 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 79 

colony" they found especially efficient in garrisoning con- 
quered country at little cost, in satisfying and reconciling 
allies, and in taking care of Roman citizens who needed land. 
Twenty of these colonies were settled between 338 and 264. ^ 
Citizen maritime colonies were more sparingly used, probably 
because of a general understanding that allies should share 
equitably in land distribution. Three of these were foimded 
at Adriatic coast points. Outright viritane assignments to 
Roman citizens apparently ceased because of the provision 
just mentioned. The custom of incorporating foreigners of 
good stock into the city-state was continued in the case of 
some of the Hemicans and ^quians, and most of the Sabines, 
Praetuttii, and Picentes. Whether any of the former half 
citizens were promoted to full citizenship during this period 
we are not told, but it is not improbable, since the custom 
of promotion was still in vogue a century later. The federal 
alliance was, of course, the device used over by far the largest 
area, and necessarily so, since it would have been impossible 
to assimilate distant peoples and tribes of alien customs on 
the instant. In fact, clear-sighted statesmen must have 
begun to doubt whether Rome could ever amalgamate all 
the states that were embraced by some threescore different 
treaties. 

One change the senate now made in its traditional policy. 
It had been foimd that Roman citizens assigned to Latin 
colonies often returned to Rome in case of disappointment, 
and that other colonists too were attracted to the metropolis 
by the ease with which "Latin" colonists could become 
Roman citizens. In fact, residence at Rome and enrollment 
on Rome's census list seem to have been the only requisites. 
If this state of affairs continued there was danger that some 
of the Latin colonies might soon dwindle away. When, 
therefore, the senate foimded a new colony at Ariminimi on 
the Gallic frontier, it decided to impose certain disabilities *^ 
upon the colonists in case of their returning to Rome. And 
this policy held for the next twelve colonies. The pre- 
caution may have been well meant, but it stirred up some 
disagreeable complications in time to come, and, what was 



8o ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

worse, it gave later legislators a precedent for imposing further 
disabilities upon other classes of allies. 

It was at this time, too (269), that the senate established 
its first mint at Rome for the coinage of silver, and, by some 
method of which we know nothing, attempted to circulate 
the new silver coin as the standard throughout Italy .^^ At 
any rate, very many of the mints of Latins and allies ceased 
to issue silver after 268. And thus the silver denarius be- 
came a token, as it were, of Rome's sovereignty over the 
whole peninsula. 

In connection with the details of conquest presented above 
it will be convenient to attempt an estimate of the territory 
appropriated from conquered states. This is the more 
necessary since no subject was more misimderstood by the 
ancients. Scholars have long known that the post-Gracchan 
annalists — yielding to a besetting sin of historians — 
overworked the psychological method in their efforts to be 
persuasive, and attributed to statesmen of bygone days the 
ideas and methods of their own. As a consequence of this, 
agrarian laws like those of the Gracchi were projected into 
the history of the fourth and third century land distribu- 
tions. Such laws presupposed the existence of vast domains 
of public land, and these, in turn, presupposed extensive 
expropriations at time of conquests. It accordingly has 
come to be a generally accepted view that Rome regularly 
took by right of conquest about a third of the conquered 
territory.*' This is very far from being the case. A careful 
weighing of all the evidence presented in the preceding suia- 
mary will establish the fact that the conquerors took ^ 

\/ about 3 per cent, not 33 per cent, of the land in their con- 

'' xjuest of Italy between 338 and 264. We know now that 

there was very little public land when Hannibal entered 

Italy in 220 and that the territory which became the bone of 

^ contention in the Gracchan days was almost all acquired 
during and after the Second Punic war: acquired partly 
through the appropriation of tracts devastated by Hannibal, 
partly through confiscation applied according to a new legal 
theory ^^ to revolting states. It was then that the whole of 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 8i 

Campania, large tracts in Lucania, Apulia, and Bruttium, and .^ 
extensive areas in Cisalpine Gaul fell to the state. Before \f 
that time Rome had in general followed the policy inau- 
gurated about 340 of taking possession only of small tracts 
on the frontier for the sake of military colonies. 

We must add, however, that though the land taken and 
colonized was a very small portion of Italy, it was a consider- 
able amount in proportion to the population of Rome. And 
even though Rome shared the colonies with the allies, she 
had to provide so many colonists during the period that her 
surplus poptdation was effectively drained off. The labor 
and capital that might otherwise have turned to commerce 
and industry found ready employment in the new allotments, 
and thus the Romans still remained a purely agricultural 
people. This circimistance accounts not a little for the 
solid strength that the nation displayed in later wars, but it 
also accounts for a certain lack of resourcefulness in dealing 
with the urban population, and lack of sympathy for various 
activities that a nation should encourage. 

NOTES TO CHAPTER V 

1. The total number of (male) citizens in 290 is given by Livy, 
Epit. XI, as 272,000. This includes, of course, a great many inhabitants 
"of important cities outside of Rome. 

2. The only reliable statement is found in Polybius, II, 19. 

3. See Mommsen, Ram. Forsch. II, 372, on this matter, which the 
annalists confused with the work of 290. Also, Miinzer, s.v. Curius 9), 
in Pauly-Wissowa. 

4. I infer that these are the Etruscans meant by Polybius, since 
they were attacked after the Gauls were disposed of. With Niese, 
Griech. und maked. Staaten, II, 28, note i, I reject the story of Cassius 
Dio, who involves Tarentum in this war. The conditions later imposed 
upon some of the Umbrians imply that they had joined the expedition. 

5. See Diodorus, XXI, 4 and 14. 

6. See Niese, Griech. und maked. Staaten, I, 476 ff. The chapter in 
this work of Niese is perhaps our best account of the Pyrrhic war. 
Beloch, Griech. Gesch. Ill, i, p. 562, is also excellent in many respects. 

7. This tale comes from a very tmreliable source, but may be true. 
It is hard to understand how or when Rome could have signed a treaty 
not to pass the Lacinian headland. After colonies were founded on the 

G 



82 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Adriatic, it was absolutely necessary to conduct some shipping past 
Tarentum, and it would seem that some transporation of goods must 
already have been carried on. The colony of Hadria was then seven- 
teen years old. 

8. Polybius mentions this fact : I, 6, 5. 

9. It may be that the disgruntled senate made the first overtures. 
The annalists would be likely to suppress such a fact. 

10. At least, the democratic party, of which Appius Claudius was 
stni one of the most respected leaders. Historians to-day usually reject 
the dramatic tale of Claudius and his speech in the senate ; but the 
story must antedate the interpolating annalists, since Ennius refers to it 
(Ed. Vah. 202). There is no reason to think, therefore, that the speech 
— which circidated in Cicero's day {Brut. 61 and Cato maior, 16) — was 
apocryphal. But if the speech existed, it must have kept the annalists 
fairly close to the facts. A timely proffer of aid from Carthage doubt- 
less encouraged the senate to accept the advice of Appius, see Niese, 
Hermes, XXXI, 495. The proposals of Pyrrhus are given in the 
Ineditum Vaticanum (Hermes, XXVII, p. 120). According to this 
authority, Pyrrhus demanded that Rome acknowledge the independence 
of all who had joined him. 

11. Nat. Hist., XXXIV, 32. Pliny often employs worthless sources, 
but in this case his source drew its information from the inscription of a 
statue which remained in fuU view in the Roman forum. Rome 
apparently had friendly relations with Thurii before; Tacitus, Ann. 
XIV, 21. 

12. See the Fasti Triumphales for the year 280, and note that the 
colony of Cosa lay mainly upon Volcian territory, Pliny, Nat. Hist. 
Ill, 51. The citizen colony of Saturnia (planted in 183) and the near-by 
praefectura Statoniensis (Vitruvius, II, 9) seem to occupy Volsinian 
territory. For Caere, see Cassius Dio, frag. 33, dated 273. The land 
was used for maritime colonies. For Tarquinii, see Diodorus, XX, 44 
(a treaty for forty years dated in 268). Since Graviscae was later settled 
near Tarquinii (Livy , XL, 29) , it is probable, that there was a loss of 
land here also. Rome had a dispute with Falerii later, in 241 ; see 
Polybius, I, 65. 

13. I have shown elsewhere that Tarquinii and Falerii both remained 
allies, and were not made civitates sine suffragio as is regularly assumed ; 
Klio, XI, 377. We do not know when Caere became ager Romanus; 
see the same study. 

14. The maritime colonies of 300 citizens planted upon the Etrus- 
can coast are as follows: Castrum (about 264), Alsium (247), Fregense 
(245), Pyrgi (about the same time), Graviscae (181). All of these, 
except the last, date from the Punic war. For references to these 
colonies see Komemann's excellent list in Pauly-Wissowa, but emend 
as follows : Castrum in Etruria was a citizen colony fotmded about 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 83 

264 ; Castrum on the border of Picenum was a Latin colony founded 
about 290-86, probably on Praetuttian land. (Note that the former is 
governed by duumviri and the latter by praetores.) 

15. A part of this was parceled out to Roman citizens a century 
later in the praefectura of Satumia (183). There were also Roman 
citizens at the praefectura Statoniensis and at several for a on the southern 
parts of the Cassian, Clodian, and Aurelian roads. Some of these 
citizens might have been tenants on public lands, some of them may have 
held allotments. For these places, see C. I. L. XI. 

16. Plutarch says that Gracchus conceived of his agrarian reforms 
because of the Etruscan conditions which he noticed on a journey from 
his province ; Plut., Tib. Gracch. 8. The population had always been 
sparse because of the uneconomic landlord system. In 225 there were 
less than two able-bodied men per square kilometer in Etruria, while 
Campania could furnish ten ; see Polybius, II, 24. 

17. The Roman annalists frequently refer to what they call slave 
riots in Etruria. These were in fact social upheavals due to the sur- 
vival of the old feudal system. In Volsinii the serfs seized the reins 
of government in 265 and the masters appealed to Rome, whose consul 
found the rocky citadel (now Orvieto) almost impregnable. As a 
result, when the city was finally taken and the former masters rein- 
stated, Rome demanded that the city be rebuilt on level ground. So 
the late annalists tell an interesting story of Rome's shrewdness ; Val. 
Max. IX, I, 9; Zonaras, VIII, 7. 

18. See Nissen, Ital. Landeskunde, II, 316. 

19. See Buck, A Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian, p. 279 (Igu- 
vinian Tables, YI, b, 54). The lapudeswere lUyrian pirates who spread 
havoc on the Adriatic coast of Italy; see Pauli, Altital. Forschungen, 

III, 413- 

20. This, I confess, is based upon inference. Asisium and Fulginia 
apparently received citizenship before 90 B.C., since their magistrates 
continued to be called by their old title, marones. Ocriculum, Mevania, 
and Trebia were not in the same ward as the cities that were allied 
until 90 B.C. They were on the Flaminian road and therefore probably 
attained citizenship early. Tuder and Iguvium, two cities assigned 
to the tribus Crustumina, were still allied to Rome a few years before 
90 (Sisenna, frag. 119, and Cic. Balb. 46). Perhaps all the cities along 
the Tiber — which were ascribed to the same ward — were allies until 
90. Of the rest we know only that Camertum possessed a foedus aeguum 
till the Social war. The subjugation of the northernmost tribe, the Sar- 
sinates, required a special invasion about 268 — not many years before 
the birth of Plautus, their most famous citizen. These mountaineers 
may have been disturbing the newly founded colony of Ariminum. 

21. Livy dates Namia at 299, but it can hardly have been founded 
until after the battle of Sentinum. 



84 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

22. Beloch (Ital. Bund. p. 57) scarcely supports his conjecture that 
Rome took large stretches of public land in Umbria. In the days 
when Rome settled Umbria it was not the custom to appropriate lands 
except by way of severe punishment, and we have no reason to think 
that many Umbrian cities incurred this. 

23. Picentian history is full of uncertainties because the Roman 
annalists confused the territory with the ager Gallicus, sometimes 
called ager Picenus in legal documents. They therefore attributed 
wholesale confiscation and allotment to land which had experienced 
nothing of the sort ; see Klio, XI, p. 373. The correct inferences can 
be drawn from Polyb. II, 21, 7, and Cato, in Varro, R. R. I, 2, 7. Strabo 
(V, 251), who finds a people called Picenti below Naples, immediately 
drew the hasty conclusion that the Picentes of the Adriatic had been 
transported. This is, of course, erroneous. I would revise Beloch, 
Ital. Bund. p. 55 ; Nissen, Ital. Landesk. II, 410, and Mommsen, C. I. L. 
IX, p. 480, accordingly. 

Asculum was an ally till 90, when in fact it was among the first to 
revolt. Since the rest of Picenum had received citizenship, Asculum 
felt that it too deserved as much. 

24. Strabo, V, 241, Kia/MTjSbv ^Qxtiv. 

25. For the Roman treaties with these tribes, see Diod. XX, loi ; 
Livy, IX, 45; X, 3. For the tribal organization, Vestini: Polyb. II, 
24 ; Livy, XLIV, 40 ; tribal coins, Conway, The Italic Dialects, p. 260. 
Marrucini: Polyb. IX, 24; Conway, p. 254, totai maroucai. Paeligni: 
Diod. XX, loi. Possibly Rome later dealt with the individual cities 
here; the evidence is late and unreliable. Mar si: Polyb. II, 24; 
Conway, p. 294, pro le[gio]nihus Martses. Frentani: Polyb. II, 24; 
Conway, p. 208, Kenzsur; tribal coins, Conway, p. 212 (Larinvun 
had a separate treaty). 

26. With the Sabines I include the subdivision of the Prsetuttii 
(modem Abruzzi). 

27. Mommsen, C. I. L. IX, p. 396, following a late legend, states 
that the Sabines were driven out and most of the land confiscated. 
My reasons for rejecting this, which is the orthodox view, are, in brief, 
as follows, (i) The earlier tradition holds that the Sabines remained 
and became Roman citizens, see Cic. de Off. i, 35 ; pro Balb. 31 ; Livy, 
XL, 46, 12 ; XLII, 34, 2 ; Velleius, I, 14. Strabo, V, 228: ea-n 8i Kal 
iroKaidraTov y^vos ol "Za^lvoi Kcd aiirdx^oves . . • avriaxov fiixP'- Trphs rbv 
irapbvTa xp^vov, (2) Livy would hardly have praised the volunteers from 
this district as he does in XXVIII, 45, had they not been of non-Roman 
stock. (3) Schulten, in Klio, II and III, has shown that names ending in 
(i)edius and idius are Sabellic, and that they occur as frequently in the 
country under discussion as in regions undoubtedly Sabellic. (4) There 
is a peculiar magistracy, called the octovirate, in Sabine towns which 
seems to be a survival of a non-Roman office. (5) It was not Rome's 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 85 

habit to confiscate land for purely Roman allotment or for the use of 
the Roman treasury until long after the period in question. (6) We 
find no references to public lands in Sabinum in Republican times when 
agrarian bills were discussed. The scant references in late sources 
probably point to unallotted rough land (so-called subseciva) left over 
from imperial expropriations. 

The legend which Mommsen follows arose from the confusion of 
Curius' settlement of Sabinum in 290 and his furious onslaught on the 
Senones in his second consulship in 284. It occurs in such unreliable 
authors as Orosius (III, 22), and Val. Max. (IV, 3, 5). 

28. The coins are partly Oscan, though the colony was founded by 
Rome. See Conway, //. Dialects, p. 199. 

29. Head ^, Historia Numorum, p. 28. 

30. See Conway, It. Dial. p. 189, an inscription of a meddiss toutiks. 

31. Polyb. II, 24. 

32. Their coins dating before and after the Pyrrhic war are stamped 
AOYKANOM. This league was wrecked in the Second Punic war when 
Hannibal conquered southern Italy and held it for several years. The 
ager publicus which Rome later possessed in Apulia was acquired after 
Hannibal's departure, partly by right of reconquest, partly by appro- 
priating devastated country. 

33. It is possible that both of these places were in the possession of 
Samnites when captured, and should not be considered in connection 
with Apulian history. 

34. See Head 2, Historia Numorum, p. 43. 

35. The public land acquired for the colony of Sipontum (194) and 
the pascua publica mentioned by Livy under date of 185 (XXXIX, 29) 
and referred to by Varro, R. R. II, i, 16, were doubtless appropriated 
during the war with Hannibal. Strabo, VI, 285, says: "Formerly 
this region flourished, but Hannibal and the later wars laid it waste." 
The plantation system, which unfortunately was invoked by Rome in 
order to develop waste country as quickly as possible, only served ulti- 
mately to make efficient development impossible. 

36. The facts are not clear, see Diod. XVI, 15, and Strabo, VI, 
255-6. The dominant element seems to have been SabeUic, but there 
was doubtless a large admixture of more primitive peoples in this last 
retreat of the vanquished. Conway records some Oscan inscriptions 
from the region. It. Dial. p. 3. 

37. See Head 2, Hist. Num. p. 91. 

38. Dionysius, XX, 15, holds that Rome appropriated half the forest 
of Sila on this occasion ; and state contractors were surely at work with 
the timber and pitch industry there as early as 213 (Livy, XXV, i). 
Dionysius may be correct, for confiscation of the central forests would 
have given protection to Rome's friends along the coast, Rhegium and 
Locri. I cannot think, however, that Rome was at this time interested 



S6 ROMAX BIPERIALISM 

in the timber of Sila. ?■ :>\ > .^ had little shipping, and there was still 
an abundance of fores;;^ luwr Rome. In the Hannibalio w'ar the Brut- 
tians aided Haimibal and were then depriN-ed of a great part of their 
territon*, which was then used for colonies. The Bnittian capti\-es 
on that occasion were apparently made public slaves if we dare believe 
Gellius. X. 3. iq. 

3Q. See E\-ans, ''Horsfme^n " of Tare-ntum, p. I93,and Niese.inHfrmfj, 
XXXI, 5or. They could not have been jftvit Hovahs as yet, for Rome 
borrowed her first ships fivm Tarentum ia the Punic war, as E^-ans points 
out on the e\'idence of Polyb. I, 20. The lack of coinage in \-arious 
Greek cities after ^65 does not necessarily point to a Roman restriction. 
Se\-eral of these cities ga^"e up coinage before the PjTrhic war because 
of poverty, and they natiirally Kx-ame still poorer during the war. 
The wealthier cities, Tarentum, Locri, and Rhegium, continued to issue 
silx'er coins. One must gtiard against attributing the distressing con- 
ditions that were brought on by Hannibal's conquests to the period 
foUowiug the P}-rrhic war. 

40. See Am. Hist. Rin^i<nc, XVIII, 242. 

41. They were denied connnbium with Rornan citizens, and difficul- 
ties were put in the way of their acquiring Roman citizensliip. See 
Komemann, ^.r. Cohniae, in Pauly-Wissowa, col. 51S. 

42. The Roman mint at Capua had struck silver since about 335 ; 
the mint at Rome issiied only bronze till 26S, a striking commentary 
on Rome's lack of interest in commerce and industry-. After 268, a 
score of mints in Latin and allied cities still issued bronze, but within 
the federation only Tarentum, Naples, Rhegium, Locri, Cales, and 
possibly Heraclea, continued to issue silver. The Bruttii also coined 
silver. The Capuan victoriaH and the Lucerian denarii were issued by 
Roman branch mints. 

43. Schwegler, R&m. drsch. II, 404, is usually cited as ha\'ing proved 
this, but his e%-idence is far from sufficient. Rostowzew, Zur Gesch. dfs 
Riimisch^n Kohniaks, has proved that the legal theory whereby ow^ler- 
ship of the soil was supposed to follow conquest came into Rome's 
policy from the Orient at a later day. 

44. The territors- of the Italian peoples — I exclude the Gauls — 
incorporated in the federation by 264 amounted to about 38 million 
acres. On land appropriated between 33S and 264 Rome settled some 
twenty Latin colonies. Each colony received about 3000 settlers, 
and each settler about eight jugera (about 5^ acres), as an average, 
making a total of about 320,000 acres. Since each colony was further- 
more given a pubUc domain from which to defray municipal expenses, 
this figure may be raised to 500,000 acres. Add to this — for liberal 
measure — half a million acres to cover other confiscations, such as we 
have mentioned in the preceding summary- of Rome's reorganization. 
The sum total will not exceed a miUion acres, that is, less than 3 per 



THE DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY 87 

cent of the Italian territory then conquered. Several considerations 
support this estimate. Ci) Niese, Hermes, XXIII, p. 410, has proved 
that the so-called Licinian-Sextian agrarian law of 366 was actually 
passed after the Hannibalic war. (2) Had viritane assignments of 
large tracts been made to citizens before the Second Punic war, the 
census figures should have risen more rapidly than they did. (3) If 
the Roman treasury ha/1 possessed extensive public lands for leaseholds n^/ 
before the Punic war, the Roman tax upon citizens might have been 
alleviated, as it was not. (4) Later references to ager puhlicus in the 
inscriptions of the Gracchan land commissioners (see Jahresbericht fiir 
AUertumsw. 144, p. 277J and in literary sources all point to land acquired 
in the Punic war and after (with exception of the ager Gallicus). Car- 
dinali, Studi Graccani, and Soltau, Hist. Vierteljahrsch. 1913, 465, 
recently attempted to support the annalistic view. 

45. Rome learned after the conquest of Sicily that conquered terri- 
tory was often considered the public domain of the victorious state. 
To be sure, Rome did not at once adopt this theory for permanent 
application, but the discovery of it had a certain effect in making the 
senate more ready than before to expropriate land. The effect is seen 
in Rome's treatment of revolting south Italians at the end of the 
Hannibalic war. 



CHAPTER VI 

ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 

The First Punic War 

The Sicilian city of Messana, the parent city of the ill- 
fated Messina which was recently destroyed by earthquake, 
gave Rome her first occasion to extend her empire beyond 
Italy.^ A band of Campanians who boastingly called 
themselves Mamertini — the sons of Mars — took posses- 
sion of Messana while serving as mercenaries in the army of 
Syracuse. During the years of anarchy which followed the 
death of the Syracusan tyrant, Agathocles, these Mamer- 
tines extended their rule over several cities of northern Sicily. 
When, however, Hiero II established himself in Syracuse 
about 274, he set out to check this new power and win back 
what his city had lost. In 268 he gained a decisive victory 
over the Mamertines and was on the point of investing Mes- 
sana, when the Carthaginians, who now possessed a full 
half of Sicily and did not wish Hiero to grow too strong, 
ordered him to desist. The Carthaginians then placed a 
garrison in the city on the pretext that they wished to pro- 
tect its independence from the encroachments of Hiero ; but 
the Mamertines very evidently did not desire that kind of 
independence, and they secretly voted to induce the garrison 
to leave and to ask the Romans for a protecting guard. The 
garrison was accordingly disposed of, and an appeal was sent 
to Rome for an alliance and a detachment of troops. 

What were the Romans to do with such a request ? The 
debate on the question was long and intense. From the point 
of view of international practices and of previously existing 
treaties no serious objection could be raised. Since Rome was 
sovereign at Rhegium on the coast of Italy, less than two 
miles from Messana, her interests were as much involved in 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 89 

the place as those of either Carthage or Syracuse. There were 
no treaties which forbade Rome to hold alliances in Sicily .^ 
On the score of respectability there could be no serious 
objection to an alliance with the Mamertines/ for although 
they had seized Messana by force, that event was now a 
whole generation past, and in the meantime they had es- 
tablished their position among nations and had been recog- 
nized by both Carthage and Syracuse as a treaty-making 
power of good standing. And what could have been shock- 
ing about the capture of a city when Sicilian history was 
filled with accounts of usurpations? Hiero had himself 
seized the throne by a coup d'etat just a few years before. 
Furthermore, when the Mamertines asked for aid, they 
were, so far as we know, autonomous,* and Rome therefore 
would not have to break the old f etial rules in granting the 
request. Nothing except the question of expedience need 
influence the senate in its decision, and yet the senate found 
itself imable to decide. The conservatism of old, experienced 
men came to the fore, men who realized the dangers, who 
must discover ways and means in case Carthage resented 
the alliance and tried to drive the Romans back, and who 
must bear the bnmt of criticism in case of failure. These 
men knew also how vast the federal structure already was 
and how easily it might crash to the ground if the founda- 
tions of faith and respect were shaken by defeat abroad. 

Rome was now a democracy, and so when the senate re- 
fused to give a favorable answer to the Mamertines the 
jingoes took the matter to the plebeian assembly. The 
populace voted to accept, "for," says Polybius, repeating 
the words of the aristocratic Fabius, "the military com- 
manders suggested that the people would individually get 
important material benefits ^ from it." 

There is every reason to think that few men at Rome saw 
the seriousness of the step that was being taken. They could 
hardly have realized that they were bringing on a terrific war 
which would last for nearly a quarter of a century. The 
senate's management of the opening maneuvers demon- 
strates the fact that it hoped to invest Messana without a 



90 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

contest and that it had no intention at first of trying to secure 
Sicily. The first consul sent to garrison Messana went with 
only two legions (Polyb, I, i6). When an armed contest 
ensued, the senate dispatched a full force of four legions, 
but reduced this by half the next year (I, 17), apparently 
not intending to conduct an aggressive war. On hearing, 
however, that Carthage was making serious preparations, 
it again sent a full force to storm Agrigentimi, and then 
finally dming the fourth year conceived the idea of pushing 
the war vigorously tmtil the enemy should be swept from 
Sicily (I, 20). And it is not till then that Rome made any 
effort to build a navy, without which little coiild be accom- 
plished. 

In view of this behavior, it is probable that the senate 
accepted the investment of Messana provided every effort 
were made to avoid war.® But what was the need of gain- 
ing control over Messana? The argument as briefly pre- 
sented by Polybius (I, 10) is just the kind that woiild con- 
vince any modem government. Carthage had expanded 
till she now controlled aU of northern Africa, the south of 
Spain, Corsica, Sardinia, and the western half of Sicily. 
Now, though there is no indication that either Rome or 
Carthage resented bigness and success in each other, the 
methods of Carthage were objectionable to her neighbors. 
Her imperiaHsm was of the oppressive and exploiting kind 
that often betrays itself in commercial nations. Her whole 
poHcy was mercantilistic. Navigation and embargo acts 
followed her army and navy. Her ambition was to gain 
possession in order to exclude other nations' vessels and con- 
trol a monopoly of trade,' and vessels that sailed in her closed 
seas were stmk. Now Rome was little concerned about 
maritime trade — in fact, the farmer-senators had always 
signed the trading treaties presented by Carthage, treaties 
which secured all the commercial advantages to Carthage 
and gave Rome few in return. What did they care for such 
things? But they were anxious for the political safety of 
southern Italy, which the Punic encroachment was endanger- 
ing. If Carthage obtained Messana, her strong fleet could 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 91 

block the narrow roadstead of less than two miles that led 
to Rome's southern allies and the Adriatic colonies. She 
also could readily invest Rhegiimi, which lay across the 
straits, a thing she had in fact showed some intention of 
doing ^ in 282. The past history of Carthage proved that 
such fears were not figments of the imagination, and it was 
clearly the prudent course to grant Messana's request for 
an alliance and keep the Sicilian straits from falling into 
the power of a state which practiced the doctrine of mare 
clausum whenever possible. 

But imdemeath the whole discussion in the senate doubt- 
less lay the consciousness that this body would soon lose 
control of the matter. Ambitious leaders would secure the 
consulship, stirring up the popular imagination with jingo 
speeches, force the hands of the senate, and entangle the state 
in a war. And that is what occurred. It is significant 
that the populace selected a Claudius to conduct the expedi- 
tion. He made short shrift of peacefid parleys and brought 
on a contest of arms. Appius indixit Karthaginiensihus hel- 
ium says Ennius,^ in a blunt hexameter that befits the occa- 
sion. The senate later took its revenge by denying Claudius 
a triumph, although he had won two decisive victories,^" but 
this was poor consolation. The consuls continued to lead 
the armies farther and farther afield and the senate had to 
shotdder the ftdl burdens of responsibility. 

This is hardly the place to rehearse the tedious history of 
the war, which can readily be found in the comparatively 
trustworthy sketch of Polybius. The events that reveal 
the evolution of Rome's purposes can be briefly told. When 
Claudius, the Roman consul, arrived at Rhegium, opposite 
Messana, he found the Carthaginian fleet policing the 
straits, but he borrowed transports from the Greek seaport 
towns,^^ eluded the enemy's navy at night, and effected a 
crossing. Beyond Messana he found the Carthaginian as 
well as the Syracusan armies laying siege to the city. With 
them he entered into negotiations, but coming to no results, 
he attacked the two armies separately and succeeded in 
relieving Messana. His success induced a great number of 



92 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Sicilian cities — both Syracusan and Carthaginian subjects 
— to declare for Rome, and even Hiero offered to pay an 
indemnity and become Rome's "friend." He was received 
with open arms and became Rome's loyal supporter for the 
rest of his long life. Rome now reduced her army for a 
year, but the next year, hearing that Carthage was gathering 
a large mercenary force of Gauls and Spaniards, she sent a 
force of about 30,000 to lay siege to the stronghold of Acragas 
(Agrigentiim) , which was taken after a six months' siege. 
At this point, Polybius says, the senate decided to drive 
the enemy from Sicily. There was little use, however, in 
attacking the seacoast towns without the aid of a fleet, and 
up to this time Rome had apparently possessed no vessels 
of war. She therefore undertook to constinict a large fleet, ^^ 
using a Punic ship which had run aground as a model. The 
consiil of 260, Duilius, who had probably never set foot on 
shipboard before, took charge of this mushroom fleet and 
annihilated the Pimic navy,^^ which had long been mistress 
of the seas. The next year the senate demonstrated the 
earnestness of its purpose by attacking both Sardinia and 
Corsica, and capturing the latter.^* When the Carthaginians 
attempted less aggressive tactics, hoping thus to weary the 
enemy, the Roman fleet fought its way to Africa (256) and 
landed an army before Carthage in the hope of forcing terms. 
This army, however, was badly defeated, and to add to the 
disaster, the Roman transports which were carrying the 
remnants back to Italy were shattered by a storm. For 
fourteen more years the contest went on with varying results, 
a contest in which upon the sea alone the Romans lost some 
two hundred thousand men.^^ Finally, with a fleet built 
by private subscription, Lutatius Catulus severed communi- 
cations between Carthage and her Sicilian army (242) and 
at last forced the tireless general, Hamilcar Barcas, to 
acknowledge defeat. By the terms ^^ of the treaty Carthage 
surrendered her possessions in Sicily, and bound herself to 
pay a war indemnity of 3200 talents (nearly foiu: million 
dollars) in ten annual payments, to give back her prisoners 
of war, and to cease employing Italic soldiers as mercenaries. 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 93 

Rome henceforth had control in Sicily. The Syracusan 
state with its subject cities became an "amicus" of Rome, 
and Messana and some of the other cities which had been 
independent before Rome's arrival became socii. The whole 
western portion, heretofore tributary to Carthage, now by 
right of conquest became tributary to Rome. 

And it was because Rome now acquired a tribute-paying 
dependency that the Pimic war was epoch-making. Hitherto 
Rome had built up a federation of autonomous states which 
had agreed to aid Rome in return for aid, but they were 
never called upon for tribute. In Sicily, however, Rome fell 
heir to a dependency, in which the inhabitants were not 
only political subjects, but tenants of the state which owned 
the soil. Would Rome adopt the foreign idea or would she 
extend her own policy of federation ? If she adopted the 
alien principle, she would secure a large annual revenue for 
the treasury and might look forward to the time when she, 
like Eastern states, could shift the burden of tax from the 
citizens to the subjects. But in that case the Roman state 
would no longer be a respected leader of a federation; it 
would be an imperial democracy, exploiting the subject for 
the profit of the sovereign citizen. The temptation of the 
tribute was alluring, and Rome yielded so far that she intro- 
duced the federal idea only sporadically. 

In the year 242, then, Rome secured her first subject 
province and set out on the devious road of imperialism.' 
And since the form of government which she now adopted 
for Sicily was ultimately to be used in a vast number of 
provinces, it will be worth ova while to consider it in some 
detail. The eastern end, of cotu-se, was not included in the 
province imtil after the fall of Syracuse in 212. The prin- 
ciples of sovereignty which Hiero and the Carthaginians 
were exercising in Sicily with such great profit before 242 
were not an invention of theirs. The inscriptions of Asia 
and the papyri of Egypt have revealed the source of these 
principles in the monarchies of the East,^^ which borrowed 
them from Alexander, who in turn had acquired them from 
Persian practices. They appear most clearly in the docu- 



94 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

ments of the Pergamene, the Seleucid, and the Ptolemaic 
kingdoms. In the Seleucid kingdom, for instance, we find 
that the king claimed as a sovereign right personal ownership 
of the soil. The territory in the kingdom was divided into 
two great divisions. One part, inhabited chiefly by Greeks, 
was given over to the cities to govern. Of such land the 
king might disclaim ownership in heu of support and relief 
from governmental burdens. To particularly loyal cities 
he might grant remission of taxes, but from the rest he could 
exact a fixed lump-sum tax apportioned according to popu- 
lation and wealth. The other part of the kingdom — chiefly 
farming country cultivated by native tribes which were not 
organized into cities — the king claimed as a royal posses- 
sion. Choice portions of this he might prefer to treat as 
his personal estate, and sublet, sell, exploit by slave labor, 
or use as himting groimd. On the rest he might permit the 
natives to live as lifelong hereditary tenants upon the 
payment of a tenth or fifth of the yearly produce. The 
territory of the Seleucids therefore was divided roughly as 
follows : 



I. Dependent but autono- 
mous cities 



II. Villages and country dis- 
tricts 



'(a) immune from tax. 

(b) taxed a stipulated sum 
which the city officials 
gathered. 

(c) Royal estates either leased 
to tenants or worked by 
paid labor and slaves for 
the king. 

(d) Tithe-paying hereditary 
tenantry. 



This system Hiero and the Carthaginians seem to have 
adopted, modifying it, however, by extending the idea 
of royal ownership even over the cities of class I, as had 
been done in Egypt. As a result, class (6) practically merged 
into class (d), that is to say, although the autonomous city 
governments of class (6) remained, the inhabitants paid 
their tithes directly to the king's contractors and they were 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 95 

considered the king's hereditary tenants. Class (a) remained 
in Sicily in a few cases at the good will of the king. 

Now, Rome adopted this system — which she called 
Hiero's — with some modifications. The changes were due 
partly to the insertion of some ideas from her own federal 
system, and partly to the desire to elevate some cities which 
had served her in the wars and lower others which had proved 
hostile. The greatest of these changes were instituted 
during the Second Punic war, when the new tyrant of Syra- 
cuse after Hiero's death was deposed for giving aid to Han- 
nibal. Our information regarding Rome's system comes 
mainly from a passage in Cicero's Verrine oration of the 
year 70 B.C. (III. 12-14) • "We accepted the sovereignty 
of the Sicilian cities with the understanding that they 
should continue in the same legal position in which they 
were . . . (i) A very few of them were taken by force of 
arms, and though accordingly their land became Roman 
public property {ager puhlicus) it was given back to the former 
possessors (on leaseholds). The renting of this land is in 
the hands of the Roman censors. (2) There are two allied 
states where no tithes are collected, Messana and Tauro- 
menitmi (in V. 56, he adds a third, Netum). (3) Then there 
are also five cities free from taxes though not allied : Cen- 
turipse, Halaesa, Segesta, Halicyas and Panormus. (4) All 
the rest of the Sicilian land is subject to tithe and indeed 
was so before our conquest even in accordance with their 
own institutions." 

Let us compare this classification with the Oriental group- 
ing given above. Cicero's class (i) is Roman ager puhlicus 
acquired by right of conquest. This had therefore in the 
main been the personal estate of Hiero and the public land 
that the Carthaginian state had owned. When Rome dis- 
placed these powers as sovereign she inherited the direct 
ownership of such tracts. She probably added to them some 
territory confiscated from hostile cities. This therefore 
corresponds to class (c) of the Seleucid scheme. It is to be 
noticed that Rome allowed the existing renters to remain 
on this land whenever they desired to do so. Cicero's 



96 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

class (2) does not correspond to anything in the Seleucid 
system, for it is an extension into Sicily of Rome's own 
federal system: Messana received an alliance like that of 
Naples as early as 264. Tauromenium ^^ secured special 
terms by a bargain in the Second Punic war. Of Netum we 
know nothing. It would seem that Rome's original idea 
was to extend her federal system into Sicily, but that later, 
when she learned how much more lucrative Hiero's policy 
was, she adopted that instead. Cicero's class (3) corre- 
sponds to the Seleucid class (a). Cities immime from tax 
at the good will of the sovereign therefore had probably 
existed under Hiero's system. Rome, however, in adopting 
the idea of the ''immune" city, did not necessarily reward 
the very same cities that the former sovereigns had. She 
had her own reasons for punishing and rewarding. Halassa, 
Halicyas and Segesta received their favored positions because 
they were among the first to declare allegiance to Rome. 
The last named profited in addition because a legend had 
grown up to the effect that it was founded by a remnant of 
the Trojans of Eneas' crew — a story not forgotten by the 
laureate of Rome.^^ It was enriched by an increase of terri- 
tory. "l\niy Centuripag and Panormus were favored we can- 
not say, for they were both taken by storm. Perhaps they 
were rewarded for good services in some later war. Cicero's 
class (4) corresponds to the Seleucid group (d) but also in- 
cludes the group (b) in accordance with the policy of Hiero 
and the Carthaginians. The sovereigns in Sicily had, as we 
have already noted, borrowed from Egypt the idea that 
ultimately all the soil belonged to the sovereign and should 
be taxed directly by him. This class included fully three- 
fourths 2" of the cities of Sicily, a state of affairs which had 
doubtless existed before the Roman invasion. Rome simply 
kept these cities in the same condition as before because 
most of them had neither aided nor withstood her in the 
Punic war. It will be seen, therefore, that the Oriental 
system as modified successively by the Seleucids and Ptol- 
emies, by Hiero and the Carthaginians, was finally applied 
by Rome to Sicily in the following manner : — 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 97 

I. Ager Puhlicus (about 6 communities) owned by the 
sovereign people. 

II. Allied cities (3) members of the Roman federation. 

III. Free cities (5) independent and free from obligations 
on good behavior. 

IV. Tithe-paying communities (about three-fourths of 
Sicily). 

It would be interesting to know whether the senators 
comprehended the theory of state ownership, the practical 
results of which they adopted.^^ Did they claim full owner- 
ship of the soil in Sicily — later lawyers called it dominium 
in solo provinciali — as the Ptolemies did in all the soil of 
Egypt ? In other words, did they at first consider the tithe 
as rent paid by tenant to owner, or as tax paid by the gov- 
erned to the state? These questions we cannot answer, 
but it is probable that in the beginning the Romans simply 
adopted the Sicilian tithe system as they found it without 
formulating the legal principle underlying it. By Augustus' 
day, of course, the theory of state ownership must have 
been accepted, since colonies were then planted in Sicily. 
But it is significant that this was not done earlier, and that, 
for a century after the acquisition of Sicily, the principle 
itself was only sporadically employed in conquered territory 
except when the Romans found it in use before their arrival. 
In other words, the Romans, though ready to benefit by 
continuing the practices of the Oriental idea, long hesitated 
before applying it independently. How further contact 
with this foreign system gradually developed a legal inter- 
pretation of its significance we shall presently see. 

We come now to the practical question which Rome had 
to face in the financial administration of her new possessions. 
The allied cities presented no difficulties, for they were treated 
as the Italian allies had been. The five new "immune" 
cities took care of themselves, and they gradually came to 
be treated like the allies. The Sicilian ager publicus fell into 
the same general category as the land of this nature in Italy 
which the Roman censors rented on leaseholds of various 
kinds. The only difference was that in Sicily prudence 



\ 



98 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

required the retention of the native tenants so far as possible. 
The tithe-papng communities, however, were an entirely new 
problem to the Roman finance department ; and here Rome 
followed the path of least resistance, simply continuing 
Hiero's system -- of tithe gathering and introducing no 
changes not absolutely necessary. Fortunately for the 
Sicilians, Hiero, fearing that his subjects might, if oppressed, 
revolt to Carthage or Rome, had de\dsed a fiscal machinery 
which precluded extortion and abuse. He had not imposed 
a fixed money rent. The reason for this was that, owing to 
the uncertainty of the rains in Sicil}^ and the impracti- 
cability of irrigation, a*ops varied mucli from year to year. 
It was obvioush' loss burdensome to the fanner, therefore, 
if he might doli\'cr in Icind a certain percentage of whatever 
his produce might be. The tax upon cultivated fields was a 
tenth of the Wold, and for grassland it was a stipulated tax 
upon the cattle that pastured there. The tax collecting 
was not done by state officials — the ancient state was 
averse to burdening itself ^ith a pennancnt staff of salaried 
agents — but was fanned out to the highest bidders. In 
Sicily these indi\ddual contractors usually served in com- 
paratively small districts, whether because no business cor- 
poration existed large enough to undertake the whole task, 
or because Hiero for reasons of policy prevented the forma- 
tion of a financially powerful association. Finally, in order 
to prevent extortion — which usually develops in a contrac- 
tor system of tax collection — and in order to retain the 
loyalty of his subjects, Hiero curtailed the powers of the col- 
lectors by proN'iding that local olficials in each cit}?- should 
make up the requisite census of landholders which served as 
a basis for estimates. In this way representati\'es of the 
taxpayer were pro\dded to guard against the gi'oed of the 
collectors, and, on the other hand, officials of the state to 
examine possible misrepresentations of the taxpayers. If a 
dispute arose between collector and peasant regarding an 
estimate, the burden of proof lay upon the collector, and the 
trial must be conducted in the district in which the tax- 
payer lived.2^ This system Rome adopted outright, and, 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 99 

in order that it might remain advantageous to the Sicilians, 
provided that the bids should continue to be made in Sicily 
— not at Rome — and in small lots, so that native collectors 
might continue to contract for the business. Thus Sicily 
was long protected from the publicans of Rome who later 
became so sinister a power in the state ; and even in Cicero's 
day we hear that Sicilian cities availed themselves of the / X 
privilege of farming the neighborhood taxes to save their 
citizens from collectors' profits. 

Regarding the amount of revenue which Rome received 
from Sicily, we are not as well informed as would be desir- 
able. The eight most highly favored cities yielded nothing ; 
the ager publicus yielded of course whatever rental the owner 
could get from it, but this area was a very small part of the 
whole. We are told by Cicero that the yield of the wheat 
tithe in the year 73 — which seems to have been a fairly 
normal year ^* — was worth nine million sesterces, i.e. about 
half a million dollars (with money having about the same 
purchasing power in terms of wheat as to-day : three sesterces 
per modius at the granary). The tithe upon all the other 
products of Sicily would hardly be as much, since the island 
produced mainly wheat. There were also harbor dues in 
the form of a five per cent export tariff and, assuming that 
Sicily could spare for export an additional tenth of her crop, 
this duty would amount to about $50,000. All in all, there- 
fore, Rome collected from Sicily approximately one million 
dollars besides her rentals on public land. If we accept 
Holm's estimate ^^ of 2,500,000 inhabitants for Sicily and de- 
duct about one-fifth of this number for the un tithed portion, 
we may fairly estimate that Rome's revenues from the main 
population of Sicily amounted to about fifty cents per capita. 

Thus far we have dealt only with Rome's method of secur- 
ing and managing the Sicilian revenues ; there still remains 
the question of the political administration of the new pos- 
session. At first Sicily may have remained under constdar 
supervision, though of this we know nothing. By 227, 
however, a characteristically Roman method of adminis- 
tration was invented, which was employed during the Re- 



loo ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

public for all the possessions later acquired outside of Italy. 
Rome had no desire to disturb the city government of 
Sicilian commimities, or to assiune the burden of supervising 
them, but three things she must do. She had to provide 
a military power strong enough to guard the island from re- 
capture, she had to authorize an official to see that the dues 
were legally collected, and she had to have a judicial authority 
at hand to try cases involving her own citizens. For the 
performance of such duties the people were ordered to elect 
an additional prsetor annually. The Roman praetors, in 
theory colleagues of the consuls, had long commanded Ro- 
man armies, and as commanders had exercised high executive 
functions. They had supervised the financial dealings of 
their own military quaestors and for many years they had also 
been given charge of the administration of justice. Thus 
the praetorship combined exactly the functions which were 
called for in Sicily. On the Roman constitutional theory a 
magistrate must have full right to act according to his own 
judgment during his term of office, and the only check upon 
his great power lay in the facts that this term of office was 
brief and that he might be impeached at the end of it for 
any abuse of his authority. Dining his term, however, he 
exercised almost royal authority, and he assumed not im- 
fittingly the place that former rulers had held in the island. 
His military services were not often called into exercise, since 
the prestige of the Roman name was now such that legions 
could usually be dispensed with. In the collection of dues 
he had a certain supervisory function, but was not burdened 
with the details except in disputed cases, when he was re- 
quired to appoint a board of arbitration.^^ The quaestor 
sent by the home government managed the financial details. 
His judicial duties were also limited, for the Sicilian municipal 
courts had jtuisdiction over all cases that involved natives 
alone. The praetor presided only when Roman citizens 
were concerned and in such cases the Rupilian law — passed 
in 131 — provided that the jury must consist of fellow- 
citizens of the defendant, whether he be Sicilian or Roman. 
It seemed, then, that the new province was thus provided 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY lOi 

with an efficient government. Time proved, however, that 
there was one serious flaw in applying the old Roman theory 
of magisterial power to the office of provincial ruler. The 
administrator who abused his powers in dealing with Roman 
citizens was certain to be called to account, but who would 
protect the interests of provincials several hundred miles 
from Rome if the praetor chose to override legal restric- 
tions ? 2^ A special court wherein provincials might air 
their grievances against xmjust governors was presently 
provided at Rome, and the Roman tribunes usually showed 
a commendable zeal — bom of party animosity against 
senatorials — in bringing delinquent governors to the bar of 
justice. Still it was an expensive undertaking to carry cases 
to Rome. It seems now that the interests of the provincials 
would have been better safeguarded by restricting the powers 
of the prsetor to some extent, but the Roman constitution 
was based upon the theory of strong and unhampered magis- 
tracies, and it was difficult to override the conviction that 
mos maiorum was infallible. Suffice it to say that few cases 
of maladministration were reported for a century, i.e. during 
the time when traditions were still sound at Rome. Later, 
when the state's sense of honor was breaking down under 
the stress of revolution, legal checks, whether at Rome or in 
the provinces, would have availed little. 

The cities of Sicily, even those which were subjected to 
the Roman tithe, were left autonomous and continued to x^ 
issue their own coins. In fact, the right of coinage was 
extended to a dozen cities ^^ which had not enjoyed it under 
Hiero and the Carthaginians. The forms of government 
varied in different cities, but they were in general more demo- 
cratic than those which Rome had established in Italy. 
Although a senate (boule) usually existed, it was frequently 
a closed corporation, membership in which conferred dignity 
rather than important power. These city governments 
with their local administration were left quite intact by 
Rome, except that her assumption of sovereignty removed 
once and for all any ambitions which such governments may 
have had with regard to dabbling in the larger problems of 



I02 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

foreign affairs. This fact naturally circumscribed their 
activities and tended to elevate the boule over the popular 
assembly, since the business with the sovereign — usually 
matters of little importance — was more gracefully and ex- 
peditiously transacted by the smaller and more dignified 
body. This does not mean that the senate deliberately 
ptu-sued a policy of oligarchizing the local governments, 
though historians often claim to find proof of such a policy. 
To be sure, several cities which fell into factional feuds 
asked the senate for aid in the writing of sounder constitu- 
tions, and in such cases the envoy sent by the senate was 
likely to bring aristocratic ideas from his own political circle 
at Rome. But even in such instances — for example Halaesa,^' 
Agrigentum, and Heraclea — the Roman lawgiver made as 
few changes as possible, and the Verrine orations are full of 
indications that the Sicilian municipal governments still 
differed radically from the Roman form devised for her own 
foundations in Italy. In such matters Rome usually pur- 
sued a policy of laissez faire. 

Whether Rome made any effort to prevent the growth of 
a communal feeling throughout Sicily by means of com- 
mercial or marital restrictions, as she had among the con- 
quered Latins, we do not know. For some reason, Segesta,^" 
one of the most favored and friendly cities, was closed to 
general commercium, while Centuripas, a city of the same 
class, was not. That is as far as our knowledge goes. There 
may have been a particular reason for the restriction in the 
case of the former city. The closing of a community's lands 
to commercium was far from being an unmixed evil, since 
Sicily was in danger of falling under the bane of the planta- 
tion system. It will be remembered that Segesta had re- 
ceived a grant of territory from Rome and it was well that 
this should not be exposed to the general market of Sicilian 
plantation owners. At least the restriction had a beneficent 
effect, for this city is later not in the list of those distressed ^^ 
by the evils of the latijundia. Is it too much to suppose 
that there were men before the Gracchi who understood 
agrarian tendencies ? 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 103 

If we should attempt to estimate the benefits to the sub- 
jects of the newly created provincial government, we should 
perhaps be assuming a work of supererogation. For, while 
the Romans desired their provinces to be ruled eifficiently, 
they measured results from the point of view of the state, 
not from that of the provincials. The Roman praetor was 
hardly expected to be a director of a charitable organization. 
Yet as prudence must have a seasoning of sympathy to be 
effective, Rome's administration, at least in the early days, 
endeavored to secure the good will of the governed. Of 
the later days of civil war and Verrine brigandage we need 
not speak here, for the Republic was then a wreck, and the 
province suffered less from Verres than did Rome from 
Verres' political master, Sulla. 

On the whole, Sicily, at least western Sicily, benefited 
by the change of sovereigns. In fact the Sicilians showed 
by their readiness to revolt from Carthage in 263 and their 
loyalty to Rome during the Second Punic war that in their 
estimation Rome was the better ruler. Carthage was noto- 
riously a hard taskmaster and it is probable that had she 
gained complete control in Sicily she would have increased 
her tributes and monopolized the Sicilian trade. Rome, 
to be sure, was a firm overlord, but she had the name also 
of desiring to deal justly. Carthage had billeted armies 
and kept up a constant petty warfare on the island. Rome's 
policy was to strike hard till a war was over and then main- 
tain peace by her very prestige. Sicily had never before 
known an era of peace such as followed the Roman occupa- 
tion. With security, freedom from armies, and exemption 
from levies,^2 the islanders were more than repaid in material X 
gains for the moderate sum that was sent to Rome in 
tribute. 

Various chance references to Sicily indicate that the gov- 
ernment did something by way of safeguarding the provin- 
cials from the greed of Rome's own citizens. We are told 
that the praetor was carefully restricted in the matter of 
accepting gifts and in making purchases.^^ He had not 
even the right to buy himself a slave in the province except 



I04 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

to fill a vacancy in his service. The provisions for native 
jurors in the praetor's courts,^ for native censors and tax 
collectors, and for special courts to hear the cases of provin- 
cials against their governors, all these things prove that the 
sovereign state entertained enlightened views upon its 
responsibility as a master. 

The governors of the province for the first century of its 
history represented the best type of Roman. The first 
pr^tor was the famous democratic leader Flaminius, and 
his services to the Sicilians were long remembered with 
gratitude. Valerius Lsevinus, who governed the province 
for three years during the Hannibalic war, gave much of 
his time to the encouragement of agriculture. The elder 
Scipio Africanus was wise enough to see that social inter- 
course with the Greeks and sympathetic regard for their 
customs gained the allegiance of the provincials without 
belittHng the governor. His heir, Scipio ,^milianus, who 
finally razed Carthage, invited the Sicilians after his victory 
to reclaim from the spoils of Carthage whatever had once 
belonged to them. In fact, the list of Sicily's governors 
included most of the great names of the period. ^^ It 
would be hard to imagine that imder such men the prov- 
ince would have been exploited for the profit of Roman 
citizens. 

The few scattered references in Roman authors that bear 
upon the matter seem to indicate that the senate did not 
further the special interests of Roman land seekers in the 
province. Just as the tax farming was largely left in Sicilian 
hands, so too the land remained in their possession. No 
Roman or Latin colony was sent to the island during the 
Republic. Some of the vacant lands of the west were given 
to Segesta.^^ After Morgantia revolted during the Second 
Punic war, the city was colonized by a Spanish troop, and 
the vacant Agrigentine lands were given by the senate to 
Sicilians of other cities. About the same time Rome sent a 
proclamation to Greece to be read at the Olympic games 
promising their former estates to all Greeks who had emi- 
grated for fear of the Hannibalic war. Finally, Rupilius in 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 105 

131 resettled with Sicilians the city of Heraclea which had 
suffered in the Servile uprising. 

But if the new regime had wrought changes in Sicily, 
how much more profound were the effects of the acquisi- 
tion of this, her first province, upon Rome. When the 
Sicilian quaestor sent the home market nearly a million 
bushels of wheat per year, he supplied about a third of 
the demand which had hitherto been satisfied by farmers 
near the city. The land released from grain production 
usually fell into the hands of capitalists engaged in cattle 
raising and fruit cultiure, and the steadier population of 
smaU-farm owners diminished in the rustic wards about 
the city. 

No less significant were the social changes after the war. 
The nobles of Rome who had campaigned in Sicily for so 
many years had often established their headquarters in the 
splendid Greek cities of the island, and there they had been 
initiated into the refinements of an old culture and an at- 
mosphere of art and letters which shamed them into new 
ambitions. In Hiero they found a willing cicerone who 
must have experienced a cynical satisfaction in displaying 
the triumphs of Greek culture to his conquerors. In the 
theater of Syracuse he doubtless showed them performances 
of Euripides and Menander; in the temples, the master- 
pieces of Praxiteles and Apelles ; in the libraries, histories 
which contained even the legends of early Rome — some 
of which probably the Romans themselves did not know. 
All this made no small impression. A year after the war a 
Roman schoolmaster was asked to translate some of the 
Greek plays so that the Roman games might have something 
better than races and fights to offer, and presently Hiero 
was invited to Rome to see how well his lessons had been 
learned. It is not surprising that Livius began with trage- 
dies from the Trojan cycle, when Segesta had already profited 
by flattering Rome with a myth of common descent from 
Troy. Presently too a soldier who had campaigned in 
Sicily wrote the story of Rome — her first native work — 
in a pedestrian imitation of Homer's epos; and senators 



io6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

who had doubtless learned the language in Sicily embellished 
the dry, priestly records of Rome with their best Greek so 
that the cultured world might know that Rome had a his- 
tory of which to boast. It was in the Pyrrhic war that 
Rome had first become conscious of her existence, and in 
the Sicilian war she found the need for self-expression and 
the ambition to take her place among the culttu"ed nations 
of the Mediterranean. 

Most of all was Rome's political policy affected by the 
conquest, not so much by what the Romans learned of 
Greek political science as by the inevitable consequences of 
owning and ruling a tribute-paying dependency. The prof- 
its accruing to the treasury were sure to tempt the populace 
to new conquest; and in expanding further the Romans 
must soon embrace peoples that could manifestly never be 
included with credit in the citizen body. They must then 
abandon the principle which had in a larger sense justified 
the continuance of a progressive extension of Roman law 
and order through Italy, and adopt a rule based upon the 
claims of superior force. The wisest of the Romans saw 
very early that consuetude in ruling a politically inferior 
people for profit must endanger Roman character, coming 
as it did before the nation had time to shape for itself a 
humanizing culture capable of counteracting the poison of 
insolence. The self-complacency with which the conquerors 
viewed their subjects overseas soon expressed itself in a 
new attitude toward their Italian allies. In their eyes the 
Italians now began to sink to the plane of subjects, and the 
promises of the great statesmen of 340 were in danger of 
being forgotten. Living in such an atmosphere, the con- 
quering Romans could hardly discover that their city-state 
was not, like the imperial monarchies, adapted for empire ; 
that a populace which gained dominion over subject races 
by means of armed force was merely creating a military 
power that would ultimately turn upon the state itself and 
subject it also to the position of servitude it imposed upon 
others. At present they only reveled in the discovery of 
"how glorious a thing it was to rule." 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 107 

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI 

1. Polybius, the most accurate of Roman historians, opens his work 
with a brief account of this war. Unfortunately, we must confess that 
his sketch — as is to be expected of an introductory epitome — is 
far from complete and bears the marks of dealing with chronological 
sequence in a summary manner. Meltzer's Geschichte der Karthager 
is the fullest modem account of the war. Beloch's Griech. Gesch. Ill, 

I, 664 S., contains an excellent sketch. See also Heitland, Roman 
Republic, I, p. 193, with a tinge of British imperialism in its philosophy; 
Hokn, Geschichte Siciliens, III ; Niese, Griech. und makedon. Staaten, 

II, 174 ff. ; Schermann, Der erste Punische Krieg; Reuss, in Philologus, 
XIV ; Varese, in Studi di Storia Antica, III ; and Meyer, Der Ausbruch 
des erst. Pun. Krieges, 1908. 

2. Philinus, the pro-Carthaginian historian of Sicily, said there was, 
but Polybius looked into the matter and found that Philinus was mis- 
informed, Polyb. Ill, 26. Philinus as secretary of a Carthaginian 
general was by no means an impartial reporter, see linger in Rhein. 
Museum, XXXVII, 153. 

3. Polybius apparently thinks it was unseemly for Rome to ally 
herself with a state founded by freebooters. III, 26. In this he is only 
repeating one of the arguments of the aristocratic opposition to the war 
as he found it in Fabius (Polyb. I, 10). I doubt not that some senators 
opposed the war on this ground, and the senatorial writers like Fabius 
could weU afford to make much of an argument so specious when later 
explaining their opposition. But it coidd never have been anything 
but a plausible pretext to cover the real conviction that the alliance 
was imprudent for other reasons. States do not consider circumstances 
of twenty-five years past, they must deal with existing nations as they 
find them ; and Messana was in 264 a recognized treaty-making power. 

4. Both Polybius (I, 11), and Diodorus (XXIII, 4) are obscure on 
this point. The only established fact is that there was no Punic garri- 
son in Messana when the Romans arrived. 

5. It is easy to see that the urban plebeians would imagine that 
various benefits might come from further conquest. More land would 
be opened, grain would be cheaper because connections with Sicily 
would be established, and plunder would be available. But I doubt 
whether real economic pressure was evident. Rome had recently been 
sending all her surplusage of population to colonies, and there was still 
unsettled land available in the ager Gallicus and near Beneventum. 
We may also doubt whether the majority of the voters — who must 
have been farmers — cared to see grain prices drop at Rome, their 
best market. 

6. Since Claudius was not granted a triumph by the senate despite 
his victories, I infer that the senate did not approve of his course of 
action in settling the dispute by force. 



io8 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

7. Strabo (802) notes that Carthage sank foreign vessels which sailed 
in her mare clausum. See also the Carthaginian treaties with Rome, 
Polyb. Ill, 21-4. It must be remembered that these were drawn up 
by Carthage to further her commerce, and that Rome, still an insignifi- 
cant agricultural state, was satisfied to accept pretentious but useless 
privileges in return for what she gave. 

8. Polyb. (I, 7) says that this is one reason why Rhegium asked 
Rome for a guard in 282. 

9. Ed. Vah. 223, cf. Livy, XXXI, i, App. Claudium consulem qui 
primum bellum Carthaginiensibus intulit. This reiteration seems to 
indicate that Claudius was the leader of the jingoes. 

10. The name of Claudius does not appear on the triumphal fasti 
for the year 264. 

11. Polyb. I, 20. 

12. The building of this fleet is described with great admiration by 
Polybius, I, 20-23. Reid, The Municipalities of the Roman Empire, 
p. 26, notes, however, that the corvi which Polybius admired so much 
had been used by the Athenians in the Sicilian expedition. 

13. The copy of the honorary inscription raised to Duilius is well 
known, Dessau, I. L. S. 65. 

14. See discussion in Nissen, Ital. Landeskunde, I, 365 ; Leuze in 
Klio, X, 420; Eliaeson, Beitrage zur Gesch. Sardin; and the oldest 
Scipionic inscription, Dessau, /. L. 5. 3. Rome probably held Corsica 
from this time, even though we do not find it mentioned in extant ver- 
sions of the treaty of 241. 

15. Polyb. I, 63, records the loss of 700 quinqueremes, and each had 
an average of 120 marines and 300 in crew (Pol. I, 26). See Tarn, 
Journal Hell. Stud. 1907, who estimates the loss at 500 ships. 

16. Polyb. I, 62 : Appian, Sic. 2. 

Hiero was still king of Syracuse and Rome's "friend" in 241, but 
his heir lost the kingdom to Rome in the Second Punic war by giv- 
ing aid to Hannibal. The eastern end of Sicily was then reorganized 
by Rome, and I shall speak of Sicily as it was after the whole of it had 
become a province. 

17. Rostowzew's study of Rome's provincial land theories {Studien 
zur Geschichte des Rom. Kolonates) is a brilliant work which displaces 
all previous discussions upon the subject. An inscription of Sardis 
of great importance to the discussion has recently appeared, published 
by Robinson in A. J. Arch. 1912. For Sicily see Rostowzew, pp. 229- 
40. Since Rome's system for Spain and Sardinia — which had been 
wholly Carthaginian — required a fixed money payment from each 
city, it is probable that Carthage did not exactly follow Hiero's method. 
Rome, however, adopted Hiero's system for the whole of Sicily. 

18. Appian, Sic. 5. 

19. See Vergil, ^neid, V. 718. The story was known to Thucydides 



ROME AS AN IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY 109 

VI, 2, 3) and the Segestans probably made the most of it. Cicero, 
Verr. IV, 72, also refers to it. 

20. All of the sixty-five civitates of Sicily except five liherae et im- 
munes, three foederatae and the very few (perpaucae) censoriae of Verres 
III, 12. I cannot agree with Hohn, Gesch. Sicil. Ill, 375, that there 
were twenty-five censoriae. Perpaucae could hardly refer to more than 
a half dozen. Besides not many cities had been taken by storm and 
some of these (Agrigentum, Leontini, Henna and Hybla) are clearly not 
censoriae. 

21. The old view that Rome always based possession of the soil on 
conquest has been thoroughly refuted by Rostowzew {op. cit.). Kling- 
miiller's attempt to revive it in Philologus, LXIX, 71, is unsuccessful. 

22. Verr. Ill, 14. 

23. Ibid. 38. A convenient brief discussion of the lex Hieronica is 
found in Holm, Gesch. Sicil. Ill, 373. 

24. Perhaps somewhat above the average ; Verr. Ill, 40, 7. 

25. The estimates vary from four million to Beloch's very low fig- 
ures of 1 1 million. See Holm, III, 243. Of course there were also 
many slaves in the third century, but there is no possibility of estimat- 
ing the number of these. 

26. Verr. Ill, 28. 

27. Later praetors — about the time of Sulla — discovered the fol- 
lowing method of extortion. The senate gave the praetor a certain 
sum with which to buy grain in Sicily for his troops. It also set the 
price at which he was to buy. Some thieving praetor found, however, 
that by ordering the whole amount needed for the year at once upon 
his arrival — that is, in the spring when grain was twice the usual price 
— the farmers would rather pay the difference in silver than deliver the 
grain at a price below the market value. The senate at home was so 
occupied with factional struggles that it failed to correct such abuses 
and the extortion passed into a recognized privilege, Verr. Ill, 181 ff. 
Verres went a step farther and demanded the money outright as his 
due. 

28. See Head^, Historia Numorum, 115. 

29. Agrigentum was given a new constitution by a Scipio (Africanus 
in 205, or Asiagenus in 193), Heraclea, by Rupilius in 131, and Halaesa, 
by a Claudius in 95, see Verr. Ill, 122-25. 

30. See Verr. Ill, 93 and 108. 

31. Verr. Ill, 120. 

32. Sicily was exempt from the regular levies to which Italian allies 
regularly contributed, but in times of stress was occasionally asked for 
volimteers : Livy, XXXV, 2 ; XXXV, 23, for the defense of Sicily ; 
XLIII, 12, soo socii navales; Messana was bovuid by her treaty to 
furnish one ship, Verr. V, 51. 

33. Verr. IV, 9. 



no ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

34. Verr. Ill, 28. 

35. Flaminius, Livy, XXXIII, 42; Laevinus, Livy, XXVI, 40; 
XXVII, 8, 18; Scipio Africanus, Tac. Ann. II, 59; iEmilianus, Diod. 
XXXII, 25. Holm, p. 513, gives the list of Sicilian praetors. After 
the Gracchan times we hear of maladministration: Carbo (114), 
Servilius (102), Aquilius (loi), Lepidus (80), and Antonius (76) were 
brought to court for abuses in Sicily. Some of them, however, were 
charged with military misconduct, and Cicero's statement may be true 
that the Sicilians had not publicly accused a governor before Verres. 

36. Segesta, Verr. V, 125; Morgantia, Livy, XXVI, 21; Agrigen- 
tum, Verr. II, 123 ; Heraclea, Verr. II, 124. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 

The Hannihalic War 

The liberal democratic movement that had gradually 
raised the plebeians to the political plane of the patricians 
by the year 287 and had manifested such propensities for 
new experiments, for political adventures, and for territorial 
increase imtil 260, was apparently checked during the sober- 
ing and oppressive war. When the times called for closely 
reasoned plans and varied experience, it became the senate's 
duty to assume the burden of direction. And so in the 
treaty of 241 and in the subsequent administrative schemes 
devised for Sicily one finds a shrewd and farsighted senate 
providing for the treasury and the national resources, instead 
of a popular assembly distributing profits and advantages to 
individual citizens. 

The colonization of the period tells the same tale. Dur- 
ing the last ten years of the war two or three small citizen- 
colonies had been placed on the Etruscan coast, apparently 
to prevent the Punic fleet from effecting a landing there, 
and it was doubtless for the same reason that a "Latin" 
colony was planted at Brundisium in 241. In addition to 
these, a small citizen-colony was placed at ^sis on the 
Adriatic: a "no-trespass" warning to the lUyrian pirates, 
who had been raiding the region and of whom the Romans 
presently had to take further cognizance. Immediately 
after the war the full franchise was given to the Sabini and 
Picentes, thus extending the city of Rome de jure across the 
peninsula to the Adriatic. Thereby the last two of the thirty- 
five tribes, the Quirina and Velina, were formed. The act 
was a graceful and liberal recognition of the worth of these 

III 



112 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

sturdy mountaineers who had fought side by side with the 
Romans in the last war. In the same year a Latin colony 
was sent to Spoletiiun in southern Umbria. Its purpose 
was apparently to serve as a point of security in the im- 
mediate rear of Falerii, which had proved refractory this 
very year. Therewith ended colonization for over twenty 
years. The heavy losses in Sicily and the consequent drain 
upon the population naturally put an end to demands for 
land, and the few Roman colonies of the time were foimded, 
as we have seen, only in response to pressing military needs. 
The spirit of adventure and expansion was manifestly in 
abeyance. And yet that that spirit could readily be stirred 
into flame by a slight spark is proved by the Sardinian epi- 
sode which we must now examine. One of the surprising 
things about the Punic treaty was that Rome had not de- 
manded Sardinia. To Rome, now that Carthage was a 
bitter enemy, this island, within a few miles of Roman Cor- 
sica and within easy striking distance of Rome, seemed to 
be a menace. Its omission from Rome's demands is only 
explained upon the hypothesis that in 241 Roman inter- 
national politics were relatively simple and that questions 
which would instantly occur to modem diplomats versed in 
foreign and domestic intrigue did not as yet fall within the 
range of Rome's knowledge. 

When the mercenaries of Carthage who had been denied 
a part of their promised stipend mutinied and her Libyan 
subjects revolted because of the oppressive tribute imposed 
upon them, the Punic garrisons stationed in Sardinia also 
mutinied and declared the island free from Punic rule. 
They even sent to Rome offering to place the island in her 
possession, but Rome refused to consider ^ the offer. In 
fact, Rome was at the time inclined to conciliate Carthage 
and to help her in her present difficulties. At a protest from 
Carthage Rome imdertook to prohibit Italians from aiding 
the revolting mercenaries.^ , Upon the release of the offend- 
ing Italians she bought up and sent back all Carthaginians 
who were in servitude in Italy, and, as Polybius goes on to 
say, "responded generously to all requests that were made." 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 113 

It is hardly a brilliant, even if widely accepted, conjecture, 
that this behavior of Rome's was due merely to a desire to 
keep alive a nation that still happened to owe her a paltry 
1500 talents. If measured by shekels, how could such a 
sum compare with the advantages that would accrue from 
the destruction of Carthage ? The policy was rather directed 
by a conservative group of men who happened to be in control 
of affairs at the time and who genuinely desired to regain 
the friendship of Carthage. With the annual change of 
magistrates, however, a change of administrative front 
towards Carthage was wholly possible. 

Carthage, indeed, was prepared not to surrender Sardinia 
to her rebels without a protest. She sent an army to regain 
the island, but her troops joined the mutineers and the 
general was put to death. "Thus Carthage lost Sardinia," 
says Polybius,^ as though the Pimic claims were thus dis- 
posed of. Some two years passed without any further 
effort on Carthage's part to reestablish her rule on the 
island. In fact, she was using every available man in the 
struggle at home, and the Romans began to hope that the 
mutineers in Sardinia would be able to consolidate their 
power to such an extent that Carthage wotdd abandon 
every effort at reclaiming the island. And it is not improb- 
able that if they had succeeded in establishing a firm govern- 
ment Carthage would not again have risked an attack. But 
the troops proved to be poor masters : they fell into quarrels, 
and were presently driven out by the natives. The fugi- 
tives then placed themselves at the service of Rome, asking 
the senate to take over their claim to the island. Their 
title was, of course, a trifle dubious, suggesting somewhat 
the treaties between intoxicated African chiefs and Euro- 
pean traders upon which modem European nations have 
parceled out large parts of a continent. Rome realized 
that Sardinia, under discordant native rule, would not long 
maintain its independence if Carthage chose to reconquer 
it, and she accordingly accepted the offer and took posses- 
sion. Carthage, however, now rid of her civil war, pro- 
tested that she had prior claims. It is possible that a modem 



114 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

cotirt of arbitration would decide that a two-year cessation 
of efforts under stress of such difficulties would not entail a 
forfeiture of rights. But of course the question was not 
submitted to arbitration. The quarrel which ensued ended 
in Rome's declaring war, and a struggle was averted only 
by Carthage's siurendering her claims, and, in addition, 
paying an indemnity of a further 1200 talents. Rome 
thereupon took possession of Sardinia, without, however, 
making any serious effort for several years to impose her 
rule upon the natives. It was enough for the present that 
the Punic fleet should no longer have occasion to cruise in 
Italian waters.^ 

The incident is highly important in showing that Rome 
was acquiring (doubtless under the tutelage of Hiero who 
knew more about the world's diplomatic ways) a wider 
view of her possible interest in neighboring lands. It shows 
also to what extent the senate was ready to disregard the 
plain dictates of justice for the sake of attaining its own ends. 
Measured by modem standards, the seizure of Sardinia was 
the act of an imprincipled bully. It would, indeed, be un- 
just to rank it with — shall we say, the recent occupation of 
Tripolis — for Rome could, after all, with not a Uttle show 
of reason, have advanced the plea that Carthage had aban- 
doned the island. It would perhaps be fairer to compare it 
with the order of the United States which compelled Colom- 
bia to renounce her claims to Panama, a few days after the 
revolt of the straits-republic. But more important than 
an odorous comparison is the judgment of Polybius (III, 28), 
who lived soon after the act and who, in a political life full 
of varied experiences, had met with many deeds that were 
worse; who, too, was ready to forgive Rome much, and 
yet condemned this as having no reasonable pretext or jus- 
tification. For Rome the chief results of the affair were 
that it killed the better feeling which for some time had 
promised to arise between the two states and that it fur- 
nished a successful rallying cry to the party of aggression 
at Carthage, the party which finally rushed the state into a 
war of vengeance against Rome. 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 115 

How the political parties in Rome aligned themselves on 
the Sardinian question we do not know. In fact, there is 
no reason to suppose that the division on the question followed 
party lines. However, before long, a discussion arose which 
divided the populace from the senate in the old manner. 
In the year 233 a tribune of the plebs, Gaius Flaminius, 
urged that the so-called ager GalUcus, from which the Se- 
nones had been driven some 50 years before, be divided into 
small farms and assigned to citizens who desired such allot- 
ments. The senate, led by Fabius, opposed the measure 
vigorously, but Flaminius nevertheless carried it by a vote 
of the tribes.^ Of course post-Gracchan writers attributed 
the senatorial opposition to a desire on the part of the sena- 
tors to keep the land open for profitable leaseholds, but it 
is very doubtful whether many senators were as yet in- 
volved in distant investments. The senate could bring 
forth serious objections to the law on several counts. It 
might hold that the state should not surrender a good source 
of revenue for the benefit of individuals. It might dislike 
a reversion to the old scheme of viritane allotment which 
sacrificed the more compact colonial system, particularly 
since the allotment had to be made so far from home. What 
could Roman citizenship mean to individuals some 200 miles 
from the city? Furthermore, the proposed assignment 
would disregard the principle followed so strictly since the 
Latin war of sharing new acquisitions with the allies in the 
form of ''Latin" colonies.^ There even seems to have been 
a charge that this legislation would disturb the social order, 
perhaps for the alleged reason that it would give public 
property to the listless who had lost their possessions and 
did not deserve state aid, and, doubtless, for the less openly 
expressed reason that laborers would be scarce at Rome if 
they were given lands of their own. At any rate, Polybius, 
who must have obtained his account from the history of 
Fabius and interpreted it in the spirit of his senatorial . 
friends at Rome, calls this act "the first step in the corrup- / \^ 
tion of the people." ^ We are not here concerned directly 
with the social import of this measure, but it touches the 



ii6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

problem of imperialism at two points. In the first place, 
the resumption of viritane assignments of conquered land 
to Roman citizens shows that the old habit of sharing all 
conquests with allies had now been suspended. Secondly, 
the distribution of lands to the poor of Rome by the demo- 
cratic government introduced a very expensive paternalistic 
principle — carried to its extreme by the Gracchi — which 
tended to make imperialism a necessity. For, once the 
conviction had gained a foothold that every Roman citizen 
ipso facto had a right to a plot of ground, the state was forced 
to surrender its revenue-producing domain within Italy to 
the crying populace, and, in order to reimburse itself, to ex- 
tend its tributary domain outside of Italy. To be sure, the 
evolution of this principle was slow, but the year 233 sees 
the birth of it in the assignment of the Gallic lands. 

About this time Rome became involved in the first act of 
a farce which later ended in a dramatic episode of serious 
import. Dining the third century the Illyrian ^ tribes of 
what is now Albania had been gathered into a sort of mon- 
archy, and from neighboring Greek colonists they had learned 
enough of seamanship to make fairly successful pirates. 
The Macedonian kings alone were shrewd enough to under- 
stand that by employing their services one could escape their 
depredations. Italic merchants had often appealed to 
Rome to suppress these marauders, but the senate was little 
concerned in maritime matters and let things drift. When 
finally about 230, Teuta, the Illyrian queen, fitted out a 
whole fleet of pirates, which seized the chief city of Epirus 
and from this station plundered the eastern shipping of 
Italy, the senate sent two envoys with the demand that the 
brigandage be stopped. To this the queen rejoined that 
she was not inclined to restrain her subjects from their cus- 
tomary occupation. When, thereupon, one of the envoys 
deHvered his ultimatum, he was seized and put to death. 
Now of coiirse the senate had to act and a Roman fleet quickly 
broke up the pirate-queen's power. The three Greek com- 
mtmities which she had taken — Corcyra (Corfu), Apol- 
lonia, and Epidamnus — were set free and joined the Ro- 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 117 

man alliance ; a part of the kingdom was given to a petty 
prince, Demetrius of Pharos, whom we shall meet again; 
Teuta was required to pay Rome tribute for the portion she 
retained in order to remind her of her past, and Rome her- 
self kept two strongholds that she might command the 
situation in the future. After this settlement Rome sent 
embassies to the Greek states most nearly concerned to 
annoimce the terms of the treaty and explain her course. 
The Achaean and .^tolian leagues thanked her heartily, and 
Corinth voted to invite Rome to take part in the Isthmian 
games. 

However, after a few years' association with royalty,^ 
Demetrius grew as ambitious as he was simple-minded, and 
when, in 219, he saw that Rome was engaged in a GaUic 
war, assuming that she cared little for the lUyrian rocks, 
he began to take possession of the whole region — even the 
part formally subject to Rome. Vengeance followed 
speedily, ^milius Paullus in a short campaign drove the 
kinglet into banishment, added the island of Pharos and the 
stronghold of Dimale to Rome's possessions, and appor- 
tioned the rest appropriately among petty princes of the 
region. Thus Rome first crossed the Adriatic. The in- 
cident is worthy of notice both because it shows a new policy 
of protecting Italian waters, and because it proves that the 
senate avoided the acquisition of territory east of the Adriatic 
except for policing purposes. 

This period is noteworthy also because of a new contest 
with the Gauls. ^ For half a centviry after the expulsion of 
the Senones in 284 the Gauls left Italy undisturbed. But 
in 238 some Transalpine peoples entered the Po valley where 
they were joined by the Insubres (living near modem Milan) 
and the Boii (the founders of Bologna) for a raid upon Italy. 
Apparently the same thing occurred now as during the Sam- 
nite war when the Celts of the Po saved their own possessions 
by diverting immigrant tribes upon Italy. The threatened 
raid ended, however, in a quarrel among the Celts, and Italy 
was spared. A few years later the movement was again set 
on foot, provoked perhaps by the fact that the Romans were 



ii8 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

then settling their public lands south of Ariminum.^" This 
time the invaders mustered an unusually large host, and 
great was the terror at Rome. A census of able-bodied men 
immediately available for service was taken all through 
Italy and an enormous army of over 150,000 men was sent 
out to meet the enemy in Etruria.^^ The consuls won a 
decisive victory at Telamon (225) and followed this up 
by invading the enemy's country, hoping, it seems, to 
crush the tribes of the Po once and for all so that peace 
would be definitely assured in the future. The Genomani 
(who lived near Verona) and the Veneti, a non-Celtic tribe 
inhabiting what is to-day the district of Venice, joined the 
Roman alliance. The Boii submitted to terms after a severe 
defeat in 224. But with the Insubres Rome kept up the 
struggle for two years, even after they had offered terms of 
peace. Then the two tribes surrendered some of their 
territory (upon which the Latin colonies of Placentia and 
Cremona were settled in 218) and submitted to tribute. 

It is difficult to determine now what attitude the Romans 
assumed towards these barbarians during this period. Polyb- 
ius (II, 35) speaks of them much as the American colonists 
spoke of the Indians in the seventeenth century : as of 
creatures that have no rights in law, and are the legitimate 
prey of any civilized nation. But Polybius was a Greek. 
It seems to be true that Rome desired more than the mere 
submission of the Insubres. She continued the attack ap- 
parently with the purpose of weakening the tribe till peace 
should be assured.^^ But she probably rested this purpose 
upon the plea that the history of Gallic raids necessitated such 
action and not upon a general theory of the inferiority of the 
barbarian, as the Greek might have done. Proof of this 
attitude is the fact that the peaceful Genomani and Veneti 
were never disturbed ; their right to the possession of their 
land was recognized, and they were finally admitted to 
Roman citizenship. We shall recur to this subject later. 
At present it is only necessary to remember that this Gallic 
war had serious consequences, since the two hostile tribes 
revolted again as soon as Hannibal arrived in Italy, and 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 119 

gave him invaluable support through the whole war, es- 
pecially by lending him cavalry. 

We now reach the Second Punic war, the importance of 
which could not readily be overstated. Who has not at his 
finger tips a list of the "remote and immediate causes" of 
this struggle? Because of the supreme importance of the 
event, it is desirable in this instance to examine the validity 
of the general belief that the two nations involved could not 
brook rivalry and that the subjection of one or the other of 
them was an a priori necessity. Such a view takes for 
granted that both nations were bent upon conquest at all 
costs. This misconception will best be refuted by a full 
statement of the causes, but it may be worth while to point 
out that it has its origin, not in a study of Roman history, 
but in a misapplication of Oriental, as well as of more modem 
ideals, to Roman methods. Before the history of the eastern 
states — Babylonia, Egypt, and Persia — was as thoroughly 
studied as it now is, the possibility existed of loosely grouping 
their political ideals with those of Greece and Rome and 
arriving at the popular generalization that the "ancient" 
state was imperialistic in a sense that, since the creation of 
the modem "concert of powers," no longer exists. Now it 
is true that the eastern monarchies were generally imperial- 
istic. The empire of the East was seldom a nation of one 
tongue, one race, one worship ; it was held together artifi- \ 
cially by its ruler and his effective instrument, a mercenary \ 
army. Conquests which brought tribute — the sinews of 
the ruler's wars — were absolutely essential to the life of 
the dynasty.^^ How different was the Greco-Roman city- 
state whose very origin lay in the homogeneous small group 
which constituted its own army, paid its own expenses, and 
chose its own magistrates from its own body ! Even in such 
a state, of course, greed for conquest might arise, but it would 
manifestly go against the grain, for the citizen himself must . 1 
shoulder the danger and the cost, and the conviction is ever N( 
present that expansion is suicidal, for the city-state constitu- 
tion must go under with the acquisition of dependencies. 



I20 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

The monarchical form, on the other hand, was adapted to 
and Hved by conquest and the monarch compelled his sub- 
jects to fight for it. Obviously a general comparison be- 
tween ancient monarchies and repubUcs ^* in this respect is 
wholly misleading. 

Certain modem parallels have also led to a misimder- 
standing of Greco-Roman ideals. ImperiaHsm has acquired 
a momentum in medieval and modem times which it did not 
have in the third century b.c, and we must guard against 
projecting present-day convictions into that period. The 
factors in the development of modem imperialism are several 
— none of which ever influenced Rome. In the first place, 
the chvirch, representing a religion that demanded world-" 
wide recognition, must of necessity, so soon as it claimed 
temporal power at all, set up the demand for universal 
empire. Secondly, the awe-inspiring ideal of the Roman 
empire inherited through Charlemagne, not only by the 
central "Holy Roman Empire," but more locally by France, 
was for centuries an example, comparable to which nothing 
existed for the Roman repubhc. And thirdly, modem em- 
pires have been built up by monarchical dynasties directed 
by the same driving force which vitaUzed the old Oriental 
monarchies. But the Romans of the third century had no 
such imperialistic backgroimd. To them the history of the 
great Oriental monarchies was a closed book. The one great 
conquest of which they knew anything had proved unsuccess- 
ful, for Macedonia was then weaker than before Alexander's 
day. Even the Diadochian powers which professed to follow 
Alexander had reached a modus vivendi which much resembles 
our "concert of powers." It is safe to say that the idea of 
>- universal power never occurred to any Roman ^^ before the 
Punic war. He was accustomed to a world of petty city- 
states which owned a few square miles outside their walls 
and did not ask for more. If, therefore, we hope to under- 
stand the groping, sttimbling, accidental expansion of Rome, 
we must rid ourselves of anachronistic generaHzations and 
"remote causes" and look instead for the specific accidents 
that led the nation imwittingly from one contest to another 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 121 

until, to her own surprise, Rome was mistress of the Medi- 
terranean world. 

In order to weigh these causes correctly it will be neces- 
sary to review the western policy of the two states interested 
in Spain at this time, Massilia and Carthage. In the early 
sixth centtiry a Greek colony from Phocaea in Asia Minor, 
settled Massilia, a town not far from the mouth of the 
Rhone. This city qtdckly grew wealthy in bartering with 
neighboring tribes and established ntnnerous trading stations 
along the coast from Nice to Spain. It showed no desire 
for empire, wishing only to have the privilege of trading in 
peace. Presently, its traders established posts in Spain for 
the interchange of goods with the Iberians, among them 
Emporiae ^^ and Rhodae in the north, — two flourishing 
towns in the third century. Other stations for the same 
purpose were established much farther south, in the region 
where New Carthage later ^'^ stood. With the arrival of 
Carthaginian merchants, however, came the new principle 
of trade monopoly. Southern Spain became a part of the 
Punic empire, and Punic ships patrolled the waters, sinking 
any trader of a foreign nation that dared appear.^^ Naturally, 
there was trouble between the shippers of the two peoples, 
and in the end the Massiliots lost their ports in the south. 
Now the significance of this struggle is due to the fact that 
Massilia was one of Rome's closest friends and most loyal 
allies. It is said that Massilia stored Roman gifts in her 
treasure house at Delphi as early as 396 b.c.,^^ and that she 
helped Rome to pay the ransom exacted by the Gauls in 387. 
The old statue of Diana on the Aventine was a copy of the 
Massilian Artemis. Throughout the Punic war the Mas- 
silian fleet appears to have been the mainstay of Rome's 
navy and, in fact, it won the severest naval battle of the 
war, if we may believe a recently discovered ^° fragment of 
Sosylos. It was apparently Massilia ^^ that introduced 
Rome to the Ilian alliance in Asia Minor, which, as it turned 
out, served to open a way to participation in Asiatic politics. 
Finally, in pajTuent for many favors, when Massilia was 
attacked by barbarians in 154, Rome sent an army which 



122 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

liberated the city ,22 and won for it an extension of territory, 
and special trading privileges among the Gauls. 

Carthage was all the while pursuing her own purposes in 
Spain. An early trading treaty ^3 with Rome (dating about 
348) had forbidden Roman vessels to trade beyond Mastia 
in southern Spain, and, as we have seen, about the same 
time Carthage blocked the Massiliots from their posts some- 
what north of this point. For a century, the Punic con- 
quests in Spain progressed slowly. But immediately after 
the great war with Rome, Hamilcar Barcas, filled with bitter- 
ness at the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, set out to establish a 
Punic power in Spain. There can be little doubt that his 
intention was to secure control of a sturdy population for 
the Punic army rather than revenue for the treasury ,2* and 
that his prime motive was to bring a war of revenge against 
Rome in return for the defeats he had suffered. He met 
with striking success, for his generalship was superb and his 
rule was firm, though not oppressive. When in 229 he fell 
in battle, Hasdrubal, a member of the same family, succeeded 
to his command and carried on the work of winning over the 
Iberian tribes even more rapidly than before. The Massiliots 
realized, of course, that these Carthaginian victories would 
soon deprive them of all their Spanish trade — for no other 
nation could trade where the Punic standard was planted. 
There can be little doubt that it was Massilia ^s that drew 
Rome's attention to Spanish affairs. She had gradually 
lost a large part of her Iberian trade and in a year or two her 
flourishing colonies of Emporia and Rhodae would doubtless 
go under. If Rome cared little for the question of open 
ports in Spain, the Massilians had other ways of arousing 
her interest. They could urge that a Punic attack upon 
Emporiffi would be a declaration of war against Massilia, 
which, in turn, must involve Rome because of their alliance ; 
and she could din into the ears of Roman senators the re- 
ports that were current in Spain that the ultimate purpose 
of the Barcids was a war of revenge upon Rome. Her di- 
plomacy was effective, at any rate. Rome became thoroughly 
concerned about Punic advances in Spain, and sent envoys 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 123 

to Hasdrubal in 226 with requests for a treaty defining that 
"the Carthaginians shoiild not cross the river Iber in arms." 
Rome obtained what she desired and presently, in pursuit 
of the same poHcy of anticipating Carthaginian success, she 
entered into a defensive aUiance with Saguntum,^^ an inde- 
pendent Iberian city of considerable strength, a hundred 
miles south of the Iber. 

Thus matters stood when, in 221, Hannibal, the young 
son of Hamilcar, succeeded to the command of Spain. He 
at once subdued the whole peninsula as far as the Iber, with 
the exception of Saguntum, and then, at the head of a 
splendidly trained army, in accordance with the plan and 
purpose that his father had taught him from youth,^^ he made 
ready to bring on a war with Rome. Saguntum, as it hap- ■ \ 
pened, offered a plausible excuse, for it had committed some 
hostile act against a Spanish tribe that was allied to Carthage. 
By picking up this quarrel, Hannibal hoped to force a decla- 
ration of war from Rome and throw the onus of the ensuing 
conflict upon his enemy. If the declaration came from 
Rome, Carthage would be forced to support him, which it 
certainly would not do if he invaded Italy on his own initia- 
tive, for the Punic aristocracy which lived by trade strongly 
favored peace. The capture of Saguntum would, further- 
more, wipe out the last unfriendly people in his rear, 
would enable him to close the harbor to the Roman navy, 
and would secure him the booty with which — according to 
Polybius — he hoped to mollify the home government and 
equip his army for the long march. He accordingly attacked 
Saguntum in 219 when the Roman consuls were busy in 
Illyricum, and, after a siege of eight months, captured it. 
The Romans sent envoys to Carthage, demanding the punish- 
ment of Hannibal and, upon the refusal of their request, 
declared war. 

What then were the causes of this war ? Livy and Appian, 
who wish to exculpate Rome, recklessly state that Hannibal 
broke the treaty of 226 by crossing the Iber to attack Sagun- 
tum, not knowing that the city lay a hundred miles south of 
that river. Polybius belittles Hannibal's provocation to 



124 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

attack Saguntmn and holds that Carthage should have 
based her grievance upon the seizure of Sardinia twenty 
years before. This seems to be a very peculiar argument from 
a statesman of Polybius' experience, for ancient states did 
not assimie the pri\'ilege of annulling old treaties on the 
ground of severity any more than modem states do. Most 
modem historians assert that Rome's alliance with Sagim- 
tum was an infraction of the spirit at least of the Iber treaty ; 
for they assinne that the treaty defined the Iber River as 
the boundary of the Punic and Roman "spheres of influence" 
in Spain. ^ This, I think, is a grave misconception of third- 
century international poHtics. Rome had made the Sagim- 
tine alliance several years before the war, and yet not a 
word of protest had been raised against it. Hannibal 
attacked Saguntimi, not on the groimd that the Sagimtine 
alliance encroached upon the Punic sphere, but on the 
ground of the wrongs committed by Saguntimi against 
Spanish allies. In no ancient source is there the slightest 
indication that Carthage considered her rights in Spain to 
have been infringed -^ by the Saguntine treaty. Polybius, 
in his very full discussion, does not hint at such a theory. 
In fact he definitely assumes that Rome had full power to 
make any alliances she chose with free states in Spain, and 
asserts that all such alHes were entitled to seciuity by the 
terms of former treaties. Nor did Rome know anything of 
the modem doctrine of "spheres of influence," although it 
may have had some meaning for the ancient monarchies of 
the eastern Mediterranean. Rome's alliances showed in 
general an abhorrence of loose ends, and always insisted 
upon clear definitions of boundaries. A penumbra of un- 
defined influence over a hinterland of unexplored territory 
would have been entirely beyond her understanding at that 
time. She had hitherto dealt with a patchwork of innu- 
merable city-states and tribes whose petty areas in every 
case were precisely defined. She had signed at least a 
hundred alliances with such states, and the jurisdiction of 
each of these hundred treaties was clearly and definitely 
known. Not one of them assumed any kind of influence or 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 125 

interest beyond the precise boundaries of the signatories. 
Accordingly, although an affair like the Saguntine alliance 
would call for immediate protest in a day of Monroe Doctrines 
and African protectorates, there is no reason to suppose that 
in the third century, when it occurred, it involved any in- 
fraction of rights or that it could, in any way, have offended 
Hasdrubal and Hannibal, except in so far as it revealed 
Rome's success in gaining an ally coveted by them. 

The cause of the war, therefore, was neither desire for 
world conquest on the part of either power, nor a dispute 
over predominant influence in Spain.^" The nations came 
to blows because the Barcid family — whose war poHcy had 
met with defeat in 242 and 238 — were able to keep alive 
the bitter feelings aroused by former defeats and to discover 
a situation at the right moment whereby they could force 
their government to support a raid of vengeance upon Italy. 
If a brilliant son of Hamilcar Barcas had not survived to 
carry on the policy of his father till the favorable moment 
arrived, there is not. the slightest reason for assuming that 
Rome and Carthage wotdd not have found a modus vivendi 
in the same way that the neighboring powers of the eastern 
Mediterranean had. 

The purposes of the two contestants are fairly weU re- 
vealed by subsequent events. Rome, upon whom an un- 
welcome war had been thrust ,^^ made no move to acquire 
territory in Spain. She simply tried to end matters by a 
quick thrust. Knowing that the Carthaginian government 
had been inveigled into the contest against its wishes, she 
ordered her whole army and navy against Africa,^^ wisely 
reasoning that Carthage would quickly recall Hannibal if 
hard pressed. Rome doubtless intended if successful to 
demand an indemnity and end the affair. Against Hanni- 
bal's veteran army of 50,000 she sent only a mere 10,000 new 
recruits,^' whose object it was to worry the enemy and hold 
the mountain passes until the main army in Africa should 
accomplish its mission. 

Hannibal's designs are also made clear by his early 
maneuvers. Not daring to rely on the home government 



126 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

for transports, he chose the hazardous land route through 
Gaul and the Alps. When once in Italy, he hoped to double 
and treble his army with the Gallic tribes of the Po which 
had recently been at war with Rome. He did not intend to 
destroy Rome and make Italy a dependency of Carthage, 
for the terms of his alliance vnth Philip of Macedonia,^'* 
made in the heyday of his greatest successes, prove that he 
assimied Rome would continue a strong power. But he 
did hope to humiliate her and to cut oflE her northern and 
southern allies in such a.way that her power would be defi- 
nitely limited. He did not even hope to gain tributary 
empire in Italy, for he knew, of course, that Rome's allies 
would not leave the Italian federation except upon better 
terms than they were already enjo}'ing. What he actually 
promised the south Italian aUies ^^ was absolute autonomy 
under Pimic protection, a form of alliance that would have 
brought little benefit to the Carthaginians, who already 
enjoyed the ordinary rights of commerce in southern Italy 
and who would scarcely have dared to propose the establish- 
ment of a commercial monopoly there. It was, therefore, 
not a war of extermination nor of conquest. ^^ Its purpose 
was simply to administer a thorough humiliation that would 
wipe out the disgrace of former defeats. 

The war was the severest test of endurance that the Roman 
repubUc had yet had to face. Hannibal made his way to 
Italy with such speed that the senate was obliged to recall 
the African expedition and itself assume the defensive. 
The brilliant Carthaginian with his veteran army made 
quick work of Rome's raw recruits. At Trebia he drove the 
consul off the field mth a loss of 20,000 men, and the next 
year trapped the unwary Flaminius at Lake Trasimene, 
where 40,000 Romans were lost. When, however, he called 
upon Rome's allies to accept his protection, he found to his 
surprise that there was no response. Then he threatened 
devastation of their lands and marched the length of Italy, 
spreading havoc, but still the allies remained loyal to Rome. 
In battle, however, he had not lost his cunning, for at Cannae 
(216) he drew the consuls into an engagement where the 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 127 

largest army Rome had ever mustered was completely de- 
stroyed. Rome lost 70,000 men that day ; and eighty sena- 
tors were among the dead. After Cannae, when even Roman 
nobles were ready to give up in despair and consider taking 
refuge in Greece, it is not surprising that there were some 
defections among the allies. The Lucanians, Apulians, and 
Bruttians declared for Hannibal, and, worst of all, Capua, 
whose forty thousand men regularly fought in the Roman 
contingent, deserted to the conqueror. Then came word 
that the Gallic garrison of 10,000 had been wiped out, that 
Philip of Macedonia was fitting out a j3eet to join Hannibal, 
and that Hiero, the generous ally in Syracuse, had died and 
that his heir was ready to yield to Carthaginian bribes. 
Half of Rome's citizens were lost, and a large number of 
her allies. New troops were raised wherever possible ; eight 
thousand picked slaves were armed for service," and promised 
freedom for good work. A double tribute was levied on all 
citizens, state loans from citizens and aUies were raised by 
mortgaging pubhc property ; and, in order to build a fleet 
against Philip, an additional graduated property tax was laid 
upon the wealthier citizens. Finally, the state appropriated 
all trust funds of widows and orphans, taking upon itself 
the payment of the trustees' annuities. The drain was 
terrific and promised to continue a long time, for Rome had 
learned that Hannibal was not to be met on the field by any 
chance consul with raw recruits. The state, besides provid- 
ing an army ^^ that coidd watch Hannibal, was obliged to 
keep a second army in Spain to block the road against 
Spanish reenforcements ; it had to guard northern Italy from 
Gallic raids, to protect Sardinia and Sicily from Punic attack, 
to lay siege to Capua and Syracuse, lest defection shoiild 
seem to go unpunished, to patrol the Adriatic with a fleet 
in order to prevent Philip from sailing, and, finally, to watch 
Carthaginian waters lest Punic aid reach Hannibal. For 
ten years the state persisted doggedly in this Fabian poMcy 
of holding its own until the enemy's prestige should wane 
and resources be found for a direct attack upon Carthage. 
Finally in 205 the legions brought Hannibal to bay in southern 



128 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Italy. Then by a supreme effort the state raised a new 
vohinteer army, equipped it from the gifts of all the Italians, 
and sent it imder the younger Scipio to invade Africa. There 
after a year of hard drill Scipio faced the enemy, and vic- 
torious in two battles, he forced the Carthaginians to sue 
for peace. According to the tenns of the treaty which the 
Roman senate and people ratified,^ Hannibal was to evacuate 
Italy, Carthage was to cede Spain to Rome, pledge herself 
to pa}' a war indemnity of 5000 talents, and, further, to sur- 
render her war vessels and give hostages until the treaty 
obligations should be fulfilled. However, before the terms 
had 3-et been put into operation, the Carthaginian navy, 
whether emboldened by the return of Hannibal, or whether 
through anger at the thought that the na\y must be aban- 
doned when peace was estabHslied, deliberately attacked 
some Roman transports. The Punic government supported 
its na\^", and even Hannibal now refused to advocate peace 
on the terms originall}- offered. There was nothing to do 
but to face Hannibal once more in the open field, and 
at Zama, in 202, Scipio succeeded in winning a brilliant 
victory over this general who had never before suffered 
defeat. 

The terms '**' which Scipio now offered, and which Carthage 
accepted, were much severer than before. The indemnity 
was doubled, and Nmnidia was declared independent of 
Carthage and given to Prince Masinissa, who had aided 
Rome. Carthage bound herself to carry on no wars outside 
of Africa, and to submit her disputes within Africa to Rome's 
arbitration. These new additions were, therefore, quali- 
tative as well as quantitative. The treaty of 203 had 
asstmied that Carthage would continue as a sovereign state 
with an empire very nearly as large as she possessed after 
the First Punic war. The treaty of 202 not onl}^ lopped off 
half of this empire, but made Carthage in fact, if not in name, 
a Roman dependency — and all the more helpless since her 
nearest neighbor was to be an ally of Rome. The treaty 
did not stipulate that Carthage must fiunish a contingent 
for Rome's army — in other words, she was not made an 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 129 

ally — but within a few years Carthage came to realize that 
although the position of socius might im^jose certain duties 
and would formally mark her as a Roman dependent, it 
nevertheless brought with it the advantages of Roman pro- 
tection. At any rate, a few years after the war, Carthage is 
found in the list of Rome's allies.^^ 

Rome came out of the terrific struggle with great glory, 
but many of her losses were irrepara?jle, and her gains proved 
a burden. The conquest of Spain had been a political 
necessity during the war, since it alone could furnish the 
enemy with new recruits, and its retention afterwards was, 
of course, the only conceivable coiirse, but for two centuries 
this new province cost the state more than it yielded. The 
Barcids, in order to acquire Spain for military purposes, had 
imposed only a very light tribute and Rome cotdd not 
expect to win it from Carthage if she incTeased these imposi- 
tions. Consequently, the Spanish tribute was always ex- 
tremely low — only half a tithe upon its poorly tilled fields.^^ 
Furthermore, the Spanish tribes were far from ripe for polit- 
ical responsibilities and they had no love for an orderly 
regime. The negotiations of the sovereign encountered 
constant difficulties owing to the fact that the people were 
divided into innumerable tribal groups. No sooner had a 
Roman general sworn a treaty with a tribe than it reshaped 
itself Proteus-like into another form of state and disclaimed 
participation in the preceding agreement. The policing of 
Spain degenerated into an undignified and costly guerrilla 
warfare, disgraced by schemes and stratagems. The Roman 
generals learned to deal in the tricks dealt them. Nowhere 
did Roman warfare and diplomacy descend to such devious 
ways as in Spain. But we shall come to this again. Suffice 
it to say that at various times during the following century 
the Roman senate would have been relieved to hear that the 
whole peninsula had disappeared under water. 

The havoc wrought in southern Italy was irreparable. For 
twelve years the Romans and Carthaginians had driven 
each other over this region, both sides storming cities and 
laying waste fields as the best methods of tiring and weaken- 



I30 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

ing their opponents. The inhabitants who did not enroll in 
one army or the other were captured or driven to other lands. 
When the war ended much of the territory south of Bene- 
ventum was a waste tract, and most of the famous Greek 
cities on the coast were reduced to a mere handful of poor 
creatures who huddled together in any comer of their city 
walls that happened to be left standing. The waste land — 

y perhaps two million acres — Rome appropriated as being 
without claimants. But what could she do with it? Her 
citizen body had been reduced by half and if any remained 
who had no farms of their own, they could find enough near 
home, for land in Latium went begging on the market. 
Colonists were not easily found, and yet the state had to 
find settlers to hold its former conquests in the Po valley if 
this troublesome frontier was to be protected. Somehow a 
few citizens and allies were presently collected for a resettle- 
ment of the Latin colonies at Cremona and Placentia near 
the Po, and for the foundation of Latin colonies at the 
southern cities of Thurium and Hipponium (henceforth 
called Copia and Vibo) ; and when Antiochus of Syria in 
194 threatened an expedition against Italy at the advice of 
Hannibal, maritime colonies were sent to hold the exposed 
seaports of Bruttium and Apulia. But these colonies used 
up all the state's available men and disposed of but a fraction 
of the waste territory. The state accordingly tried to devise 
a scheme that would provide for the speedy development of 
the rest. The impoverished resources at hand precluded the 
possibility of reestablishing intensive farming, but it was 
argued that if the state would lease large tracts of its land 
upon easy terms, citizens might be induced to contract for 
such leaseholds for the raising of cattle and sheep. Ranches 
would require but few hands ; they could be manned with 
slave labor, if free labor was not available; their products 
could be marketed more readily than grain, and the state 
would soon be receiving considerable returns from land now 
useless. The scheme was adopted, and the terms made 
attractive. Leaseholds of five hundred acres *' — or even 
of a thousand acres, if the contractor had two children — 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 131 

were Differed, in order that all the land might soon be made 
productive. 

There can be little doubt that this method of exploiting 
the land was the wisest possible at the time. But it later led 
to the irremediable evils of the plantation system with its 
concomitant evils of slave labor ; and it prevented the 
healthy development of more productive farming when 
Rome's population was again increasing.^ And yet how 
could the inexperienced government of 200 know that Rome's 
population would soon reach normal proportions, that it 
would be difficult to recover the leased lands for coloniza- 
tion, and that the landlord system, once firmly intrenched, 
would become well-nigh impregnable, to the permanent exclu- 
sion of the small farm ? Nor did the senate foresee that 
Rome would one day govern a score of foreign provinces 
whose armies must draw their strength from Italian farms 
if the state was to survive. Rome did her best to meet the 
situation in the light of past experience, but the problem 
created by the war was too complicated, her experience too 
inadequate, and later the harm done was beyond repair. 

In the Roman constitution the war wrought few changes. 
The newly acquired province of Spain *^ readily fell into the 
form of government shaped for Sicily. The federation in 
Italy had stood the endurance test better than coiild have 
been anticipated, and the senate saw no reason for intro- 
ducing any innovations there. In fact, because of the general 
satisfaction, the senate even grew negligent about making 
several well-deserved promotions towards citizenship. The 
old city-state government at Rome had proved itself versatile 
enough to meet the exigencies of the war. To be sure, the 
early losses on the field had been appalling, and it is usual 
to assert that these heavy losses were due to an oligarchical 
system which placed annual civil magistrates at the head 
of the army.*® This criticism is not entirely justified. The 
senate, as a matter of fact, did not adhere to the constitu- 
tional principle very closely. Just as soon as a commander 
had proved himself efficient, he was kept at the head of the 
legions until his work was done.*^ The old oligarchical 



132 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

jealousy of the popularity of individual generals was effec- 
tively suppressed. The two elder Scipios, Marcellus, Sem- 
pronius, and Otacilius were kept in service until their death. 
Fabius and Marcellus were elected to the consulship five 
times and repeatedly held promagistracies in the intervals. 
Valerius served in the field tininterruptedly for ten years. 
In the case of the younger Scipio the disqualifications of 
age were overlooked in order that he might carry the war 
into Africa, and after he arrived there he was kept in charge 
until the war was over. In fact, the constitution was so 
liberally interpreted that it did not in any way obstruct the 
selection of the best men. The difficulty lay rather in find- 
ing any man who could face so brilliant an opponent, for it 
is not every generation that begets a Hannibal. Even if 
Rome had possessed a large standing military staff, the 
chances are that ranking officers would have proved incapable 
of meeting the extraordinary test, and that this war, like 
most modem wars, would have had to find its own general. 
It cannot be said then that this crisis in Rome's history had 
proved the oligarchical constitution woefully at fault. On 
the whole, the senate and the people both came out of the 
struggle well satisfied with their government and its conduct 
of the war.^^ The senate had special cause for satisfaction, 
since it emerged with its prestige enormously increased, and 
was able for the next twenty years to rule Rome practically 
single-handed. 

But perhaps the most portentous result of the war lay 
in Rome's new consciousness of her strength. The struggle 
had revealed an unknown power of endurance, of loyalty, 
and of persistence in the temper of the Roman people. It 
had demonstrated that the constitution held the state's 
resources at a point of quick response. It seemed to prove 
that the nation was unconquerable. If Rome soon grew 
impatient with the tedious methods of older powers that 
merited her respect, if she began to command where she 
should have followed, if she betrayed an itching desire to 
impose her form of polity upon neighbors who failed to 
conduct a businesslike government, and if, finally, supremely 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 133 

contented with the workings of her constitution, she ceased 
to remold it to growing needs, how much of this overweening 
faith in herself was not due to that proud consciousness of 
her strength which was borne in upon her on the hard road 
from the Trebia to Zama ! 



NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 

1. Pol. I, 83 and 88. Even Utica near Carthage asked Rome to 
accept sovereignty over that city. Rome was bound by the treaty of 
242 not to make aUiances with the subjects of Carthage. 

2. Such action would be taken as a matter of course to-day, but our 
modem rules of neutrality are not old. They are largely due to the 
efforts of Thomas Jefferson. See United States Statutes at Large, I, 381. 

3- I. 79- 

4. Velleius, II, 38, says that T. Manlius Torquatus subdued the 
natives in 235. The island, together with Corsica, was placed under 
a special praetor in 227, as was SicUy. It is probable that tithes were 
then imposed. However, during the Second Punic war, about 215, 
the Sardinians rebelled, probably because they were ordered to give 
extra supplies of grain to the then bankrupt state (Livy, XXIII, 32, 9). 
Upon being reconquered they were subjected to additional oppression 
{Ibid. XLI, 6). They seem, in fact, to have been reduced to the same 
class as the civitates censoriae of Sicily, if we rightly understand Cicero, 
pro Balb. 41, and pro Scauro, 44. 

5. Pol. II, 21, and III, 80. A public landmark dating from the 
Gracchan period has been found in the Ager Gallicus (C. I. L. I, 583), 
proving that Flaminius did not distribute all the public land there. 
Probably there were not enough settlers for all of it. 

6. As late as Gracchan times this point was raised as an objection 
to viritane assignments. See Appian, Civ. Wars, 1, 10, and Lex Agraria, 
1. 31 (C. I. L. I, 200). To be sure, the ager Gallicus had not been shared 
with the allies at the time of its conquest, except that a portion had 
been used for the Latin colony at Ariminum, but the senators probably 
held that when the time for division came it must be shared in the old way. 

7. For the Illyrian affair see Pol. II, i ff., and Niese, Griech. und 
makedon. Staaten, II, 281. 

8. Pol. VII, 9. 

9. The Gallic war is reported in Pol. II, 21-35. For a good summary 
of the Gallic wars, see Niese, s.v. Galli, in Pauly-Wissowa, and Lauter- 
bach, Untersuchungen zur Gesch. Oberital. 

10. This is the explanation of Polybius, II, 21, which, however, is 
not entirely satisfactory. The aristocrats, Fabius and Scipio, from 
whom Polybius obtained his facts, apparently were very severe on the 



134 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

reputation of the democratic leader, Flaminius. As senatorials they 
opposed the distribution of the agcr Galliciis and were all too ready to 
prove that the distribution of this land caused the calamities of the 
Gallic war. Polybius' censure (III, 8i) of Flaminius is unduly bitter. 
We must remember that the Transalpine migrations of the Celts which 
for two centuries had exerted pressure southward from the Black Sea 
to Spain were not yet over. 

11. Polybius, II, 24, has preserved a summary of this invaluable 
document. The number of able-bodied Italians is given as 770,000. 

12. Reid, The Municipalities of the Roman Empire, p. 73, calls 
Flaminius a great expansionist. Doubtless several ideas of the Gracchi 
as well as of Cassar had their origin in the schemes of this independent 
democratic leader; but in Gaul Flaminius seems to have followed the 
senate's orders. The attack upon the Insubres in 224-2 was a neces- 
sary answer to the Gallic invasion of Italy, and the most persistent 
campaign against the Insubres was led not by Flaminius but by the 
aristocratic consuls of 222, Marcellus and Scipio. It is also to be noted 
that the conquered territory was settled by " Latin " colonies at Pla- 
centia and Cremona, a fact which points to senatorial methods. 

13. Even Polybius (XI, 13) saw that republics were naturally anti- 
imperialistic, while monarchs were driven to a policy of expansion. 

14. On imperialism in Greece and the Hellenistic empires, see Fer- 
guson, Greek Imperialism, 1913. 

15. To be sure, Polybius represents Scipio Africanus as saying in 
his harangue to his soldiers before Zama that they were fighting for 
the "supremacy of the world" (XV, 10). Polybius, who wrote sixty 
years after the event, could hardly have had a report of the speech. 
Scipio's whole career proves him an anti-imperialist. The first treaty 
he signed with Carthage in 203 recognized that state as independent. 

16. See their coins in Head", Hist. Num., p. 2 ; on excavations see 
Schulten in Neue Jahrbiicher, 1907, 334. 

17. Strabo, III, 159. 

18. Strabo, XVII, 802, quotes Eratosthenes (early third century) 
to this effect. 

19. See Christ, Sitz. bayr. Akad. 1905, p. 80. 

20. Edited by Wilcken in Hermes, 1906, p. 103. See also Polybius, 
HI, 95-6- 

21. This I think a reasonable inference from the close political con- 
nections existing between Marseilles, Lampsacus, and Rome in 196 B.C., 
as proved by a Lampsacene inscription: Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscr. 
Graec.^ 276. 

22. Pol. XXXIII, 8, 12. For an attempt at a correct understanding 
of this affair see Am. Hist. Review, XVIII, 236. The war in question 
was undertaken by Rome wholly on Massilia's behalf and all the 
profits of the conquest fell to Massilia. 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 135 

23. Considering Rome';; clorjc connections with Massilia, it Is not 
unreasonable to assume that Carthage is here adding a clause in Rome's 
treaty which was devised chiefly for Massilia; Pol. Ill, 24, gives the 
treaty. 

24. Since Rome later received only half a tithe as tribute in Spain, 
it is probable that the Punic tribute had aLso been low. 

25. The Roman historians naturally forgot the important r61c of 
Massilia in the earlier proceedings, since Rome eventually assumed the 
whole burden of the quarrel. However, Appian, Hann. 2, knew that 
"Greeks settled in vSpain" first appealed to Rome against Punic en- 
croachment, and these were, of course, the clients of Massilia. 

26. The Massiliot traders may well have suggested this course to 
the Saguntines, since a Roman alliance would insure an "open door." 

Polybius (III, 30) places the alliance several years before 221, but 
apparently after the Iber treaty. The city was Spanish, as the excava- 
tions prove, not Greek, as the annalists thought. But it was strong 
and well governed, Pol. Ill, 17. 

27. Pol. in, ir, 12. 

28. E.fi. Heitlanrl, The Roman Republic, I, p. 223 ; Niese, Rom. Gesch.*, 
p. 110, footnote 2 ; MelLzer, Gesch. dar Karlkagnr, II, 421 ; Kromayer in 
Hist. Zeilschr. 1909, p. 237 ; Ed. Meyer, Kleine Schriflen, p. 269. 

29. Polybius (III, 29) goes so far as to claim that the Carthaginian 
government repudiated the Iber treaty on the ground that Hasdrubal 
was not authorized to make it. 

30. When the war opened, Rome sent only a small detachment to 
Spain with the purpose, not of conquering the peninsula, but of holding 
back Spanish reenforccments until the war should be settled in Africa. 

31. Polybius informs us that there were no discussions at Rome, for 
the reason that the war was thrust upon the state and could not be 
avoided (I II, 20). It would be futile, therefore, to look for party align- 
ment in regard to this war. 

32. Pol. Ill, 41. 

33. Pol. Ill, 40. 

34. Pol. VII, 9. Kromayer, Hist. Zeitschr. 1909, p. 237, has pointed 
out the importance of this document in judging Hannibal's policy. 

35. Pol. Ill, 77 and 85; VII, 4. 

36. Hannibal hoperl, however, to win back the western half of 
Sicily (Pol. VII, 4) and probably Sardinia. 

37. For these various measures, see Livy, XXII, 57 ; XXIII, 21, 31, 
49; XXIV, II, 18. The socii navales furnished but few ships: Livy, 
XXVI, 39 ; Tarn, in Journal Hell. Studies, 1907, p. 48. 

38. Livy, XXV, 3, seems to exaggerate when he estimates the citi- 
zen army for the year 212 at 23 legions. However, there must have 
been at least 15, stationed as follows: 4 with the consuls, 2 as city 
reserve, 2 with Pulvius in Apulia, i with Claudius, 1 in Etruria, i on 



136 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the Gallic frontier, 2 at Syracuse, i on board the fleet operating in 
Greek waters, and i in Sardinia. Besides these, Gracchus had the 
8000 ex-slaves in Lucania, and Lentulus had in Sicily the fugitives from 
Cannae who had lost their citizens' rights. The Scipios in Spain prob- 
ably had only allies. 

39. These terms are given indirectly by Pol. XV, i, 7, 8. The por- 
tion of Polybius in which the matter was discussed has been lost. 

40. Pol. XV, i8. 

41. Livy, XXXVI, 4, 10, de classe Carthaginiensibus remissum 
praeterquam si quid navium ex foedere deberent. 

42. Livy, XLIII, 2, 12. 

43. The first reference to this law occurs in a speech of Cato (Gellius, 
VI, 3, 37) delivered in the year 167. It was doubtless passed soon after 
the Hannibalic war. I believe this law was made for the purpose of 
quickly developing southern waste lands. To accomplish this object 
the senate freely allowed tenants to assume larger leaseholds than the 
law specified. It is well known that this practice brought intense 
dissatisfaction in the Gracchan days. This is, of course, the famous 
law which the annalists erroneously credited to Licinius and Sextius 
of 366 B.C. Cardinali, Siudi Graccani, 1912, believes, however, that the 
annalistic account is accurate. 

44. It required several decades, however, before Rome became over- 
crowded again. During the three decades after the war, Rome's citi- 
zen body increased only 25 per cent, whereas the acreage of ager Ro- 
manus increased 100 per cent. See Am. Hist. Review, XVIII, p. 245. 

45. The only practical difference was that the civitates were allowed 
to pay Rome specified sums as tribute (in this case, based upon an esti- 
mate of half a tithe on produce) instead of an annual percentage in 
kind. This was the usual Seleucid system, probably established in 
Spain by Carthage. The cities were, therefore, stipendiariae rather than 
decumanae. Of course there were favored cities in Spain as well as in 
Sicily : several foederatae, some liberae, and many which, at an early day, 
secured the privileges of Latin cities. See Marquardt, Staatsverwal- 
tung, I, 251. 

46. E.g. Heitland, The Roman Republic, I, p. 227. 

47. The record of Marcellus, the hero of Clastidium (222) is as fol- 
lows. He entered the service as praetor, 216, and was stationed near 
Capua; retained there as proconsul, 215 ; consul, 214, but still serving 
at Capua ; as proconsul transferred to take charge of the siege of Syra- 
cuse, 213; remained there, 212 and 211, when he captured Syracuse; 
reelected consul, 210, and sent against Hannibal. Kept in command 
till his death in 208. 

48. Party animosity practically vanished during the war so that an 
"era of good feeling" ensued which it is difficult to parallel in Roman 
history. The senate constantly consulted the wishes of the assemblies, 



THE FEDERATION PUT TO THE TEST 137 

for example, in the changing of the money standard and the appoint- 
ment of a monetary commission in 217 and 216, in the election of a 
board of public works in 212, and in the proroguing of magistrates in 
208. On the other hand, the assembly sometimes delegated its duties 
to the senate, as in the matter of ptmishing the Capuans in 210 (Livy, 
XXVI, 33). This harmony between the parties lasted until Cato se- 
cured the downfall of Scipio. 



CHAPTER VIII 

SENTIMENTAL POUTICS 

The Punic war was not yet at an end when envo5rs* 
catno from Eg^-j^t ^ and --Etolia cotnphiiuing of nnwnn-ntitod 
inouraons upon their territory by the ininil}' rhih[> V of 
Macedonia, Rome's recent foe. They desired Rome to aid 
them. Pi-esently Rhodes and Attains sent envoys with 
similar messages and appeals. Lastly eame Athens. Her 
land had been aitaeked, she had no anny, her other friends 
had already been rendereii helpless. Here was a door 
opened to Rome leadinj; to the whole world of eastern 
polities. The appeal was tlattcMiiij; for it proved a wide- 
spread respect for her power as well as a snrc faith in her 
reliability. 

The political confusion in the East that Rome was in- 
\ntcd to help disentani;le was not an ordinar}'- one. For a 
number of )ears there had been a kind of "concert of powers" 
which had more or less sucet^ssfully dominated the ^Egean 
world. Wliile the three kingdoms, Macedonia, Syria, mid 
EgjTDt, composed of fragments of Alexander's empire, had 
fought one another to a point of equilibrium, the old Greclc 
city-states had largely reestablished their freedom, and had 
been able to \\an over art increasing nmnber of cities for the 
\area of autonomy. These free states pronnilgated the par- 
ticularistic'' principle of the aneient Greek city-state and 
during the third century seeutwl its tacit adoption by the 
monarchies that found such dtiriculty in forgetting Alexan- 
der's example of conquest. In order to understand Rome's 
participation in the politics of this old world it becomes 
necessary to review the situation of the more important 
nations composing it. 

The two most important republics of tliis group were 

138 



skn'I'imi-:n'iai. f'omtics 139 

Rhodes and Athens. Athens had not regained her autonomy 
until 229, when Ach.'ea paid the recjuinsd f^riee to Maeedonia 
for her liI>(;r.'i.tion ; and yet heeavise of fier j^reat past and 
hee.'uise of tli(! niiiriher of i>iihli(ri;;ts in her serviee, she amid 
do ;;oni(;l,liin)^ toward ereatinj^j puhlie of)inif)n and toward 
holdinj^ (lir.cord.'uit elements to^^ether in a (;omrrion eaus(!. 
Thus she. w.'is influential, even though wliolly negligible in 
arms. 

Rhod(;s' strcnj^.h in the earlier days w.'is a direct produc;t 
of the " Royal " jKsaee and. its tendeneies (387 u.o.). Lixior tho 
state f(;1I tmder Macedonia's sway, but in 305 it asserted, its 
right to .'uitonomy by splcmdiflly nisisting the attack of 
IJeincitrius. Me.'inwhih!, Ivliodc:, Ii.i.d iMown strong, not 
only b(!cause of its situation iipf^n iJic line of Mediterranean 
commen-e, but also because; <')f its rea(hn(!SS and ability to 
beeoin(; tlu! carrier of that coninuwci!. II, was of j)rime 
imporl,an(;(; to this republic Ui,-i,l, the "concert of powers" 
^;llf)nld encourage peru^^ .11 id |)ro;;pcril,y in the; (eastern end of 
l,l)c Mcditerranci.an and tluit ambition!; (h:r.\i<>\.v. r.lionld be 
kejit from gaining ])(jwer enough to mono|joli/A; LIkj trade 
or to c;lo;;c .'iiiy of the harbors of the Tli^gc.'m and the Pontus. 
But Rhodes deserves better than to Ix; weighed in the 
economic scale and listed upon the kidger as purchasable 
in drachmas. This community of merchants must have had 
many statesmcm of sterling worth among its leadcTs. 'J'hat 
no (jre(!k state; was ever more trusted, is shown l)y the num- 
ber of app(!als it received to arbitrate international dis[)utcs, 
and OIK! has only to rernemb(;r how the whole Greek world 
sent it ri(;h gifts with which to restore the city that fell in 
the earth((nake of 224 to nialize in what esteem and respect 
it was held. RIkkIcs may sc(;m at times to have been ofTicious 
in h(;r \\)U-.rh'.rv.ur.v, with belligerents, since; she even under- 
took to pronoinicc; judgments and. demand re[)aration from 
the side; she; d(;e;meei in the; wrong. Yet he;r ne;ighbors had 
Ic.'iriicd that Rhoeles' decisie)ns we;re usually fair, that what 
sh<^ d(;,ir(;d. was the prevention of useless anel unjust wars, 
and tli.'it ;;he; had no S(;he!m(;s for te;rritona1 aggrandizeiincnt 
hiding in the folds of her diplomacy. Other republics of 



V 



140 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

some note, several of which were accustomed to act in unison 
with Rhodes, were Chios, Mitylene, Byzantium, Cyzicus, 
and Heraclea. 

In the Peloponnese, the Achaean league, comprising about 
ten democratic city-states, was the strongest and most re- 
spectable power. At the beginning of the third century, 
when the Diadochi were quarreling over the fragments of 
Alexander's kingdom, a few of the cities of the Peloponnese 
had tmited for mutual defense and had invited their neigh- 
bors to rid themselves of Macedonian garrisons and co- 
operate with them. Thus the Achaean league had originated. 
It met with moderate success throughout the third century, 
and occasionally made some effort to include in its member- 
ship all the cities of the peninsula, for it reaHzed the value of 
reaching a natural boundary on every side. At the same 
time, however, the league restrained undue ambitions, and 
deserved more friendship from its neighbors than it actually 
received. Its great misfortiuies were that Sparta, its nearest 
neighbor, was for a long time in the hands of tyrants with 
whom peace was impossible upon any honorable terms, 
that a Macedonian garrison had to be admitted into the 
strategic city of Corinth, whereby the league became de- 
pendent upon the will of Philip V, and, finally, that under 
its federal constitution united action was so difficult to 
secure at critical moments that the decisions of the league 
were often ambiguous and tardily carried out. 

The -^tolian league resembled the Achaean in form, but 
differed materially in substance. Its people were more 
homogeneous, for it was rather a primitive group of cantons 
than an artificial league of cities. Furthermore, its ideas 
of international relationships were quite undeveloped; 
piracy and brigandage were apparently recognized modes of 
gaining a livelihood. These occupations made the iEtolians 
good fighters, and an alliance with them seciu"ed the double 
advantage of immunity from their raids and the use of their 
excellent soldiery. 

Finally, among the powers of the Hellenic world that 
withstood the aggressive policy of the despots, was Attains/ 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 141 

the ruler of Pergamum, himself a despot. This king — he 
was the first of the royal line — ruled over territory that his 
uncle had shaped into an independent state upon the death 
of Lysimachus in 281, but the title to the territory, as well 
as to the royal position, was so uncertain that Attains dared 
not be unfriendly toward the policy of peace. To his credit 
be it said that he had from temperamental inclinations asso- 
ciated himself with the best traditions of Greek art and cul- 
ture, a fact that naturally directed his political sympathies 
toward the policies advocated by Rhodes and Athens. And 
thus it is that, though a despot, he is not to be classed with 
Philip and Antiochus, and that, though territorially and 
economically the natural rival of Rhodes, he is found at the 
end of the third century working with the Greek states in 
favor of a concert of powers. 

Around this Greek core were the three Hellenistic empires, 
— Macedonia, the Seleucid kingdom, and Egypt, — which, 
after the death of Alexander, inherited the greater part of 
his world power. The only real nation among them was 
Macedonia, a state that had been welded together out of 
simple peasant and herdsmen tribes by Philip II. With 
this homogeneous nation at his back, what could not Alexan- 
der have done toward shaping the whole of Greece into a 
united nation if he had but appUed his genius to such a 
task instead of pursuing the title of King of Kings ! But 
perhaps the suggestion involves an anachronism, for the full 
meaning of nationalism was not yet known in his day. After 
Alexander's death Macedonia lost much of its foreign power 
and scarcely held its own, even at home, until Antigonus 
Gonatas (277-39) came to the throne. He strengthened 
the central government, won the alliance of Achaea, and 
reestablished garrisons in many Greek cities. His grandson, 
Philip the Fifth, continued his policy of controlling the 
Peloponnese by means of an alliance with Achaea. PhiHp 
gained his spurs in directing the "social war" against JEtolia, 
where, if we may believe Polybius, he proved himself a 
skiUftil general and a popular ruler .^ . His success, interpreted 
by court flatterers in terms that would better befit an Alex- 



142 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

ander, apparently turned his ambitions toward empire, and 
we shall presently have ample occasion to note what price 
he paid for these ambitions. 

Antiochus ® III of Syria (222-187) earned his title of the 
Great by his success in regaining large parts of the interior 
of Asia that preceding Seleucids had lost. At the end of 
the third century, he was engaged in the project of winning 
back Coele-Syria, which the Ptolemies had taken from the 
Seleucids in their weaker days and which Antiochus himself 
had failed to regain in an earlier effort. His plans for the 
future contemplated an invasion of Asia Minor, where his 
ancestors had held possessions in the past, and these plans 
ultimately resulted in the destruction of the ambitious king. 

In Egypt ^ reigned the third despotic power of the East — 
the Ptolemies. The first three kings of this house had not 
been satisfied with their empire on the Nile, and so, availing 
themselves of favorable opportunities, they had stripped 
their rivals of Coele-Syria and the various cities and islands 
along the shores of Asia Minor and Thrace. Later rulers, 
however, had been inclined to adopt the particularistic doc- 
trine of Rhodes, knowing that an increase in the number of 
free states in the northern .^gean would result in the weaken- 
ing of Macedonia and Syria, and would also aid the commerce 
in which Alexandria was heavily interested. Accordingly, 
the Ptolemies kept peace with a large part of the world, sub- 
sidized the smaller states of the -^gean, particularly the 
neighbors of Macedonia and Syria, and made trading alli- 
ances as extensively as possible. In fact, we have seen that 
Egypt was one of the first eastern states to offer Rome her 
friendship, a circumstance that profited Rome in a very 
practical way when her grain supply was destroyed by 
Hannibal.^ 

Such, in brief, was the situation in the ^gean when Rome 
was invited in the year 201 to join the coalition against 
Philip V of Macedonia. This Philip, it will be remembered, 
had without excuse given aid to Hannibal after the battle 
of Cannae, and had for several years during the Punic war 
engaged a large part of Rome's fleet when she could ill 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 143 

afford to divide her forces. The circumstances of this 
First Macedonian war were as follows. Demetrius of 
Pharos, when banished from his Illyrian possessions by Rome 
in 219, had taken refuge with the ambitious Philip, devoting 
all his powers to inducing him to attack Rome and build 
himself an empire in the west.® When PhiUp heard of 
Rome's defeats at Trebia and at Trasimene Lake, he decided 
that the plan was feasible and that he might arrive in time 
to divide spoils with Hannibal and secure for himself at least 
a part of Italy. He was obliged, however, to subdue a 
rebelling Illyrian hireling first, and by the time this was 
done, Hannibal had won the battle of Cannae. This battle, 
of course, changed Philip's plans, for he now knew that 
Hannibal had anticipated him in Italy. However, with the 
design of securing as much of Rome's wreckage as possible, 
he sent envoys to Hannibal to request an alliance on the 
best possible terms. The shrewd Carthaginian, who did not 
care to have a rival in Italy and yet was glad enough to 
permit Philip to draw off some of Rome's forces, made an 
alliance promising the Macedonian a free hand in Roman 
Illyricum. In return, Philip was to assist Hannibal "in 
whatever way the signatories should later determine." ^^ 
The king was doubtless disappointed, but took what was 
offered and invaded Rome's possessions in Illyrictim. The 
senate heard of the treaty, and, not knowing that Hannibal's 
jealousy would suffice to keep Philip away from Italy, sent 
all the forces it could possibly spare against the new foe. 
Philip's former enemies, the ^tolian league, Attains of Per- 
gamum, Athens, and Sparta, joined Rome, and for several 
years a desultory warfare was kept up to prevent the am- 
bitious monarch from leaving the defense of his own coimtry. 
However, in 207, when Hasdrubal arrived in northern Italy 
with a strong army to aid Hannibal, Rome had to concen- 
trate all her energies upon a supreme effort to save herself. 
She had to let Philip into Illyricum, a large part of which he 
accordingly conquered. The next year when the great dan- 
ger to Rome was over, — Hasdrubal was slain, and Han- 
nibal shut off in Bruttium, — the senate realized that Philip 



144 RO]VL\N IMPERL\LISM 

was no longer in a position to combine with Hannibal, but, 
since Rome was now intent upon gathering a strong army 
to invade Africa, it agreed to make peace with Philip and 
ceded to him the larger part of Illyricum." Thus in 205 the 
first Macedonian war came to an end. Rome "hauled down 
the flag" before Piiilip, a thing she was not accustomed to 
do, but in the course of the struggle she had formed several 
friendships vnth. the states of Greece that were later to be 
of great service to her. 

A year later the foolhardy monarch set out upon a career 
that soon tmified all his enemies against him. Full of con- 
ceit at his successful contest ■with Rome, he turned east- 
ward for new fields to conquer. Treaties and friendships 
were as nothing to him. Believing that Rhodes would imder- 
take to defend the free cities of the -^gean, he attempted — 
unsuccessfully to be sure — to cripple her by having her 
docks and arsenals burned. However, the death of Ptolemy 
Philopator, which left Egypt in the hands of a child, pointed 
to a surer way of conquest, and Philip entered into a bandit's 
agreement with the "Great" Antiochus to divide the pos- 
sessions of the Ptolemies — at least the parts that were 
nearest the boundaries of the two signatories. While An- 
tiochus marched upon Coele-Syria, PhiHp began his cam- 
paign of brigandage in the -^gean. Seizing several of the 
Cyclades, he sailed off to possess himself of the prospering 
trading cities near the Hellespont. Then Rhodes protested, 
and, when the Cians and Thasians were taken and sold into 
slavery, she prepared for war. It now became evident that 
the estabUshed order in the .^gean was wholly to be dis- 
regarded, that no treaty rights were to be respected, and 
that, if no one interfered, the Eastern world, including 
Greece, would within a few years be entirely at the mercy 
of the two despots. The concert of powers was apparently 
at an end. Rhodes succeeded in securing the cooperation 
of Attains, and the two powers gathered as strong a navy as 
possible in order to check Philip's progress. Then both 
sent envoys to Rome asking for aid. Egypt, the greatest 
sufferer, appealed to Rome about the same time (202-01), 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 145 

recalling the fact that she had aided the Romans in their 
Punic war with a generous gift of com. In the winter Philip 
increased his fleet to the utmost capacity, and in the spring 
took Samos, devastated the lands of Attalus, and set sail to 
attack Alexandria. On his way, however, he was met off 
Chios by the fleet of Rhodes and Attalus,^^ and defeated. 
So, after devastating the Egyptian and Rhodian lands in 
Caria, he turned home for repairs. Meanwhile, his generals 
had been operating in Thessaly, and, as a result of these 
operations, the ^tolians went to Rome with complaints. 
Finally, Athens became involved in a quarrel with Philip's 
ally, Acamania, and being luiable to protect herself against 
the attacks of the Macedonian army, she too sent envoys 
to Rome. Apparently all Greece felt that Rome had such 
cause to hate Philip that the appeal would not be in vain. 

Could Rome heed the appeal? Even apart from the 
question of expediency, there were two very serious objec- 
tions against aligning herself with the enemies of Philip: 
the strong disinclination of the people to undertake a new 
war, and the illegality of such a war from the point of view 
of the ius fetiale. The people would at first not hear of it, 
and voted down the motion.^^ They had suffered too severely 
in the war just ended to desire a new one. The toll of dead 
and wounded had been appalling. Their fields were wasted. 
Taxes were high because of the interest on the public debt, 
and a part of the principal on that debt was already over- 
due.^* Experience had taught them that the state could 
no longer turn war into a profitable undertaking, since even 
the indemnity imposed upon Carthage would come in such 
small installments that they would hardly support one 
Roman legion. The populace yielded only when the leaders 
who favored the motion called the assembly together a 
second time and convinced them that Philip would invade 
Italy and devastate their fields as Hannibal had done, imless 
they forestalled him. 

The second objection, that of legality, was also serious, 
for the people were not in a mood to invite the wrath of 
heaven by breaking the sacred injimctions of the ius fetiale. 



146 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

The difficulty lay in the fact that the rules of the sacred 
college did not permit of any except defensive wars — that 
is, wars in defense of the state and her oath-bound socit of 
good standing ; and the appealing nations in this case were 
not socu, ^^ they were only amici. The importance of this 
distinction may be brought out by a brief review of Rome's 
international policy. Since the old fetial rules had recog- 
nized only defensive wars/^ the state had built up its federa- 
tion hitherto on defensive alliances, and had always been 
averse to treaties of mere neutrality or friendship. The 
foedera varied somewhat in content, granting privileges 
according to the deserts of the ally, but, wherever Rome had 
her own way, they were invariably based upon the central 
stipulation of mutual defense in case of an enemy's incursion. 
This form of treaty she had been able to impose upon every 
one of her hundred aUies in Italy,^^ and these alliances held 
"for all time." The iusfetiale was accordingly the dominant 
factor in the ItaHan federation. When, however, Rome met 
strong foreign nations which had for centuries employed 
other forms of treaties, she found that these nations were 
far from willing to make alliances with her at her own very 
exacting terms. If now Rome insisted upon her old practices, 
she would obviously be excluded from political association 
with the older nations. At first she was ready to accept an 
inferior advantage for the sake of retaining the old form, 
and thus in the case of the south Italian Greeks and Naples, 
she bound herself to protective duty, although requiring 
none from her ally. But with nations farther off, this was 
out of the question. Hence, during her distressing contest 
with Philip of Macedonia, she had signed alliances of ami- 
citia ^^ and short-term foedera with the Greek states according 
to the Greek customs. But now the question came up as 
to the standing of these amici in fetial law. The Greek 
practice, whereby amici made free to form temporary coali- 
tions against a common danger, seemed much more reason- 
able than Rome's; and several Roman admirals who had 
campaigned in the First Macedonian war with King Attains 
and various Greek admirals had had every occasion to learn 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 147 

the advantages of these coahtions. They knew that Rome 
could never assume a dignified place among the time-honored 
nations unless she were willing to participate in the Hellenic 
coalitions. Doubtless the senators who were experienced in 
diplomacy wished to break away from the old restrictions. 
But the fact remained that for a thousand years the Romans 
had acted on the belief that an infraction of the ius fetiale 
would bring a curse upon the state. Nevertheless, the 
Macedonian problem was referred to the fetial priests, and 
they were apparently influenced by the new school. They 
decided to disregard the vital distinction between societas 
and amicitia and to extend, for the present occasion, the 
provisions of the ius fetiale over the amici}^ It is charac- 
teristic of Roman legal -mindedness that the Romans then 
began to substitute the delusive phrase socius et amicus — 
which had hitherto had no legal standing — for the simple 
word amicus. They would stretch the fetial law to new 
needs, but they dared not disregard it. 

Having thus convinced the populace of the necessity of 
the war and allayed their fears regarding the sacrilege it 
might incur, the Roman senate sent three envoys to investi- 
gate conditions and to consult with the appealing powers at 
Athens. 2" It is apparent that the senate gave the envoys 
general instructions to work for peace in the .^gean and to 
demand reparation for injuries done, but left the exact 
wording of the stipulations to the judgment of the envoys 
after they should have consulted with the injiu-ed states. 
At the Piraeus the Roman legates spent a day with Attains,^* 
who, together with the Rhodian envoys, then persuaded the 
Athenians to declare war. The advice of Attalus was 
apparently based upon instructions, or at least promises, 
given by the Romans. Philip answered the declaration 
by sending a force to attack Athens, whereupon the Roman 
envoys delivered their decision in the name of the senate 
that Philip must not wage war with any Greek state and 
must submit the claims of Attalus to arbitration (Pol. XVI, 
27). The phrasing of this deliverance shows clearly the 
results of the day's interview with Attalus. His claims 



148 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

alone are mentioned, and the particularistic doctrine that 
he advocated is adopted outright. Thus it was Attalus 
upon whom the responsibility for the phrasing of the proc- 
lamation rested. To the senate, which had determined 
upon war with Philip in any case if he continued to play his 
reckless game, the exact wording was not important, pro- 
vided it accomplished its purpose, satisfied the appellants, 
and secured the greatest possible support for the common 
cause. 

The envoys, following the old Roman custom of proclaim- 
ing international demands to all concerned, sailed the length 
of the coast of Greece, announcing their ultimatum — 
doubtless to the amusement of the more sophisticated 
Greeks — and then proceeded to Rhodes. A conference 
with the Rhodians resulted in the addition of two items 
suggested by the interests of that republic, and from this it 
is apparent that a full understanding with Rhodes had not 
been reached at the Athenian conference. The new de- 
mands were that the Rhodian claims, like those of Attalus, 
be submitted to arbitration, and that Philip cease interfering 
with the possessions of Ptolemy. These combined demands 
iEmilius Lepidus presented to Philip in the spring of 200 
when the king was besieging the free city of Abydos. As the 
ultimatum was greeted with scorn, Rome declared war and 
sent her consul with an army to Ill3nicum, even before Philip 
had returned home from his sack of Abydos. 

But what after all induced the senate to entangle itself 
in a new war when the state had just barely escaped destruc- 
tion by Hannibal ? This is a question upon which our 
sources are far from satisfactory. Livy holds that Rome 
was bound by her treaties to aid Greek states, but we now 
know that her treaties of amicitia with them entailed no 
such obligations. The senate, according to the same author, 
told the populace that Philip was on the point of invading 
Italy, but the senate could hardly have thought such an 
invasion imminent. Polybius, the Greek, to whom a 
coaUtion of friendly states seems wholly natural, does not 
even pause to set himself the question. Modem historians 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 149 

are, therefore, left to their own conjectures. We are told, 
on the one hand, that the senate's decision was due to an 
outburst of sentimental philhellenism,^^ and, on the other hand, 
that the real motive power was greed for empire hidden 
under a veil of hypocrisy.^' One distinguished historian ^* 
affirms that Rome was forced by her position to accept the 
appeals of the Greeks, another ^^ that Rome's interference 
was as criminal as the brigandage of Philip which she under- 
took to suppress. What shall we believe ? 

That the senate desired mere territorial expansion we 
cannot assume, since Rome took no land after the war, 
not even claiming Illyricum, which Philip had won from her 
in 205. There was, besides, more devastated land in Italy 
awaiting development than the capitalistic investments of 
Rome could hope to care for within a generation. 

The impulse eastward came from other considerations. 
Rome had no love for Philip, and the desire to punish him 
for his treacherous attack at a time when she was defenseless 
must have been strong. The acknowledgment of defeat 
in 205 and the cession of the Illyrian mainland still rankled. 
Of course a treaty of peace had been made in 205, so that the 
preceding events could hardly be openly avowed as cause 
for hostility ; but if both ancient and modem historians have 
excused the Barcids for keeping in mind the seizure of Sar- 
dinia, we must grant that Rome had even greater cause for 
resentment against Philip. 

Mingled with this hatred of Philip was Rome's fear that 
his aggression might soon have to be met. Of course, we 
need not believe that an invasion of Italy was imminent. 
But Philip was a man of singular daring and force, and the 
Greeks had found him a lawless neighbor. In the year 201 
he had a long series of victories to his credit : he had rees- 
tablished the Macedonian power throughout the extent of 
Greece ; he had gained control of the northern ^gean, the 
entrance to the Black Sea, Thrace, and several strongholds 
of Asia Minor. The Eastern world was, it seemed, about 
to be divided between him and Antiochus. That he had 
inherited the ambitions of Alexander was a matter of every- 



150 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

day talk. The question for the senate to decide was not 
whether Rome might weaken a possible rival, — as yet Rome 
thought only of becoming a member of the Mediterranean 
concert of powers, — but whether Philip, her neighbor, was 
a man who observed the laws of neutrality and respected the 
ordinary rights of his neighbors. This Philip did not do. 
And Rome knew from her own experience with him and from 
the tales of the Greek envoys that Philip would honor his 
treaty with her only so long as she was in a position to defend 
herself. 

But Rome had another reason besides fear and hatred of 
Philip for greeting this opportunity of entering the East. 
The Romans felt bitterly the slur conveyed in the term 
harhari which the Greeks still applied to them. They 
counted for nothing in the civilized world. In the volumi- 
nous world histories that Greek writers published year after 
year, every petty incident of effete Greek villages was re- 
corded in detail, whereas Rome's epoch-making transactions 
were relegated to parentheses ^^ and explanatory notes. 
Her heroes still remained unsimg carent quia vote sacro. 
Entrance into the ^^gean concert of powers would change 
all this, adding immeasurably to the dignified position of 
the state, gaining it prestige among the old-world civiliza- 
tions, and, incidentally, ministering to the pride of Roman 
senators. We need not assume that the nobles whom such 
considerations influenced were aiming at any definite ma- 
terial advantages. Men like the Scipios, Flamininus, the 
Fabii, and Paulus did not have pahns itching for gold, but 
they were to some degree touched by "that last infirmity" 
of all Romans ; such men it was who stamped the Roman 
character on the words gloria, Jama, and dignitas. They now 
saw the door open to a more dignified position. Who shall 
say that such enticements do not often outweigh economic 
considerations in world politics ? 

Finally, the great historian " was doubtless right who 
pointed out the importance of philhellenism as a factor in 
the decision. Never at Rome was the enthusiasm for 
things Greek so outspoken as during this time. The per- 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 151 

formance of Greek tragedies and comedies in translations 
good, bad, and indifferent promised to become the national 
form of festival entertainment. The fountain of native 
hterature was well-nigh choked by the wholesale importa- 
tion of Greek products, and the entire nation was assimilating 
the form and substance of a transmarine art with an avidity 
that can hardly be paralleled. Even Roman senators began 
to write their nation's history in Greek. And the Hellenic 
culture was being woven into the very fabric of Roman 
institutions. The Roman gods had been identified with 
those of Greece, and the priests conducted many of the sacred 
rites Graeco ritu. The oracle at Delphi was resorted to as 
a final court of appeal in times of danger, and the Greek 
legends were being grafted into the main stock of Rome's 
national tradition. Later, to be sure, a day came when 
familiarity with the Graeculus bred contempt, and the dis- 
covery was made that Roman character was sturendering 
some of its best elements in exchange for an ill-fitting culture 
which carried corruption within. But that was later. In the 
year 200 men felt only the magic of Greece, and the appeal 
of the Greek states for aid in preserving their liberty struck a 
chord of response full of genuine good will for the imperiled 
people. Nor did this feeling subside during the war : within 
two years the senate enlarged its demands upon Phihp by 
requiring not only that he desist from his attacks upon 
Greeks, but also that he liberate those whom he held in sub- 
jection. 

These, then, were the motives that led the senate to abandon 
its ancient fetial practices, to adopt the Greek methods of 
international association, and to enter the Hellenic concert. 
And it must be borne in mind that this was not a war 
between Philip and Rome, but — in the beginning, at least 
— a war conducted by an Hellenic coalition of which Rome 
was but a modest member, participating with only a small 
part of her forces. 

Philip opened the campaign ^^ of the first year with an 
attack upon Athens. The coalition divided into two parts, 
the Pergamene and Rhodian forces, together with Rome's 



152 ROJ^IAN IMPERIALISM 

naval contingent going directly against Philip, while the 
Roman consul with his two legions attempted to open a way 
into Macedonia from the side of lUyricmn. Attains, who 
seems to have been leader of the southern army, accomplished 
little, except the defense of Athens. The Roman consul, 
effectively blocked by the Macedonian mountain garrisons, 
made no headway. During the second year the coalition 
advanced in three divisions, since it had now gained the 
aid of the ^toHans. The Romans on the west broke through 
an lUyrian pass, but were stopped by an inner Hne of gar- 
risons. The ^tolian division operating from the Thessalian 
plains was more successful, and engaged Philip's army 
during most of the campaign. The naval division under 
Attains also met with some success in its attack upon Mace- 
donian seaport garrisons in Thessaly. The third year 
began with disappointments for the coalition. The Roman 
army attempted a new route through Epirus, but failed, and 
about midsummer, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, who had 
now taken charge, found his army unable to move forward 
and was obliged to negotiate for terms of peace. To these, 
however, PhiHp refused to listen.^^ Then the tide tmned. 
With the aid of Epirote guides, Flamininus found his way 
through the motmtains, effected a juncture with the ^tolian 
army operating in Thessaly, and the two armies pushed 
Philip back to the defenses of his own country. These vic- 
tories, furthermore, induced the strong Achsan league to 
join the coahtion. The allied fleet, meanwhile, blockaded 
Corinth, and this city was promised to the Achasans in 
return for their support. Philip now asked for a peace 
conference, since he saw that if he persisted he could not 
hope to retain any of his conquests outside of Macedonia. 
The representatives of the allies met the king at Nicsea and 
presented their demands. Flamininus asked for nothing 
on Rome's behalf,*' insisting only upon the previous demands 
of the coahtion that Philip evacuate all Greek cities and 
restore to Egypt her possessions in Thrace and Asia Minor. 
Attains claimed indemnity for the injmies sustained in 
Philip's raids of 201 ; Rhodes demanded the cession of the 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 153 

Carian lands which Philip had taken in 201 and insisted 
upon the freedom of the Greek cities in Asia ; the Achasans 
asked for Corinth and Argos. The ^EtoUans, while claiming 
to support the coalition's demands for the hberation of all 
Greek cities, nevertheless required a re-cession to their league 
of all cities that had ever been members of it. This disagree- 
able demand of the iiEtoHans threw the conference into a 
long-winded discussion, and several sessions were devoted 
to exhibitions of Greek oratory. The result was a growing 
conviction that PhiHp must treat with the Romans alone, if 
anything was to be accomplished. Here a peculiar cir- 
cumstance, apparently of small moment, brought Rome into 
a predominating position. Philip, learning that Roman 
consuls were not legally empowered without a confirming 
vote of the senate and people to determine the terms of peace 
for Rome, requested that the conference be adjourned to 
meet at Rome. The Greek envoys were at first disinclined 
to see negotiations thus taken out of their hands, but having 
originally appealed to Rome for aid, they could not now dis- 
regard an important requirement of the Roman constitution. 
The consequences were more far-reaching than either the 
Greeks or the Romans at first realized. The necessity of 
settling the negotiations of the whole league in a discussion 
before the Roman senate not only made Rome visibly the 
predominant power in the coalition, but it placed the senate 
in the position of a signatory, not only to the Roman claims, 
but to the whole treaty. And when once Rome's signature 
was subscribed by vote of the senate and people to a docu- 
ment which affected the whole of the -^gean world, she would 
naturally be involved in the task of guaranteeing the integ- 
rity of that document. To be siu^e, the present conference 
at Rome ended in a disagreement, Phihp's envoys refusing 
to yield to the senate's demands for the complete liberation 
of Greece, but a precedent had been set by the whole affair 
which pointed to Rome as the futiu-e arbiter of Mediterranean 
politics. 

When the war reopened in 197, it was primarily a struggle 
between Philip and Rome. The fleet was no longer needed, 



154 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

so that the Rhodians departed to take possession of the 
Carian ^^ lands to which they had laid claims. The Achseans 
were sent to help them. Perhaps they preferred not to take 
part in a battle against their former ally. Attains returned 
home ill, and died soon after, leaving his kingdom to Eumenes 
II ; his naval forces apparently did not again engage in the 
war. At the end, only the ^Etolian contingent was left to aid 
Rome. Doubtless Flamininus was glad to have the task 
to himself ; we are almost tempted to suspect that he had 
purposely found work elsewhere for his allies. Roman con- 
suls were not used to following the orders of a junto ; they 
were accustomed to make their own decisions. Flamininus, 
after gaining the adherence of the Boeotian league-cities, 
advanced directly against Philip, who, meanwhile, had taken 
up his position at Cynoscephalae in northern Thessaly. 
The Roman force of 20,000 was supported by some 6000 
^toHans — cotuageous and well-trained soldiers — 1200 
Epirotes, and a few mercenaries sent by the Spartan tyrant, 
Nabis. The two armies came to blows before PhiHp had 
time to mass his phalanx in a satisfactory manner. Conse- 
quently, the pliable Roman legions gained an easy and de- 
cisive victory, much to the astonishment of the Greeks, who 
still climg to the belief that the Macedonian phalanx was 
unconquerable . ^^ 

Philip now offered to accept the terms he had rejected at 
Nicsea, and although the .^tolians demanded the king's 
deposition, the former treaty, with but slight revision, was 
again submitted by the consul. The only additions to the 
original articles were the Roman demands that the king 
surrender his navy and pay Rome a war indemnity of a 
thousand talents.^^ These terms were accepted. 

Now came the difficult task of reaching a satisfactory 
agreement with all the allies concerning the disposition of the 
liberated territory. Rhodes occasioned no difficulties. She 
asked only for the return of a plot of Carian groimd, and for 
the liberation of the cities of Asia Minor, — two items which 
were at once granted. Rome even undertook to request 
Prusias to liberate Cius, which Philip had presented to him. 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 155 

The modest demands of the Pergamene king were also 
qtiickly conceded. The Achaean league received Corinth 
and Argos back into membership, as it desired. The Epirotes 
and the Macedonian tribe of Orestis, both of which had 
joined Rome during the war, were granted autonomy. So far 
everything went well. 

But the -^tolians were insatiate. After regaining Phocis 
and Locris, which Roman arms had taken from Philip, they 
also demanded all Thessalian and Boeotian towns that had 
ever belonged to them. The other allies saw that the "lib- 
eration of the Greeks" would become a farce if .^tolia was 
to gather in the spoils. The senate accordingly took upon 
itself the odium of refusing the request, thereby incurring 
the bitter enmity of the league. The cities in question were 
made autonomous. 

Finally, the senate left to the discretion of its commis- 
sioners and to Flamininus the settlement of a suitable date ^* 
for the Roman evacuation of the three strong forts, Corinth, 
Demetrias, and Chalcis, the "fetters of Greece" which 
Philip surrendered to Flamininus. The reason for deferring 
a decision on this point was that Antiochus of Syria was 
beginning to invade the territory of Asia Minor which Philip 
was evacuating. Envoys had been sent to Antiochus to 
ask him to desist, but the senate felt that it would be danger- 
ous to withdraw entirely from Greece until there was reason- 
able assurance that Antiochus would not make trouble. 
However, when the ^tolians saw that the senate was ap- 
parently hesitating, they seized the opportunity to raise the 
charge that Rome intended to take permanent possession 
of the three Greek forts. Flamininus, therefore, even against 
the wishes of the commissioners, insisted that Rome must 
at once prove the sincerity of her professions by withdrawing 
every garrison of hers upon Greek soil. And so, at the 
Isthmian games of 196, he was able to send out a herald with 
the proclamation ^^ that : — 

"The Roman senate and Titus Quinctius, proconsul and 
imperator, having conquered King Philip and the Macedo- 
nians in war, declare the following peoples free, without gar- 



IS6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

rison or tribute, in full enjoyment of the laws of their own 
countries : i.e. Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, 
Achasans of Phiotis, Magnesians, Thessalians, Perrhsebians." 

This satisfied the last doubt regarding the integrity of the 
senate's intentions, and the joy of the Greeks was unbounded. 

But the senate knew well enough that a mere proclama- 
tion was far from sufficient, and so Flamininus, whose sincere 
philhellenism was unquestioned by all but the disgruntled 
^tolians, was continued as proconsul until the terms of the 
treaty should have been put into practice. 

The magnitude of the task that Flamininus faced in at- 
tempting to establish a score of new states may well be 
imagined when one remembers to what extent the history of 
the Greek states is a record of revolutions and impractical 
experiments. 

In helping the liberated states to shape new governments, 
Flamininus favored a form which was somewhat more aris- 
tocratic ^^ than the cities were accustomed to under Mace- 
donian rule. There were several good reasons for this. 
Philip, the absolute monarch, had, as might be expected, 
suppressed powerful individuals and had tried to gain the 
good will of the populace in every city. The people were, 
after all, his warriors. Consequently, it was always the 
aristocratic element in these cities that favored Rome, and 
naturally this element later desired to be recognized by Rome 
as predominant. Now Flamininus, himself a true senatorial, 
sincerely believed in the aristocratic principle and was glad 
enough to further the aims of the more congenial faction in 
each city. He believed that the men of property could 
conduct a stabler and more consistent government than the 
populace. Hence, wherever he was called upon to write a 
city charter, he based the franchise on a property qualifica- 
tion. He introduced these reforms, however, in a most lib- 
eral spirit, and the charters that he framed were even more 
democratic than those usual in Italian municipalities. He 
placed all legislation in the hands of a council (boule) and a 
popular assembly," whereas, in Italian cities, the council 
(decuriones) alone usually conducted all municipal business. 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 157 

Unfortunately the necessity of thus sympathizing with the 
aristocratic faction later bore bitter fruit, for the populace 
all through Greece drew the logical conclusion that they had 
less to gain from Rome than from Philip. And Philip soon 
discovered that he could make capital out of this conclusion. 
But Flamininus could not have avoided the task even in the 
face of the troublesome consequences : he did his work with 
a sincere desire to establish the best governments possible.^ 

After a year of this kind of reorganization, one very dis- 
agreeable task still remained. Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, 
had refused to give up Argos to Achasa according to the terms 
of the treaty, and Flamininus was therefore obliged to call 
out the allies for one more campaign. Nabis soon yielded, 
and Flamininus then drew up an agreement between Sparta 
and the Achaean league. The incident gained importance 
later when Nabis refused to carry out all the articles of this 
treaty also, and Rome was then called upon to support an 
agreement which she had guaranteed. 

Finally, in 194, having done his utmost to start the new 
states upon a successful career, Flamininus withdrew his 
troops from the last garrison in Greece, and to the repre- 
sentatives of the Greek states who had assembled at Corinth 
he gave an account of his stewardship, earnestly counseling 
harmony and united action.^^ He then sailed for Italy. 
Yet even at that time Antiochus had seized several cities in 
Thrace and Asia Minor, contrary to the provisions of the 
treaty of 196, and Scipio Africanus was urging the need of 
holding Greece against the probable invasion of this new 
enemy. 

It is the fashion to call Flamininus an impractical senti- 
mentalist ; and there is no doubt that his enthusiasm for the 
old Greek cry of liberty somewhat blinded him to larger poHti- 
cal needs. He accepted as sacred the particularistic doc- 
trine which had made the Greeks so futile in state-building. 
Furthermore, in his haste to prove that the Romans harbored 
no ulterior purposes, he chose to disregard the annoying 
approach of Antiochus. But if Flamininus was at fault, 
the senate was no less so. Two years before Flamininus 



158 ROMAN IMrERlALISM 

li.ul wielded any influence in tlu> st.-iLo, ilic senate had 
adopted a j^eneml proj'r.iin of liberation, and in 198 it 
provinl its eontinued faith in that proj^ram by reasscrtinj; 
ill more emphatic fonn its detnaiids for "freedom." 1(, 
stood flnnly by these requirements in the Roman eoiifereneo 
of i<;7, and its envoys to Antiochus in ig6 reiterated the 
doctrine in that slrikinfj; messajjje *"' with its five une(|uivoeal 

nej^atives : ov8iva yhft in tcGv KAA,>;v<i»i' outc iroXtiuurOai vvv vtt' 

oi'Stfck oiJTe SovXeveii' ouScci. "No Greek shall henceforth bo 
attacked by any man nor servo any man." The fact of the 
matter is that whatever arguments may havc> imhieed the 
vScnate to etit.(>r the war, a wave of pliilhellenisin had 
swept oviT l\\c state before the war was finished. The 
statesmen of koine; were carnc>d aw;iy by a jj;enerous impulse 

— what nation's history cannot fm'nish at least one luirallel ? 

— and in their enthusiasm they forjjjot to count the cost or 
wei)',h tlu! consequences. And who sliall say that the con- 
sec iiuMices would have been better if the statesmeti had acted 
with more sobric^ty ? Could Greece have preserved a na- 
tional form of j^overnment if unity had been foret>(l ni)on 
her? Cijuld the ingrained love of autonomy and individual 
existence, which lay at the very core of the Greek character, 
bt^ stamped out in a day ? Ihid not (he (h'(>(>ks proved that 
after all each futile city-state could beget men and matter 
that the great nations admired? And although h^lamininus 
mi)'ht have saved Rome a battlt* or two by holding (ireece 
against Antiochus, he wouUl have awakened a dangerous 
suspicion among the Greeks that Rome was seeking a pretext 
for rtMuaining. The act of liluM-al.ion — that one g(>nuine, 
disinterested deed — set a wholesome precedent in the more 
prosaic days that followed, which acted as a restraining in- 
fluene(« upon tlu^ Romans, aiul made them for a while at 
least better rulers of the empire they were winning. 

In Greece the act was received with the inteuvse enthusiasm 
it ileserved. Polybius' account **' i>f the proelaination at 
tlie Isthmian games is an attractive page in the history of 
Rome's foreign relations : — 

"WluMi the heiald repeated the procUmiation, (here was 



SENTiMr:NrAL poLrncs 159 

siK'Ii .'III oiil,l)iir;;l, ol .'i|»|)I;ius(; as is difTk^ull to convey to 
l,lic iiii;ij'.iii.'il,i<)ii. WIkii ;i,1, Icii)',I,Ii the .'ippl.'uist! (Xi.'iscd, no 
one: paid any al.Uiiil-ioii Lo llic aLliIclcs, bill, all wr.m talking 
to th(nnHolv(:s or (iach otlu!r, and secm('d like i)0()plc bereft 
of their sciiiuis. Nay, {^v(!n after tin; )'.aiii(!S wvn) over, in 
the extravagance of tJK^ir joy, tliey nc^arly killed I'^laiiiininus 
by the exhibition ol llieir gratitude. Some wanted to look 
him in tin: lace and eall liiin tli(>ir preserver; others w(!ru 
raj^er to toneii his li.'uid ; most threw >(arlaiid;; ;i,ii<l fillets 
upon liiiii, iiiil.il l)rl,w<'eii them they nearly cKclied him to 
death." I'olybiiis add;;: ''that the Konians and their 
lea<ler P'l.iiiiiiiinii:; r.hoiild liav(; delib(;rat(!ly incurred un- 
limited ( |.( II ;c and daii)',er for the sole purpose of freeing 
(ireeee, truly deserved their adiniration." 

It was not the senate's fault that the (hcek;; no longer 
|)o;.;.(:.;,cd the eapacity to uso tho gift they lia,d received. 
What wa;; to be exp(;(;te(l of a peopl(> who dedicated, their 
public buildinj^'S : 

To Titus and Apollo, and To Titus and Jlercules,'^^ 

and founded a, new cult who.'.t: votaries sang pjcans: — 

To Zens (tud Koine and Titus and Rome's Good I'^aith! 



NOTES 'I'o (MlAl''il':k VIII 

I. I'olyhiuB, Bka. XVl-XVIll, ih tho Imi.i, ,;..iin(^ for tim "Socond 
Mjuidoiiiim war." Unfortuiiutoly, his toxl- i:; oiciisioiiiilly in fni^inonts, 
IhiI. I -ivy, who copioH PolyhiiiH fairly closi^ly in (iroolc iiuiIUth, supplies 
iiiiiny nf the Itli;^sill^); iiui<l<int,s. Nii'i.c, Criiili inid makrdon. Slaaten, 
vol. If, iiiid Colin, Konif ft la Urkr, \(\v' Mm immk , ; r.o ruily Uiiil, I Imvo, 
to II \i,Yviil (rxtciil., (lispoiuu^d with l.ht; rit.iiLioii ol rdcic'iuu^s. 

3. bivy, XXXI, I and 2. Livy is, ol' t;otiiso, in tirror wIkmi in- calls 
tlldSd n!ilioii:; ../</; . ■! Koine; tlu'y were only amui. 

3. That, |iiiii( i|i|( was formally r('co).'.ni/('(l for \\n- Hellenic world 
in the Peace of AnI.aleidas, or l,lui " Koyal P(!a(Hi" of 3«7. K. had heen 
disrcKarded hy Alexan<ler and some of his ainbiUous successors, hnl- it 
had never Ihhmi iiuite I.>i(mi( l( n, and by Uio year 200 it was Lakcii for 
grunted by most of the slalc!; on l.he /IC^ean. 

4. Cardinali, // rr^ino di I'crnamo, njoO. 

5. rolyhids, VII, li. 



i6o ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

6. Bevan, The House of Seleucus, IT ; Bcnichd-Leclercq, Histoire des 
Sileucides, 1913; Ferguson, Greek Imperialism, j). 183. 

7. Bouch6-Lcclcrcq, Histoire des Lagides; Ferguson, op. cit., p. 149; 
Lcsquic>r, Les institutions mMtaires de VEgypte. 

8. Pol. IX, 45. 

9. It is usual to attribute Philip's attack upon Rome to Rome's 
interference in Illyricum. But I have ])roforrcd to follow the motiva- 
tion of Polybius. It is wholly improbable that Philip would be much 
concerned about the barren lands along the Adriatic coast. His plans 
were drawn on a far larger scale. See Pol. V, loi, 102, and 109. 

10. i\)i. vn, 9- 

1 1 . Rome seems to have retained only two islands and a fort on the 
mainland. Her alliances witli I'^pidamnus and Ajjollonia, tlie cities of 
Epirus, and with Coreyra were not disturbed. See Livy, XXIX, 12, 13. 

12. See llolleaux, in Klio, IX, 450. 

13. Livy, XXXI, 6, 3: ab omnibus fcrme centuriis antiquata est. 
The populace opposed the war to the very end : Livy, XXXIII, 25, 6. 

14. Livy, XXXI, 13. The state, not having the money for payment, 
liquitlated the debt by giving iiublic lands to the creditors. 

15. The Ptolemies liad been aniici of Rome since about 272 ; Rhodes, 
according to Pol. XXX, 5, since 306; but llolleaux {Milanges Pcrrot) 
places the date a century later, wliile Tjiubler (Imperium Romanum, p. 
205) plausil)ly argues for the date 205 it.c. She became an ally in 165. 
Attains had been a tem]K)rary ally in the First Macedonian war, but was 
so no longer ("a coiiperation that formerly existed," says Pol. XVI, 25; 
see also Livy, XXVI, 24, 8; XXIX, II, 2; 12, 14). He was now an 
amicus. Athens had been a "friend" since 229 B.C., according to 
Zon. VIll, 19. Tliublcr (op. cit., p. 216) places the treaty at 199, but 
on insudieient evidence. 

16. See C^liai)ier 1. It was the oath, always used in making foedera, 
which sanetilied the obligations connected with the jus fetiale. The 
breaking of an oath incurred the wr;ith of heaven. 

17. The Etruscans in the early days secured (nvek forms of alliance 
or friendship. They preserved neutrality or signed foedera for terms 
of years. However, Rome ultimately introduced her own customs 
there. 

18. Miss Matthaei, On the Classification of Roman Allies, Class. Quart. 
1907, 182 (T., has well explained the origin and significance of the Roman 
amicitia. 

19. See Class. Phil. IV, 122. We ilraw tliis inference from the fact 
that the phrase socius et amicus dis[)laees the leg.il term amicus. Livy, 
XXXI, I, 2, betrays hopeless confusion when he asserts that the appeal- 
ing nations were socii; however, it was easy to err on this point, since 
Rome did not later make a practice of aiding amici. It was, of course, 
high time that Rome broke with the narrowing demands of the jus 



SENTIMENTAL POLITICS i6i 

fetiale. She had received much help from her amici, particularly Hiero 
and Massilia, and it was illogical for her to remain less liberal than they. 

20. Pol. XVI, 25 and 26. 

21. It was apparently on this occasion that Attalus dedicated at 
Athens the bronze figures of "Gauls," the marble copies of which are 
still to be seen in museums. 

22. Mommscn, Roman Hist. Eng. tr., II, 443. 

23. Peter, Zur Kritik der Quellen, p. 41, so also Ihne and Duruy. 

24. Eduard Meyer, Kleine Schriften, 277 ff. 

25. Wilamowitz, Staat und Gesellschaft der Griechen, 146. It is 
difficult to understand how the distinguished scholar could have reached 
the conclusion which he has set down upon this page. 

26. Pol. V, 33. The desire of the Romans to establish for them- 
selves a place among the Greeks is well illustrated by Flamininus, who 
had himself called Mneades Titus in the Greek verses made in his honor, 
Plut. Titus, 12. Ennius, the poet, apparently told of Rome's lineage 
from Troy in the introduction to his account of this war (Vah. 358). 

27. Mommsen. See note 22. 

28. A large part of Polybius' narrative has been lost. The frag- 
ments remaining show that he considered it a war of the Greek coalition 
rather than a Roman war; see, e.g. XVI, 25, 26, and Livy, XXXI, 45 
(from Polybius). Livy, of course, finds little interest in the deeds of 
the Greeks, and enlarges upon the importance of the Roman campaigns. 
Since Livy's story is complete, historians have naturally adopted his 
manner of emphasizing the Roman interests. 

29. The demands are more sweeping than in 200, for Flamininus 
insists on the liberation of all Greek cities; Livy, XXXII, 10, 3-7. He 
must have had instructions from the senate to do this, for a consul 
had no right to add to former stipulations at will — a point that de- 
serves attention, since the philhellenic program is usually accredited 
to Flamininus alone. 

30. Pol. XVIII, I. The lUyrian frontier was to be restored accord- 
ing to the terms of the last treaty (205). What Philip finally ceded in 
lUyricum was given to a native prince, Pleuratus. 

31. Antiochus was at this time advancing northward, and the coa- 
lition was considering measures to thwart him. 

32. Pol. XVIII, 48. 

33. Pol. XVIII, 44. Livy, XXXIII, 30, would have it that Philip 
had to surrender his independence in foreign affairs to Rome. Later 
events prove this to be an error. Philip was left by the treaty an inde- 
pendent neutral. A few years later he became an amicus and was then 
excused from paying the part of the indemnity still outstanding. 

The iEtolians wished Philip deposed, but Flamininus argued that a 
strong power was needed in the north to safeguard Greece against 
barbaric invasion. 

M 



i62 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

34. This was merely a question of date. The senate's instructions 
provided for the complete evacuation of Greece. 

35. Pol. XVIII, 46. 

36. Livy, XXXIV, 51. 

37. In every case Flamininus demanded that political exiles be 
recalled, whether they were democratic or aristocratic. The return 
of the democratic leaders to Thebes caused a revolt against the new 
government of Flamininus, but this is the only case of failure that we 
hear of. Livy, XXXIII, 29. 

38. A letter addressed by Flamininus to the town of Cyretiae has 
been preserved {Inscript. Graecae, IX, 2, no. 338) which shows the nature 
of Flamininus' task. Here he gives to the city certain properties that 
had fallen into the possession of Rome "in order that you may see how 
clean-handed the Romans are." 

39. Livy, XXXIV, 48-50. 

40. Pol. XVIII, 47. 

41. Pol. XVIII, 46. 

42. Plutarch, Titus Flam. 16. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 

In his attempt to divide Ptolemy's possessions with An- 
tiochus, Philip had fallen. Antiochus, however, although 
he had carried through his part of the task with as much 
energy as the Macedonian, was as yet unmolested. Reasons 
for this difference in the treatment of the two monarchs are 
not difficult to find. It is apparent that whereas Philip's 
operations at once threatened the safety of several different 
states, those of Antiochus caused immediate trouble to 
Egypt alone. Furthermore, Antiochus had the support of 
a far more plausible excuse, for he carefully announced that 
he was only retaking from Egypt the border territory of 
which his ancestors had been robbed. This claim may not 
have been a very good one, since Antiochus had surrendered 
his title to such lands after the defeat of Rapheia, but the 
announcement at least served to assure his neighbors for 
the time being that he was only following a reasonable policy 
which woidd not interfere with their well-established rights. 
Philip, on the other hand, seemed to assume in his promis- 
cuous raids that he possessed the right of expansion and was 
immime from the necessity of furnishing pretexts for his 
actions. Probably this irresponsible assumption of PhiUp's 
brought him as much vigorous opposition as any of his acts 
of war. It is clear, therefore, that the Roman coalition re- 
frained from interfering with Antiochus' advance southward, 
not only because it was busy elsewhere, but also because 
Antiochus had been careful to avoid giving a reasonable 
ground for intervention. 

In the spring of 197 Antiochus, after securing Coele-Syria,* 
turned westward and seized the Ptolemaic cities of Cilicia. 
In doing this he had practically the same justification as in 

163 



i64 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the preceding acts, and was still not endangering any free 
communities of the Greeks. But he was approaching more 
disputable ground. The Rhodians therefore notified him 
that they woidd oppose him if he advanced beyond Chelidon, 
the promontory of Lycia which had of old served as the 
boundary between Persian and Hellenic spheres.^ They 
were afraid, they said, that he might go to the aid of Philip 
or that he would endanger the freedom of Greek cities. 
Could it be that the Rhodians, entirely unsupported, dared 
send this defiant order to the Great King, the conqueror of 
Asia? It is a significant fact that they had this very year 
been excused from the campaign against Philip that they 
might operate in Caria, and they had even received the aid 
of the Achcean contingent for this campaign. May we not 
conclude that Attalus and the Romans were supporting the 
Rhodians in their apparently daring order to Antiochus? 
The king responded somewhat evasively that he would do 
nothing to offend Rhodes, and that he was on good terms with 
Rome. Just then, — it was the midsummer of 197, — 
news of Philip's defeat came, and Rhodes, knowing that 
there would now be no danger of a union with Macedonia, 
and that stronger powers than she would have their hands 
free to deal with Antiochus if he became dangerous, did 
nothing more to support her order.' Accordingly, before 
the season ended, the king, finding his path open, sailed 
northward, seized Ephesus, the chief Ptolemaic city of Asia 
Minor, and even Abydos.^ This city Philip had taken from 
Ptolemy, and Antiochus could not have been blind to the 
fact that with the rest of Philip's booty it must now be at 
Rome's disposal. Then, knowing well that in taking Abydos 
he was challenging Rome to war, he sent envoys to the 
Roman consul ^ to see how the news of its capture would be 
received. The ostensible purpose of the envoys was to ask 
for a treaty of friendship with Rome, but while they were 
engaged in their pretended mission of peace, the king ad- 
vanced still farther and seized every available stronghold 
on the coast of Asia Minor. He wished to be forehanded in 
the discussion that was bound to come. 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 165 

Let us review for a moment the status of the disputed 
region. In 281 Seleucus ^ of Antioch wrested from Lysim- 
achus both Thrace and Asia Minor, which the latter had 
received out of the wreckage of Alexander's empire. Diiring 
the half century that followed, the cities of Asia Minor passed 
through various vicissitudes. As the Syrian kingdom gradu- 
ally weakened and lost its hold in the region, Attalus of 
Pergamum was able to shape himself a kingdom in the very- 
center of it. He defeated the Galatian invaders, declared 
himself protector of the Greek cities, and succeeded the 
Seleucid kings as master of several interior tribes. Many 
Greek cities of Asia secured complete autonomy at this time, 
while others placed themselves under the protectorate of 
Attalus. The Ptolemies of Egypt in the meanwhile had 
gained by inheritance and by desultory attempts at expan- 
sion some important possessions in Asia Minor. And al- 
though Egypt failed to maintain her foreign power consist- 
ently throughout the century, nevertheless large parts of 
Lycia and Caria besides Thrace remained in the hands of 
the Ptolemies till the opening of the second century. Finally, 
Antiochus III, ambitious to regain all the lands that had been 
claimed by his powerfiil ancestor, Seleucus I, invaded the 
interior of Asia Minor in 216. He acknowledged the claims 
of Attalus to the territory about Pergamtim, but won back 
for himself Phrygia, Pisidia, Lycaonia, and the larger part 
of Lydia, and established a court at Sardis. He even ob- 
tained alliances with several princes beyond the Halys. 
We may suppose that he included the capture of the Hellenic 
cities in his plans, but knowing that this attempt would meet 
with much opposition, he felt that he must first strengthen 
his empire and gain a reputation as a strong ruler and a 
friend of the Greeks.'^ Be that as it may, he seems finally 
to have despaired of taking the Hellenic cities, for when in 
204 Philip proposed a division of Ptolemy's possessions, 
Antiochus surrendered to Philip his shadowy claims upon 
these Greeks and promised to confine himself to Coele-Syria 
and Cilicia. 

In the light of this history it is not difficult to understand 



i66 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

why in 197, when Philip had to evacuate Asia, Antiochus 
again saw a possible prospect of becoming complete master 
of Asia Minor. Perhaps he even dreamt of regaining the 
whole of Alexander's Empire, including the possession of 
Greece and Egypt.^ The deeds of Antiochus loomed large 
in the flattery of his courtiers ! 

The status of the Greek coast towns at this time was as 
follows. A number of the stronger cities like Ephesus and 
Halicamassus were still Ptolemaic, but some had been taken 
from Ptolemy by Philip in the years 202-200 and were now 
to be handed back to Ptolemy by Rome, Philip's conqueror. 
Others, particularly those on the Chersonese which had 
previously broken away from Egypt but had recently been 
taken by Philip, were to be set free by Rome and her allies. 
Lastly, several cities, such as Smyrna and Lampsacus, which 
had asserted their independence at various times during the 
century, continued autonomous. Many of these free cities 
were allies of stronger states like Pergamum and Rhodes and 
would hardly go under without a protest being raised by 
their friends. What was perhaps more important, Lampsa- 
cus and Ilium and other cities of the Troad belonging to a 
religious league which worshiped the Ilian Minerva had 
very close relations with Rome, whose descent had for over 
a century been traced to Troy. Ilium seems to have had an 
alliance of friendship with Rome, and the Lampsacenes ad- 
dressed the Romans as kinsmen. During this very year, 
197, the Lampsacenes, when troubled by the Galati, had 
sent envoys to Rome on the strength of this supposed rela- 
tionship and had received letters from Rome in support 
of their wishes.^ 

In short, Antiochus was invading very dangerous territory : 
Rome, supported by Attains and Rhodes, had for two years 
been announcing from the housetops that if she conquered 
Philip, she would give the appropriate part of his gains back 
to Egypt, and would guarantee freedom to another part; 
furthermore, it was well known that Rome had close relations 
with several cities and that Rhodes and Eumenes, the Per- 
gamene successor of Attains, were keenly interested in 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 167 

seeing that no new despot invaded the region. Therefore, 
although the invasion of Antiochus may seem natural and 
reasonable in the light of his own policies and the history of 
Asia since Alexander's time, in view of the new situation 
created by the events of the decade preceding, it must 
be considered an exceedingly daring move. Antiochus, by 
surrendering to Philip his feeble title to the Greek coast in 
204, had apparently left himself no defensible footing; his 
advance, in spite of the reiteration of his ancestral claims, 
was rightly regarded as a baseless act of aggression. And 
yet Antiochus was a very shrewd man and a careful diplomat. 
He had more resources at his command than he at first re- 
vealed, and he would probably have won his game in the 
end had he not grown overbold and been drawn on by new 
complications. 

We know enough of his plans and his method of work to 
understand the reasons for his confidence. Unlike Philip, 
he was exceedingly cautious in maintaining his diplomatic 
friendships. While advancing past Rhodes he carefully 
abstained from giving the island republic direct cause for 
hostility, and he even seems to have aided her in clearing 
Caria.^" By similar methods he hoped to allay the opposi- 
tion of Pergamum. The serious question for Antiochus, of 
course, was what attitude Rome would assume. And it 
was to discover this that he sent envoys to Flamininus as 
soon as he had seized Abydos. He seems to have argued 
that Rome had entered the war against Philip partly because 
of the appeal of her friends, partly because Philip's disre- 
gard of old and recognized rights made him a dangerous 
neighbor. Now, if he could preserve the friendship of Rhodes 
and Pergamum on the one hand and prove to Rome on the 
other that he was proceeding only to reclaim ancestral pos- 
sessions and would limit himself strictly to this purpose, 
would not Rome be satisfied and shut her eyes to the prom- 
ises of the Macedonian treaty ? One can understand how a 
monarch, brought up in the expansionistic school of Alex- 
ander, would naturally conclude that a power which had so 
little interest in the East as to withdraw completely after an 



1 68 ROMAN IMPERI.\LISM 

expensive war would not trouble itself greatly over Asia 
Minor. Accordingly, his envoys stated his case carefully, 
but insisted with firmness that the king had no intention of 
receding from his position. 

Now the weakest point in the king's position was his 
claim upon the land that had within the last decade passed 
from Ptolemy to Pliilip and that was now to be given back 
to Egypt by Rome. Antiochus knew that the senate was 
not in the habit of retreating from its professions, and so 
he entered into secret negotiations ^^dth Egypt " \\'ith a view 
to purchasing the Egyptian rights directly, and thus shutting 
Rome out of the question, if she could not be made to connive 
at her old declarations. Egypt's price was high : no less 
than Coele-Syria which had just been taken from her. Antio- 
chus hesitated. He wished to try persuasion with the 
Romans first, but, if that failed, he determined to strike the 
bargain with Egypt. In the long run, he reasoned, it was 
better to have some cities in Asia Minor without Roman 
influence too near than to possess Coele-Syria with Rome as 
chief arbiter of the ^^gean. 

Accordingly while his envoys were discussing affairs with 
Flamininus, in the spring of 196, the king, as we have seen, 
advanced over the disputed territory. One division of his 
army took possession of the chief cities upon the coast of 
Asia Minor, laying siege even to free cities like Smyrna and 
Lampsacus. With the other the king himself crossed into 
Europe, drove the Thracians back upon the Danube, and set 
in with all vigor to rebuild Lysimachia. The liberal ex- 
penditure of treasure in Thrace proves that the king was not 
merely making a feint in order to gain an advantageous 
position with a view to a later compromise. He hoped to 
hold Thrace permanently. 

Flamininus meanwhile sent the king's envoys back with 
an uncompromising answer, an answer which was practically 
a reiteration of Rhodes' demand of the previous year that 
the king could not be allowed west of Lycia, and he even 
sent envoys of his own to carry this message to the king in 
person. The Roman stipulations were in detail these : ^^ 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 169 

(ij Antiochus must abstain from attacking autonomous 
Greek cities in Asia. This demand had reference to the 
wishes of the Rhodians and Eumenes, who were only slightly 
less afraid of Antiochus than they had been of Philip ; it also 
embodied Rome's own wish to protect friends like Lampsacus 
and Ilium. (2) He must evacuate the cities that had been 
subject to Ptolemy. This in the main referred to Rome's 
professions of guarding her friend Ptolemy. (3) He must 
evacuate the cities that had been subject to Philip, for, as 
the envoys added, it was ridiculous to propose that Antiochus 
should come in and take the prizes of the war which Rome 
had waged with PhiHp. (4) He must withdraw from Europe, 
"for no Greek was to be attacked henceforth or to be en- 
slaved by any one." This fourth demand was actually 
covered by the second and third, and brought in a new ele- 
ment only in so far as it produced an additional motive. 
In short, Rome's work in Greece was not to be endangered, 
and to make sure of this, Antiochus' sphere of action must 
be permanently limited to Asia. 

At this point, however, the king produced his secret agree- 
ment with Egypt. This completely took away the raison 
d'Ure of the second and third demands, and Rome had prac- 
tically lost her case. She could hardly risk a war with the 
Great King for the sake of protecting a few Asiatic cities 
like Lampsacus, which claimed a mythical relationship with 
her, and for the sake of excluding the king's influence from 
Europe, when Ptolemy had just ceded him his own well- 
recognized rights in Thrace. 

Thus it came about that within a month after the Mace- 
donian treaty had been recited to the assembled Greeks at 
Corinth, the several clauses relating to Thrace and Asia 
were made void by the shrewd diplomacy of Antiochus. 
Even to the two other demands of Rome the king had ready 
answers. He professed readiness to refer the case of Lamp- 
sacus and Smyrna to Rhodes for arbitration. He refused, 
however, to recognize Rome's right to limit his realm to 
Asia, saying that he had never attempted to interfere in 
Italian affairs. Rome was clearly outwitted, and Antiochus 



I70 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

during the next year proceeded with his conquest of the 
cities of Asia Minor and of Thrace unmolested. 

The situation was of course satisfactory to no one but 
Antiochus. If Rome withdrew her demands, a great many 
cities that had hoped for autonomy would fall to Syria, and 
Etmienes would have to surrender permanently a part of the 
kingdom which his father had possessed ; he would be cut 
off from the sphere of influence of his best friend, and woiild 
effectually be boimd by the wishes of Syria. Rhodes, whose 
commerce and poHtical power depended upon the life of 
the particularistic principle, was equally dissatisfied, although 
Antiochus did his best to gain her good will. Even the cities 
of Greece seemed to be afraid that Antiochus would not 
long limit his ambition to Thrace. Embassies, asking for 
Rome's interference, came in numbers. For Rome the 
question became constantly more involved. The enmity 
of ^tolia grew stronger when her repeated demands for a 
larger share of spoils in Thessaly were refused, and her cour- 
age expanded with the hope that Antiochus would finally 
take up the cudgels against Rome. Nabis of Sparta, who 
had become hostile after his defeat in 195, was ready to 
break out in revolt at any time in an effort to regain the 
coast towns which he had been forced to surrender to the 
Achaean league. Finally, Hannibal who, in 196, had been 
banished from Carthage by the aristocratic government 
then in power, took refuge with Antiochus. It was no 
secret that he was urging the Syrian king to attack Rome 
and was promising to secure a revolt in Carthage if Antiochus 
would do so. It surely is no mere coincidence that in the 
year 194 Rome made provision for the colonization of every 
suitable improtected seaport of southern Italy.^^ The 
fear that Hannibal's policy of invading Italy would be 
adopted by Antiochus was apparently very real. 

Events seemed to be pressing toward hostility, but the 
senate remained sluggish and on the defensive. It will be 
remembered that in 196 the senate, when proclaiming the 
liberation of the cities taken by Philip, had mentioned by 
name only one city that had fallen into the possession of 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 171 

Antiochus. It is apparent that even then the senate did 
not desire to take an uncompromising stand ; and in 194 the 
same attitude was again revealed by the readiness with which 
Rome, despite the advice of Scipio, withdrew her armies 
from Greece. In fact, for three years after the diplomatic 
defeat of 196, the senate avoided the question, and it came 
up again only when in 193 Antiochus sent envoys to Rome 
asking for an alliance of friendship. 

To grant this request would of course be tantamount to 
a recognition of the status quo (Livy, XXXIV, 57) ; to re- 
fuse it would be to invite the king's hostility without secur- 
ing any advantage. The senate decided upon a compromise 
and asked Flamininus, apparently the author of the sugges- 
tion, to word this response. It was to the effect that Rome 
would grant his request for friendship and would even re- 
frain from interfering in Asia, if he would withdraw from 
Europe.^* This offer is interesting. It frankly confessed 
that the old ground for action, based upon the treaty of 196, 
had been rendered untenable by Antiochus' treaty with 
Egypt. It seems also to have abandoned Eumenes and 
Rhodes to the Syrian sphere of influence, though it may 
well be that the final treaty was to safeguard their interests. 
Most interesting of all, it proves that the senate was for the 
first time ready to adopt from the Greeks the theory of 
spheres of influence in an important matter. The adoption 
of this new policy does not necessarily mean that Rome in- 
tended to extend her political or economic interests over all of 
Europe. But a settlement along these lines would safeguard 
what was still practicable in the treaty of 196 and thereby 
save Rome's honor, and might satisfy the king, since he had 
actually suggested the doctrine of spheres in his previous 
negotiations. Nothing could have been better for the future 
of both Rome and the East than the adoption of this com- 
promise. It is safe to say that the Greek cities of Asia would 
not have suffered severely imder Syrian rule, that in fact 
they might have prospered under the philhellenic Seleucids, 
and it is equally apparent that the small states of Greece 
would have had a better opportunity to preserve their 



172 ROM-\X IMPERI-\LISM 

autonomy in prosperit}' if Greece had not become merely a 
road station for Rome's eastern anuies, proconsuls, and 
traders. But the settlement >;\'as not adopted. The envoys 
of Antiochus had no instructions to compromise/'' and so 
the offer came to naught. The senate, still hoping to roach 
a modus vivcuJi. let the matter rest at tliis stage, only an- 
nouncing to the Greeks that it could not recede fiuther. 
It is probable enough that the two powers could have reached 
an agreement but for the intervention of Rome's enemies in 
Greece, and the nervous tension ^^TOught by iho presence 
of Hannibal at the court of S}Tia. 

The cliief mischief makers among the Greeks were the 
.^tolians. who understood no pohtical game except one that 
involved booty sharing. They had received a larger portion 
in the di^•ision of Pliilip's possessions than any other all}*, 
but they were dissatislied because Rome had checked their 
exorbitant demands. They were now ready to complain 
of Roman interference, for they saw a chance, if Rome sliould 
be driven back by Antiochus, of being free of her restraining 
influence and of participating in a new di\'ision of booty. 
Their plans were fairly ripe by the time that the S^Tian en- 
voys retimied in 193. Hearing from these envoi's that 
Antiochus and Rome had not come to terms, the .-Etolians 
set to work offering Nabis of Sparta support if he wished to 
regain what he had lost two years before. A second em- 
bassy was sent to Pliilip to request liis cooperation in an 
attack upon Rome. A tliird went to Antiochus to egg on 
his emnity against Rome, and to promise ail manner of sup- 
port if he would land in Greece and proclaim his intention 
of dri\dng Roman intervention out of the land. They 
even went so far as to promise Pliilip's cooperation, of wliich 
they had not the slightest assurance. Antiochus, however, 
was not ready to act. In fact, Roman envoys who had 
\'isited him at the end of the year to discuss the situation 
further rettmied with the assurance that there was no im- 
mediate danger of war in sight. -^^ 

But Nabis of Sparta started hostilities (probably in the 
spring of 192) by seizing the coast towns that he had sur- 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 173 

rendered to the Achaean league in accordance with the Ro- 
man treaty of 195, The senate, responsible for the integrity 
of this treaty, at once sent a praetor with a fleet to aid the 
league, and at the same time sent Flamininus at the head 
of a commission to labor with the Greek cities against the 
demoralizing influence of ^tolia.^^ 

The ^Etolians meanwhile proceeded with all vigor. See- 
ing that Nabis was losing in the contest with the Achaean 
league, they dispatched a troop to kill the tyrant and hold 
the city by force. Nabis fell, but the y^toHans were routed 
in their turn, whereupon the Achaeans under the command 
of Philopoemen captiired the city. Another troop which 
the -^tolians sent to Chalcis failed completely. But at 
Demetrias they were successful. They managed to seize 
the fort there and to put the Roman sympathizers to death.^^ 
These acts of violence were, of cotuse, open attacks upon 
Rome, but the senate still moved slowly, waiting to see what 
Antiochus would do. 

The king was not yet ready to act. Several cities of Asia 
were holding out against him ; moreover, he had only some 
10,000 soldiers at hand. But when the ^^tolians armoimced 
that they had captured Demetrias and had voted him the 
command of the whole .^tolian army, he could not refuse 
to undertake a war that had been begun largely because of 
reliance upon his aid.^^ Hannibal, to be sure, urged the 
pursuit of an entirely different policy. He advised the king 
to attack Italy directly, invite the cooperation of Carthage, 
and labor for the complete armihilation of Rome. But 
Antiochus knew his own purposes better than Hannibal. 
The annihilation of Rome would doubtless be desirable, — 
particularly to Carthage, whose independence wotdd thereby 
be won, — but the risks were too great for the Syrian king, 
who only wished a free hand in the East and at most a pre- 
dominating position in Greece. Hannibal's own experience 
had been siifficient proof of the hopelessness of a struggle in 
Italy, far away from one's base of supplies, against an enemy 
that would not treat for peace upon native soil. In not 
hazarding an invasion of Italy, Antiochus was wise. He 



174 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

was even wise in deciding to strike quickly, though his force 
was small, for he had a reasonable chance of holding several 
strong positions in Greece until the rest of his forces could 
be brought over. His mistakes of judgment lay rather in 
overestimating his strength. He could hardly have known 
that the loquacious -^tolians would fail to support him, 
nor could he be expected to surmise after his successes in 
Asia that his soldiers were no match for the Roman legions. 

The details of the brief and interesting war which followed 
are easily found in any of the handbooks and can be omitted 
here. Not long after landing in Greece, a Syrian division 
met some Roman cohorts that were apparently on the way 
from the fleet to Chalcis and routed them. Rome then 
declared war, and early in 191 sent the constil to Greece 
with a force of about 20,000 men. The Romans crossed 
quickly, being aided by Philip. They foimd Antiochus 
intrenched at Thermopylae. A division under Cato cleared 
a pass on the heights and simultaneously attacked the flank 
and the front. The battle ended in a rout of the Syrians. 
Antiochus escaped to Chalcis with a mere handful of men, 
and from there set sail for Asia. 

The consul next advanced upon the cities of ^Etolia. 
The league was ready to surrender upon favorable terms, 
but refused to yield unconditionally, and a temporary truce 
was therefore arranged. 

The following year Lucius Scipio as consul and his brother, 
Scipio Africanus, as ''extraordinary" proconsul, were sent 
to invade Asia by way of Thrace. Antiochus had first de- 
cided to meet them north of the Hellespont, but after his 
fleet had been more than half destroyed in an encounter 
with the combined fleets of the Romans, Pergamenes, and 
Rhodians, he retreated to Asia for safety, and offered to 
accept the terms offered in 193, as well as to pay half the 
cost of the war. Scipio, however, was not satisfied. He 
assumed practically the position which Rhodes had taken 
in 197 i.e. that Antiochus must remain on the other side of 
Lycia, or, to be explicit, south of the Taurus mountains, and 
that he must pay the whole cost of the war (Pol. XXI, 14). 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 175 

Antiochus refused these terms and offered battle. Toward 
the end of the year 190 he was decisively defeated near 
Magnesia, and he asked again for peace. Scipio offered the 
same terms as before, on the condition, of course, that they 
would satisfy the senate, whereupon the king sent envoys 
to Rome for an expression of the victor's wishes. The 
principal articles finally agreed upon were as follows : 2° — 

(i) There shall be perpetual peace between Antiochus and 
the Romans if he fulfills the provisions of the treaty. 

(2) Antiochus shall evacuate Asia this side of the Taurus 
Motmtains and be confined by sea within the promontory 
Sarpedon. 

(3) He shall pay an indemnity of ten thousand talents in 
ten yearly installments and ninety thousand medimni of com. 

(4) He shall not wage war upon the islanders or dwellers 
of Europe, nor upon any allies of Rome unless he be attacked. 
If attacked, however, he may ; but he shall not have sover- 
eignty over such nations and cities, nor attach them as 
friends to himself. 

(5) He shall surrender his elephants and all but ten war- 
ships, and send twenty hostages to Rome. 

The status of Antiochus after the war is sufficiently de- 
fined by these terms. He retained his independence in a 
way that Carthage, for example, had not, for he preserved 
the right to defend himself in war even against Rome's allies, 
and he was not bound in any way to aid Rome in her wars. 
To be sure, his resources were weakened, and the burning 
of his fleet removed the possibility of his breaking the treaty 
by attacking Greece, but none of the territory which he had 
held before his advance northward in 216 was taken from 
him, and almost all of Asia remained at his disposal. He 
had a field for action which to an Alexander would have 
seemed the equivalent of Rome's. A strong line of suc- 
cessors on the throne of Antiochus could still have made 
Syria a worthy match for Rome, but unfortunately the 
Great King died two years after his defeat, and weaklings 
succeeded to his position. 

After coming to terms with the king, the senate took up 



176 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the problem of settling Asia Minor, a territory of about 
150 miles from north to south and 200 miles from east to 
west. The question was fully discussed in conjunction with 
King Eumenes, the delegates of Rhodes, and a great nimiber 
of Greek cities of the territory affected. The Rhodians 
spoke vigorously in favor of granting autonomy to as many 
cities as possible. Eimienes, on the other hand, pointed out 
that this would mainly aid Rhodes, since it woiild greatly 
increase her prestige and bring large accretions to her league. 
Indirectly such a coiu"se would make it difficult for Einnenes 
himself to keep his territory in subjection. The senate and 
its board of commissioners reached a compromise which on 
the whole favored Etunenes ^^ more than Rhodes. The 
Greek cities which had not previously been subject to Perga- 
mum were given freedom, except for a few which had strongly 
supported Antiochus. These latter were made tributary 
to Eumenes. Several of the free cities were granted an in- 
crease of territory in payment for their good services during 
the war. As for the interior, Eumenes was given sover- 
eignty over the region north of the Meander, thus nearly 
quadrupling his territory ; and Rhodes was given Caria and 
Lycia south of the Meander.^^ 

Unfortunately this paper agreement did not in itself suffice 
to reorganize the whole region. Several communities were 
disposed to disregard the alterations, and the peoples of the 
interior were especially slow to recognize the new order. 
The fleet had to be sent to Caria to compel the acquiescence 
of some dissatisfied commtmities there, and later to Thrace 
to remove the Antiochene garrisons at -^nus and Maronea 
and to set those cities free.^^ Even the free communities 
offered difficulties by presenting claims against each other 
which the commissioners had to adjust. And each decision 
involved the sovereign state in a fresh series of obligations. 

The new consul, Manlius, was sent into the interior with 
the Roman army and a strong contingent of Pergamenes to 
demand a recognition of the new status there. His ulti- 
mate destination was Galatia, the larger part of which had 
forsworn its friendship for Eumenes in order to join Antio- 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 177 

chus. Manlius, however, turned aside from his path to 
settle disputes and to impose his orders upon several com- 
munities in Pisidia and Pamphylia which adjoined the new 
empires of Rhodes and Pergamimi. These tribes seem to 
have furnished large contingents to Antiochus during the 
war,^ and although according to the terms of peace they 
were to be left independent, it seems that the consul thought 
best to impress them with Rome's strength and to exact 
treaties of "friendship" from them. When they did not 
grant these treaties voluntarily, he imposed an indemnity, 
and in some cases even punished the recalcitrants by devas- 
tating their territory. 

He then proceeded against the Galati. Polybius (from 
whose account Livy, XXXVIII, 12 and 20 are doubtless 
taken) seems to explain this expedition by saying that the 
Galati not only had forsaken the friendship of Eimienes and 
aided Antiochus, but they were such dangerous neighbors 
that the removal of Antiochus would have no value for the 
peace of Asia Minor unless they were first weakened. These 
barbarous Celts had seized their position in Asia some eighty 
years before and had since then been a constant menace 
to the Greeks. They were at one time strong enough to 
exact tribute from the whole of Asia Minor, even from the 
Seleucids beyond the Taurus. About 240, Attalus, in a war 
which is still famous wherever the Pergamene marbles are 
known, had compelled them to respect his boimdaries, but 
after his power had weakened they again began to menace 
the Greek cities far and wide.^^ It appears that at the time 
of Magnesia only one minor chieftain had remained Etimenes' 
friend. From the others who had joined Antiochus, Manlius 
now requested an indemnity and a pledge of "friendship." 
They refused and gathered their forces for defense, but were 
routed in two battles. When they finally agreed to submit, 
Manlius ordered their envoys to meet him at Ephesus, where he 
intended to consider the matter with Eumenes. There he an- 
nounced that they might have peace with Eumenes on the con- 
dition that they would confine themselves in the future to their 
own territory (Livy, XXXVIII, 40) . This specification seems 



1 78 ROMAN IMPERI.\LISM 

to imply that the campaign was undertaken chiefly in the 
interest of Asia, and not of Rome, and that Eumenes \Nras 
ordained to retain a protectorate over the Galatians. At 
the very end of the campaign, Ariarathus of Cappadocia, 
who, as an all}' of Antiochus, had been of no little ser\'ice 
at Magnesia and who also had recently given aid to the 
Galati against the consul, now sent envo}'^ to apologize.-^ 
The consul set the price of pardon at 600 talents, which was 
reduced by half at the request of Eumenes, who meanwhile 
had come to an excellent understanding with the Cap- 
padocian. 

This campaign of Manlius, which so loaded down the 
Roman army vdth plunder that at times it could hardly 
proceed, raises several difficult questions. The source upon 
which Polybius' accomit is based concerned itself chiefly 
with the campaign itself ; Polybius, on the other hand, fixed 
his attention upon the benefits derived from it. Neither 
undertook to explain Rome's purposes. It is easy to dis- 
pose of the entire matter bj'' adopting cither the conventional 
explanation that this campaign of Manlius was merely a 
raid for booty undertaken by an avaricious consul, or the 
equally orthodox \'iew that it was an attempt to establish 
on a pennanent basis the sovereignt}^ of Rome in the East. 
Manlius, it must be admitted, was at times merciless and 
often interfered \^^th affairs seemingly outside of his proper 
sphere. Even the later Roman annalists felt shocked at his 
procediure and invented a senatorial discussion upon the 
question whether Manlius should not be denied a triumph 
for attackuig the Galatians without a fonnal declaration of 
war.-^ The probabiHties are, however, that the campaign 
was planned by the senate in accordance with information 
furnished by Eumenes and at the recommendation of the 
Scipios, and that it was undertaken only after full delibera- 
tion regarding the necessity of some such action. Rome 
realized that although Eumenes, according to the terms of 
the treaty, was about to gain a large extent of territory, he 
possessed onlj'- the merest fragment of an army, since Antio- 
chus had stripped him of almost the whole of his kingdom. 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 179 

Immediately behind this defenseless expanse were the 
Galatians, a tribe accustomed to levy blackmail upon the 
length and breadth of the region. It would have been a 
serious mistake for the senate to leave the country without 
forcing from the barbarians an explicit recognition of the 
new order, and proving to them that Eumenes, at least until 
he grew into his position, had the support of a power whose 
word bore meaning. Moreover, another source of danger 
lurked in the fact that these Galatians and the Cappadocians 
near them had been allies of Antiochus. They could con- 
ceivably prove to be a very tinder box of revolution if the 
Great King should again dare to cross the Taurus. 

For thase reasons it was that the consul was sent to de- 
mand a recognition of the inviolability of Eumenes' new 
empire, and incidentally to impress upon the tribes the 
weakness of their former ally and the strength of Eumenes' 
friend. The Galatians were to pay the cost of the expedi- 
tion in the form of an indemnity for having participated in 
the battle at Magnesia. The cost perhaps would also serve 
to impress the new arrangements upon the memory of a 
people who were disposed to forget such matters. We 
may conclude then that, from the point of view of Asia's 
welfare, the campaign was a poHtical necessity, and that 
Polybius 2* justly sums up the campaign by saying that 
nothing so pleased the whole of Asia Minor as the removal 
of aU fear of the barbarians and a respite from their insolence 
and lawlessness. 

To the important work directed against the Celts, the 
other acts of the constil were incidental. So far as we can 
now judge, the detour into PamphyHa was self-imposed and 
his behavior there unjustifiably harsh; and yet we may 
well understand that it served in the south the same general 
purpose that the main expedition accomplished in the east. 
The consul's behavior illustrates the fact that the Romans 
had been learning in their recent vSpanish and Gallic wars 
the dangerous lesson of fighting barbarians with barbaric 
means. They no longer felt the need of applying to all 
opponents alike the old standards assumed by the fetial 



i8o RO^IAN IMPERIALISM 

law. While willing in Greece to do as the Greeks did, in 
Barbary they were learning to practice a harder fomi of 
warfare. One maj^ point out, however, that the Greeks had 
long before this time learned the same lesson, and that men 
like Euraenes and Antiochus probably saw no reason for 
being shocked at the beha\'ior of the Romans. We surely 
find no criticism of it in Poh'bius, even though the later 
Roman annalists felt constrained to apologize for it. 

While the more pressing work of ending the contest in 
Asia was progressing under Manlius, Fuhdus Nobilior, the 
other consul, was busy in ^Etolia. It will be remembered 
that the ^Etolian league had twice refused to suirender un- 
conditionally and, in the spring of 190, had been granted a 
truce of six months b}- Scipio. Even before the end of these 
six months, however, the league had lent its army to aid 
Am}Tiander in dri\'ing Philip, now a Roman ally, out of 
Athamania. It followed up this success by pursuing Philip 
to the very bounds of Macedonia.-^ In the spring of 189, 
the period of truce ha\4ng expired, Fuhaus again took up 
the struggle against the ^^tolians. He first advanced upon 
Ambracia, a strong and rich city held by an ^Etolian garrison. 
After a long, unsuccessful siege, described by Ennius, who 
accompanied the consul, Athenian and Rhodian envoys 
arrived to beg for mercy for the league. This was actually 
the third time within two years that Athens had interceded 
in their behalf. The consul accepted the good offices of 
the intennediaries and found that the senate was also ready 
to withdraw its previous insistence upon an unconditional 
surrender. To be sure, Philip complained vigorously to 
the senate of the attack upon him, but the Athenians per- 
sisted in their mission, even at Rome, and met with success. 
Ambracia surrendered upon honorable terms, losing appar- 
ently only some of its public treasures. The amount of 
indemnity originally demanded of the league was reduced 
by half. Rome demanded, however, that the league agree 
to surrender all claims upon the cities and communities it 
had lost during the war, as well as upon the island of Cephal- 
lenia ; and that it acknowledge the sovereignty of Rome and 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 18 r 

support her in war. In other words, the /Etolians, like the 
Italian tribes of the past, were to remain autonomous, but 
also, like these, they were in the future to be a subordinate 
ally. The league, however, escaped being placed among 
the tributaries of the class of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain. 
The stipulation made regarding Cephallenia is explained by 
the next move of the consul. He immediately asked these 
islanders to accept the sovereignty of Rome. All the cities 
did so with the exception of Same, which was then besieged 
and taken by storm. Its inhabitants were sold into slavery. 
The desire of Rome to possess the island is probably to be 
explained by the fact that it was infested with pirates who 
had tried to close the sea to Roman transports during the 
preceding summer.'^'' 

We have arrived at the conclusion of two serious wars 
that were dreaded by Rome in prospect as much as any that 
she had ever undertaken ; for the military fame of Mace- 
donia and Antiochus far outranked even that of Carthage 
in her best days. After these wars, the statesmen of Rome 
must have realized that there was now no power left that 
could cause them serious trouble. If, however, we have 
rightly interpreted the senate's purposes in the last two 
chapters, we may feel certain that during this decade Rome 
was fighting neither for the sake of aggrandizement nor 
even with the more general purpose of removing potential 
rivals. 

It still remains to be seen whether in the final settlement 
before the second withdrawal of her forces she made any 
provisions for a possible future assertion of sovereignty in 
the countries which her armies had traversed. Antiochus 
had come out of the contest as free from any mark of direct 
depenrlence as he had been before, although Ids sphere of 
action was somewhat restricted since Rome's friendships 
were now more extended and since he had agreed not to sail 
west of a certain point. Rome's advantages consisted de 
facto in the knowledge that Antiochus had this once been 
defeated, and de jure in the fact that she did not pledge her- 
self to any of the restrictions which bound Antiochus. But 



i82 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

this difference in the status of the two opponents might dis- 
appear if only the monarchs of Syria could establish as firm 
a hold upon their boundaries as Rome had upon hers. The 
senate showed no undue desire to emphasize its advantages 
over Syria in the succeeding years. The Seleucids were 
henceforth the amici of Rome, and neither Antiochus nor 
his son Seleucus IV had any reason to complain of Roman 
oflEiciousness. 

Rhodes remained a friend as before. Her wishes had 
carried great weight during the war; her naval policy was 
adopted by the Roman admiral in 190, her pleas in behalf 
of the ^tolians were granted by the senate, and her sugges- 
tions for the liberal treatment of Asia were largely accepted. 
After the war a slight dispute arose regarding the exact mean- 
ing of the clause of the treaty relating to Lycia, but the 
senate refused to press its interpretation, Rhodes carried 
out her measures to suit her own understanding of the matter, 
and the affair passed off amicably. A few years later the 
island again exerted her influence at Rome, requesting that 
the senate intervene in favor of Sinope.^^ On the whole, 
however, Rhodes assinned a dignified and independent 
bearing, and took care not to entangle herself or her friends 
in any Roman problems which might necessitate the media- 
tion of the West. 

The situation of Eumenes was peculiar, for the larger part 
of his empire had practically been given him by Rome. He 
was shrewd enough to see that success in ruling his posses- 
sions without having to raise a costly army depended upon 
his spreading the opinion among his neighbors that he had 
Rome's support. Accordingly, he pursued a policy of bring- 
ing Roman embassies into Asia whenever possible, and tried 
to impress the senate with the fact that the general safety 
of the region required their presence. Thus it is that in 183, 
when his realm was invaded by Phamaces, he chose rather 
to complain to Rome than to repulse the attack himself. 
The senate sent envoys to plead for a peaceable settlement, 
but when Phamaces refused to listen, the matter was dropped 
by the Romans. Eumenes himself then carried the war to a 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 183 

successful end, and at its conclusion made a treaty without 
in any way referring to Rome, although the rearrangements 
which he proposed involved several of Rome's friends. That 
Eimienes was entirely unrestricted in his foreign policies is 
shown not only by this, but by several other instances, — for 
example, when he aided Rhodes in her Lycian war ; when he 
undertook a new war with the Galatians, subjugating them 
completely ; when at various times he extended his influence 
among the Greek states by means of gifts ; and when he 
actually sent his forces into Syria to aid Antiochus IV to es- 
tablish his throne,^^ It is not apparent that before the war 
with Perseus the senate took any heed of Eumenes unless 
appealed to by him. He evidently enjoyed the degree of 
independence that he desired and that he was ready by 
personal effort to secure for himself. Thus the relations 
existing between Rome and Asia in the year 188 were fairly 
well defined. Rome had apparently no intention as yet of 
considering any part of Asia as a dependency ; and although 
she doubtless regarded herself as responsible for the general 
peace and safety there, at least for some time to come, she 
was actually ready to disregard numerous changes in her 
own settlement of the region. 

Rome seems therefore to have evacuated Asia without 
intending to return. From Greece she could not so com- 
pletely sever herself. For not only did the definition of her 
sphere of influence in 193 proclaim a conditional protectorate 
over Greece, but the subjection of ^tolia to the position of 
an obedient ally established her sovereignty on the coast of 
Greece. Furthermore, her relations with the several states 
had become so complicated that only the wisest of states- 
manship could have diminished the need for further inter- 
ference, and Greece had few wise statesmen at this time. 

Philip of Macedonia had come out of his war in 196 with- 
out any explicit definition of his status towards Rome.^* 
Later, to be sure, he had asked to be enrolled as a "friend" 
of Rome, whereupon the still unpaid installments of his war 
indemnity were remitted and his hostages returned. In the 
war of 191 he had occasionally aided Rome, but only when 



1 84 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

he saw some prospect of increasing his own domain thereby. 
He sent no troops to accompany the Scipios to Asia. There 
seems to have been some misimderstanding regarding his 
position during the war,^* the king apparently assimiing that 
he had the Hberty of overrunning Thessaly and Epirus, and 
the right to retain all he could take from the -^tolians, while 
the Romans, being responsible for the status as organized a 
few years before, saw that this would be impossible. Fla- 
mininus accordingly placed obstacles in his way, but was 
careful not to offend him by prestmiing to give any com- 
mands. After the peace of 189 Philip spent much time in 
extending his boundaries on the north.^^ Presently he fell 
into difficulties with the senate by taking possession of ^nus 
and Maronea, which the Romans had left free in 189 after 
removing the garrisons of Antiochus from them. This 
peculiarly reckless move of the king's — dupHcated indeed 
in Thessaly — brought on threats from the senate which 
annoyed him. However, it is clear that he blundered in 
this case and that his independence had been entirely re- 
spected until he did so. 

The Athenian republic was a Roman amicus, and enjoyed 
the most Hberal privileges. We never hear of Athens re- 
quiting Rome for various deeds of armed protection except 
by regaling the senate with elegant orations. For a long 
time after other allies had become de facto subjects, Athens, 
like Massilia, was allowed to keep up the form of an independ- 
ent power. 

The Achaean league was technically on the same footing 
as Athens, and could well have remained so if it had main- 
tained a dignified and consistent policy. But the league 
had grown so accustomed to assuming a heroic role while 
actually accepting the protection of some stronger power 
that it had acquired a kind of fitful fear lest it might not 
always appear thoroughly independent. This distemper, 
combined with a misplaced and not always scrupulous am- 
bition, made it an easy prey for rash leaders. When the 
Roman consiil, for instance, attacked Athamania because 
of its part in the war with Antiochus, the Achaean league 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 185 

presumed to purchase from the representatives of the now 
defimct government the island of Zacynthus, which had 
belonged to that coimtry, but which of course after the fall 
of the government must necessarily be at Rome's disposal. 
A great many of the Achaeans had acknowledged from the 
first that the act was imprudent, and yet they made free 
to accuse Flamininus of officiousness when he asked the 
league to revoke its action. Then again Sparta was a thorn 
in the flesh, bringing about a disagreement between the two 
states for which neither was actually to blame. On the 
death of Nabis in 192, Philopoemen, the Acheean pr^tor, had 
entered Sparta and annexed it to the league. In this Rome 
acquiesced, and, since Nabis had been her ally, became a 
party to the treaty drawn up between Sparta and the league.^® 
Trouble arose when Philopoemen now claimed that the league 
was sole sovereign in Sparta, and imder that claim refused 
to carry out the terms of its treaty regarding the political 
exiles. This refusal induced Sparta to send clamorous pro- 
tests to the senate. The disastrous restdts of this quairel 
will become apparent later. 

The minor states suffered but few changes in the war with 
Antiochus. The Boeotian league seems not to have been 
punished for its espousal of Antiochus' cause, and most of 
the Thessalian communities, as well as the Epirotes and 
Illyrians, remained in the position they secured in 196. Both 
of the Locrian leagues and that of Doris continued as mem- 
bers of the -^tolian league, which had in fact lost little. 

What now was Rome's position beyond the Adriatic after 
the wars with Philip and Antiochus ? Had she adopted the 
theory of conquest held by the Eastern monarchs — a theory 
she had inherited in Sicily through Hiero and Carthage? 
Obviously not, for Rome did not asstmie proprietary rights 
in a single foot of soil as a result of either conflict. Had she 
then followed her own ancient methods and extended her 
federation? Not even this; for her associates in the war, 
Rhodes, Achaea, Athens, the kings of Pergamimi and Egypt, 
remained amici as before, and her defeated enemies, Philip 
and Antiochus, were added to that list of "friends." 



i86 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Rome's participation in Eastern affairs had in fact followed 
a line of reasoning wholly new to her statesmen ; it resolved 
itself into nothing more nor less than a frank adoption of the 
Greek particularistic policy. The Scipios and their circle, 
men who had felt the magic of Hellenic civilization and were 
eager to draw Rome out of her stolid and monotonous mate- 
rialism, were hastening the day when Rome would no longer 
be a despised "barbaric" nation, but would take her place 
beside enlightened peoples. And the easiest way of approach 
seemed to them participation in the counsels of the respected 
group of republics which was wont to safeguard the peace 
and autonomy of the ^gean states. 

It is a great mistake to call the Scipionic policy imperial- 
istic. These men may have seen that Rome's sphere of 
political influence must widen through their work, but that 
was to them an incident, not an aim. In fact, the cultural 
influence which Greece would exert over Rome in conse- 
quence of closer contact was, in their eyes, a more desirable 
thing than Rome's political dominance over Greece. No, 
the policy of these statesmen, if logically carried out, was 
fundamentally anti-imperialistic : it would forever preclude 
Rome's expansion beyond the Adriatic. 

However, experience was soon to prove that the Scipionic 
group had undertaken the impossible. On the one hand, 
there was a very strong and ever growing party at Rome 
which did not sympathize with the new-fangled doctrine, 
and in i88 there were already signs that this party might 
easily gain control of the government and revert to more 
orthodox methods. On the other hand, the puny Greek 
states proved incapable of playing the game with so strong 
a partner. When Etmienes came to Rome to the general 
conference of powers which was to settle Asiatic affairs, he 
was greeted by the senate as a splendid and powerful 
monarch ; but when he rose to speak, he betrayed the spirit 
of a lackey ; instead of giving his counsel as an independent 
member of a coalition, he cringingly "entrusted his interests 
imreservedly to the hands of the Roman senate." This 
course paid him well, for the senate proved generous in the 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 187 

face of such humble reliance, but what "concert of powers" 
could there be with men of his stamp ? Yet the philhellenes 
were still too enthusiastic to see the reaction that must in- 
evitably come. In their eyes Rome's work beyond the 
Adriatic seemed to be complete in 188. In the future the 
senate would have little to do, they thought, but share with 
other nations in the fruits of the peace that had been estab- 
lished throughout the world. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 

1. Livy, XXXIII, 19; the objections of Rhodes: ibid. 20. 

2. By the "Royal" treaty of 387. 

3. Niese, Griech. und maked. Slaaten, II, 640, is not entirely accurate 
when he says that the Rhodians helped Antiochus plunder Ptolemy. 
Rhodes rather protected Ptolemy's possessions ; Livy, XXXIII, 20, 1 1. 
She did not seize Caunos, but purchased it. To be sure, Rhodes finally 
received a large portion of Ptolemy's Asiatic territory after the battle 
of Magnesia, but that was when Ptolemy had given up all claims to it. 

4. Polyb. XVIII, 41. Livy, XXXIII, 38, proves that Antiochus 
had a garrison in Abydos in the spring of 196. 

5. Polyb. XVIII, 47. 

6. Bevan, The House of Seleucus, vol. II ; Bouche-Leclercq, Histoire 
des Seleucides; Beloch, Griech. Gesch. (Ill, 2, p. 264), discusses the 
limits of Ptolemaic and Seleucid possessions in Asia. Max Nicolaus, 
Zwei BeitrUge, proves that Macedonia had no possessions in Caria until 
201. 

7. Several inscriptions show that he was employing his diplomacy to 
the utmost to gain a good reputation with Greek cities, Bevan, op. cit. 
II, p. 53- 

8. Polyb. XVIII, 41 ; XXVIII, 20 ; Cassius Dio, fr. 60. 

9. Ditt. Syll.2 No. 276 (cf. Dittenberger's note 10). The Lamp- 
sacene envoys apparently set out in the summer of 197, so that the 
motive of the embassy was rather to secure moral support against the 
Galati than against Antiochus, who was then far away. Note also 
that Rome's answer was addressed to several kings — not to Antiochus. 

10. Livy, XXXIII, 18; Polyb. XXXI, 7; Hicks, Greek Hist. 
Inscr.^ 174. Antiochus had also incurred the enmity of Eiunenes by 
laying claim to a large part of his kingdom, but he apparently intended 
to purchase Eumenes' good will when the proper time came ; Polyb. 
XXI, 20. 

11. Niese, op. cit. II, 674. 

12. Polyb. XVIII, 47 and 50. 



1 88 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

13. Maritime colonies of 194: Sipontum, Croton, Tempsa, Buxen- 
tum, Salernum, Puteoli, Liternum, Voltumum, and, possibly, Pyrgi, 
also Latin colonies at Thurii and Vibo in 193-2. It is a forceful com- 
mentary on Rome's depleted condition that Rome had to send Latins 
to two of these maritime colonies and also fiU the quota of the citizen- 
colonies with non-Romans ; and yet only some three thousand men all 
told were needed. 

14. Livy, XXXIV, 59 ; Diod. XXVIII, 16. 

15. Livy, XXXIV, 59. 

16. Livy, XXXV, 22. 

17. Flamininus used his influence to secure the control of Athens, 
Chalcis, and Demetrias for the propertied classes. This policy was 
quickly effective, but it brought unpleasant consequences later ; Livy, 
XXXV, 31 and 50. 

18. Livy, XXXV, 34-8. 

19. Livy, XXXV, 42, 2, and App. Syr. 12. Kromayer {Antike 
Schlachtf elder, II, 127) has clearly demonstrated the impracticability 
of Hannibal's program. 

20. Polyb. XXI, 45, 46. 

21. Since Antiochus had offered Etunenes all that had ever belonged 
to Attains as the price of an alliance (Polyb. XXI, 20, 8), Rome could 
hardly do less. 

22. In the settlement Ptolemy was, of course, disregarded, since, by 
his secret treaty with Antiochus, he had forfeited all rights to his Asiatic 
possessions. The status of Pamphylia was left under dispute. Later, 
a part of it was assigned to Eumenes, while a part was set free. 

23. Livy, XXXVII, 60, 7, and XXXIX, 27, 10. An inscription of 
Heraclea, reproducing a letter of the Roman consul (Ditt. Syll? 287) 
proves that Manlius and the ten commissioners did not always settle 
the status of old cities on broad principles. The purport of this letter 
is, "We grant you freedom and autonomy because you supported our 
cause.'' The spirit of the letter hardly accorded with the intention of 
the senate to sever political relations with Asia in the future. See 
also Manlius' settlement of a dispute between Samos and Priene, Ditt, 
Syll.'^ 315- 

24. Livy, XXXVII, 40, and XXXVIII, 14. 

25. See the inscription of Lampsacus (Ditt. Syll.^ No. 276) ; also, 
Livy, XXXVIII, 16 and 47. 

26. Livy, XXXVII, 40 ; XXXVIII, 26, 4 ; and Polyb. XXI, 47. 

27. Polyb. XXI, 36, and Livy, XXXVIII, 44 ff. (from Valerius 
Antias). 

28. Polyb. XXI, 43. Cf . ibid. Ill, 3, where the Greek author credits 
the Romans with freeing all the nations west of the Taurus from the 
violence of the Galati. 

29. Polyb. XXI, 25-30, and Livy, XXXVIII, i ff. 



CONSEQUENCES OF SENTIMENTAL POLITICS 189 

30. Livy, XXXVII, 13, 12. For the capture of the city, see Polyb. 
XXI, 40, and Livy, XXXVIII, 29. 

31. Rome and Rhodes: the naval policy, Livy, XXXVII, 15 and 
17 ; Rhodes' good offices accepted, Polyb. XXI, 24 ; Lycian dispute, 
Polyb. XXII, 5 ; the affair of Sinope, Polyb. XXIII, 9. 

32. Rome and Eumenes : the war with Phamaces, Polyb. XXIII, 9 ; 
XXIV, 9; XXV, 2; Eumenes aids Rhodes, Polyb. XXIV, 9; war 
with the Galati, Niese, op. cit. Ill, 72 ; aid of Antiochus IV, Inschr. 
von Perg. No. 160 ; App. Syr. 45. 

33. Polyb. XVIII, 44 ; Livy, XXXIII, 35, informs us that he later 
became a friend. Livy's loose phrase societatem amicitiamque reflects 
the new interpretation of the fetial rules which was to bring the policy 
of the Scipios under cover of the mos majorum; see Chap. VIII. 

34. Philip's claim that he had a right to make conquests under 
Rome's protection was whoUy untenable. The independence of the 
Greeks established a few years before could not be disregarded. He had 
been more than liberally rewarded for his military aid, for he was per- 
mitted to hold a large part of Magnesia, the Dolopians, and four cities 
of Thessaly (Livy, XLII, 56 and 67). 

35. Livy, XXXIX, 35 and 53 ; Polyb. XXIII, 8. 

36. Rome and Achaea ; the affair of Zacynthus, Livy, XXXVI, 32 ; 
the Spartan treaty, Livy, XXXVIII, 33, 9; XXXIX, 36, in vestro 
foedere. 



CHAPTER X 

REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 

The general withdrawal of Rome's Eastern armies in i88 
seemed for the moment to prove that the Scipios had suc- 
ceeded in completely reforming Rome's foreign policy. In- 
stead of fighting for an extension of empire, the senate had 
during ten years proved its willingness to act as a member of 
the ^gean concert of powers, to enter into temporary al- 
liances and coalitions, and to withdraw its forces when its 
main work had been done. In i88 it was apparent that if 
this policy cotdd be conserved long enough to eradicate the 
old Roman idea that an ally was a subject, Rome might 
become a permanent member of the Hellenic coalition whose 
purpose it was to propagate the Greek particularistic doc- 
trine. But the philhellenic group in the senate was not 
strong enough to bend the nation to a course so un-Roman. 
The Scipios soon fell from power, and with them their policies ; 
or perhaps, if we knew the whole truth, we should find that 
these leaders fell because their philhellenic policy could not 
withstand the vigorous assaults of conservative Romans 
like Cato. We can readily understand why the doctrine 
that underlay the work of this decade was not popular. 
Firstly, it broke utterly with the mos maiorum. The crea- 
tors of Rome's old institutions had formed scores of alliances, 
but always with the understanding that each and every one 
of their allies should sturender its foreign affairs to Rome's 
supervision. It made old-fashioned Roman senators un- 
comfortable to observe that they had signed away their 
privilege of lording over the East by accepting alliances of 
friendship instead of insisting upon the far more advanta- 
geous forms of treaty which former senators had imposed upon 
Italian states. Many of them felt that the Greeks did not 
deserve any privileged position among Rome's allies and that 

190 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 191 

there should be a leveling in favor of consistency. Secondly, 
the conservatives were not accustomed to entering upon 
expensive wars for sentimental reasons. They cared little 
whether or not Athenian orators pronounced them uncivilized 
for living outside the pale of Greek politics. Philhellenism, 
particularism, and applause at Greek games did not seem 
to them things for which one should spill Roman blood and 
appropriate public moneys. Their great ancestors had 
usually secured a substantial indemnity of money and terri- 
tory in return for citizens' blood. But criticism was directed 
not only against the policy, but against the results of the war. 
Men like Cato pointed out that the soldiers who had fought 
in Greece and the East came home with new-foimd vices and 
that the generals' staff brought back an un-Roman taste 
for everything from Greek cooking to marVjle statuary. The 
oft-repeated statement of the annalists that the deteriora- 
tion of Rome's morals dated from the return of Manlius' 
army was doubtless secured from Gate's speeches. And 
finally we may infer from the support which Cato's attacks 
upon the Scipios received in the democratic assembly that 
there was also political opposition to the philhellenic policy. 
Ever since the Roman army had crossed the seas in 264 the 
senate had steadily grown in prestige at the expense of the 
popular assembly. The believers in popular sovereignty 
were surely shrewd enough to see that if the state became 
involved in a mass of international disputes whose delicate 
points the populace could not hofje to understand, the senate 
would of necessity become a stronger and stronger adminis- 
trative body. That body would have to shape the govern- 
ment of a large empire, and its members would travel as 
ambassadors to all parts of the East ; in fact, the nobles were 
already assuming superior airs in consequence of the almost 
divine honors they had received from the servile peoples of 
the East. Not for centuries had the aristocracy of the senate 
possessed the power that it controlled in 190. The people 
saw the danger to their own prestige that lay in continuing 
along the road which the Scipios had laid out. 

All this dissatisfaction was ready to be unified into effective 



192 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

opposition when the right leader should be found, and that 
leader presently emerged in the person of Cato. He seemed 
ideally suited to the task, combining all the sympathies and 
prejudices which would make him the natural opponent of 
the Scipios. He hated them personally because Africanus 
had insulted him. He hated their poHcies because he was a 
narrow-minded and practical farmer of the type that in- 
stinctively favors expansion only if it pays and does not 
involve a breach of a legal code : there was no room for senti- 
ment in his politics. By temperament he was conservative 
to the core. Innovations, whether in politics or in food, in 
vices or in virtues, in religion or in art, he could not endure. 
At the same time he had no little sympathy with the popu- 
lace and the principles of popular sovereignty, especially if 
the people cried out against the power of the aristocratic 
cliques. In what follows we shall have occasion to observe 
how he gathered about himself all the opposition to the 
Scipionic regime, and, when the time was ripe, let loose the 
forces which effectively crushed it. Once in power he re- 
called the senate to the old heavy-handed policy of conducting 
all international dealings upon strictly business principles; 
and th.en the Greek allies of Rome awoke to the fact that 
they were allies only in the sense that the Italian socii had 
been; that they were no longer independent states, but 
Roman subjects. 

In tracing this change of the senate's attitude towards 
the Greeks — a change which eventually led to a new war 
in Macedonia — we need not enter into every dispute that 
arose. The history of the Achseo-Spartan imbroglio will 
lead to the main crisis and will sufficiently illustrate the 
point. According to the treaty of 191, which was signed by 
Flamininus, the Achaeans, and the Spartans, Sparta was 
to .surrender its coast cities to the Achsan league, was itself 
to become a member of the league, and was to recall to full 
rights the men that Nabis had exiled. The recall of these 
exiles, however, would of cotu-se necessitate a redistribution 
of the property which Nabis had taken from them and handed 
over to his partisans, — a proceeding to which the men then 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 193 

in possession nattirally objected. They accordingly hesi- 
tated to comply with the demands. Flamininus wished to 
settle the matter at once, but Philopcemen, either thinking 
that the time was not yet ripe, or hoping to carry the measure 
in a manner more advantageous to his league by dispensing 
with Roman aid, actually prevented Flamininus from be- 
ginning action.^ The Spartan possessors were elated; and 
when the exiles appealed for aid to Flamininus, whose re- 
newed request for a speedy settlement was again refused 
by Philopcemen, the Spartan possessors concluded that they 
had the Achaean S5mipathy, and accordingly made bold to 
storm a coast town where many of the exiles were living and 
put not a few of them to death. Then Philopcemen finally 
prepared to take action. But Sparta, now thoroughly 
frightened, declared itself free, and offered to give itself to 
Rome, sending envoys first to the consul Ftdvius, and later 
to the senate. The Achaean envoy at Rome, Lycortas, 
again pleaded against intervention ,2 and the senate refused 
to interfere. 

The results of the senate's inaction were disastrous. 
Philopcemen, who really desired to put a complete end to 
Sparta's claims as an independent state, advanced upon the 
city and demanded the surrender of the citizens who were 
guilty of the recent disturbance. These offered to come forth 
for trial under a pledge of safe conduct, but their appearance 
was the signal for a riot in which several of them were killed. 
The next day Philopcemen, in a farcical trial ,^ condemned 
all the rest to death, and thereupon carried out the project 
he had so greatly desired. He incorporated the city into 
the league, replaced the old Lycurgan constitution with one 
of his own making, destroyed the city's walls, and ordered 
the landholders to give up their possessions for redistribu- 
tion. Those who refused to leave the territory were sold 
into slavery, — some three thousand in number. Then he 
brought back the old exiles, hoping that because of this 
kindness they would prove friendly to the league. Of 
course this entire procedure absolutely disregarded the 
Roman-Spartan treaty of 191, and the senate doubtless felt 



194 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the insult. But the senate, still believing that Greece should 
be left to her own ways, said nothing. 

Two years later the question came up again. This time, 
strange to say, it was the returned exiles who appealed to 
Rome. They complained that in restoring them to their 
former property Philopoemen had banished too many in- 
habitants. They also asserted that the league held the 
reins of subjection too firmly, and that the walls of Sparta 
should never have been destroyed. They were even willing 
that their former enemies should return in order that the 
city might regain its former size and dignity. To answer 
these complaints the league had also sent envoys Rome- 
wards.* The senate answered both disputants by letter, 
stating that, although it did not approve of the league's 
treatment of Sparta, it would not interfere in the matter. 

The position of the senate under the Scipionic regime is 
well illustrated by the fact that this one answer was the ftdl 
extent of its interference for four years in the face of very 
strong provocation. However, in 186-5, matters assumed 
a different aspect, the reason for which we may with proba- 
bility trace to the fall of Africanus, and the threatening atti- 
tude of Philip. Several years before this Cato had begim a 
systematic attack upon the aristocratic leaders. In 193 he 
brought suit against the ex-consul Minucius Thermus for 
alleged cruelty to some Gallic prisoners, but apparently 
with little success, for the defendant soon became an officer 
in Scipio's campaign against Antiochus. He next attacked 
Acilius Glabrio, the friend of Scipio, and the general under 
whom Cato himself had served with such distinction at 
Thermopylae. Glabrio was charged with trying to gain 
popularity by means of lavish gifts to the soldiers, and Cato 
was so far successful in his prosecution of the case as to 
compel his opponent to withdraw from the contest for the 
censorship (Livy, XXXVII, 57). The effort made in 187 to 
deprive Fulvius and Manlius of triumphs is doubtless at- 
tributable to another attempt of this same indefatigable 
leader to discredit the aristocratic clique and to establish a 
precedent, if possible, by which to strike higher up. Finally 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 195 

in 186 Cato directed the tiltimate blow when a demand was 
made in the senate that Lucius Scipio account for the moneys 
obtained by him in the Asiatic campaign. Africanus,^ who 
well knew that the attack was in reality directed against 
himself, answered, justly enough, that a consul was not 
accountable by law, and forthwith tore up the records openly. 
As the sequel proves, however, Cato actually gained his 
point in the matter, for he succeeded in spreading the sus- 
picion among his partisans that the Scipios had reason to 
fear an accounting. He thereupon brought action in the 
assembly directly against Africanus, charging him with 
having accepted bribes from Antiochus. As proof, he cited 
the fact that Antiochus had met with strikingly liberal treat- 
ment, and he dwelt upon the incident of the Eastern king's 
generosity in sending back Africanus' captive son as a free 
gift. The populace, which had little imderstanding of the 
Scipios' liberal diplomacy, apparently found this evidence 
plausible, and Africanus seems to have avoided trial in a 
sufficiently haughty manner to excite even further adverse 
criticism. The trial, to be sure, fell through when Africanus 
appealed most effectively to the memory of his past deeds, 
and the whole matter came to naught later when he accepted 
a commission from the senate which removed him from the 
city. Cato, however, renewed his attack upon Lucius, and 
won his case before the popular assembly. In this emer- 
gency, Africanus appealed to the tribimes for aid, but the 
only one who heeded was Gracchus, a man of democratic 
sympathies and his personal enemy. Lucius, through the 
influence of Gracchus, was saved from prison, but the ac- 
ceptance of service from such a source was naturally a sui- 
render of all political influence. The Scipionic regime was 
completely at an end. Africanus withdrew to his villa, where 
he soon after died. With this victory Cato reached the 
height of his power. It is in 186-5 that we first notice a \/ 
new trend in the foreign policies of the senate. 

The second important incident to which we referred was 
the aggression of Philip. It will be remembered that in 191 
Adlius Glabrio had given Philip permission to campaign in 



196 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

northern Thessaly, with the understanding that the king 
might take and retain such cities as had voluntarily aided the 
enemy. ^ The king, however, overstepped his agreement 
and failed to evacuate certain cities that did not properly 
fall into this class. He went even further, for during the 
succeeding years he quietly insinuated his partisans into 
several free Thessalian cities, and by diplomatically working 
one faction against another, by removing his opponents, 
and by colonizing cities with Macedonians, he extended his 
power considerably. In Thrace he was still bolder. There 
he employed factional disturbances as a means of intrqducing 
his garrisons into ^nus and Maronea, which the Roman 
general Fabius had left free in 188 ; and, finding that Fabius 
had designated the public road as the boundary line of these 
cities, he altered the road so as to secure an addition of terri- 
tory for himself. The seizure of these cities was a signal 
for protests from every aggrieved source, and Eumenes 
gladly joined the complainants, hoping to gain possessions 
in Thrace if Philip were forced to recede. It is very difficult 
to understand how Philip dared to risk a contest with Rome, 
but his conduct is probably to be explained by his knowledge 
that the Scipios were not wholly in favor, and that Cato, 
who would apparently succeed them, had little respect for 
the Greeks and would scarcely take great pains to support 
measures instituted by the preceding regime. What Philip 
failed to understand was that Cato, although neither phil- 
hellenic enough to care for Scipio's policy, nor imperialist 
enough to desire a foothold for Rome in Greece, was too much 
of a patriot to let an insult to the state pass unchallenged. 

The senate did indeed take heed, and dispatched an em- 
bassy under C^cilius Metellus to hear complaints, even 
assuring protection to all who wished to speak. Philip, to 
be sure, had provoked the humiliation involved in this pro- 
cedure, but it must be admitted that Metellus conducted the 
proceedings with little consideration for the sovereign rights 
of the king. To Rome's final decision, however, so far 
as we can make it out, we can scarcely object. The two 
Thracian cities were again declared free (Livy, XXXIX, 29), 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 197 

and were not, happily, given to the tale-bearing Eumenes. 
We are less clearly informed concerning the disposition of 
the cities in Thessaly. We know that the king later pos- 
sessed Demctrias with most of Magnesia, the greater part of 
Dolopeia, the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which 
Antiochus had once taken from him, and, if we may judge 
from what Perseus "^ appears to possess in 170, several cities 
in northern Thessaly. It seems therefore that the trial board 
decided the issue on the basis of Philip's understanding with 
Acilius in 191. Whatever territory he had occupied in dis- 
regard of that agreement, he was ordered to evacuate. 

The king was extremely angry, and warned his enemies 
that his last sun had not yet set. The orders he had re- 
ceived he took no pains to expedite. The envoys that came 
to investigate what progress was being made, found that he 
was still dallying ; and when finally he evacuated Maronea, 
he spitefully had the leaders of the city murdered.^ Livy 
adds, perhaps on good authority, that he was secretly urging 
the Istri to invade northern Italy at this time, and the sug- 
gestion has been made that the colony of Aquileia at the 
head of the Adriatic was founded (18 1) in view of such ac- 
tivities. At any rate, for several years after 186 there was 
intense fear at Rome that the trouble with Philip would 
soon end in another Macedonian war. This fear it was that 
in turn shaped Cato's policy after he had overthrown the 
Scipios, Cato was in no sense an imperialist. He would 
have preferred to withdraw from Greece completely and to 
have forbidden all intercourse with the country which 
seemed to him the bane of Roman ideals. He was practical 
enough, however, to see that Rome could not favorably with- 
draw in the face of a threatening war. The only alter- 
native possible to Cato's conception of politics was to re- 
main in Greece as master of the situation, and to require 
that the petty states of Greece quit dallying with excuses 
and meet their agreements seriously. This is the spirit in 
which Rome's envoys dealt with the Greeks after 186. The 
new regime even made a point of employing more practical 
men for the diplomatic service, men like Caecilius Metellus, 



198 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

who had once imprisoned the poet Naevius ^ because of a 
pointed Satumian, Marcius Philippus and the Popihi, 
trained in devious methods by their experiences with the 
barbaric Ligurians, and Appius Claudius, who conducted his 
foreign mission with all the proverbial haughtiness of his 
clan. Even Flamininus,^*' to whom the Greeks had sung 
pasans as to a deity, adapted himself to the new trend of 
things and became the servile tool of a senate which blotted 
out the splendid work of his early career. 

In the Achaso-Spartan imbroglio, it was Caecilius Metellus 
who, on his return from the harrowing conference with 
Philip in 185, visited the Acheeans and reopened the ques- 
tion regarding the league's treatment of Sparta. This was 
of course a complete reversal of the senate's former position, 
for it had in the preceding year notified the league that it 
would take no further action. Moreover, Metellus con- 
ducted his business with the league in an offensive manner. 
He came without proper credentials, abused the Achasans 
for what they had done, and asked them to call a full meeting 
of the league in order that measures of restitution might be 
adopted. His demand was refused on the ground that it 
was illegal to call a meeting of the league at the bidding of 
an allied power unless properly drawn up instructions were 
presented (Pol. XXII, 13). For this perfectly justifiable 
action of the Achaeans the senate administered a sharp re- 
buke, and instructed its next envoy to Philip, Appius 
Claudius, to stop in Greece and renew the request for the 
desired action. Upon his return from Macedonia in 184, 
Claudius accordingly asked for an assembly of the league and 
presented the senate's complaints against the Achaeans for 
the legal murders of 188, the destruction of Sparta's wall, 
and the changes in her constitution. The league's president, 
Lycortas, replied that the league could make no amends. 
Claudius retorted brutally that the league would do well to 
listen to the senate's suggestions before it was compelled 
to obey its commands. Thereupon, Lycortas answered 
with bitterness that if changes were to be made in the Spartan 
constitution, the senate might do it and save the league from 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 199 

the crime of breaking an agreement sealed with oaths. And 
so the matter went to the senate for review. But that body 
hardly distinguished itself for wisdom. 

A commission of three men, Flamininus, Metellus, and 
Claudius, was delegated to draw up a final decision, and this 
it did in a session held at Rome. In its verdict Achaea's 
position as a sovereign power was completely disregarded. 
In fact, the Acheean envoys present were asked to sign an 
agreement which openly involved their breaking the laws 
and treaties of the league; and they signed it.^^ By this 
decision Achasa was to restore the exiles of 190 and to re- 
build Sparta's walls, but not a word was said about the im- 
portant question of redistributing Spartan property. Mar- 
cius Philippus was now sent to deliver this decision to Achaea, 
but the league, in a rage, voted not to accept it, taking the 
stand that if the senate would rehear the case, it would annul 
the commission's verdict. Some time later, the league, stiU 
disregarding Rome's decision, entered into a new agreement 
with Sparta, accepting her as a league-member on the signed 
promise that the exiles were not to be recalled.^^ The 
senate must have resented this show of independence, and 
yet, not being willing to compel obedience by force of arms, 
it remained silent. 

Meanwhile the situation in Macedonia had been growing 
more serious. Demetrius, whom the Romans had hoped 
to see as Philip's successor, had been poisoned, apparently 
by the agents of Perseus. Rome no longer had any way of 
checkmating her enemies in Macedonia except by direct 
interference. Accordingly in the year 180, she sent a note 
to Achaea stating that the commission's decision must be 
enforced. This brought on the crisis. Lycortas, taught in 
the Fabian school of Philopcemen, proposed trying per- 
suasion with the Romans again, and his motion carried, but, 
tmfortimately for his plans, his enemy, the pro-Roman Cal- 
licrates, secured a place on the embassy sent to Rome. This 
man, reckoned by later Greeks as one of the most infamous 
of traitors, did not carry out the instructions of Lycortas 
and the league, but instead, describing the division of parties 



aoo ROMAN" nirFKlAMSM 

in the Greek cities, advised the senate tJiat if it would but 
eti^Miraiiv the atSstocratic factions it\ the vnriiMis oiiii\s aiui 
re\v;u\l th<.^se who fa\tM>ed Rome's wishes, its it\thuMivv would 
soon piwloniinate and its reseripts wv^nld Iv hooded . ivc.vixl- 
less of Aeha^is laws ..-.'. .o.^stitution ^^Tol. XXIV. iv). 
The result of tliis ad.\ i.\~ w.un viooisive. The souaie, under 
tlie intluotuv o: ^\..>\ .lotonniuod to use its i\>wor diiwHly 
in the est;\blishu\oiii of pm-Rotwati jwrtios ihmu^i^hout 
Greeee, and tJ\at dete.m\inatii.\i\. aiwtnliuj^ to l\^lyhius 
(XXIV, I j), begins a new em in the history ot (.M-;ix\>-RvMuai\ 
relations. Ot\ the stnM\i;tl\ of Rome's suppiMt. whieh was 
ptibliely expivssed thivu^.;hout Giww. t^allierates sinnnwi 
his own election to the pn^sideney of the Uw.cue ai\d eartied 
out the stipulations of the set\ate to the fuli.'^"' 

This incident, so teiiious in its petty details, shows as 
nothing else how domestic ajid foreign e\*cnts ctMispinxl to 
inwigle the st\nate in a policy of intervetuion with tvfeiviuv 
to Achaw. The further history of the Ma».\\lot\ian i]uartvl 
explains how the sjune policy came to be adv^ptod for the 
rest of Gnvce. 

After I S3, Philip had tacitly yielded to the souatc's de- 
mands that he cease interfering in Greeh affairs. I lo turuod 
all his eneriiy towat\i stivngthctnn>i his cinpiiv iti other 
directions; he inctvased the population of his kingdom by 
wise inner colonization, he ri\>rganized tlie finances of the 
state, and trained his antty by waging war with the tribes 
on the north. He even itwited the Celtic tribe of the l>as- 
tamfe from beyond the Daniibe to «.\Mne aud live \n tlte 
Nneinity of Ahuvdonia. for by this move he would rid him- 
self of his neighbors, the ptv-Romat^ Pardani. aT\d secure 
the ser\'ice as mercenaries of a stivng .md frictidly tribe. 
All this acti\-ity was of ct^nrse known at Rome, nor was its 
ultimate pur{.x")se a secret, but no excuse for ptvtest was 
available. The subject furnished the senate no little anx- 
iety — and much food for tvtlcction upon the ultimate 
consequences of the Scipionic policy. 

"\Maen Philip died in 17Q. Perseus succveded to the throt\e 
and to the puqx^ses and jxilicies of his father. He renewed 



REACTION 'I'OWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 201 

the "friend:. flip" wiih Rome, and in so df^in^ he specifically 
nteoj^nized Uie reeerii aj^efrtneni made between his father 
and tfie senate,'" hut hir, subsequent behavior shows that 
from the first Ik; did rK)t, intend to heed it in too literal a 
sense. I'liilip';; work oi internal improvement he continued. 
fie ,'i,I:;o be^^an to store ujj grain and treasure for war pur- 
\><):.(-.. I '.lit his greatest success lay in his diplomacy. Close 
alii.'i.iic:e;; with Sftleiuiis ,'ind Prusias, sealed, by <lynastic 
marria;,'es, al,tr.'i,et,f:d iJie attention of the whole Ii)ast to him. 
He secretly aided n.ii.ive princes in the vicinity, who created 
difTieiill,ir;s amon;.^ I,lie Illyrian chiefs friendly to Rome. Most 
imporl,ant of .'ill, however, he ;;uccef;ded in building up a 
remarkably ;;l,roti;^ pro M,'i,eedoni;i,n p.'ul.y iJiroiijdiont, Orecce, 
anrl tlii;; l.'ist, work, reve.'ding, as it does, the extnrmely eom- 
[>lif:,'i,ted nature oi Rome's peculiar positif>n, deserves fuller 
notice. 

Th(! great instability of govr;rnrnent that existed among 
the (Ireek <rity ;;tate;; i:; ))roverl)i.'i,I. It is safe to say that 
during Uh- (omUi ,-i.iid iJiitd <-eiil,iitie:; I, here were, few dties 
that difl not undcrg') ;i, bloody revolution ,'i,t le,'i.;;t once every 
general.ion. Atifl l,he;,(; revolutions were thfjroiighgfjing, 
often involving a Complete redistribution of piiv.-ite property 
a;; well a:; .'i, change in the form of government. Politically, 
it was usu.'dly .'i. (juestion whether the city should be a pure 
dc*mo(Taey or ;i,n oligarchy ; bid, practically such revolutions 
had mf)re th.-m political imporL-uice, for the party in power 
(|uite regularly banished its ojjjK^nents, confi.scated their 
lands, anrl either devoted, these to state piirpo;;e:; or r.iniply 
red i;;tribti ted. them among the vid/Ors. 

Now the entnince of Rf>rne into this field w;i,;. sofHi dis- 
cover(;d to be an. influ(!nce for stability and for a stricter 
lf;gal f)bservanc(; of jjermanent prof)erty rights. Wherever 
I'Narnininus, for instance, was called ujjon to reorganize the 
constitution of a state, it was noticed thnt f,wo princ-ifjles 
irnrnefhately c;ame to the front. P^irstly, all political exiles 
Wfire called back, for stable governmcjnt was imj)OSsible so 
long as one faction was excluded and waiting on the border 
for its opfjortunity to raise an insurrection. vSecondly, the 



202 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

preponderance of legislative power was placed, as at Rome, 
in the hands of property ownoi^ ; in other wonls, a mild 
fonn of aristoeraey was regularly recoi^iiized. The meaning 
of this trend was soon obser\^ed, and it reacted directly or 
indirectly npon the greater part of Greece. In the enthvi- 
siasin for tlie new order ivpresented by the proclamation of 
196, the oligarchic parties came to the fore in very many 
states. The leaders of these aristocracies felt instinctively 
that the presence of a Roman protectorate would work for 
stability of government and consequently guard tlieir prop- 
erty rights, that in fact nothing would again bring back the 
danger of revolutions or encourage " t>'ra.nnies " and pure 
democracies so much as the reestablishment of the old 
Macedonian protectorate. Accordingly, the leaders of such 
states because more and more ajiti-Macedonian, that is, 
more and more pro-Roman. 

Needless to say, the new order did not satisfy all. Many 
who believed sincerely in the democratic fonn of govern- 
ment saw that it was now in danger of disappearing. And 
of course the unpropertied and the whole class of those who 
fall into economic dithculties under whatsoever regime saw 
in the new stability the end of a convenient and profitable 
mode of readjustment. This class grew strong in many 
cities, and being in the politicid opposition at home, they 
naturalh' included in their platform a plank with reference 
to the larger main question. Perseus knew, of course, that 
any enemy of Rome might ha\'e the s^inpathy of this class, 
and therefore undertook to create out of that s^nnpathy a 
positive force. At all frequented shrines of Greece he posted 
edicts in\4ting home all absconding debtors and political 
exiles who had left Macedonia (Pol. XXV 3). The immediate 
inference throughout the land was that Perseus would be a 
friend of the oppressed, and that if he had the opportimity, 
he would throw his influence in favor of democracies through- 
out Greece. The consequence was that secret missions 
began to flock to the king from every direction extending 
sympathy, making promises for tlie future, and asking for 
his support. The Boeotian league, where the democratic 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 203 

forms were still in force, went so far as to make a close 
alliance with him, — Perseus' sanction of which seems to 
have been a violation of his treaty with Rome. We may 
add that the royal correspondence which later fell into the 
hands of Paullus contained letters from this period that 
brought many prominent Greeks into disgrace at Rome, 

Thus before any directly hostile act from either side had 
been observed, opposing factions in all cities of Greece were 
instinctively aHgning themselves under the names of pro- 
Roman and pro-Macedonian. But economic considerations, 
we must hasten to add, were not the only issue between the 
two parties. There were even leaders of moderate political 
views who never gave up the fear that Roman influence 
would ultimately prove a menace to Greece. With a long 
and varied history from which to judge they instinctively 
and rightly suspected the professions of Rome, even when 
they were sincere. The compelling movements of political 
events had so frequently given the lie to the most altruistic 
of beginnings, and the Greeks had so frequently been "liber- 
ated" with disastrous results that they had grown suspicious 
of the effectiveness of the most genuine promises. The 
worst was that since 185 even kind words had begun to fail 
and the senate's disinterestedness to pale. When occasionally 
benefits ^^ were still bestowed to prove the reliability of old 
pledges, they were too often brought by tactless men who 
conveyed them in somewhat the blunt and unsympathetic 
•way that Russia, for instance, befriended the Slavs of Bul- 
garia after the war of '78 — and with similar results. 

Relations then were badly strained all through the third 
decade of the century. Perseus was rapidly gaining strength 
and sympathy. He might conceivably march south with a 
strong army, in which case he would undoubtedly meet 
with enthusiastic support. If Rome did not wish to repu- 
diate all her past work in Greece and give up the land again 
to Macedonian dominance, she must sooner or later face the 
issue with decision. The only question was whether to 
wait for Perseus to act and accept the war at a disadvantage, 
or be forehanded, make a demonstration upon the border of 



204 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Macedonia, and exact terms that would leave the king 
harmless. 

The king was himself in no enviable position. His father's 
attempt to displace pro-Roman tribes on the west by the 
introduction of friendly Celts had been met by the exten- 
sion of Roman alliances in the direction of Thrace. This 
indicated that the king might eventually be deprived of the 
privilege of aggression, even on the north. If this successor 
of Alexander found such a situation growing intolerable and 
gave vent to his anger in secret action contrary to the spirit 
of his promises, it cannot be wondered at. Such action, 
however, brought upon him further irritating orders from 
Rome, bidding him observe more care in his dealings with 
his "friend." When finally Eumenes came to Rome in 173 
with an overfull catalogue of Perseus' suspicious acts,^^ the 
senate was convinced that it was wise openly to counteract 
the king's influence in Greece. It therefore sent a group of 
envoys to the several Greek states, calling upon them to 
break off relations with Macedonia and commit themselves 
unequivocally in favor of Rome. These envoys succeeded 
after a time in gaining the allegiance of almost every state, 
but in some places only with great effort. When, for in- 
stance, the Boeotian league hesitated, Marcius Philippus, 
the Roman envoy, at once disregarded the sovereign position 
of the league and asked the cities individually to sign agree- 
ments with Rome. All but three 5delded, not daring to 
face her displeasure. Thus the Boeotian league came to an 
end. The Achasan league, which submitted to pressure so 
readily in 180, had been forehanded enough in divining the 
pleasures of Rome and had severed its commercial relations 
with Macedonia as early as 175, though it thereby made the 
kingdom a safe refuge for all runaway slaves from the 
Peloponnese. 

The envoys went even to Asia to obtain new assurances 
of support in case of war. Here Rome had troubled the 
various states so little that a greater degree of good will 
existed. Prusias, who was Perseus' brother-in-law, declared 
that he would observe neutrality because of his relationship. 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 205 

Emnenes' friendship was of course unquestioned. Syria 
had been absolutely unmolested these fifteen years, so that 
Antiochus was well enough pleased with the course of events. 
He, too, promised to observe friendship. Rhodes was less 
well satisfied. The predominance of Eumenes in Asia Minor 
was at times galling, while a recent declaration of the senate 
that the treaty of 188 intended Lycia to be an ally rather 
than a tributary of Rhodes had cost the island a war with 
its subject.^^ However, its recent unprecedented prosperity 
was so clearly dependent upon the even balance at present 
maintained that Rhodes could have had little desire to see 
the return of the Diadochian regime which would follow the 
success of Perseus. Rhodes readily promised aid therefore. 

Of course this open activity against Perseus was intoler- 
able to that king, but, instead of meeting it with arms as it 
deserved, he began to quail before the contest, and meekly 
asked what was desired of him. He was told that his 
activities against Rome's allies were considered infractions 
of the treaty and that he could have peace only upon com- 
plete submission to Rome.^^ 

During the first year of the war which followed this ulti- 
matum, the Roman army fell into incompetent hands. The 
consul Licinius Crassus lost his first battle and peevishly 
threw the blame for his defeat upon the allied troops. Then 
he tried to show results by plundering disaffected Boeotian 
cities during the winter. ^^ C. Lucretius, the prsetor in charge 
of the fleet, was of similar caliber, evincing inexcusable 
cruelty toward the Boeotian cities of Haliartus and Thisbe 
for closing their gates to the Romans. His successor was no 
less intemperate in seizing every pretext to pillage hostile 
cities and request supplies from friendly ones. In fact, the 
senate, which was not yet wholly corrupt and was prudent 
enough to see that it was losing the moral support of its 
allies, had to adopt vigorous measures against its generals. 
It sent an order that no requests for supplies were to be heeded 
unless they bore the senate's authorization ^° ; it took meas- 
ures to right the wrongs inflicted upon the Greeks, punish- 
ing several of the miscreant officers by fines and banishment. 



2o6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

The second consul, Hostilius, devoted most of his time to 
bringing his army into a better condition and the allies into 
a more sympathetic attitude. His attempt, however, to force 
his way into Macedonia failed. 

Q. Marcius Philippus, the third consul, was a rough-and- 
ready man who stood well with the populace, but had a bad 
blot upon his military record because of having led his army 
into a disastrous ambuscade in Liguria during his first con- 
sulship in 1 86. His Macedonian campaign of 169 nearly 
ended in the same fashion. By a hazardous stroke, he pushed 
his army over the pathless mountains above the well-fortified 
pass of Tempe into the closed comer of southeastern Mace- 
donia. As he was wholly dependent upon making connec- 
tions with his transports, which nevertheless failed to appear 
for a long time, he fell to all appearances into hopeless 
straits. Perseus, however, who naturally inferred that 
Marcius had established the necessary communications, 
withdrew all his garrisons in the rear, thereby unwittingly 
saving his opponent. Even so, little of worth had been 
accomplished by Marcius. The little nook into which he 
had forced his way was readily locked off, and the consul 
had to waste the whole season. Marcius, seeing this, his 
second campaign, also in danger of ending to his discredit, 
seems to have lost his courage, for he suggested to the 
Rhodian envoys who visited him that they use their good 
offices in trying to reestablish peace. Certain it is that 
several of Rome's allies, seeing the apparent inability of 
Rome's army to push forward, began at this time to waver in 
their support. The lUyrian king made overtures to Perseus, 
the anti-Roman faction in Rhodes was rapidly becoming a 
powerful party, and even Etimenes entered into secret 
communications with the king. In fact, the autiunn of this 
year was the darkest period of the war for the senate.^^ 

When the Rhodian envoys returned home and reported 
Marcius' request, the pro-Macedonian party immediately 
drew what was doubtless the correct inference, that the 
consul had despaired of success. They made the most of 
the occasion, secured a majority in the state, and voted to 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 207 

send a friendly embassy to Perseus, assuring him of their 
good will, and to invite a group of states to cooperate with 
them in bringing pressure upon the senate to end the war. 
Unfortimately '^ for them, their envoys did not reach Rome 
tmtil after Perseus' defeat, and their offers of mediation then 
only served to offend the senate, which already had good 
reason to suspect their loyalty. 

Even Eimienes was touched by the contagion. Polybius 
relates that he kept up an extended secret correspondence 
with Perseus, offering to intervene in his behalf for a stipu- 
lated sum of money. The story in this form hardly 
seems to accord with the character of Eumenes, but it is 
more than probable that there was an interchange of mes- 
sages. Probably the Pergamene was shifting his course, and 
tentatively hid his real S5nTipathies under a pretense of 
business forms, in case the letters should be intercepted. 
One can readily understand that Eumenes saw as well as 
others the danger in too complete a success on Rome's 
part, and hoped that now when the army seemed to be at 
bay an agreement could be reached which would somewhat 
moderate her power. Even if Rome won, there cotdd be 
little fiurther profit for him, since he already had everything 
that was reasonably available ; Roman success would simply 
place him in danger of being overshadowed by his protector. 
On the other hand, he was now so strong that if Rome could 
be excluded from Greece, he might hope to be one of the 
three or foiir dominating powers of the East in the future. 
However, his negotiations with Perseus came to naught; 
and in the end he succeeded only in bringing down the wrath 
of the senate upon his head. 

The Achaean league likewise, which had been so ready with 
aid at the inception of the war, was now far less enthusiastic. 
The party that stood for independence and neutrality was 
led by Lycortas, the father of Polybius, a man who for the 
first time in years seems to have sectired a majority for his 
policy. Although Lycortas studiously avoided committing 
an overt act of hostility to Rome, — PauUus found no letters 
in the king's archives incriminating any Achaeans, — he 



2o8 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

betrayed a remarkable inclination to involve the league in 
Egyptian affairs, in order, of course, to keep it as far as 
possible from the Roman imbroglio. All in all, Rome, during 
the autumn and winter of 169, was rapidly losing the support 
of her discouraged friends. It was high time for more effec- 
tive work. 

However, the public conscience was also awakened, and 
in 168, ^milius PauUus, a tried general of high principles, 
was sent to Macedonia. Within a few weeks he outflanked 
the enemy, forced him to fight, and, by his complete success 
at Pydna in the midsummer of 168, ended the reign of Perseus. 

The senate had long decided that Perseus must be de- 
throned. Indeed, Paullus, and doubtless the preceding 
consuls as well, carried instructions not to address him as 
king after his defeat. But the settlement of Macedonia was 
of an unprecedented nature. The senate decided that the 
Macedonian people should be autonomous, that they should 
not live under a Roman administrator, but should pay an 
annual sum to Rome of one hundred talents, i.e. somewhat 
less than half the amount they paid in direct tax to their 
king; and furthermore, that the royal mines and estates 
should be closed.^^ Paullus and the ten commissioners 
made the final arrangements upon this basis. The extrane- 
ous possessions gained by Philip in 190-189 were severed, 
the island possessions being given to Athens. Macedonia 
proper was divided into four independent republics accord- 
ing to the natural geographical Hnes so clearly marked out 
by the high mountain ranges and rivers of the country. In 
order to break up the national feeling that might readily 
emerge into perilous action if a pretender to the throne 
should appear, connuhium and commercium were declared 
void between the four various states. Charters were devised 
for the cities and states by Paullus with such good judgment 
that they seem still to have been in force two centuries 
later.24 We may well believe that the cities received the 
conservative form of government so strongly favored by 
Rome in those days. 

The constitution ^^ devised for the foiu" republics was one 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 209 

of the most remarkable of ancient times, if we interpret the 
evidence correctly. Indeed, it was apparently nothing short 
of a unicameral, representative government. The chief 
magistrate, doubtless elected annually, was chosen by the 
direct vote of a popular assembly. The magistrate seems, 
however, to have received his ordinances, not from the popular 
assembly, as was usual in Greek states, but from a senate 
or syiiedria, whose members were chosen by the individual 
communities. 

To be sure, the principle of representation was not a dis- 
covery of Paullus, for it had been employed to a certain 
extent by the old Boeotian league,^^ and probably by several 
of the other leagues. The innovations of Paullus, however, 
are very significant. Whereas in the leagues the senates 
were regularly subservient to the decisions of a primary 
assembly or a board of archons, here the representative 
senate — probably for the first time in history — formed the 
real government of the state. The primary assembly re- 
tained only elective powers, being considered unfit for gov- 
ernmental duties. Secondly, the central government of each 
Macedonian republic was made relatively stronger than in 
any of the leagues, for the reason that the Macedonians 
had lived together as a homogeneous and united people in 
a territorial state under a strong central government, whereas 
the leagues were more or less artificial aggregates of inde- 
pendent cities. As a result of all this, the republics founded 
by Paullus, so far as forms are concerned, must have very 
closely resembled those of modem territorial states. 

Paullus and the commissioners adopted several other 
measures of an innovating character. While the states were 
given the right of coinage, which was regularly considered a 
mark of sovereignty, they were nevertheless required to 
pay Rome an annual tribute equal to one-half the tax they 
had paid their kings. Livy adds that all the mines were 
at first ordered closed. Finally, the export of timber as well 
as the importation of salt was forbidden. These strange 
measures deserve a word of explanation, for they are usually 
interpreted as meaning that Rome went to great lengths, 



2IO ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

not only in enriching her state treasury, but also in creating 
monopolies for the benefit of her merchants. The tribute 
need not be taken as a mark of subjection. Its very small- 
ness, about loo talents per year, proves that it was not a 
tax of the usual kind. Rome had, in the past, been in the 
habit of demanding a war indemnity from those she con- 
quered to help pay the expenses of the struggle; in this 
case, however, the government with which she had fought 
was now defimct and cotdd not pay such an indemnity. 
The tribute therefore was doubtless considered as a sort of 
interest on a capital that would have equaled a fair indem- 
nity. Be that as it may, the republics were regarded as 
"free" by their neighbors, and all through Greece there was 
astonishment at the liberality with which the Macedonians 
were treated.^^ 

The importation of salt ^^ was not forbidden in order to 
benefit traders of any class. The Macedonian kings had 
doubtless created a state monopoly in salt for the sake of 
revenue, a custom, as we know, of most of the Hellenistic 
monarchs. This monopoly Rome confirmed to the new 
republics in order to aid their revenues. The prohibition of 
timber exports was due to similar causes. The Macedonian 
kings had owned large forest tracts, and, in order to protect 
the royal revenue, had forbidden the private export of tim- 
ber. These tracts, which had been the king's personal estate, 
now became Rome's public property. However, Rome had 
not yet decided to send her agents to manage these proper- 
ties, for the presence of Roman publicans would scarcely be 
welcomed by a "free" people, and furthermore, the senate 
was not at all siu-e that it desired to retain possessions so 
far from home. Accordingly the old royal prohibition was 
reimposed until a final decision could be reached. The 
mines had also been royal property, as was usual in those 
days. PauUus decided to let contractors (probably the 
Macedonians already in charge) continue to work the iron 
and copper mines upon favorable terms, so that the state 
would not have to keep constant watch over the production. 
The gold and silver mines were closed for the same reason 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 211 

that the forests had been. In 158 they were reopened and 
probably leased to Roman contracting firms. 

The effects of the war with Macedonia spread far beyond 
Greece. When the senatorial commissioners had reorganized 
Asiatic affairs in 188, they had tied Rome to future obliga- 
tions in Asia as little as possible, establishing relations with 
the several states, if at all, by treaties of friendship, but not 
by alliances. They furthermore left the implication that 
the weaker states were to be within the respective spheres 
of guardianship of the Pergamene and Rhodian governments 
rather than of Rome. It does not appear, therefore, that the 
Roman lawyers had as yet proposed any theory to the effect 
that by the battle of Magnesia the sovereignty of the cis- 
Taurian region had actually passed from Antiochus to Rome 
and had then been granted as precatory to the various 
states which were left in charge. Antiochus had been looked 
upon simply as an invader who had not yet established his 
sovereignty in the region. His advance and retreat had not 
on the whole affected the question of ownership. It was 
only when some city had voluntarily aided Antiochus that 
the allies chose to consider its rights forfeited to the victors. 
The allies also assiuned possession of the former Egyptian 
possessions in Asia Minor on the ground that they had been 
forfeited by Ptolemy's bargain with the Syrian king. But 
during the war with Perseus it seems that a new theory was 
gaining acceptance at Rome, the theory that since the senate 
had organized Asia in 188, it too could make whatsoever re- 
arrangements it saw fit in any part of cis-Tatuian territory. 

The first indications of this change appear in Rome's 
new dealings with Rhodes and Pergamtim. We have re- 
marked that Rhodes incurred the enmity of Rome in 169 
by exerting her influence in an unfriendly way towards bring- 
ing the war to an end. Feeling ran high at Rome when this 
fact was discovered. A praetor even called an assembly 
and proposed a declaration of war, but Cato, who hated 
the whole Eastern entanglement, minimized the importance 
of Rhodes' act and insisted that proof of an unfriendly atti- 
tude could not be considered a just cause for war so long as 



212 ROM.\N IMPEIOALISM 

there was no overt act of hostility. The tribunes were 
accordingly ordered to break up the praetor's assembly, and 
the senate, while voicing its displeasure at the action of the 
unfriendly state, gave assurance that there would not be a 
war.-^ Some punishment, however, the senate meant to 
inflict, and envo>-s were accordingly sent with, the order 
that Rhodes must grant Lycia and Caria autonomy in 
accordance with the settlement of 188. The folloNving year 
when Rhodes asked for a permanent alliance, the senate 
showed its continued displeasure by tabling the request. 
Presently the senate entertained the exiles of Stratonicasa 
and Caunos, who complained of Rhodes' harsh rule, acceded 
to their ■^'ishes, and ordered the Rhodians to liberate both 
cities. Not till 165 was the requested alliance granted the 
penitent islanders, who then became ^^rtually subject to 
Rome. We shall recur to tliis incident presently. 

Eumenes suffered even more severely, though perhaps 
more deservedly, than Rhodes. The senate, sa3"s Polybius, 
was con\anced that he had attempted to betray Rome, 
although it had no absolute proof of the fact. Yet it acted 
on its con\action. Attains, the brother of Eumenes, was 
told that if he laid claim to a part of liis brother's kingdom, 
Rome would support him, but Attains, much to his credit, 
was true to his brother. Then Eumenes set out for Rome 
to defend himself, but was met at Brundisium with a message 
from the senate not to come farther. Finally, when the 
Galati revolted against the overlordship which he had 
recently established over them, the senate declared them 
autonomous.^" 

These imperious acts against Rhodes and Eumenes clearly 
indicate a changed poHcy at Rome. In severing the Gala- 
tians from Pergamum, and the Lycians and Carians from 
Rhodes, the senate may have based its action on an osten- 
sible desire to reaffirm the permanency of its former Asiatic 
settlement. Even so, the action was significant, since it 
intimated that Rome would perpetually keep an observant 
eye on the Eastern states. But the liberation of Caunos and 
Stratonicaea signified very much more. It will be remem- 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 213 

bered that Rhodes had gained possession of these cities 
before the war with Antiochus, that is, before Rome had 
ever set foot in Asia. These cities were, therefore, not gifts 
from Rome which might justly be recalled at any moment 
that the sovereign chose to scrutini^ze the terms of its arrange- 
ments. On what grounds could this decision have been 
made? Apparently it was made on the broad claim that 
in virtue of the defeat of Antiochus ^^ and the relegation of 
that king to the territory south of the Taurus, the victor 
became sovereign over the cis-Taurian territory. Such a 
theory would hardly have borne scrutiny before a court of 
law, but there was no power left competent to dispute it. 
And even if Rhodes and Eumenes were now inclined to chafe 
under the claim, they could not consistently oppose it, for 
they had made the theory possible by having so freely 
accepted Rome's arbitrament in 188, knowing as they did 
that they were to be recipients of the booty. This, then, is 
the most important result of the Macedonian war for the 
East. It begot the theory that Rome was sovereign as far 
as her conquests of 189 had extended. We must hasten to 
add, however, that the theory was not often reasserted by 
the senate during the next century, nor were its consequences 
ever accepted in their entirety. But a theory once acted 
upon is never afterward wholly without effect. 

The Roman senate had also come to a siu*er conviction 
of its position in Greece. The leaders of both parties 
advocated local autonomy for Greece, though on different 
grounds. Both held that Rome could not create a province 
in any part of the country or assume the direct responsi- 
bility of government. Paullus may well be considered the 
spokesman of what remained of the Scipionic circle. His 
love for things Greek was fully as genuine as that of the 
former leaders, though perhaps it expressed itself in a less 
sentimental form. In his employment of practical political 
methods he justifies the inference that he did not subscribe 
to all the enthusiastic sentiment that Flamininus had 
uttered in his after-dinner speeches in 196. But his party 
still intended to show that the promises of those days had 



214 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

an enduring vitality, that at least no agent of Rome should 
hold residence in Greece as a sign of permanent occupation. 
Cato's reasoning differed widely from that of the philhellenes, 
but he reached similar conclusions. In the fragment of a 
speech ^2 which a late writer has fortimately preserved, he 
says that "Macedonia must be set free, since we cannot hold 
her." The Macedonians and the Greeks meant Uttle to 
him. It was not from sentiment that he argued. Rather, 
hardheaded, conservative farmer that he was, distrusting 
a scheme that would inevitably lead to a change in Rome's 
social life and in the very nature of her constitution, he 
advocated a continuance of the old peninsular policy. So 
the two parties agreed well enough on the main point, that 
the Greeks should be left "free." 

However, the word "free" could never again mean what 
it had. After the war it came to signify nothing more than 
local autonomy and exemption from the pajrment of tribute 
to any foreign power. In everything else the senate expected 
obedience to its wishes, and it undertook to demonstrate 
this by severely punishing all who had committed themselves 
to friendship with Perseus. The royal correspondence 
(Livy, XLV, 31), now in the consul's hands, was searched 
for evidences of guilt. The disagreeable work began with 
.^tolia. There the Romanizers had already banished or 
put to death some 500 opponents, and Paullus, upon review- 
ing the evidence, gave his approval. Then the investigation 
was carried into Acamania, Epirus, and Boeotia. The leaders 
of revolt were condemned to death, and many, against whom 
no evidence could be found except of incorrect sympathy, 
were sent to Rome ostensibly for trial, though in reality for 
banishment. Against the Achseans no incriminating evi- 
dence was found. But the Romans felt that the state had 
shown needless zeal in the cause of neutrality when as an 
ally it was expected to give direct aid. At an informal in- 
vestigation, some suspected Achaeans, in their conviction of 
innocence, offered to go to Rome to stand trial before the 
senate. The offer was accepted, and a thousand of the fore- 
most members of the neutral party were called upon to go. 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 215 

When they arrived, the senate postponed their trial indefi- 
nitely, assigning the men to exile in various Italian miinici- 
paHties. The senate apparently realized that a trial 
wotild only publish abroad the innocence of the Achaeans 
and the errors of the senate. Preferring the charge of 
cruelty to ridicule, it kept the men for seventeen years as 
hostages of Achasa's good behavior. This unjust detention 
aggravated the hatred of the league till it broke out in one 
of the bitterest wars of Roman history. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER X 

1. Plut. PMlopcemen, 15-17 ; Paus. VIII, 51, i ; Livy, XXXVI, 35. 

2. Livy, XXXVIII, 32, 8. 

3. Livy's account (XXXIX, 37) reproduces Polybius* report of 
his own father's speech. It is apparent in the well-ordered apology 
which Polybius presents for his father's friend that the historian's 
usual fairness deserts him. We may add that while Polybius reports 
that eighty were slain, a pro-Spartan writer (Aristocrates, in Plut. 
PMlopcemen, 16) reports 350. 

4. Polyb. XXII, 3 and 9. Polybius, in his desire to exculpate his 
friend Philopoemen, obscures his account. Historians have been mis- 
led into the belief that Rome interfered when not invited. A careful 
scrutiny of the evidence wiU show that Rome was invited by both dis- 
putants to pronounce judgment ; see Class. Phil. 1909, p. 133. 

5. See Mommsen, Die Scipionenprocesse in Rom. Forsch. II, 417, 
and Bloch, three articles in Revue des Et. Anc, 1906. For subsequent 
researches, see Fraccaro, / processi degli Scipioni, in Studi Storici, 191 1, 
p. 218. 

6. Livy, XXXIX, 25-28. The protests against Philip are recorded 
by Polyb. XXII, 8. 

7. Livy, XLII, 56 and 67. 

8. Polyb. XXII, 15, 17, and 18. 

9. Marx, NcBvius, in Verh. sacks. Gesell. 191 1, p. 69, gives a different 
explanation. 

10. It is interesting to note that Flamininus, who had for several 
years done no work of importance, seems to come to the front in a meaner 
r61e after the death of the Scipios : see Pol. XXIII, 3 ; Livy, XXIX, 51 ; 
and Plut. Titus. Apparently, his ambition was stronger than his con- 
victions. 

11. Polyb. XXIII, 4 ; Paus. VII, 9. 

12. Polyb. XXIII, 18, and XXIV, ll. 

13. Polyb. XXIV, 12. 



2i6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

14. Livy, XLII, 25 and 40. 

15. Polybius (XXVII, 10) speaks of the many benefits derived from 
Rome. Achsea, Rhodes, and many of the Greek cities attained to a 
new prosperity in the years following the Second Macedonian war. 

16. One item of this list of complaints, namely, that Perseus had 
abetted the Northern tribes in their raids upon the Greeks, occurs in 
an inscription at Delphi. Of. Reinach in Bull. Corr. Hell. 1910, p. 249. 

17. Rome is usually criticized severely for this decision, but the truth 
seems to be that Rhodes took advantage of an indefinite clause in the 
settlement of 188 and imposed a heavy tax upon Lycia. The senate, 
not desiring to appear officious, connived at the offense, until, several 
years later, it was officially asked for a definition of the clause. Not 
a Little of the senate's vacillation of this period is explained by an 
interesting sentence of Polybius (XXIV, 12): "The Romans, having 
the feelings of men with a noble spirit and generous principles, pity all 
who have met with misfortune, and show favor to all who appeal to 
them for protection ; but as soon as any one claims anjrthing as a right 
on the ground of having been faithful to their alliance, they at once 
draw in and correct their error to the best of their ability." 

18. I have taken no notice of the story that Marcius tricked Perseus 
into a six months' truce so that Rome might have time to prepare for 
war. I have elsewhere (Class. Phil. V, p. 358) pointed out the objec- 
tions to this tale. 

19. Livy, Epit. 43. The action of Lucretius against Haliartus — he 
sold the inhabitants as slaves — seems to have passed as justified. The 
territory was later given to Athens. The senate, however, seems to 
have made amends for his harshness to Thisbe. The senatus consuUum 
de Thisbceis {Ephemeris Epig. I, p. 278; I. G. VII, 2225) shows that 
the senate on reviewing the case called for a restoration of all its rights 
and properties. (Mommsen surely cannot be correct in the conten- 
tion that the inhabitants were henceforth stipendiary to Rome.) The 
senate also repudiated the consul's punishment of Coronea, and re- 
stored the captives ; the populace finally imposed a fine of a million 
sesterces upon the offending consul, Livy, XLIII, 8 ; Zon. IX, 22, 6. 

20. Polyb. XXVIII, 3 ; Livy, XLIII, 17. 

21. The behavior of Marcius — as indicated above — is usually 
explained in other ways. Polybius, who was far from friendly to the 
consul {Class. Phil. V, 358), professes to suspect a deep-laid scheme on 
the consul's part. He suggests that Marcius may have been trying 
to implicate the Rhodians in a quarrel with Rome so that the senate 
would have a pretext for seizing the island. This is too Machiavellian, 
not to say improbable, to be accepted merely on the basis of an enemy's 
half-uttered suspicion. 

22. It is exceedingly difficult to determine whether Rhodes went 
SO far as to deserve Rome's enmity. Livy (XLIV, 14) follows an anna- 



REACTION TOWARD PRACTICAL POLITICS 217 

listic source which proves its own unreliability by misdating the event 
a full year, while the main part of Polybius' report is lost. However, 
we have the important judgment of Polybius that the Rhodians com- 
mitted an inexcusable blunder (XXIX, 10). We may infer, therefore, 
that they did much more than offer their good offices toward making 
peace, for both Rhodes and Athens had frequently done that without 
offense. 

23. Livy, XLV, 18, 29, 32 ; Plut. Mm. 28 ; Diod. XXXI, 8, 9. 

24. Justinus, XXXIII, 2. 

25. The evidence is not wholly conclusive. Such as it is, I have 
presented it in Class. Phil. IX, p. 49. 

26. Bonner, The Boeotian Federal Constitution, Class. Phil. 1910, 

p. 405- 

27. Polyb. XXXVII, 2 ; Diod. XXXI, 8. 

28. The purport of the specifications regarding timber and salt are 
explained more fully in Chapter XIV. 

29. Polyb. XXX, 4. Cato's ringing appeal for justice to Rhodes, 
Orat. (Jordan), XXXIV. The punishment of Rhodes, Polyb. XXX, 5 ; 
XXV, 4, and XXX, 22. 

30. Polyb. XXXI, 2, about 165 B.C. 

31. Sulla in his speech to the Asiatics in 88 seems to assume, if we 
may trust Appian {Mith. 62), that Roman dominion in Asia rested upon 
the conquest of 189, and not only upon the bequest which Attains made 
in 133. He actually refers to Rome's severance of Lycia from Rhodes 
to prove that the senate considered that Rhodes and Eumenes had only 
precatory rights over the land disposed of in 189. (The mention of this 
intricate legal point lends plausibility to Appian's report.) Ferguson, 
Am. Hist. Review, XVIII, 38, has recently tried to prove that Rome's 
assertion of sovereign rights in the East rested upon the basis of Rome's 
deification by the Eastern cities. In this I have not been able to foUow 
him. 

32. Cato, Orat. (Jordan) XXXIII, Macedonas liber os pronun- 
tiavit quia teneri nan poterant. 



CHAPTER XI 

PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 

In the three or four decades that follow the fall of Perseus 
it is difficult to find in the Roman senate what might be 
termed a consistent foreign policy, since no leader arose with 
power enough to direct that body along a well-marked course, 
^milius Paullus, who seemed in his Macedonian settlement 
to be the master of a comprehensive and generous imperial 
plan, not tmlike that of the Scipios, died (about i6o b.c.) 
before the time of greatest need arrived. Tiberius Gracchus, 
who had so often served with wholesome effect on missions 
to the East, seems to have lost his influence about the same 
time. To be sure, these men had never qtiite gained control 
over the clique that specialized in practical politics, but they 
had often been employed when efficient work in the field or 
conciliatory tactics in the council chamber demanded the 
support of respectability. Had these two lived and worked 
together, they might have left the impress of their statesman- 
ship upon the imperial government.^ As it was, their influence 
lived on only in the circle of the younger Scipio iErmlianus 
which came into power for a brief season after the senate 
had definitely committed the foreign administration to a 
more despotic course. Cato, to be stu-e, lived through the 
critical period, but he can hardly be held solely responsible 
for the course which the senate ptu-sued, for he was too in- 
sistent upon personal views to become a successful party 
leader. His dislike for entangling alliances had favored a 
laissez-faire policy in the disposal of Macedonia, and his 
characteristic insistence upon the letter of the law had 
resulted in some degree of justice to Rhodes, even as it had 
frequently protected the provincials from misgovemment. 
On the other hand, however, his practical-minded patriotism 

218 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 219 

left little room for sympathy with the peculiar needs of sub- 
ject peoples. Cato's refusal to let the senate give audience 
to the distressed Achaeans typifies the spirit which brought 
on the Achaean revolt in 149. His cruel insistence upon the 
letter of the bond with Carthage led the senate to adopt 
what was perhaps the harshest measure in its long era of 
rule. But in general it is true that Cato's influence was 
neither strong enough to control the senate for long periods, 
nor was it directed along sufficiently consistent lines to 
create a definite administrative policy. 

More influential than the power exerted by any single 
individual was that which emanated from the governing 
cliques of the senate, and which was quickly reducing public 
office to private privilege. There was a time during the 
Punic wars when the years of public office were a term of 
self-sacrificing and strenuous service. Now no dangers or 
hardships attached even to the duties of the consulship. 
The easy victories gained over the world-famed monarchs 
of Macedonia and the East had accustomed Roman consuls 
to expect inordinate rewards from the office. Young men 
of noble families were tempted to look upon triumphs, booty, 
and honorary cognomina as their prescribed right. They 
cast their vote on questions of foreign administration with 
a view to personal advancement rather than to the needs 
of the state and the welfare of the province. Never was 
"triumph-htmting" in Ligtiria and Spain and Dalmatia a 
more shameful evil than during the middle of the second 
centiu-y B.C. 

However, out of the very evils of the senatorial regime 
there grew up an antidote for those evils. Aristocratic 
governments dread the strong individual, and for this very 
reason, when for no other, the Roman senate was inclined 
to avoid war. A score of times when the senate's wishes 
had been disregarded by the alHes and a lucrative contest 
was in prospect, the senate refused to sanction vigorous 
action, contenting itself with sending envoys to cajole, urge, 
threaten, and compromise, but not to commit the state irrev- 
ocably to war. A victory would mean great honor for some 



220 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

general and consequent influence with the populace which 
might endanger the power of the nobility ; on the other hand, 
a defeat redounded to the dishonor of the senatorial regime. 
Hence, the senate was inclined to deal in diplomacy rather 
than in arms. 

Finally philhellenism was still a power, though not in 
the same degree as during Flamininus' day. That early 
sentiment had been based upon a deep, if somewhat un- 
reasoned, respect for Greek culture. Familiarity with the 
Greeks themselves, however, had bred the proverbial con- 
tempt. In Greece the Roman generals seemed to find a 
race of men who theorized about ideal states but misgoverned 
their own, who prated about the nature of the ethical sanc- 
tion but accepted bribes and misapplied state moneys. 
Their enthusiasm for Greek liberty had accordingly chilled 
perceptibly. Later, however, the overpowering attraction 
of Greek literature reasserted itself, and a group of young 
aristocrats proved by their devotion to Greek studies that 
the best of the Romans were not ashamed to acknowledge 
discipleship to a subject nation. The spirit animating these 
young men was the same as that which later inspired Sulla 
and Caesar and Cicero and Nero : because of their gratitude 
to the great Greeks of the golden age they were ready to 
forgive the descendants much. This new philhellenism 
was a very strong force with Scipio yEmilianus and his friend 
Laelius, and with many of their associates and friends : 
Mucius Scaevola, pontifex and consul; the Mummii, both 
effective generals ; ^lius Tubero, consul and scholar ; Fannius, 
consul and historian ; Furius Philus, consul and philosopher ; 
and many others. To such men Greece owed not a little 
for patient attention to futile squabbles. 

We have said enough by way of preface to indicate how 
the cross currents of individual policy, of selfish ambitions, 
of class jealousy, and of more generous sentiments so opposed 
each other as to prevent the growth of a consistent imperial 
policy 2 during the middle of the second century e.g. Against 
this background we must now view the actual behavior of 
the senate and its agents in dealing with the problems of 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 221 

empire which presented themselves in Asia, in Greece, in 
Spain, and in Carthage, 

Eumenes of Pergamum had incurred the suspicions of 
Rome in the last war and had from that time on met with 
unfriendly treatment, but in 160 he was succeeded on the 
throne by his faithful brother, Attains II, a man who was 
in all respects what the Romans considered a desirable 
client prince. He was not so subservient as to make the 
senators feel embarrassed in his presence. He even showed 
that he was, de jure, an independent monarch by transacting 
much foreign business without asking the advice of Rome. 
When Rome was in diflficulties in the East, he qtiickly volun- 
teered to help her, and when he in turn was in trouble, 
attacked by his aggressive neighbor, Prusias ^ of Bithynia, 
he at once asked his "friend," Rome, for aid. And Rome 
aided him, in a way that was becoming more and more 
customary. She sent envoys to investigate, and to warn 
the enemy, and, if this failed, to threaten. When these 
measures proved unavailing, and even the envoys were be- 
sieged, she annulled her alliance with Prusias, and sent 
word to her other Eastern friends to aid Attains. In the 
end Attalus gained his point : a restoration of his losses and 
a war indemnity. This event will illustrate how Rome 
gradually began to substitute ambassadorial messages for 
armed forces in satisfying her national obligations. Attalus, 
on the whole, had no reason to complain of his relations with 
the great republic. Surely the aid Rome gave him was as 
effective as any he ever rendered in return, and during his 
twenty-one years of power he was not once troubled by the 
unrequested interference of the stronger power. It must 
be added that he gave Rome little cause for interference. 
He had no territorial ambitions. He was satisfied to en- 
courage art, play the patron of men of letters, and build 
cities, and he died at a ripe old age in 138, leaving a pros- 
perous if unincreased kingdom. 

The Seleucids * fared less well at the hands of the Romans. 
During the war with Perseus, Antiochus Epiphanes had 
availed himself of the opportimity to seize a part of Egypt. 



222 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

As soon as possible after the battle of Pydna, the senate 
sent an envoy, Popilius, to order Antiochus off the territory 
of Rome's friend, a task which the envoy carried out with 
no little display of haughtiness. The Romans never wearied 
of telling how Popilius, drawing a circle in the sand around 
the Syrian king, demanded that the king give his answer to 
the senate's demands before he left the spot. Antiochus 
acquiesced, and Rome accordingly demanded no further 
penalty of him. After this he was left entirely free to carry 
on his empire building in the interior, and, had he lived, he 
may well have regained a large part of Alexander's empire 
in Asia. He died in 165, when Rome was still carefully 
watching the sequel of the Macedonian war. The senate 
seized the occasion to warn the Syrians that the terms of 
the treaty of 189 must be more strictly adhered to in the 
future, and demanded that the newly constructed navy of 
Syria be burned. It also used its influence for a while to 
prevent Demetrius, the rightful heir, from reaching the 
Seleucid throne, favoring instead the nine-year-old son of 
Antiochus, who gave promise of being a more pliant 
tool of Rome. The next half century of Syrian history is 
a constant record of dynastic warfare, which soon placed 
the kingdom beneath Rome's notice, not to say her solicitude. 
With regard to Egypt,^ Rome's course was exceedingly 
vacillating. The two Ptolemies, Philometor and Euergetes, 
nicknamed Physcon, could not agree as co-rulers, and in 
164 Physcon, the younger brother, drove the elder out. 
When the latter appealed to Rome, the senate sent him back 
with arbitrators, who arranged that Philometor should have 
Egypt and Cyprus, while Physcon should rule over Cyrene. 
This seemed to be satisfactory to all parties at the time, but 
presently Physcon asked the senate for a more even division, 
in fact, for the addition of Cyprus to his allotment. The 
senate, seeing the advantage that would accrue to Rome if 
Egypt were weakened, treacherously suppressed the decision 
of the envoys and voted in favor of Physcon's request. 
However, Philometor boldly disregarded the senate's vote 
and continued to hold Cyprus. He not only drove Physcon 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 223 

out of that island, but attacked him in Cyrene, cajoling the 
Roman envoys all the while. In 158 the senate revoked its 
alliance with him and encouraged his brother to seize Cyprus 
once more, but to no avail. ^ Four years later the senate 
even sent Physcon some triremes and issued a circular letter 
inviting the aid of the Eastern "friends" for the seizure of 
Cyprus, but Physcon's expedition again failed, and the island 
continued to be a part of the kingdom of Egypt as long as 
Philometor lived. We need not be surprised that Rome 
assumed a right to arbitrate in Egyptian affairs, for the 
Ptolemies had twice accepted protection from Rome and 
had thereby virtually admitted their dependence. What 
amazes the modem reader is that Rome should have vacil- 
lated and allowed her repeated requests to go unheeded for 
fifteen years. The consequences of this indecision must 
have been far-reaching, for we may fairly assume that neither 
Carthage nor the Achaean league would have been so ready 
to disregard Rome's wishes if she had acted with more vigor 
in the case of Egypt. The affair well illustrates the inef- 
fectiveness of the aristocratic rule. Probably the senate 
was divided on the question of imperialism so that it was 
difficult to gain a constant majority either for or against 
an aggressive policy. Probably, also, the dread of the mili- 
tary hero, which so often fotmd expression in the senate 
here as elsewhere, preferred procrastinating diplomacy to 
a decisive war. 

We now come to Greece. The four Macedonian republics' 
established by Paullus in 168 seem to have fared unusually 
well in view of the fact that the people were totally unac- 
customed to self-government. Only once do we hear of 
factional strife, and then the son of Paullus was asked to 
arbitrate. In 158 the senate found order so well established 
that it opened the royal mines and gave the republics the 
right of coinage. A few years later, a man who claimed to 
be a son of Perseus, and who very much resembled him, tried 
to gain support in Macedonia for his claim to the throne, but 
without success.^ He then tried to win the sympathy of the 
Syrian king, but failed in this also. When, however, the 



224 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

sister of Perseus, who was living in Thrace, recognized him, 
his task became easier. The Thracians furnished him with 
funds and a strong army, and with this he marched towards 
Macedonia. But the repubHcs, hastily raising an army, 
defeated him. He returned with additional troops and 
successively defeated the armies of two Macedonian re- 
publics, after which the rest acquiesced and he was pro- 
claimed king of Macedonia. What is most noteworthy in 
the whole affair is the evident aversion of the Macedonians 
to experiment with a new monarchy. They were, apparently, 
not eager to revolt from Rome. Her division of the nation 
into separate republics had, it seems, not wakened the op- 
position that a similar act would evoke to-day. We may well 
conclude that the national spirit,^ which became so strong a 
political factor in the nineteenth century, was of little moment 
in the Graeco-Roman world. Once the pretender had gained 
his throne, however, he found no few adherents among his 
people who, whether from loyalty or fear, supported him to 
such an extent that he was able to defeat the Roman praetor 
who had been sent with a legion to drive him out. But his 
days were numbered. In 148 Cascilius Metellus arrived 
with two new legions, quickly cleared Macedonia, and put 
the region out of future danger by declaring the territory a 
Roman province, and the permanent residence of a prsetor. 
This arrangement imposed few changes upon the natives. 
The internal regulations of Paullus continued in force. ^° 
So far as we know the tribute was not increased, but the 
restrictions on commerce and intermarriage were removed. 
The presence of the praetor would in the future safeguard 
the northern frontier, which had hitherto been none too well 
protected from raids. From the viewpoint of the empire 
the new settlement was more important, since now for the 
first time a permanent governor was to be placed east of the 
Adriatic. Under his sphere of administration was also to 
be included lUyricum and probably Epirus. That the occu- 
pation was conceived of as permanent is shown by the fact 
that one of the first praetors imdertook to build a paved road 
through the province from the Adriatic to the ^Egean.^^ 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 225 

In this period, too, falls the destruction of the Acheean 
league, which marks the complete end of all hopes for in- 
dependent national Ufe in Greece. Unfortunately, the his- 
tory of the incident is a patchwork of contradictory and 
incomplete sentences. Pausanias, who proves to be an 
untrustworthy historian, has left the only unbroken account 
we have, but inscriptions are constantly coming to light which 
refute his statements on the most vital points. The frag- 
ments of Polybius are but few, and they happen to dwell 
mostly upon the stupidity and inefficiency of his country- 
men's leaders, telling us but little of the real causes of the 
war. From these accounts, such as they are, one fact stands 
out unmistakably: the populace of Achasa so consistently 
supported the anti-Roman leaders, even after convincing 
proof of their inefficiency, that the historian is forced to 
assume that Rome was badly at fault in her general policy 
with Achsea. 

It was apparent that even before the war with Perseus 
the insistence of the senate that its requests be considered 
authoritative in Achasa aroused much bitterness. Yet, if 
these requests had come directly, the Achasans might have 
submitted without much ado to a necessary state of de- 
pendency. The galling aspect of the situation was that 
Achasa was urged to elect magistrates from the pro-Roman 
party, whether she would have them or no, and then receive 
through these magistrates the sovereign state's requests in 
garbled form. This method, of course, lightened the senate's 
work, but it also bred hatred. 

The senate's worst blunder was its invitation to the thou- 
sand prominent citizens to stand trial at Rome. The senate 
soon discovered that no evidence coiild be produced against 
these men, and so attempted to save itself from the necessity 
of having to confess its mistake by detaining the whole 
number in Italy on the pretense that their return might en- 
danger the peace of Achasa. Of course, the detention of all 
the anti-Roman leaders left Achsea thoroughly cowed and 
wholly at the mercy of Callicrates' party. For fifteen years 
this man was absolutely the dominant factor in the Pelo- 
Q 



226 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

ponnese, and the state was officially all friendliness. But it 
is not difficult to picture the feelings of the inhabitants during 
this time from the events that followed. Few there were 
who did not loathe the senate for the act of injustice. And 
though for the present obedience and the reelection of 
Callicrates' nominees were considered necessary, silent 
prayers arose from every household that condign punish- 
ment might some day be visited upon Rome for her tyrannous 
action. There are signs that after a few years the senate 
regretted its blunder and made some effort to establish better 
relations with Greece. It hardly dared dismiss the Achsean 
detenus, and therein it probably adopted the only political 
course possible. But it tried to spread faith in the justice 
of its acts by other means. The envoys whom it sent across 
the Adriatic in the middle of the century were just and 
conciliatory men like Tiberius Gracchus, who was repeatedly 
dispatched to the East ; Marcius, the envoy to Epirus, in 156, 
who was charged with the task of undoing the work of 
Charops ; Junius, sent East in 164 ; and Torquatus and 
Merula in 162. Nor did the senate henceforth decide all 
disputes in favor of its friends. When Charops proved 
utterly unfit, he was rejected, and Athens, always an obedient 
friend, was nevertheless compelled to submit to penalties 
for injustice in 156-50. The quarrels of Oropus and Athens 
were referred to the arbitration of Sicyon, the Achaean city, 
in 156, and in 164 the boundary dispute between Sparta 
and Megalopolis was referred to the decision of the Achasan 
league.^- This course of conciliation might have served to 
abate the hatred in Acheea had it not been that Callicrates 
was ever present as a proof of Rome's past sins. His un- 
popularity, which went so far that the children on the streets 
greeted him with cries of "traitor," reacted upon Rome's 
reputation. 

We need not go into the long and intricate dispute which 
ensued, and which is only half explained in our sources. 
We find, however, that, about 150, the pro-Roman party 
somehow lost its leadership, that men like Diaeus and Damoc- 
ritus, who had been banished probably at Callicrates' behest, 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 227 

were recalled and elected to power. ^^ We are not told 
whether the three hundred hostages, who had now finally 
returned, — all that were left of the original thousand, — 
had any direct influence in this act. It may be that although 
their courage and energy were too broken to make them good 
leaders, their presence served as a strong reminder of past 
mistreatment. It is more probable that the Achseans mus- 
tered courage to reject the pro-Roman leaders because they 
observed that Rome was now involved in great difficulties. 
In fact, added to a dangerous and widespread revolt in 
Spain, there had come the war with Carthage, and the 
sudden rising of pseudo-PhiHp in Macedonia. The Achasans 
seem to have reasoned that since Rome had recently at- 
tempted to be conciliatory and had seldom enforced her 
requests and decisions by use of arms, she would certainly 
now, when distracted by several very dangerous wars, over- 
look their effort to rid themselves of disagreeable leaders and 
to establish a precedent of independence regarding the 
Spartan disputes. Pausanias and Polybius both add that 
Diaeus pursued his desperate coiuse because he was involved 
in charges of bribery. This is probably true, and may ex- 
plain his mad persistence, but it does not explain why the 
poptdace supported his cause so unflinchingly. Theirs 
was, apparently, the heartfelt purpose that refused to ques- 
tion the reputation of any man who would lead them against 
the hated master. 

The immediate occasion for the renewal of the old dispute 
was again Sparta's dissatisfaction with her position in the 
league. Disus, without regard to Rome's wishes, secured 
the death penalty against twenty-four of his enemies in 
Sparta. Rome retorted with an edict that the cities which 
the league had gained through her aid might sever their 
connections with the Achaean league so far as she was con- 
cerned." The senators who bore this announcement to 
Corinth were met by a mob, from which they were rescued 
with difficulty. The senate then dispatched new envoys 
with conciliatory messages, but this only produced the im- 
pression that Rome was afraid to take a decisive stand. At 



228 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the advice of Diaeus, the Achaeans now declared war against 
Sparta and Heracleia, the first two cities that acted upon 
Rome's decree and seceded from the league. This declara- 
tion was, of course, virtually directed against Rome, and 
Metellus, who had just defeated pseudo-Philip, marched 
southward to meet the Achaean force besieging Heracleia. 
This he readily defeated, and Mummius, his successor, who 
presently anived with four legions, in one brief battle com- 
pletely routed the main army of the enemy. Mummius 
then entered Corinth, and took captive the few inhabitants 
who had not left the city.^^ 

The senate, acting through Mummius and the usual com- 
mission of ten, now took in hand a thorough reorganization 
of the political affairs of the Peloponnese. The Achaean 
league was disbanded, and its cities were made individual 
allies of Rome. Although for the time being deprived of 
commercial relations with one another, they were left auton- 
omous and apparently free from tribute.^^ They were 
ordered, however, to adopt an aristocratic form of govern- 
ment according to a model charter prepared for them.^^ 
Corinth was razed to the ground. Some of its territory was 
given to Sicyon to help defray the expenses of the Isthmian 
games which that city was to conduct in the future, and the 
rest became Roman ager publicus. Rome also confiscated 
the personal property of Diaeus, and, proscribing a number of 
his partisans, seized their property also, except where there 
were parents or children surviving to claim it. Having 
made these provisions, the consul evacuated Greece, com- 
missioning Polybius to go up and down the land to explain 
the nature of the new city charters. Greece, however, was 
not made a Roman province ^^ for over a century. 

The destruction of Corinth, Achasa's foremost city, seems 
needlessly cruel. Livy {Epit. 52) explains it as an act of 
resentment at the attack upon the senate's envoys. Jus- 
tinus (XXXIV, 2) is probably nearer the truth in judging 
that the punishment was intended to serve as a warning 
example. As a matter of fact, Rome was once more leaving 
the Greeks to themselves. The vacillations of a decade 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 229 

had borne disagreeable fruit, and the senate felt that decisive 
action of some sort was called for, if its word was to be obeyed. 
The sequel shows that Greece well understood and never 
forgot the lesson taught at Corinth. 

The imposition of an oligarchic polity upon the cities of 
Achaea may perhaps be more justly criticized, since this 
form was unpoptdar, and hastened the accumulation of 
property in the hands of a few men. But the senate con- 
cerned itself only with its own advantages. It was by this 
time incurably convinced of the excellence of its own con- 
stitution ; furthermore, it could deal more quickly and with 
more dignity through city councils of propertied elders 
than through democratic assemblies. 

And now we again come to the old question why the senate 
did not assume the responsibility of government and shape 
a new province out of its conquests. The answer is not diffi- 
cult. The senate had not yet forgotten the Isthmian 
games of 196 and the proud boast that the, Greeks were now 
forever free. It is inconceivable that any senator who re- 
spected the mos maiorum, as Romans were wont to do, should 
have thought it possible to impose a tribute upon Greeks at 
that time. And luiless the sovereign could collect tribute, 
it hardly cared to burden itself with the task of governing. 
Nor was there great need for a supervising governor. Ex- 
ternal dangers were eliminated by the fact that the Mace- 
donian proconsul could protect the only exposed frontier. 
There would hardly be any political uprisings within the 
country itself after the swift punishment visited upon Cor- 
inth; and, as for Roman citizens who sojourned or traded 
in Greece, they could well trust themselves and their affairs 
to the justice of Greek courts. In all other contingencies 
where the sovereign's decision might be required, the cities 
were probably advised to address the Roman senate or its 
representative in Macedonia.^^ We may add that after a 
few years Rome removed all barriers placed upon inter-city 
commercium in Greece and also allowed the Greeks to re- 
establish their leagues, though only for social and reHgious 
purposes. 



230 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Spain, apparently, had the faculty of la5ang bare the worst 
flaws of senatorial rule. This province had been acquired 
from Carthage by the Second Punic war and had been brought 
into tolerable order during the stem but able governorship 
of Cato in 195. In 179 Tiberius Gracchus carried the work 
of pacification to a more enduring stage by meting out 
rewards as well as punishments and arranging a series of 
compacts that were satisfactory to the natives. For twenty- 
five years the province prospered and enjoyed peace under 
his settlements. Unfortunately, some of the succeeding 
governors imposed unjust burdens upon the province. The 
tribute in Spain, which was only one-half the usual provincial 
tithe, was collected by the natives themselves, but it seems 
that the governors were prone to go beyond their rights in 
estimating the amount and in sending ofificers to collect it.^" 
In 171 the Spaniards sent envoys to the senate, requesting 
that the old methods be adhered to. The senate promised 
to correct the abuses of the governors, and peace continued 
till about 154. Then came some misunderstanding about 
the right of certain Spanish towns to build fortifications, 
and a distressing war resulted. This war was apparently 
near an end in 1 5 1 when LucuUus arrived. He, it is charged, 
through greed for booty and a desire for a triumph, attacked 
an innocent tribe on flimsy pretexts and broke faith with the 
people after they had surrendered. Galba, during the same 
year, was accused of even worse treachery, and, in fact, was 
brought to trial at Rome by Cato, but escaped punishment 
because of political influence. After such deeds as these it 
is not surprising that the revolt spread widely. The contest 
dragged on for about twenty years. At times the Romans 
displayed good generalship, but its effect was offset by the 
blimders of several inefficient and dishonest men. Fabius, 
in 140, saved his army from slaughter by signing a disgraceful 
treaty; Servilius, in 139, secured the death of his worthy 
opponent, Viriathus, by a bribe ; Mancinus, in 136, marched 
into a trap, and then saved the lives of his soldiers by a 
treaty promising independence to Numantia. The crowning 
disgrace, however, rests upon the senate, which refused to 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 231 

ratify Mancinus' terms, and, in order to escape the vengeance 
that falls from heaven upon the violators of an oath, delivered 
up Mancinus to the enemy, stripped and bound, but forgot 
to surrender the advantages it had gained by the treaty. 
The war was finally brought to a close by the younger Afri- 
canus in 133, and the province started on the road to the 
great prosperity it enjoyed in Augustus' day. 

Such is the unpleasant story that Appian ^^ tells regarding 
Rome's rule in Spain. To be sure, our source is not wholly 
reliable, but, after all possible allowances have been made, 
we must still conclude that the history of Spain between 150 
and 135 reveals an unspeakable amount of inefficiency and 
treachery. The lack of success is partly accounted for by 
the fact that Romans of reputation avoided the province as 
unprofitable and difficult, and partly by the fact that the 
senate never fully realized the seriousness of the contest 
there. The treachery, of course, deserves no excuse, but it 
may perhaps be in place to consider why the Roman char- 
acter developed its worst traits in Spain. The Romans 
regtdarly spoke of the Spaniards as peculiarly treacherous 
peoples. Now it is quite conceivable that the rules of the 
game were not the same in the ancestral customs of Spain 
and of Rome. Such differences often preclude an intelligent 
appreciation of an opponent's real temperament, and they 
alone would be sufficient to give rise to misunderstandings 
and charges of dishonesty. But it must be remembered 
that in facing the conquering Romans the defeated tribes 
allowed themselves the privilege of breaking treaties. It 
is natural, and has always been natural, for weak tribes, when 
compelled to surrender before the irresistible power and su- 
perior diplomacy of a strong nation, to sign the articles of 
submission with a mental reservation. They feel, and 
justly, that theirs was never a fair chance. They are in 
the position of an individual who has signed a contract under 
compulsion. The law does not support such a contract 
in the case of the individual, and the conscience of the native 
is quite logical in not demanding adherence to such a con- 
tract in the case of the tribe. For this reason, if for no other, 



232 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the Spanish tribes constantly disregarded their oaths and 
treaties, and thereby gained the reputation at Rome of being 
peculiarly deceitful. Obviously, this condition must have 
reacted upon the generals who carried on the wars of the sover- 
eign people. They learned to fight the native with his own 
weapons. They, too, when driven into close quarters, made 
treaties with mental reservations. The history of our wars 
with the Indians, and of the British conquests in East India, 
win sufficiently illustrate this tendency and explain some of 
the ugly facts of the Spanish period that we are considering. 
In the Italian wars of the fourth century the opponents had 
been on very nearly the same plane of civilization, and the 
customs of war were then practically the same on both sides. 
Hence, we hear little of such charges from either contestant 
at that time. In Spain, on the contrary, vital differences 
existed. The deterioration in the character of Roman di- 
plomacy and warfare that Polybius noticed in his later days 
is traceable in some degree to this reaction of the barbarian 
methods of warfare upon Rome's armies. 

There was also another cause for misunderstanding which 
the later Roman historian did not always appreciate. Dur- 
ing the second century the senate had become so powerful 
that it asserted the right to revise or reject any treaty made 
by its general in the field. This, of course, was not the prac- 
tice later: Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar were so strong that 
they cotild compel the senate to ratify their arrangements 
to the last word. Nor had any such right been assimied by 
the senate before the Punic wars. The old consuls of the 
fourth century had employed the senate as an advisory body, 
but they were not compelled to submit their acts to it for 
supervision or correction. Whatever arrangements they 
made in the field were practically final. It is not diffictilt 
to see that diplomatic confusion must have resulted from 
the senate's encroachments upon the powers of its generals 
during the second century. The senate hardly dared reject 
the arrangements of a Scipio, to be sure, but, when a young 
praetor in Spain agreed to disgraceful terms in order to ex- 
tricate his army from a trap, would the treaty be binding? 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 233 

The Spanish tribes probably thought ^^ it would be, since 
they were supposed to be bound by the pledge of their chief. 
The Roman general who signed for Rome may have felt 
that he stood on constitutional ground in binding the state. 
But for a few decades at least the senate, in the heyday of 
its power, undertook to assinne revisory rights. To the 
senators it became a constitutional question of great impor- 
tance whether the senate must not, whenever possible, sup- 
port the new aristocratic theory of government and compel 
the general to submit himself to the senate. We under- 
stand, therefore, why the problems presented by the treaty 
of Mancinus were not easy to solve. Not only did differences 
in customs and practices of war make it impossible for the 
Romans and Spaniards to understand each other, but con- 
stitutional changes affecting the Roman senate made it 
difficult for that body to decide the fate of Spanish tribes 
on the merits of each individual case. In the end, Spain 
became the burial groimd of Rome's pristine fame for fair 
dealing. 

Finally, this period includes the destruction of Rome's 
ancient rival, Carthage.^ At the end of the Second Punic 
war the Carthaginians agreed among other things to restore 
to Masinissa, the Numidian king, all territory that had be- 
longed to him or his ancestors (Pol. XV, 18). Now, since 
they had also agreed not to carry on any war in Libya with- 
out Rome's consent, it is obvious that it might pay Masinissa 
well to find ancestral claims to various Libyan lands. It 
seems that after about thirty years ^^ of peace the Numidian 
king decided to seize some of the cities southeast of Carthage 
on the strength of such claims. A series of disputes arose 
which had to be referred to the senate. Envoys came and 
went, and, as Polybius says, the Carthaginians invariably 
got an adverse decision from the Romans, not on the merits 
of the case, but because the judges were convinced that such 
a decision was to Rome's interest. In fact, it soon became 
apparent that a strong faction in the senate desired to see 
Carthage completely crushed. Few incidents of Roman 



234 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

history are as widely known as the constant repetition of 
the phrase Carthago delenda est in Cato's perorations. Never- 
theless, we are far from possessing a unanimous judgment re- 
garding the causes of the hatred that found expression in 
Cato's words. Was it fear of commercial competition, or 
need for more territory for an expanding population, or 
simply dread of a political rival ? The first of these reasons 
is frequently alleged and has been pointedly expressed by 
Mahaffy to the effect that ''it was the commercial monop- 
olists and not old Cato and his figs who destroyed Car- 
thage." Nevertheless, I think we shall presently find in a 
detailed survey of Italy's economic conditions that neither 
Roman shippers nor Roman landseekers are likely to have 
brought heavy pressure to bear upon the senate at this time. 
The only explanation offered by the trustworthy sources 
for the poUcy of Cato and his following is that the Romans 
firmly believed that if Carthage ever grew strong enough, she 
would renew the bitter war of revenge which Hannibal had 
so long sustained. Cato based his whole plea on the con- 
viction that Rome's future would never be assured until 
Carthage was destroyed; his fellow envoys supported his 
contention by emphasizing the spirit of hostility they had 
found in Carthage and the vigorous preparations for war. 
Even Nasica, who opposed Cato, founded his arguments 
upon the same assumption, for he advocated sparing Car- 
thage in order that Roman discipline might be preserved 
through fear of a strong political rival (App. Pun. 69), 
Polybius 2^ has preserved for us some of the comments of 
contemporary Greeks upon Rome's policy, and it is interesting 
to find that they were engaged in justif5dng or condemning 
Rome's purpose of removing "a perpetual menace, and 
destrojdng a city which had disputed the supremacy with 
her and might still do so if opportunity offered" It was on 
account of this fear of an old enemy, therefore, that the senate 
encouraged Masinissa's encroachments upon Carthage and 
refused to grant the wronged city the right to defend itself. 
Cato, who in 153 had been one of the envoys that visited 
Carthage on a mission of arbitration, was strongly impressed 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 235 

by the hostile attitude of the city and by the stores of supplies 
there that seemed to be reserved for use in war. He pro- 
posed that the city be destroyed at once. Scipio Nasica 
could not agree with this attitude of a man who naively 
claimed for his state the privilege of annihilating a neighbor 
simply because it was strong and ill-disposed. He even 
argued that rivalry was on the whole beneficial to Roman 
character, and added that Rome must at least await a 
plausible pretext. 

In two years the pretext came, for the impetuous demo- 
cratic party at Carthage had come into power and had de- 
clared war on the still encroaching Nimiidian king. The 
aggressive party then gained a majority in the Roman 
senate, despite the protests of Nasica, and the Carthaginians 
fled home from a defeat in Nitmidia only to be met with the 
news that Rome was mustering an army. In their terror 
they sent envoys with instructions to do the utmost to pre- 
serve peace. These envoys offered imconditional surrender, 
whereupon the senate assured them that the Carthaginians 
would be allowed to retain their liberty, their laws, and their 
possessions, but that they must give hostages and await 
the arrival of the consul with further orders. When the 
consul arrived with his army before Carthage, he demanded 
that all arms be surrendered. This order the Carthaginians 
obeyed ; then the consul commanded them to abandon their 
city and build elsewhere, at least ten miles from the sea. 

This indirect procedure brought upon the senate the 
charge of double-dealing, but it was able to retort that it 
had broken no explicit promise and, furthermore, that since 
Carthage had sent an unconditional surrender, she was not 
in a position to bargain for favorable terms. We may even 
add that Carthage might well have expected an order to 
move the city, since this had long been one of the senate's 
methods of rendering enemies harmless. A century before, 
the people of Falerii had been compelled to rebuild their 
homes on a level plain three miles from their ancient citadel. 
In 177 the Ligurians were deported from their mountain 
fastnesses to public lands in Samniimi, and in Spain it had 



236 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

become a customary proceeding to divide tribes and colonize 
the various sections in less dangerous positions. In the case 
of Carthage, the senate's decision was apparently a compro- 
mise between the cruel proposal of Catoand the liberal attitude 
of Nasica. It did not contemplate destroying or enslaving 
the inhabitants, or enlarging the Roman domain, but it in- 
tended to weaken the state permanently by cutting off access 
to the sea, its greatest source of gain. In fact, the senate 
proposed the same position for Carthage that Bismarck in 
187 1 proposed for France, that of "a vanishing repubHc." 

The senate's ultimatum threw the Carthaginians into a 
rage of despair; they closed their gates and set to work 
manufacturing new arms. For two years, under two differ- 
ent consuls, the Roman army attempted to storm the city — 
and failed. Then the people, determined to put a general 
in the field who could succeed, disregarded the law relating 
to consular qualifications, and elected Scipio Aemilianus 
consul, despite the fact that he was then applying for the 
asdileship. Then, overriding the senate's constitutional right 
to allot provinces, they directed Scipio to take charge of 
the war. After months of the severest effort, Scipio finally 
was able to capture the city, but the Carthaginian losses 
had been so heavy that there were only a few survivors 
to stirrender to him at the end. 

In the settlement Rome assumed direct ownership ^^ of all 
the land belonging to the people that had taken part in the 
war ; that is, the whole Carthaginian state, except seven 
cities headed by Utica. A large portion of this territory 
she gave up immediately. Utica, for instance, was hand- 
somely rewarded for her support by the gift of the whole 
coast between her city and Hippo. All who had deserted 
the enemy during the war were given private allotments.^^ 
The eastern portion near Cyrene was presented to Numidia. 
The native Berber population, apparently the tribes that 
had formerly been tributary to Carthage, were assigned ^^ to 
their former holdings as tributaries of Rome. The land left 
in Rome's direct possession after this distribution was prob- 
ably a large part of what had constituted the private prop- 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 237 

erty of the Carthaginians. This the state disposed of in any- 
way it saw fit. Fortunately, the splendid bronze tablet 
containing the agrarian law of 11 1 B.C. gives us some insight 
into the history of this ager publicus. There we find that 
the state sold ^^ a part of it for cash, probably at once, since 
the state treasury had borne enormous expenses in recent 
years. Some of it Gaius Gracchus assigned to the colonists ^^ 
of Junonia (Carthage) in 122 ; and, though the colony's 
charter was revoked the next year, the colonists were given 
title to their land (Lex Agr. 59-61). Finally, considerable 
portions of it continued to be ager publicus and were leased by 
the censor to citizens or strangers at whatever they would bring 
{Lex Agr. 82). The seven friendly cities were left free from 
tribute and autonomous. Utica particularly prospered, 
becoming the most important seaport of Africa. One notes 
with surprise that the Romans did not have enough interest 
in commerce to build or retain a harbor of their own. 

The Romans, in fact, became agriculturists in Africa.'^ 
The men who bought and rented the land there from the 
state were largely Italians, since the native poptdation had 
stiifered severely. To judge from the condition of things 
revealed by later inscriptions we may safely conclude that 
slave labor found little encouragement in the development 
of this land. The peasants worked the soil themselves, 
and where they prospered and increased their estates, they 
sublet them in small lots to tenants. Thus free labor pre- 
vailed in Africa, and very successful it was, too. Before long 
we begin to hear that this province was taking Sicily's place 
as the chief grain-producing land of the empire. 

We have now reviewed Rome's methods of provincial 
administration during the middle of the second century. 
However much she may be criticized for vacillation, inefficiency, 
and cruelty she can scarcely be charged with greed for ter- 
ritorial acquisition, since she might readily have incorpo- 
rated Greece, and showed less liberality in giving away por- 
tions of the Carthaginian territory. She might even have 
availed herself of some of the many insults offered by Ptolemy 
Philometor to acquire a part or the whole of Egypt. On 



238 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the other hand, the senate showed no consistent inclination 
to follow the laissez-faire policy of Cato's early day, for it 
very jealously watched the behavior of every state that 
evinced the least sign of independence. The whole period 
is a season of meddling, even where the meddling is inef- 
fectual. Finally, the old Scipionic policy of malcing Rome 
a member in a fraternity of civilized Hellenic states had 
become an impossibility forever, after Rome discovered how 
feeble the Eastern powers actually were. The destruction 
of Carthage was the first avowed concession to the feeling 
which had been growing for half a century that Rome was 
the destined ruler of the world, and might therefore be a law 
unto herself. Henceforth, the possibility of realfocdcra avqua, 
of genuine amicitia, of arbitration, and of healthy emula- 
tion between states passed away from the ancient world. 
With the con\action of supreme power came a hardening in 
the character of the ruling people which even the contem- 
porary Greeks were quick to notice. According to Polybius 
their comment upon the destruction of Carthage was that 
Rome's character had changed after her great successes, 
that she had gradually and insensibly become perverted to 
the same ambition for power that had characterized other 
successful conquerors, and that this had led her to commit 
an act of irretrievable cruelty. 

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI 

I. Among the other mediocrities of this epoch only Scipio Nasica 
and Claudius Marcellus call for mention. The former, consul in 162 
and 155, apparently supported the old Scipionic foreign policj'- which 
aimed at friendly cooperation with outside nations rather than conquest 
and exploitation. He fought Cato vigorously when the latter advo- 
cated the destruction of Carthage, and when finally both Carthage and 
Corinth were razed, he remarked sarcastically that there were now no 
longer any nations which Rome need either fear or blush before. 
However, Nasica was too weak a leader to command the attention of 
the senate so long as Cato lived. After Cato's death, Nasica was recog- 
nized as the princeps senatus, but it was then too late to bring back the 
principle of cooperation, for there were no strong civilized nations left 
in independence. Claudius Marcellus resembled Gracchus in his 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 239 

combination of skillful generalship and clemency in administration, 
but he too seems to have fallen before the practical politicians. When 
he was consul for the third time in 152, Cato forced through a law, 
apparently directed against him, which forbade reelection to the consul- 
ship (Cato, Jordan, Or at. 36). 

2. A recently discovered inscription of Delos clearly betrays the 
indefiniteness of the senate's policy (Cuq, Le Senatus- Consulte de Delos, 
1912 ; Roussel, B. C.H. 1913, p. 310, dates the inscription 164 B.C.). 
The Athenians to whom Rome had given Delos in 167 had banished a 
priest from the island. This man appealed to Rome for restitution. 
The Roman senate neither assumed full authority to decide nor admitted 
lack of jurisdiction. It announced equivocally: "so far as we are 
concerned, he may return," and passed the matter on to Athens. The 
Athenian boule "discussed the matter for a long time," then restored 
the plaintiflp. Query : Who was master in Delos ? 

3. See Niese, Griech. und maked. Staaten, III, 326, and Dittenberger, 
Or.Graec. Inscr.2)2'J ; TLpovalnv . . . Trapa^dpraras dik'PwiMaLuy ye\_vo/M^vas 
cvvd'r)Ka.f\. 

4. See Bevan, op. cit.; Bouche-Leclercq, op. cit.; Niese, Griech. 
und maked. Staaten, III, 207. Tiberius Gracchus was sent to Antioch 
on a tour of inspection in 166. He became convinced of the king's 
loyalty (Pol. XXXI, 5). In 164 Octavius was sent to order the de- 
struction of the Syrian fleet which had been built contrary to the 
treaty of 189 : "to arrange affairs according to the will of the senate . . . 
and generally to weaken the forces of the kingdom." This embassy 
was so unpopular that Octavius was murdered in a public building in 
Laodicea {ibid. 12-20). Later (160), when Demetrius seized the throne, 
Gracchus was sent to sound him, and made a favorable report to the 
senate (Pol. XXXII, 4). But since Demetrius had come into power by 
setting aside Rome's choice, the senate never favored him, and finally, 
in 152, when a strong coalition was formed in the East to depose him, 
the senate expressed itself in favor of the undertaking (Pol. XXXIII, 
18). After this one hears little of Syrian affairs at Rome. So far as 
we can judge, Rome excused her course of intervention by citing the 
articles of the treaty of 189. But it is apparent that occasionally the 
senate was also ready to use the advantages of prestige and skillful 
diplomacy to secure a favorable incumbent for the Syrian throne. A 
dedication by Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, raised at Delos in honor 
of Masinissa, king of Numidia, was recently discovered {B. C. H. 
1909, 484) which strikingly demonstrates how Roman diplomacy was 
connecting the far ends of the world. East and West had doubtless 
met at Scipio's house in Rome, and there formed this strange friendship. 

5. Mahaffy, Empire of the Ptolemies; Niese, op. cit. Ill, 207. 

6. Polyb. XXXI, 18; XXXI, 28; Diod. XXXI, 33. 

7. See Chapter X. WUcken, Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Andriskos; 



240 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Niese, op. cit. 331 ; Colin, Rome et la Grece, p. 639. The new epitome 
of-Livy (1. 126; see Kornemann, Klio, Beiheft II) proves that the Roman 
prastor did not arrive in Macedonia until 148. Thus pseudo-Philip 
had a whole year in which to establish himself there. 

8. Zon. IX, 28 ; Diod. XXXII, 15, 7 ; Polyb. XXXVII, 2-5. 

9. See Ksievst, Hist. Zeiischrift, 191 1, p. 530, who points out that 
modern historians, and particularly Mommsen, have overemphasized 
nationalism in ancient history. 

10. Justinus, XXXIII, 2 : Leges quibus adhuc utitur, a Paulo accepit. 
In view of this statement, it is surprising that Niese should hazard the 
supposition that the tribute was increased. There is no ground for 
supposing that it was, for the war was not a Macedonian revolt ; it 
was imposed upon Macedonia quite as much as upon Rome. 

11. The Macedonians continue to strike the old coins bearing the 
image of Alexander the Great (cf. Brit. Mus. Cat. Maced. No. 87). 

12. Inschr. v. Olymp. No. 47, Ditt. I^, 304. In this decision the 
league recognizes Rome as the protector and sovereign of the Greeks. 

13. Polyb. XXXIX, ID. 

14. Corinth, Argos, Orchomenus, and Heracleia are specified by 
Pausanias, VII, 14. Justinus, XXXIV, i, goes so far as to state that 
the legates had secret orders to dissolve the league ; but this is not true. 
Polybius had also heard this charge and denies it (XXXVIII, 7). 

15. Paus. VII, 16. 

16. The proof for this is not conclusive. Pausanias alone mentions 
a tribute, and his account is full of gross errors. Later epigraphical 
evidence indicates that from time to time some Greek city was freed 
from tribute, and this is sometimes (cf. Kuhn, Verfassung, II, 70 ff.) 
taken as evidence that tribute was levied in 146. However, all of these 
passages can be explained as referring to special war contributions or 
to a much later age. The senate was not yet ready to annul to the fuU 
the decree of 196. We must have one good piece of evidence before 
believing Pausanias here. 

17. Pol. XXXIX, 16. Note, for instance, the inscription recently 
unearthed at Argos {B. C. H. 1909, p. 176) which proves by its form 
that the government of the city was vested in archons and a synedrion 
without the participation of the demos. This was soon after 146. 

18. Here, too, Pausanias is in error. The evidence is weU reviewed 
by Colin, Rome et la Grece, p. 640. The first inscription that recognizes 
a proconsul in Greece before 27 was recently found. It was erected at 
Delos in the year 57 in honor of the Macedonian proconsul (B. C. H. 
1909, p. 504). However, the appearance of this inscription hardly 
disproves our statement, since we know that Piso, the partisan of Ceesar, 
was given an extraordinary province, covering Achaea. See Cic. in 
Pis. 37 and 96, and pro Domo, 60. 

19. An interesting instance of this is revealed by a Delphian inscrip- 



PROTECTORATE OR TYRANNY 241 

tion (B. C. H. 1899, 5 ff.) which proves that the dispute of some Greek 
actors was first referred to the Macedonian governor. Again, when 
about 120, the populace of Dyme attempted to displace the charter 
given by Rome, a praetor, Fabius, punished the guilty, Ditt.^ 316 
(cf. Class. Rev. 1900, p. 162). We do not know whether Fabius was the 
governor of Macedonia or a praetor at Rome. 

20. Livy, XLIII, 2. 

21. See Appian, Iber. 44 flf., and the critique of Appian by Schwartz 
in Pauly-Wissowa, sub. voc. 220; Kornemann, Klio, Beiheft II, on the 
new epitome of Livy, and Schulten's exemplary article on Hispania in 
Pauly-Wissowa. Appian gives the only consecutive account of Spanish 
affairs, and he is here particularly untrustworthy. A part of his record 
is based upon Polybius, who, in his enthusiasm for Scipio, belittled the 
work of other governors in Spain ; a part rests upon Posidonius, who is 
always inclined to see the dark side of Roman provincial government ; 
the rest is based upon late rhetorical annals, which were seldom accurate. 

22. An interesting illustration of the constitutional confusion is 
supplied by Livy, XXXII, 2, and Cic. pro. Balb. 34 ; the city of Gades 
made a treaty with the Roman general in 206, but later suspecting that 
the general's sole pledge was not authoritative, requested the senate to 
add its confirmation. 

23. Meltzer, Geschickte der Karthager (vol. Ill by Kahrstedt, 1913) ; 
Miinzer, in Pauly-Wissowa, IV, 1443; Kornemann, Klio, Beiheft II. 

24. Appian's chronology, as so often, seems to be uncertain here. 
Polybius (XXXII, 2) leaves no doubt that these events took place not 
long before the year 161 ; Kahrstedt, op. cit. p. 592. 

25. Pol. XXXVII, I. Later writers also held that political reasons 
alone demanded the destruction of Carthage; see Sallust, fr. 11, stante 
Carthagine metus pads infidaefuit. Kahrstedt, op. cit. 616, is correct in 
denying that commercialism supplied the motive, but he hardly carries 
conviction with his hypothesis that the war was brought on by a desire 
to stem Masinissa's growing power. 

26. For agrarian conditions in Africa see Mommsen's commentary 
on the Agrarian Law of in B.C., in Jurist. Schr. 1, 65; Weber, art. 
Agrargeschichte in Handworterb. der Staatsw. I, 170; Hardy, Six Roman 
Laws, p. 35; Strachan- Davidson, ed. Appian, 'B\i.. I; Rostowzew, 
Gesch. d. rom. Kolonates, p. 313. 

27. Appian, Pun. 135 ; Lex Agraria, 1. 80 ; Livy, Epit. 50. 

28. stipendiariis adsignatus, Lex Agr. 11. 76, 77, 80. 

29. The date of sale is not made clear; since it is discussed in the 
law before the colonial lands assigned in 122 (Lex Agr. 1. 45), I think 
the sale was probably made soon after 146. It will be remembered 
that the state also sold much of the land it confiscated in Achaea in 146. 
The state did not give a clear title to the lands thus sold in Africa, for 
they are caUed ager privatus vectigalisque, that is to say, private prop- 



242 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

erty still liable to a tribute. We do not know what this implies. If 
the land was sold at full value, the tribute still due must have been 
nominal. On the other hand, if the tribute was considerable, the sale 
price must have been nominal. The former view is probably correct. 
The state needed money at once far more than it needed future tributes ; 
secondly, the land could hardly have been designated ager privatus if 
the tribute was considerable. The state's purpose in levying a nominal 
tribute was doubtless to make the land redeemable in case too much of 
it fell into the hands of natives and began to support a hostile popula- 
tion. 

30. These allotments were large, apparently 200 jugera per colonist 
(about 160 acres). There may have been nearly 6000 allotments (cf. 
Lex Agr. 11. 60, 61, and App. B. C. I, 24). 

31. Lex Manciana and Lex Hadriana, reprinted in Bruns, Pontes 
Juris ", 295 and 300. Rostowzew, op. cit., points out that the peasants 
were later attached to the soil in Africa, which would indicate that the 
land was settled by tenants, not worked by slave labor in large planta- 
tions, as is usually assumed. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF A SOCIALISTIC DEMOCRACY 

It was an unprecedented event, nothing less than the 
acquisition of a rich and extensive kingdom by testament, 
that next presented the question of territorial expansion 
to the Roman people. Attalus HI, who, in 138, had suc- 
ceeded his uncle, Attalus II, as king of Pergamtim, died 
after a brief but petulant reign in 133. He was the last of 
his Une, and through some xinexplained caprice deeded his 
kingdom, together with all his personal property except his 
slaves, to the Roman state,^ even appointing the legatee as 
executor. The only conditions prescribed, so far as is known, 
were that certain cities, including Pergamum, should be 
autonomous and free from tribute. 

The testament reached Rome at the very time when 
Tiberius Gracchus was submitting his agrarian proposals 
to the populace. Provincial affairs properly belonged by 
established custom to the senate's sphere of activity; but 
Gracchus, who needed the Pergamene treasures for the 
furtherance of his expensive schemes, and who, furthermore, 
wished to reelevate the plebeian assembly to the powerful 
position it had once held under the law of 287, proposed a 
bill in the assembly whereby it should at once accept the 
legacy of Attalus and take fuU charge of the administration 
of the new Asiatic possession. The assembly voted to ac- 
cept the legacy, but before further action could be taken, 
Gracchus was slain, and the senate, reassuming its customary 
administrative functions, appointed a commission of five to 
take charge of the Asiatic province. A recently discovered 
inscription ^ contains a fragment of the senatorial order, pro- 
viding that the stipulations of Attalus should be followed in 
full. 

243 



244 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

The kingdom ^ of Attalus embraced the territory in Asia 
Minor l3n[ng between the Hellespont and the river Meander, 
and between the -^gean Sea on the west and Cappadocia on 
the east, with the exception of several Greek coast cities 
which were independent states. Since the Attalids had 
built the kingdom out of various fragments of Alexander's 
conquests, the Oriental ^ theory of land tentu-e which had 
descended from Persia to the Diadochi was still in vogue. 
Consequently, Rome found in Asia a system not unlike that 
which Hiero had introduced into Sicily. An illuminating 
passage in Plutarch ^ relating to the early conquests of the 
first great Attalid clearly reveals the fact that the king 
claimed the soil of the native Anatolian population as his 
private property on the theory that he had inherited the 
privileges of the Persian crown through Alexander, whose 
successor in Asia Minor he claimed to be. When he needed 
funds for his treasury, disregarding the possessory rights 
of the natives and their princes, he sold large strips of the 
land to the highest bidder. In a word, the king was pro- 
prietor, and the gentiles — to use a Scriptural translation 
of the current term Ethne — were his tribute-paying vassals. 
If the proprietor chose, he could evict his vassals, treat their 
land as personal property, and rent or farm the soil, as he 
saw fit. However, both for sentimental and political reasons, 
the Attalids, Hke the Seleucids, followed the custom of treat- 
ing Greek subjects better than the non-Greek Ethne. The 
Greeks were regularly allowed their own municipal govern- 
ments. A few of their cities were, for various reasons, ex- 
empt from tribute, but even the tributary ones were favored 
to some extent by being allowed to collect their own tribute 
— a fixed amount leniently estimated. Over such cities 
the king claimed the right of eminent domain, but did not 
assert proprietary rights in the soil. In fact, the Attalids, 
like the Seleucids, found it advisable to plant Greek cities 
on the crown-lands, for though they thereby diminished the 
area of tithe-paying possessions, they secured more loyal 
subjects for the army and better farmers for their stipendiary 
cities. And obviously, an increase in the productiveness of 



THE FOREIGN POLICY 245 

a given district would vdtimately justify the exaction of an 
increased stipend for the treasury. 

After a century of empire building along these lines, the 
Pergamene kingdom had come to be a complex of (i) royal 
estates^ (iSt'a), (2) crown-lands^ (x^pf*' /^aaiXiKr]) , (3) de- 
pendent tribute-paying Greek cities, and (4) protected 
Greek cities which either from favor or from policy were 
exempt from tribute. The revenue that accrued to the royal 
treasury from these different classes naturally varied in 
amount. From the royal estates the king secured all the 
profits that his managers could obtain, whether the estates 
were worked by the king's slaves or sublet to tenants. The 
crown-lands probably paid a tithe ^ in kind on grain and 
fruit and a certain proportionate fee on pasture lands. The 
tribute-paying Greek cities annually contributed a fixed 
amount apportioned by the king according to the city's 
wealth. The tithes of the crown-lands were brought in by 
the king's agents. It is not apparent that the king employed 
the contractor system of taxgathering, though he may have 
done so in the collection of port revenues, octroi, and poU 
taxes, since the system was known in Syria and Egypt. ^ 

Such was the kingdom which Attains gave Rome. How- 
ever, the king apparently saw no reason why his legatee 
should draw all of his revenues, and perhaps he was not 
unmindful of the benisons that would flow to his deified 
spirit for one act of mercy : he provided accordingly that in 
the future the Greek cities should be exempt from tribute.^" 
Even so, the Romans had reason to be pleased with their 
gift, for the royal estates and crown-lands together with 
their rents and tithes fell to them. As late as Cicero's day 
one still hears of ager publicus, called agri Attalici,^^ in the 
province of Asia. 

Before the Roman commissioners, delayed by the Gracchan 
dissensions, could arrive in the East, Aristonicus, a bastard 
son of Eumenes, laid claim to the throne. From the king- 
dom itself he attracted no large following, for the future 
seemed bright according to the terms of the testament. But 
a part of the Pergamene army ^^ (which would now be dis- 



246 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

banded), some of the non-Greek natives, many slaves, and 
several non-Attalid Greek cities that were afraid of Roman 
aggression, lent support to the pretender. The Romans 
thereupon had to send an army to Asia, and since they 
moved slowly, Aristonicus was able to capture several cities 
in the kingdom before their arrival. The first consul sent 
over underestimated his enemy's strength, and suffered a 
disgraceful defeat in consequence. But in 130 the pretender 
was effectively routed, and a new commission of ten men 
was delegated by the senate to complete the work of reor- 
ganization. This board still recognized the terms of the 
will as in general binding, but it brought into the province 
and subjected to tribute several Greek cities ^^ which had 
supported the pretender. On the other hand, it lopped off 
and gave away a large part of the interior, apparently fear- 
ing lest its unruly tribes should prove to be a new thorn in 
the flesh like Spain. To Mithradates, the Pontic king, it 
ceded a part of Phrygia. The house of Cappadocia ^* re- 
ceived Lycaonia. The Pamphylian and Pisidian tribes were 
set free to rule — or rather, misrule — themselves.^^ A 
part of Thrace seems also to have been set free. The taxes 
of the provincials were also lightened ^^ in order to secure 
their good will. 

In all this we may see a tendency to revert to the sena- 
torial policy of the great Scipio. In fact, the younger Scipio 
Nasica was an important member of the first commission, 
and the younger Africanus, a philhellene and anti-imperial- 
ist,^^ was the most influential member of the senate which 
sent the commissions. These men deemed it wise to accept 
as a province only that part of the kingdom which could be 
ruled without needless warfare ; they sought to gain the favor 
of the inhabitants by the remission of some of their taxes and 
the good will of neighboring provinces by a show of modera- 
tion. Their policy, like that of the old senatorials, smacked of 
inefficiency in that it carelessly adopted a complicated series 
of relationships, which in the eyes of Rome actually had no 
raison d'etre. It sprang from the old laissez-faire conserva- 
tism which was ready to accept a modicum of the honors 



THE FOREIGN POLICY 247 

and privileges of empire while thrusting aside the severer 
duties as well as the more doubtful prizes of sovereignty. 

However, the senate had not been in charge of the Asiatic 
province very long when in 123 Gaius Gracchus, the bitter 
opponent of the senate, came into power as tribune. This 
vigorous reformer had a penchant for "efficient manage- 
ment." ^^ He found that the tithes due Rome from the 
crown-lands were dwindling because the state had no trained 
corps of taxgatherers to take the place of the despot's skillful 
bureau of taxes, and because the years of anarchy in Asia 
had given the tenants a taste of freedom from surveillance. 
Furthermore, he did not understand why the distinctions 
that obtained under Attalus need necessarily dictate the 
regulations of a Roman province ; why, in short, the inhabit- 
ants of cities should be free from tribute while the villages 
were obliged to pay their tithe. He therefore passed a 
law ^^ that the censors should let contracts at Rome for 
the collection of the Asiatic tithe to the highest bidder and 
that the tithe should be exacted from the property owners 
of cities as well as of crown-lands. We must add that he, 
too, exempted ^° a few cities from stipend, but his exemptions 
were based wholly upon reasons of Roman policy and not 
upon the stipulations found in the will of Attalus. 

That this measure of Gracchus was inexcusably unjust 
in thus annulling the codicils of Attalus' will while receiving 
the benefits of the legacy cannot be denied. In fact, it 
points to a characteristic weakness of this enthusiastic re- 
former ; for Gracchus, though personally a man of integrity, 
did not always have the courage to withstand the clamors 
ciuium praua iuhentium. But the criticism often made that 
the contract system of taxgathering was unfeelingly intro- 
duced by Gracchus to subject the natives to the spoliation 
of Roman puhlicani for the sake of currying favor with the 
moneyed classes seems to be unmerited, Gracchus' whole 
career proves him a man of wide sympathies, deeply concerned 
in the honest administration of Roman subjects, and exoner- 
ates him from the charge of treachery regarding Asia. His 
father before him had been famed as the constant advocate 



24S ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

of wronged allies and pro\4ncials, and his brother, Tiberius, 
had accepted as his chief ad^'ise^ the stoic philosopher, Blos- 
sius, a man who, tnie to his creed, had tried to found the 
Gracchan political poHcy upon curqttitas."^ Gaius as qutestor 
for two years in Sardinia had gained the love of the proAnn- 
cials by his fairness and integrity, and in one of his j&rst 
pubHc speeches at Rome he succeeded in securing an in- 
demnity for the Spaniards who had been WTonged by Fabius. 
Long before his tribimate he had risked liis influence with 
rich and poor alike by his insistent advocacy of the Italian 
cause, and we may judge for ourselves of his sincerity by the 
excerpts from his speeches conser\'ed by Aulus Gellius.^ 
It is impossible to imagine that the man who made these 
speeches could have framed the Asiatic law vnth a cold dis- 
regard for the w-ehare of the pro\dncials. In fact, Appian -' 
incidentally betrays the fact that Gaius' measure was at 
first considered lenient because the gathering of a tithe was 
not as oppressive in years of crop failure as the Attahd exac- 
tion of a fixed annual tribute, whatever the harvest — a 
matter of considerable weight in the semi-arid plains of 
AnatoHa. Of course, taxgathering by contract later proved 
to be an abominable system. But it seems that Gracchus 
adopted it in all good faith as the only efficient system avail- 
able for Asia, and that its terrible flaw^ were not foreseen 
by him and not yet demonstrable. 

The contract sj^stem of revenue collecting was the nattural 
sj'stem in the ancient city-state -* of conducting any exten- 
sive public business. Athens and other Greek cities had em- 
ployed it from time immemorial, and Rome had relied upon 
it throughout the republic. It is not difficult to under- 
stand why. T\Tien magistrates hold office for but a year 
and are not chosen because of technical knowledge of their 
official duties, it is ob\'ious that they cannot direct work 
which must extend over a term of years and which requires 
special training. They can onl}' issue specifications and let 
contracts accordingly, relying upon their successors to see 
that the specifications have been satisfied when the work 
is complete. Even the Hellenic monarchs of Egj^jt and 



THE FOREIGN POLICY 249 

Asia employed this system in the collection of minor reve- 
nues, although they were in a position because of life tenure 
to establish trained corps of officials for most of the civil 
service. That Roman statesmen saw the necessary connec- 
tion between constitutional forms and systems of civil serv- 
ice is shown by the fact that although Julius Caesar did 
not abandon the contract system during his consulship 
when he revised the provincial laws, he adopted a direct 
tax just as soon as he became dictator. He then observed 
that it would be possible to create a responsible and per- 
manent treasury bureau. 

To be sure, Rome had employed other systems of tax- 
gathering in Sicily, Spain, and elsewhere, though not with 
marked success. But those systems were not practicable 
for Asia. In Sicily, for instance, the cities gathered in their 
own tithes, and in Spain the native tribal states collected 
the revenue that was due Rome. But in Asia at least half 
of the province had no political organization corresponding 
to the cities of Sicily or the tribes of Spain. Fiuthermore, 
had the Sicilian tithe system been adopted for Asia, the 
state would have had an enormous amount of raw produce 
to dispose of. This produce would have been too far away 
to be available for the Roman market, and a governmental 
grain trade in the Orient was not an inviting undertaking. 

It may be in place to note here that the accusation that 
Gracchus passed this law in order to catch the votes of the 
Roman corporations is a modem invention. The senatorial 
historians accused Gracchus of devising various other laws 
with a view to winning the equites, but they never made 
such charges against this one. As a matter of fact, at this 
time the equites were not deeply involved in tax farming : 
they could not yet foresee the advantages that Asia would 
bring them. A fuller discussion of this subject will be 
found in Chapter XIV. Suffice it to say here that no ulterior 
motive can be proved against Gracchus in the framing of 
this law.^^ We are therefore led to the conclusion that 
Gaius Gracchus organized the only system which he sin- 
cerely believed could efficiently bring in the Asiatic revenues. 



250 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

If for a moment he suspected that the tax farmers might 
resort to extortion, he had reason to hope that such evils 
would quickly find a check in the tribunate which he was 
then elevating to all-sufficient power. 

It remains only to indicate the attitude of parties and 
party leaders at Rome toward the Asiatic legacy and the 
bearing of the new legislation upon movements tending 
towards further expansion. It is at once clear that im- 
perialism per se was not a burning question at the time. 
The discussions of the day dealt mainly with domestic 
affairs and tended to realign parties on new platforms which 
had Uttle to say regarding foreign policies. So far as Asia 
was concerned, the real dispute was not whether to accept 
the gift, but whether the senate or the tribal assembly should 
manage the business. Probably both parties were equally 
ready to extend Rome's empire when so rich a gift was 
thrust upon the state in so flattering a way. The senate 
showed by the action of its commissioners that it was mildly 
expansionistic in the old Scipionic way — provided the con- 
stitution was left unimpaired ; that is to say, provided the 
senate itself might peaceably administer the new accession.^^ 
The Gracchans favored acceptance, especially since the 
province brought new revenues with which to finance their 
contemplated measures. And the populace, of course, under 
normal conditions was always favorable to expansion if it 
did not cost too much. It is interesting to note that Tibe- 
rius Gracchus ,2^ in one of his early campaign speeches 
supporting his agrarian laws, attempted to stir the imagina- 
tion of the crowd by arguing among other things that if 
Italy continued her system of slave-worked plantations 
much longer, there would soon be a dearth of free men for 
the armies, and "with a strong army," he concluded, "you 
have hopes of becoming masters of the rest of the habitable 
world." The speech smacks of the hustings and contains 
a threat-burdened appeal to the self-interests of the voters ; 
it reveals the attitude of the populace rather than any heart- 
felt ideal of the speaker, and is worth noting therefore as an 
indication that now as before the instinct of acquisitiveness 



THE FOREIGN POLICY 251 

was not far below the surface in the crowd, ready by a simple 
transmutation to appear in the nationalized form of imperial- 
ism. That the Gracchans would ever have made a serious 
dogma out of this part of the speech we can hardly beHeve, 
for their sympathies, by inheritance, by teaching, and by 
nature, lay in the direction of equitable, not to say generous, 
treatment of allies and foreign nations. 

Concerning Rome's theories at this time regarding her 
dominium in solo provinciaW^^ we unfortunately get no clear 
light. The senate did not have to face the question, since 
the acceptance of Attalus' legacy brought no forms of owner- 
ship that did not readily conform to those already in vogue 
in Sicily. The free cities of Asia corresponded to the liber ae 
et immune s of Sicily. The other cities differed from these 
only in the degree of dependency. The crown-lands were 
in theory the equals of the Sicilian decumanae, while the king's 
estates of the East corresponded to the "censoriae" which 
had been Hiero's private property. The yoiuiger Gracchus, 
however, made vital changes when he extended the tribute 
over the free cities. Was he aware that he was carrying 
the theory of dominium in solo a step farther than even the 
Seleucids and Attalids had done? Perhaps he reasoned 
that since the Greek cities in Sicily were decumanae it was 
only consistent that the Attalid cities should be. If so, he 
was applying Hiero's idea to Asia. Or perhaps he argued 
that Rome had originally fallen successor to Antiochus by 
the victory at Magnesia and that she now had a right to 
assert the ownership which the senate had then waived. 
Be that as it may, after the work of Gaius Gracchus was 
complete, Rome had but little more to learn about this 
question from Hellenic rulers. It was now time for the 
lawyers to formulate their theories. 

The most important effect of the Gracchan tax law so 
far as it concerned foreign policy was that it directly attached 
the welfare of the business corporations to the resources of 
a rich province. These firms of capitalists, hitherto small 
and of little influence, grew rapidly on the wealth of Asia. 
Not only did they take the legitimate profits of shrewdly 



252 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

made contracts on the tithes ; they were also able to store 
their produce for profitable markets, to lend money to delin- 
quent cities at usurious rates, to avail themselves of business 
opportunities in the province, and, finally, to extort over- 
full measure from cities that fell into their power. With 
their increasing wealth their political power grew. And 
since their power was due to profits on provincial revenues, 
it is apparent that their voice would some day be heard in 
every question of foreign policy. Where they were in con- 
trol, they called for protection ; where they were not they 
desired new fields of operation. To this evil we shall have 
occasion to recur. 

Finally, the Gracchan method of legislating was fraught 
with danger for the time-honored senatorial policies of 
empire. Both the Gracchi believed fully in popular sover- 
eignty, and they did not hesitate to disregard the senate's 
assumed right to administer foreign affairs. If the tribal 
assembly could revise the provincial revenues, what could 
it not do ? The senate considered such action unprecedented, 
but dared not annul it. Perhaps some senators remembered 
that their own right to administer the provinces had come 
to them, not by any constitutional measure, but only by 
the unquestioning acquiescence of the sovereign people. 
After Gracchus' death the senate reassumed its old adminis- 
trative functions as though nothing had occurred, but the 
precedent set by the tribunes was never again forgotten. 
Marius followed it when he desired the province of Africa. 
The knights brought it up when they desired Pompey as 
general to end a war in the East which was destroying their 
profits, and, finally, Csesar proved himself the apt pupil of 
Gracchus by asldng the populace for an army with which he 
conquered Gaul and presently made himself the imperial 
master of Rome. 

We cannot leave this period without mentioning some of 
the innovations that took place during it in Spain and Gaul. 
Gains Gracchus, it will be remembered, had not only con- 
tinued his brother's policy of assigning small leaseholds of 
public lands to Roman citizens, but, dtuing his second trib- 



THE FOREIGN POLICY 253 

uneship/' had also devised an extensive scheme of colo- 
nization. His plan was to send colonies of picked men, 
apparently both Italians and Romans, to various points in 
and out of Italy where important cities had once flourished ; 
such places, for instance, as Carthage, Tarentum, and per- 
haps Capua. He probably reasoned that the former pros- 
perity of these places proved that they lay at points naturally 
adapted for colonization. Tarentum and Scylaceum were 
soon successfully settled, though, it must be added, they 
hardly justified the hopes of the founder. He had apparently 
failed to see that the commerce which had made these points 
important in the past had since been diverted into other 
channels. His commendable attempt to colonize Carthage 
did not meet with the consideration it deserved. The 
senate, finding that the populace disliked to be sent so far 
from home, chose the measure as an issue by which to attack 
the tribune. Baiting the people with the offer of more attrac- 
tive colonies nearer home, — promises that were never ful- 
filled, — it secured the repeal of the measure and thus weak- 
ened the tribune's prestige. 

This opposition of the senate, however, cannot be taken 
as an indication of its general attitude toward extra-Italian 
colonization, since it allowed two military colonies to be 
planted in the Balearic islands ^'^ about this time, and since 
— as is proved by the agrarian law of i n B.C. — it approved of 
selling public lands in Africa to citizens and allies both before 
and after the proposal of the Gracchan law. Of course 
there were speeches delivered in the senate directly attack- 
ing the wisdom of Gracchus' bill. Velleius (II, 7) seems to 
be giving the gist of such a speech when he expresses the 
belief that Carthage if colonized might have outstripped 
Rome as in the past it had outgrown its mother city. Tyre. 
However, such flimsy arguments, trumped up to serve the 
occasion, clearly did not represent serious convictions. The 
senate's attack was ready to burst out at any point where 
it saw the possibility of breaking the majority of the Gracchan 
bloc. 

The measure itself, though it did not contemplate direct 



254 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

territorial expansion, deserves attention for the breadth of 
view it betrays regarding the direction of the state's possible 
development. If we can accept Plutarch's chance remark ^^ 
that the colonists of Carthage and Tarentum were to be 
picked men, we may conclude that the plan, unlike the agra- 
rian laws, was not socialistic in spirit. Gaius apparently 
intended to build up industrial and commercial cities such 
as Tarentum and Carthage had formerly been, apparently 
trusting that the same power which had created industry 
in these places in the past would do so again. His hurried 
work may perhaps betray a lack of keen analysis, but it 
must be remembered that no one had as yet blazed the trail 
before him. And indeed the conservative respect for mos 
maiorum is so ubiquitous a factor in Roman history that 
one greets the courageous experimenter with pleasure. Still 
more gratifying it is to find a statesman ready to think in 
terms non-Roman, to put his faith in large schemes of de- 
velopment, to utilize the waste energy of the empire without 
considering just how the profits from the schemes would 
flow into Roman purses. 

The immediate results were of course not startling, for 
the rabble lacked Gracchus' imagination and refused to 
follow to the end. When the law was repealed, the settlers 
already at Carthage were allowed to retain possession of 
their allotments, but no city was organized to do the work 
that Gracchus had planned. Had his scheme been successful 
and carried out to a legitimate conclusion, it is possible that 
a representative government ^^ would have been devised to 
serve the needs of far-distant citizen-colonies, and a solid 
and healthy republic might have come into being. As it 
was, the plan bore fruit only when Caesar adopted it, but 
then monarchy was already at hand and the natural results 
of an extensive colonization could not come to maturity. 

Gaul was also opened to the Romans in the Gracchan 
days, and in a very strange manner. As early as 154, Rome, 
at the request of Marseilles, had subdued the Alpine peoples 
who made a practice of raiding the Greek settlements near 
Nice and Monaco. After the subjugation of these peoples 



THE FOREIGN POLICY 255 

the Roman general had given their territory to Marseilles 
and had then withdrawn. In 125 Marseilles again ap- 
pealed to the senate for aid, this time against the Salluvii 
and Vocontii, whereupon the consul Fulvius Flaccus and 
his successor, Sextius, administered the requisite punish- 
ment. It is probable that the senate now arranged with 
Marseilles that Rome should secure a strip of land in Gaul 
wide enough for a permanent road from Italy to Spain, since 
the senate presently obtained an alliance with the .^dui 
in the hinterland and followed up its first successes by plant- 
ing a military fort at Aquae Sextiae between Marseilles and 
the barbaric tribes. The defeated king of the Salluvii had 
meanwhile taken refuge with the strong Gallic tribes of the 
Arvemi and Allobroges, which refused to surrender him to 
Rome. The senate, realizing that, unless its demands 
were obeyed, it would lose the respect of the Gauls, prepared 
to take action. Domitius, the consul of 122, and Fabius, 
the consul of 121, were sent north, and in two costly battles 
defeated the enemy. Domitius then set about the task of 
building the military road to Spain through territory which 
thus became a Roman provincia, though apparently not 
tribute-paying territory. A chance reference in Caesar's 
commentaries ^^ reveals the fact that the Arvemi, although 
conquered in war, were neither subjected to tribute, nor 
included in the provincia. What treatment the Allobroges 
received at this time we do not know. The intention of 
the senate apparently was simply to secure control of a strip 
of territory which would permit the laying of the coast road, 
guard the passes into Italy and Spain, and include the fort 
north of Marseilles. 

But the Gracchan ferment was doing its work, and the 
senate presently lost control of the situation. Some tribime 
introduced a bill establishing a colony at Narbo, a seaport 
town in the province, fronting rich farm lands west of the 
Massiliot territories. The senate fought the measure, feel- 
ing apparently that, since there were no natural boundaries 
near, the colony would open up costly military problems and 
invite further expansion. When, in spite of all it could do, 



256 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the plebiscite was passed, the senate awaited a favorable 
opportunity and then introduced a bill to repeal the colonial 
act.^* The orator Crassus, just then beginning his illus- 
trious career, surprisinglj' enough came to the rescue of the 
original meastue and carried the day. Narbo was foimded 
in 118 and became the center of a very vigorous trade be- 
tween the Gallic tribes and Rome. Politically, however, 
little more was done in Gaul for sixty years. It was Csesar 
who seems first to have conceived the idea of absorbing 
Gaul, and the story of how he conquered it is known to every 
schoolboy. 

The movements in Gaul are usually credited to the ex- 
pansionistic designs of the Gracchan party, because the first 
step in 125 was taken in the consulship of Fulvius Flaccus, 
a Gracchan supporter, and the final settlement of Narbo in 
118 was accomplished in opposition to the senate. This 
view, however, is not well supported. The salient facts are 
that Rome in 125, as in 154, acted only upon the request of 
Marseilles; that, in 125 when the first army was sent, the 
senate was in control at Rome ; that the succeeding generals 
who carried on the northern war and laid down the terms of 
peace — Sextius, Domitius, and Fabius — were all sena- 
torials ; and, finally, that in the organization of the province 
the senatorial policy of occupation for miHtary purposes only 
was followed. All these facts show clearly that the Gallic 
affair in its initial stages was inspired by the senate and was 
not due to any popular program of expansion. 

The settlement of Narbo, on the contrary, was surely 
dominated by the Gracchan spirit. It may even have been 
suggested in 122 by Gaius himself as a continuation of his 
work at Carthage and Tarentum, though the suggestion 
naturally came as a result and not as a cause of the whole 
movement. The most significant thing about the coloniza- 
tion of Narbo is the support lent it by Crassus. This man, 
though a senatorial, belonged to a family holding extensive 
investments and had developed a keen intuition in com- 
mercial affairs. His interest in the colonization scheme sug- 
gests that the measure must have been carried in the face 



THE FOREIGN POLICY 257 

of senatorial opposition by the iinited efforts of the populace 
and the knights to whom the new settlement would offer the 
inducements of proletarian colonization, on the one hand, 
and mercantile expansion, on the other. The later history 
of the colony at least proves that it satisfied both of these 
purposes. 

A review of the extra-Italian activities during the Grac- 
chan decade justifies the conclusion that the democratic 
reformers were not aggressive imperialists, though they may 
ultimately have been forced by their policy into imperialism 
if they had lived longer. In this respect they differed but 
little from the senate. The latter faced the problems of 
the frontier from the political viewpoint, desiring to govern 
its possessions with as little expenditure of blood and money 
as possible. The Gracchans, while disclaiming a policy of 
aggression, desired to develop the state's possessions as far 
as possible and make them profitable. They desired the 
provincial tribute to yield funds with which to ameliorate 
domestic conditions ; ,they wished to colonize neglected 
farm lands and harbors throughout the whole empire, thus 
developing wasted resources as well as caring for Italy's 
idle population. If they had been able to pursue this posi- 
tive program for several years, it may be that they wotild 
have been drawn into territorial expansion, but there is 
nothing in our sources to show that they ever openly advo- 
cated it, and possibly their Stoic training and their keen 
human sympathies would have restrained them from adopt- 
ing such a course. 

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII 

1. Livy, Epit. LVIII ; Plut. Tib. Gracch. 14; Frankel, Inschr. von 
Pergamum, 249 ; Momm. Hist. Schriften, I, 63 ; Foucart, La Formation 
de la prov. rom. d'Asie; Cardinali, // regno di Pergamo, 294. 

2. Athen. Mitlh. XXIV, 192; Foucart, op. cit. p. 314; Ditt. Or. 
Inscr. 435. Scipio Nasica, one of the envoys, died while abroad. On 
his epitaph, which was recently discovered, he is called irpea^evr-fis, 
Athen. Mitth. 1910, p. 484. 

3. Chapot, La province romaine d'Asie, Chap. Ill ; Niese, Griech. 

S 



258 ROI^L\N IMPERI.\LISM 

und makfdon. Staatcn, III, 61. Cardmali, op. cit. p. 90, gives a list of 
the free and Att;ilid cities. 

4. Riiinsay, CiiUs and Bish. of PhrygUi, I, pp. 103, 131, 259, 260. 
This scholar has sIiowti how the monarchs drew into tJie roy;vl estate 
tlie extensive possessions of tiie numerous temple-states. Rome see-ins 
to have continued this policy. Most invaluable is Rostowzew, Ge- 
schicht<' d. rom. KolomiU's, 240-31 j. For the history of a tj^jical temple- 
state, see Buckler and Robinson in Am. Jour. Arch. 1912. 

5. Plut. Ennw^/if^s, S. As the successor of Alexander he even claimed 
possession of territory- he had not conquered. \Vlien he sold such terri- 
tory', he fumislied the purchaser troops with which to bring it into 
subjection in case the natives refused obedience. 

6. The land which Cicero {leg. agr. II, 50) calls Attalicos agros in 
Cht'rrotu^so had been the personal estate of the king, and not "crown- 
land," for Cicero calls it agri regii. See also Inschr. von Prietie, in, 
112: & Trpbrepov eipyiiaro pa<n\ei>s 'AttoXos; Cardinali, op. cit. p. 182, 
has a list of royal estates. The fact that the king owned a large army 
of slaves may indicate that he cultivated extensive estates as private 
property quite apart from the crown-lands. 

7. The gentiles (eOi'v) had no municipal organization, but lived in 
tribal \dllages {K^/xai) governed by the king's agents. They are often 
called the king's vassals (\aol ^a<n\iKol), and their land x^po- /^acrtXiKj), the 
royal domain. See Rostowzew, op. cit. p. 247. 

8. This subject has been discussed by Pelham, The Imperial Domain, 
in Essays on Roman History; Chapot, op. cit. 324; Cardinali, op. cit. 
173 ff. ; Rostowzew, articles s.v. Fisciis and Frumcntum in Pauly- 
Wissowa, and Hirschfeld, Z?/V Kaiserliclwn Venoaltungsheamtcn^, p. 121. 

9. Rostowzew, Gcschicht^ der Staatspacht, Philologus, Supp. IX, 
P- 336. 

10. This is not absolutely established, but it seems probable. In- 
scriptions indicate that Pergamum (Inschr. v. Perg. 249 = Ditt. Or. 
Inscr. 338) and Sestos (Ditt. Or. Ins. 339) received freedom from the 
testament, l^ivy, Epit. 59, kgata libera esse deberet, and Appian, B. C. 
V, 4, imply that Attains intended most of the Greek cities to be immune 
from tribute. A Pergamene inscription honoring the envoys who went 
to Rome to plead for the freedom of Pergamum was recently found: 
Atlien. Mitth. 1910, 408 = Inscr. Gr. Rom. Pert. IV, 292. 

11. Cicero, leg. agr. II, 50. 

12. Diodorus, XXXIV, 3. 

13. Cassius Dio, XLI, 25, 3, mentions Phocaea. Perhaps Miletus 
and Clazomene were also deprived of liberty at this time, since they 
had been free before, whereas in the year 78 they belonged to the prov- 
ince (C /. L. I, 203). However, the vicissitudes of the Mithradatic 
war may account for the change. Most of the Greek cities of Asia 
which were independent states and "friends" of Rome before 133 



THE FOREIGN POLICY 259 

remained so at least until the Mithradatic war. See Niese, op. cit. 

HI, 371- 

14. Aquilius, the consul at the head of the commission, was accused 
of having been bribed by these monarchs to bestow these gifts. That 
he was tried on the charge proves little ; his acquittal proves no more. 
It Ls well to remember that the consul could hardly have acted without 
the full approval of the ten commissioners, who had general instructions 
from the senate, and that the populace no more understorjd the sena- 
torial moderation now than in the days when they suspected Scipio of 
accepting bribes because of his leniency toward Antiochus. The senate 
ultimately yielded, for in 120 it recalled its gift to Pontus, thereby 
offending the Great Mithradates, who was now king ; cf . Ditt. Or. 
Inscr. 436. 

15. Here the withdrawal of a responsible government catLsed no 
little harm. The mountains were soon infested with Ijrigands, and Rome 
was later (102) compelle<^l to estah)lish the province of Cilicia in order 
to protect herself. 

16. App. B. C. V, 4. Perhaps the poll taxes were removed, though 
the passage — a reputed speech of Mark Antony's — will not support 
a heavy load of inference. 

17. Cf. Val. Max. IV, i, 10 ; and Alhen. Mitth. 1910, p. 484. 

18. His qusestorship was noted for its efficiency. We may reasonably 
suppose that he expected to finance his grain laws without loss to the 
treasury merely by economically storing and distributing the vSicilian 
tithe. The success of his road building was never questioned. His 
hobby was to increase revenues and thus develop the state's resources 
to their utmost. Cf. Gell. XI, 10, uti vectigalia vestra augeatis quo 
facilius vestra commoda el rem publicam administrare possitis, and Cic. 
Tusc. Ill, 48, palronum aerarii esse dices. 

19. The references are unsatisfactory. See Cic. Verr. Ill, 12 ; 
App. B. C. V, 4; Cic. ad Alt. V, 13 ; Marquardt, Staalsverw. I, 338. 

20. Foncart, op. cit. ]). 23^- Pergamum apparently remained exempt 
from tribute by the Gracchan law. It seems, however, to have lost its 
privileges in the Mithradatic war, but, according to a recently unearthed 
inscription, Athen. Mitth. 1909, p. 330, to have regained them by a gift 
from Julius Csesar. Strabo, XIV, 642, says that the Ephesian temple- 
state was granted exemption by the Romans, though this had been 
denied it by the kings. See also Ditt. Syll.'^ 334 ; Or. Inscr. 440 ; Athen. 
Mitth. XXIV, p. 177; Josephus, Antiq. Jud. XIV, 247. 

21. There are several useful studies which aid in the sifting of 
Gracchan sources, notably, E. Meyer, Kleine Schriften, p. 383 ; Warde 
Fowler's essays in the English Historical Review, 1905 ; Komeraann, 
Klio, Beiheft I; Pohlmann, Sitz. Bay. Akad. 1907; and Cardinali, 
Studi Graccani, 191 2. Concerning the influence of the Stoic theories 
on the Scipionic and Gracchan policies, see Schmekel, Die Phil, d. 



26o ROMAN IMFERL\USM 

nnttUren Stoa, p. 4j;g ff. : Arnold. Rcnhzn Sic^uism. p. 3S0 ff. Was 
Blosshis following the example of the Stoic Sph;vnis, who supported 
Qeomenes in his agnrnan reforms at Sparta a cciitun.- before ? 

22. Gell. X. 3. For the other points see Gell. XV, 12; Plut. C. 
Gracchits, 3 and o ; Aiir. Victor, 65. 

23. Bdi. Or. V. 4. 

24. See Rostowzew, G^sck, d. Staatspacki^ PatotogHS^ Supp. IX. 

25. This is but a feeble protest against a score of fll-considered jtidg- 
ments of which the following may serve as samples : Poiir accxoitxe 
roptilence des che\-aliers, C. Gracchus fit deux choses : il cx6a la dime, 
et il la fit affermer par les censeius, Chapot, op. ciL 326 ; "we are Irft 
to gaess how a man of high character came to hand over the people 
of Asia to the mercies of the publicatd^" Heitland, The Roman RepubUCf 
II, p. 304. 

26. If the speech of Cato cited by Festus (Lindsay, 266) belongs to 
this period, we may conclude that the yoimger Cato followed the policy 
of his father in preaching the doctrine of "hands off." The title of 
the speech was In dissuasione de rege Attalo et vect^aUbus Asiae, He 
could hardly ha\*e had a large following in such a cause. 

27. Appian, B. C. I, 11. 

28. Mommsen holds that the doctrine of dominium in solo propincutU 
was first consistently apphed to the inheritance of the Attalid kingdom ; 
Staatsrechi, III, p. 731. However, Gracchus simply extended to Asia 
the practice already in vogue in Sicily. I do not belie\*e that lawyers 
were yet apph-ing the doctrine universally in Cicero's day. 

29. Li\^', Epii. 60, ut complures coloniae in ItaJia d^duccrcntur et una in 
solo diruiae Carthaginis; Veil. I, 15, et post annum ScoJacium Miner- 
riMOT, Tarentum Neptunia, Carthagoque in Africa; Plut. C. Gracch, 
6, S, and 10 ; App. B. C. I, 23 ; Veil. II, 7 ; Les agraria 60, 61 (see 
Hardy, Six Roman Laws, p. 73, footnote). 

30. Strabo, III, 167. Metellus, the proconsul who founded these, 
was a ver\' strong senatorial. The colonists were apparently Roman 
soldiers who had ser\-ed in Spain. 

31. Plut. C. Gratrchus, 9. This has been admirably discussed by 
Greenidge, .-1 History of Rome, p. 224. 

32. Representative government was never far from the trial stage 
at Rome. See Class. Phil. IX, p. 50. 

33. Caesar, Bell. Gall. 1, 45 : Bello superatos esse Arvemos et Rutenos 
ab Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Romanus igno^^sset neque in 
pro%dnciam redegisset neque stipendium imposuisset. For these x\-ars 
see JuUian, Histoire de la Gaule, III, pp. 1-40. However, I have not fol- 
lowed this scholar's explanation of the war as due to the intrigues of a 
land-seeking democracy. 

34. Cicero. Brut. 160; pro Cluent. 140. 



CHAPTER XIII 

SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE 

In the peaceful days before the Gracchan upheaval it 

was not unusual for a group of prominent men to gather at 
the house of Scipio to discuss problems of pohtical science.^ 
The philosopher Panaetius discoursed upon the ideal state 
of Plato and the Stoics, the nature of the usnial forms of 
government, and the dangers that lay inherent in each. 
Polybius would point out how the Greek states had fallen 
short of the ideal, how in Athens the rabble had impulsively 
followed ill-considered courses, while Sparta, though properly 
combining the true principles of government, had failed to 
meet successfully the exigencies of international i>''-'htics. 
Then Scipio took delight in demonstrating that Rome had 
so wisely combined the elements of monarchy, aristocracy, 
and democracy in its consuls, senate, and assembly that the 
state which the wise Greek philosophers had devised in 
imagination, but could not bring into existence, had im- 
wittingly been realized by the untutored farmers of Rome. 
In this state all classes were evenly represented. Each at 
the same time checked and supported the others. Here 
at last was a government which promised harmony at home 
and victory abroad. 

Then came Gracchus with his merciless indictments 
against the government, challenging the senate to work out 
the necessary reforms. When the senate refused, he resur- 
rected the tribunician machinery and with that set about 
the task himself. A war of classes resulted. The philoso- 
phers awoke to the fact that the different classes no longer 
either supported or checked each other. The symmetrical 
constitution described by Polybius in accordance with the 
theories of Scipio and Panaetius had proved to be a fiction. 

261 



262 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Harmony was destined to return only in the form of uni- 
versal subservience to the will of one man. 

Gracchus was, of course, not the wrecker of the constitu- 
tion. He merely served as the inevitable instrument that 
pried open fissures hitherto imobserved. From the inception 
of the republic till 287 B.C., Rome had struggled away from 
oligarchy towards frank democracy. Under the Hortensian 
law the popular assembly led by the tribune was practically 
supreme at Rome. But with the advent of the foreign wars 

\ ' the assembly began to realize its limitations. Unable to 
yK cope with large international problems, it stepped into the 

/ background again, and, with its acquiescence, the senate 
entered upon an ever- widening sphere of action. Within a 
century the once humiliated senate had regained, de facto 
at least, enormous administrative, judicial, and even legis- 
lative powers, and after the death of Cato it was not far 
from being the ruling power of the state. The Hortensian 
law had not become wholly a dead letter ; occasionally during 
the second century the tribunician machinery was employed.^ 
But in general the senate so firmly controlled the action of 
the tribunes that popular sovereignty seemed to be doomed. 
Few senators cotild then have thought that the assembly 
would ever again become wholly independent of the senate's 
control. But Gracchus shattered their hopes by introduc- 
ing the principle of "the recall," whereby tribunes who fell 
imder the senatorial influence could be deposed by the 
people. After that measure the assembly attained greater 
independence than it had ever before enjoyed, and Gracchus 
employed it not only in disregard of the senate's wishes, but 
by way of humiliating the senate. The senate on its side 
insisted that the accumulated power of a century faithfully 
used, even if not legally granted, had vested it with unassail- 
able rights which it intended to preserve at all costs. And 
thus in 133 there were two powers working side by side, each 
claiming sovereignty, and Rome awoke to the fact that the 
state was a house divided against itself. From this time on 
a consistent foreign policy was impossible. Not only did 
the home government incessantly change, but factional 



SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE 263 

quarrels constantly subordinated imperial to domestic ques- 
tions. Nor was there any hope of harmony. Neither party 
could ever again forget the power it once had held and 
acquiesce in the supremacy of the other. And the bitterness 
of the hatred stirred up by the struggles of 133-12 1 made 
compromise impossible. It is against a backgroimd of civil 
contention that the action of foreign politics must now be 
viewed. Obviously, measures supporting or opposing wars 
and treaties can no longer be used as an index of party atti- 
tudes. Tribunes will be found opposing measures inaugu- 
rated by either party merely by way of obstructionistic 
tactics, regardless of the merits of the case, even as our presi- 
dents, for party reasons solely, sometimes veto bills passed 
by an opposition congress. 

The first event that thoroughly tested the temporary 
peace of factions after the death of Gains Gracchus was the 
Jugurthine war ^ in Numidia. The son of Masinissa died 
in 118, leaving his kingdom to his two sons, Hiempsal and 
Adherbal, and to his nephew, Jugtutha, a forceful and am- 
bitious, but unscrupulous, soldier, who had effectively led a 
contingent of Numidians under Scipio in the siege of Numan- 
tia. As the Numidian kings had recognized Rome's sover- 
eignty for a century, and as all the important acts of the 
kingdom during that period had been submitted to the 
senate for approval, it is obvious that the senate was in- 
volved in the duty of preventing wasteftd civil wars, or at 
least such wars as utterly disregarded the pacts that bore 
the seal of its approval. What now occurred was briefly 
this. Jugtirtha first expelled Hiempsal in 116. The senate 
ordered and secured the fugitive's restoration. Neverthe- 
less, Jugurtha employed agents to assassinate him. Then 
Adherbal, the brother of the dead prince, took up arms against 
Jugurtha, but was defeated and fled to Rome. After much 
quibbling the senate dispatched a commission which divided 
the kingdom between Jugurtha and Adherbal, giving the 
former the better portion, "because of bribes," says the 
democrat Sallust. No sooner had the Roman peacemakers 
departed than civil war again arose, and Jugurtha besieged 



264 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

his lival in the stronghold of Cirta. Roman envoys came 
once more to altemiit a acttlemont ; Juj^irtha spoke them 
fair, made j)n)mises, but conLiiuicd tlie sic[![e. Again the 
senate sent envoys with threats of war, but they too departed 
re infecta. JuKin-tha slornied the town, put Adherbal to 
death, and with liiiu, a uuniber of Italians and Rt)iuaus who 
had been trafficlcing in Numidia. This was in H2. Now, 
finally, the senate was stirred to action — by the accusations 
of a tribune, says Sallust — and declarcil war. 

Calpumius Bestia, the consul, was sent to the scene of 
action, and with him several prominent members of the 
senate, "to share the blame for whatever mistakes might be 
made," according to our anti-senatorial authority. At first 
Bestia succeeded well, storming several coast towns of the 
enemy. But then came the real test, for he had to i)ursue 
the light Numidian horsemen through the desert sand dunes 
with his stolid Roman legions, and any reader of Sallust who 
has [Hctured to himsell' the tantalizing inconelusiveness of 
such a task will hardly blame Bestia and his council of war 
for compromising with Jugm'tha when he presently offered 
to come to tenns. The Numidian did not olTef much : a 
few horses and elephants, some munitions of war to grace a 
"triumi^hal" procession, imd a pretended imconditional 
surrender made under jiledge that the kingdom would after 
all be left him. Bestia accepted the offer, gave Jugurtha 
his kingdom, and peace was declared. The tribunes at 
Rome now cried out that the senators nuist have been 
bribed to accept such lunniliating tenns. One of them, 
Memmius, proposed a bill requesting Jugurtha to come to 
Rome and tell whom he had bril^ed. The Icing came, but 
when about to speak, he was forbidden to do so by another 
tribune. We do not laiow whether this tribune had been 
bought by the senate, as Sallust holds, or whether, as is 
more likely, he felt that a sovereign state must not wash its 
linen, whether clean or dirty, before a vassal prince. At 
any rate, the daring Numidian employed his time in Rome 
to some piu-pos(> by having a possiblt* rival, his cousin A'tissiva, 
munlered there, whereupon the senate once more was obliged 



SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE 265 

to declare war. But this time the Romans fared even worse 
than before. While the new consul, Albinus, was at Rome 
engaged in state business, his brother, who was supposed to 
be drilling the army in Numidia, rushed into a battle, was 
hopelessly defeated, and saved the remnant of his army only 
by a shameful capitulation. The indignation of the popu- 
lace at Rome knew no bounds. The people had been fed 
upon rumors, suspicions, and charges of venality for five 
years now, and, meanwhile, a petty usurper in Africa was 
sending Roman legions under the yoke. A new tribune, 
Mamilius, satisfied the excited populace by proposing to 
establish a special court ^ empowered to investigate all 
charges of collusion with and support of Jugurtha. The 
jury was drawn from the equites, and even Sallust admits 
that its work was done in a spirit of bitter partisanship. 
Bestia and Albinus were banished at once and with them 
three other nobles whose connection with this war is not as 
evident as their opposition to the popular movement in 
general. 

Meanwhile, the new consul, Metcllus, an honest noble, 
and no mean soldier, was sent to the war. For two years 
he did what could be done with a cumbersome army against 
a slippery foe, wisely developing his cavalry and light-armed 
contingent so far as his resources permitted. But the people 
at home were clamoring for evidence of telling results. When 
the democrat, Marius, a lieutenant of the consul, convinced 
the people that he could bring the war to a successful end, 
they elected him consul for 107, and when the senate exer- 
cised its old prerogative in foreign affairs by reappointing 
Metcllus as proconsul, the populace overrode that body and 
passed a plebiscite giving Marius the army. Marius worked 
vigorously, but the task was difficult' and required time. 
The senate continued his term in the field as proconsul, glad 
to have peace at home. Finally, Jugurtha was caught by 
means of the purchased treachery of his former ally, the 
Moorish king, and the war which had ruined so many repu- 
tations finally came to an end after six stormy years. 

Numidia was not incorporated in the Roman empire. A 



266 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

portion was given over to Gauda, the only remaining repre- 
sentative of the old Numidian line. Bocchus, the Maure- 
tanian king who had caught and surrendered Jugurtha, 
received the western half of the kingdom. Only Leptis on 
the east of the African province, which Rome had long before 
adjudged to Masinissa, and which declared for Rome in ii6, 
was added to the Roman province. 

This war and its conclusion will serve as an indication of 
Rome's complete apathy to foreign expansion during this 
period, an apathy apparently shared by all political parties. 
The senate was utterly averse to the war from the beginning. 
Sallust states freely his belief that this aversion was due to 
the friendships that Jugurtha had made while campaigning 
with the Romans in Spain and to the lavish bribes that he 
distributed at Rome. But Sallust is so reckless with facts 
— even with facts of his own day — and his judgment is so 
warped by party prejudice that one must in all justice ques- 
tion his motivation * of this war. There may have been 
bribery — there doubtless was, for Rome had not a few 
corrupt poHticians at the time — but the senate's hesitation 
did not have to be bought on this occasion, since that body 
had good reasons of its own for avoiding the war. As a 
matter of fact, the senate had found for the last half century 
that client-princes — like the Ptolemies and Seleucids, for 
example — usually obeyed its requests so promptly that a 
declaration of war was unnecessary. It naturally expected 
Jugurtha to follow this same course, especially after the 
dangers of disobedience had been intimated to him. Indeed, 
the senate did not wish to remove Jugurtha if it could retain 
him as a friend. In case of his removal, Rome must either 
take Numidia as a province, which she did not desire to do, 
or hand it to some weakling of the royal line like Gauda, a 
prince who would not have enough force to keep peace on 
the border of Rome's province. In short, the senate needed 
Jugurtha where he was. Furthermore, the senate dreaded a 
war which had to be fought in the desert. The Roman 
legion was too unwieldy for such warfare, and it would take 
time to gather an army of light-armed, quick-moving mer- 



SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE 267 

cenaries and allies. Meanwhile, the populace wotild cry for 
results, charge the senate with inefficiency, and hint at 
collusion. In fact, the nobles saw themselves facing a loss 
of prestige in a cause for which their practical good sense 
could have little S3mipathy. It is more than probable that 
Bestia had secret instructions from the senate when he 
went to the war to attempt first to gain such success in the 
field as might reasonably be called a satisfaction for Jugurtha's 
past instdts to the national honor, and then to make peace 
as quickly as possible.^ There is some support for this view 
— aside from its reasonableness — in the fact that Bestia 
took with him a group of the most influential Romans of the 
time to bear the blame at home for the treaty which he hoped 
to secure, but which he knew would probably not satisfy 
political opponents unable and unwilling to understand the 
nature of his task. It is clear, then, that the senate dreaded 
this war with good reason, avoided it as long as possible, 
and eagerly seized the first opportunity of ending it. The 
settlement of Ntmiidia upon Gauda and Bocchus proves, 
moreover, that the senate was determined not to increase 
its foreign possessions. The old instinctive aversion to 
standing armies with their consequent elevation of a military 
class, and the knowledge that the probable income of a 
province in Numidia would hardly cover the expense of 
occupation, plausibly explain this decision. 

It is not so clear what the desire of the populace and 
equites was in the matter. However, when one considers 
that during the last years of the war the opponents of the 
senate were powerful enough to obtain whatever they desired, 
and that Marius had charge of the final arrangements, it 
may fairly be concluded that the democratic party agreed 
with the senate in deciding against creating a new province. 
The party that could pass the Memmian and Mamilian roga- 
tions and override the senate's appointments with a pleb- 
iscite giving Marius the command could readily have re- 
jected the senate's disposition of Nimiidia, if it had really 
favored expansion. 

Yet the knights are usually credited with an aggressive 



268 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

policy through this period. Is not all the evidence against 
such tm assumption ? Can we be sure that the traders who 
were massacred in Cirta were more than a few adventurers ? 
Have we any right to suppose that they represented the 
business firms of Rome or that Roniai\ money was invested 
in Nutnidia to any extent ? If Roman capital was as heavily 
involved as is usually assumed, pressure could have been 
brought to bear to attach Nmnidia to the province of Africa, 
or, at least, to keep all of Nuinidia as a Roman protectorate 
under Gauda, instead of giving more than half of it to the 
Moorish king who was still left imattached. And these 
arrangements were carried out by Marius, who had himself 
been a business man at Rome. The obvious conclusion is 
that neither the capitalists nor the populace had any real 
interests to safeguard or promote in Nmnidia. Their cry 
for war, ov rather their cry against the senate charging pro- 
crastination, inefBcienoy, and dishonesty, was not inspired 
by jingoism or in\perialism ; it was created by party ani- 
mosity emanating from opposition leaders who found in the 
senate's dilemma a chance to tnannfacture caniixiign material. 

The whole atTair then sliows that none of the Roman parties 
at this time had any imperialistic designs. Unfortunately, 
it does reveal a cankerous condition in the state, \\nien, at 
a time of war, the energies of the nation could thus be 
wasted in bickerings ami nuilual accusations, disaster 
threatened the constitution. 

The struggle'^ with the ''Cimbri and Tcutoni," wliich 
overlaps and follows this war, would hardly come \vithin 
the scope of the present inquiry were it not for the military 
aspect of the war. In 109, while IMetellus was campaigning 
in Africa, the Cimbri in Gaul attacked and routed his col- 
league, Silanus. Two years later the consul Cassius was 
defeated and slain by a part of the invaders ; his successor 
in command saved his army only by marching under the 
yoke. Servilius, the consul of 106, refused to cooperate with 
Mallius, the consul of 105, because the latter was not of his 
political party, and both were defeated at Orange, \vith a 
loss, it is said, of 60,000 men. Once more the populace 



SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE 269 

intervened, set aside the constitutional provisions against 
the reelection of a consul, appointed Marius to the command 
for the year 104, and continued to reelect him, until in his 
fifth consulship he put an end to the war. 

For the present inquiry the important points are the 
nature of the reforms which Marius introduced into the 
army and the unconstitutional reelection of Marius. Accord- 
ing to an old practice which dated from the time when the 
state did not pay its soldiers nor furnish their armor, the 
legions were, until the time of Marius, recruited from property- 
owning citizens. In the days when property consisted mostly 
of farms, this system was excellent. The middle-class 
farmers were hardened to difficult army work by labor in 
the fields, and were deeply concerned in the welfare of the 
state of which they were full citizens and in which they 
held their property. But this class rapidly decreased in 
number during the second century. Under the plantation 
system, the owners of the soil became, for the most part, 
absentee landlords who lived in leisure in the city, and 
naturally were not inured to severe campaigning. The men 
who actually tilled the soil belonged largely to the slave 
class, or, at best, to the class of free tenants who went down 
in the census rolls as proletariate and were therefore in- 
eligible for ordinary army service. The middle-class popu- 
lation was not numerous in the city because of the inactivity 
of industry and commerce. Moreover, the liberal com 
distributions introduced by Gracchus encouraged pauperism. 
Thousands of men who might have created an independent 
income for themselves were satisfied to live a shiftless, 
hand-to-mouth existence. All these able-bodied but unprop- 
ertied men were ineligible for service in the legion according 
to the old regime, and Rome, accordingly, found difficulty 
in making up a respectable levy in time of war. 

Marius presently took matters into his own hands and 
called for volunteers ^ from all classes. The senate probably 
realized that the new experiment was necessary. In fact, 
it must have remembered that a precedent for such a reform 
had already been established during the Punic war. For- 



270 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

tunately for Marius, the barbarians of the north made an 
excursion into Spain so that he had time to train his rabble 
into good legionaries; and Marius possessed the qualities 
of leadership which quickly brought out the fighting spirit 
of such men. 

However, in order to make his levy a success, Marius had 
spread a report abroad that the state would allot lands to 
the army after the war, and the sequel to this report was 
entirely in character. Marius, acting through his spokes- 
man, the tribune Satuminus, introduced a comprehensive 
agrarian law ^ by which he intended to pay his promises. 
The public lands of Italy were gone, but he proposed to give 
his men whatever public lands the state owned in Greece 
and Macedonia. The senate opposed the scheme, and riots 
ensued, in which the tribime acted with such violence that 
Marius himself had to throw in his support with the senate. 
The measure, therefore, was lost, but Marius finally succeeded 
in obtaining for his men a plot of land in Corsica and the 
site of the battle field in Cisalpine Gaul where he had defeated 
the Cimbri.io 

The success of Marius' army reform in securing a large 
army marked it as the accepted method henceforth, and 
subsequent events prove that his allotment of lands to his 
soldiery also became a precedent. Henceforth, the army 
was recruited from the city proletariate, a class that had 
little to lose by joining the ranks, a nervous, unoccupied 
people, brought up to seek excitement, and ready to stake 
life on a chance for adventure, booty, and a possible gift of 
pubHc land at the end. Obviously the commander who 
7\ promised most succeeded best in securing such recruits. 
Obviously, also, the general who could at the end of the war 
proctire good allotments for his soldiers might, in the future, 
command a strong personal following in whatsoever cause. 
Such soldiers fought for the liberal paymaster, and the time 
was not far distant when they were found ready to fight for 
their pa5rmaster, whether for or against their country. 

It was partly because of this reorganization of the army 
that the repeated reelections of Marius introduced a new 



SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE 271 

danger into the state — the danger that some one popular 
leader might gain control over the army and employ it for 
his own ends. The senate had always realized that it must 
suppress individualism in order to retain control of the 
state, but, so long as the army remained small and consisted 
of a citizen soldiery which had the welfare of the state at 
heart, there was little to fear from unscrupulous leaders. 
During the Punic war the senate had never hesitated to pro- 
long indefinitely the command of efficient generals. Curi-'*V^ 
ously enough it was Cato's democratic faction which, fearing 
the domination of powerful noble families, introduced the 
laws ^^ that required a long term in the civil service as prepa- 
ration for the consiilship and then forbade reelection to that 
high office. The Gracchan experiments, however, revealed 
to both parties the true tendencies of individualism. When 
that popular leader proposed that tribunes should be allowed 
to stand for reelection, the senate realized that a leader 
who gained the attention of the voters could virtually make 
himself an autocrat in the state. It therefore saw the 
necessity of consistently upholding the constitutional limi- 
tation to one term in the consulship as well as in the tribune- 
ship ; and so long as the Republic remained, this was a very 
important plank in the senatorial platform. After Marius 
had demonstrated the possibility of recruiting an army 
from the unstable rabble, taught by recent factional fights 
to criticize the state and the mos maiorum, the necessity 
of limiting the power of the commander who controlled so 
dangerous an implement became all the greater. 

The Jugurthine and Cimbric wars first revealed the 
dilemma into which territorial expansion had brought the 
state. Possessions beyond the sea needed more skillful 
generals than the constitutional limitations admitted, and 
they required larger armies than conservative principles 
could provide. The day was soon to come when the military 
organization required by transmarine domains would remold 
the constitution of the state to its own needs, and Rome 
herself be forced to accept an imperial master. 

Several incidents of minor importance, which neverthe- 



272 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

less bear upon otir subject, occurred during this period. 
The Cimbric hordes in the marches and countermarches of 
a decade between the Danube and Spain had set the whole 
of central Europe in commotion and, in particular, had 
pushed the Balkan tribes upon the borders of Roman Mace- 
donia. The senate accordingly had to send consular armies 
into that region for several years, and Macedonia soon 
became the favorite field of operation for triumph-hunting 
consuls. Some of the generals secured the desired honor by 
simply defending the province. Others seized the occasion 
to push the war into the hinterland, and, as a result of their 
operations, the province of Macedonia was extended east- 
ward into Thrace and northward through Dalmatia. 

Coincident with these troubles came the need of sup- 
pressing Cilician ^^ brigandage and piracy. Rome was 
prodded on to her manifest duty regarding these pirates 
along a very sinuous route. When the king of Bithynia face- 
tiously wrote the senate that he could not furnish the con- 
tingent he wished to send because the Roman publicans had 
kidnaped so many of his citizens, the senate decided that 
it must investigate matters. It forthwith sent out a decree 
requiring provincial governors to find out whether any slaves 
in their provinces had been illegally obtained, and, if so, to 
set such slaves free. These investigations raised the hopes 
of slaves all over the empire. In Sicily, when the proceed- 
ings were brought to a close because of riots, the disappointed 
slaves rose in revolt en masse, and Rome had a disagreeable 
war to face. The search, however, had revealed the fact 
that the tribes of Cilicia and Pamphylia, which Rome had 
severed from the province of Asia and set free in 128, were 
engaged in brigandage and piracy. Their favorite occupa- 
tions were kidnaping slaves in the interior of Asia Minor 
to supply the Greek and Roman slave markets, and fitting 
out privateers which would carry their captives to market 
and prey upon the .^gean shipping as well. The senate 
thoroughly realized now that its neglect of these growing 
evils had brought upon itself not only the sarcastic taunts 
of the Eastern kings, but also a slave war in Sicily. The praetor 



SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE 273 

Antonius was accordingly sent to drive the pirates off the 
seas, and to seize the ports of CiHcia from which they sailed. 
He succeeded in his mission, but what Rome actually did 
with her new possessions is not clear. She apparently did 
not reclaim Cilicia and Pamphylia and reattach them to the 
province of Asia, which would have been the logical course. 
The authorities, indeed, speak of a province of Cilicia from 
this time on, but these coast towns could hardly have been 
a province in the ordinary sense. They furnished little else 
than a sort of "beat" for a praetor on police duty, and they 
were the kind of acquisition that the populace most disliked, 
involving burdens but bringing little return in revenue. 

The same leitmotif of laissez faire also runs through the 
minor incidents of the period, A son of Ptolemy the Cor- 
pulent, one siu-named Apion, had ruled Cyrene since 117, 
and when he died in 97 he left his kingdom of five cities and 
some Berber tribes to Rome. His generosity is as inexpli- 
cable as that of Attalus, who had bequeathed his realm to 
Rome some years before. This new gift, however, was 
hardly as profitable as the previous one, and the senate was 
in a quandary whether or not to accept a new field for triumph - 
hunting governors. Acting in character, however, it ac- 
cepted the king's personal property, set free the five cities, 
which were more or less hellenized, exacted the royal tribute 
from the non-Greek natives, and left the place without a 
govemor.^^ Now the royal tribute was collected in kind, 
and amounted annually to thirty pounds of the country's 
staple product, silphium. This the natives dutifully sent to 
Rome each year. But the savory herb appears to have 
been a drug upon the market at Rome which the treasury 
officials were obliged to lay aside in the storeroom. At 
any rate, when Csesar, fifty years later, took stock of his 
treasury, he seems to have found all of it still intact, — 1500 
pounds of asafetida, according to Pliny. 

A superficial review of the three decades beginning with 
the tribunate of the elder Gracchus might tempt one to call 
the period expansionistic that brought into the empire Asia 
and Cyrene, and strips of Gaul, Cilicia, Africa, and Mace- 



274 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

donia. A carefiil examination of the behavior of the home 
government, however, reveals the significant fact that a 
complete indifference to expansion, at times verging upon a 
positive aversion, existed at Rome, The Asiatic province 
and Cyrene constitute the only considerable territorial 
additions, and these were gifts, accepted in both cases with 
certain restrictions. In Africa, Gaul, and Cilicia, Rome took 
charge of the least rather than the largest possible portion 
of territory at her disposal. The senate was, of course, the 
center of the anti-imperialistic sentiment, discouraged, it 
would seem, by its experiences in Spain, and wholly out of 
sjnnpathy with the military developments necessitated by 
foreign possessions. But apparently neither the populace 
nor the commercial classes did anything to promote expan- 
sion; the former caring little for opportunities to colonize 
land in distant countries, — as Gracchus discovered to his 
sorrow when he offered them African allotments, — the 
latter being still too small and disorganized to exert any 
appreciable influence in politics. At most, these two 
classes merely reveal a readiness in the Asiatic reorganiza- 
tion and the Narbonese settlement to make profitable use 
of what the state already possessed. To obtain increased 
dominion, they seem to have made no effort. In fact, all 
parties were completely absorbed in questions of home 
politics and in taking revenge upon one another for the 
vicious factional onslaughts of the Gracchan riots. They 
had no time to devote to the administration of extra-ItaHan 
possessions and protectorates. Never was expansion so 
dead an issue, and yet this is the period in which militarism 
and monarchical principles, the forerunners of imperialism, 
came into prominence. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII 

I. SeeCicero,dei?c^. 1, 15; de Off. I, go; Polybius, bk. VI ; XXXII, 
9 ; Veil. I, 13 ; Cic. Acad. pr. II, 5. For Scipio ^milianus and his 
political views, see Miinzer ia Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Cornelius, No. 335 ; 
for Panaetius, Schmeckel, D. Mittl. Stoa. 



SENATORIAL LAISSEZ FAIRE 275 

2. See Botsford, Roman Assemblies, 346 ff. 

3. Greenidge's account of this war in A History of Rome may be 
criticized for adopting Sallust's account of the campaigns too unques- 
tioningly; but it is unsurpassed in its analysis of the poHtical cross- 
currents of the time. Consult also Bloch, M. Mmilius Scaurus, in 
Melanges d'histoire ancienne {\Jnrvevs,\t€Ae Paris, 1909). A convenient 
compendium of sources and references is Greenidge and Clay, Sources 
for Roman History, 133-70. 

4. uti quaereretur in eos quorum consilio Jugurtha senati decreta 
neglegisset, quique ab eo in legationibus aut imperils pecunias acce- 
pissent — qui de pace aut bello cum hostibus pactiones fecissent. Sail. 
Jug. 40. In such a court any man who had been seen conversing with 
Jugurtha might find himself in difficulty. Cicero, Brut. 128, says that 
the two generals, Bestia and Albinus, were condemned, also Galba, 
C. Cato, and Opimius. Cato was unpopular because of the defeat he 
incurred four years before in Thrace. Opimius was, of course, the very 
impopular consul of 1 2 1 who had led the senate in the murderous assatdt 
upon Gracchus. When Lucilius calls him "this Jugurthinian Opimius" 
(Marx. Lucil. 418), he may refer seriously to his proved guilt, or sar- 
castically to the court proceedings. 

5. See Lauckner, Die Ziele der Monographic Sallusts iiber den Jug. 
Krieg. 191 1, a good study of Sallust's historical methods, though in- 
clined to attribute slips of carelessness to party bias and stylistic de- 
mands. Schwartz, Hermes, XXXII, 554, and John, Neue Jahrb. 
Suppl. VIII, 203, are studies of the Catilina which illustrate Sallust's 
methods. Bloch, M. jEmilius Scaurus, does not overstate the case for 
the Jugurtha. Sallust's political prejudices betray themselves in phrases 
like: tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est. Jug. 51. 

6. The senate may also have hurried negotiations because the Cimbri 
who had defeated Carbo at Noreia in 113 were now entering Gaul. At 
this time of party strife many charges of bribery were bandied about 
to which Sallust had access. We need not believe all that the prose- 
cutors at the Mamilian court proclaimed. The popular revulsion 
against the excesses of this court soon reached such a pitch that Ser- 
vilius was able to pass a law restoring the jury panels to the senate. 
A given quantity of smoke does not prove the existence of the same 
amount of fire south of the Alps as north. 

7. Strabo, VII, 292 and 3 ; Livy, Epit. 63, 65, 67, 68 ; Licinianus, 
p. 17; Plut. Marius. 

8. Sail. Jug. 86 ; GeUius, XVI, 10, 10 ; Val. Max. II, 3 ; cf. Polyb. 
VI, 19, for the old custom. 

9. Appian, Bell. Civ. I, 29 ; de Vir. III. 73 {Siciliam, Achaeam, Mace- 
doniam novis coloniis destinavit, and ibid. : ut gratiam Marianorum 
militum pararet legem tulit ut veteranis centena agri jugera in Africa 
dividerentur) ; Cicero, pro Balbo, 48. 



276 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

10. The choice of the battle field seems to prove that, for the moment, 
they considered the land occupied by the invading Cimbri as Cimbric 
territory, and, accordingly, by virtue of the victory, as Roman. This 
is a strange doctrine, but not at all unusual for a Marius, who confessed 
that "in the din of battle the feeble voice of the law was not always 
audible." Metellus went into exile rather than support such a doctrine. 
Eporedia : Strabo, IV, 205 ; Pliny, N. H. Ill, 6, 80, Marianam a C. 
Mario dcductam, a colony in Corsica. 

11. Lex annalis, by a tribune in 180 ; Plut. Cat. Maior, 8 ; Livy, XL, 
44 ; Livy, Epit. LVI : vetat quemquam iterum consulem fieri; Cato, 
Orat. (Jordan), XXXVI. 

12. Livy, Epit. 68 ; Obscquens, 104, gives the year as 102 B.C. 
For the province, see Marquardt, Staatsvcnvaltung, I, 379. The Asiatic 
system of taxgathering was in vogue in Cilicia in Cicero's day, but was 
probably introduced by Pompey in 63. 

13. See Marquardt, Staatsverw. I, 459. A generation later (74) 
Gyrene became a province, and a few years later Crete was annexed 
and placed under Gyrene's governor. 



CHAPTER XIV 

COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 

We have repeatedly referred to the contention that com- 
mercial and capitalistic interests played an important r61e 
in shaping Rome's foreign policy during the second century 
B.C. Mommsen ^ and Colin took cognizance of these in- 
terests in explaining the war of 200 B.C. Wilamowitz refers 
the attack upon Rhodes in 167 to the "treacherous trades- 
man's politics of Rome. ' ' We have already quoted Mahaffy 's 
belief that the "commercial monopolist" of Rome secured 
the destruction of Carthage. " In the treatment of Corinth," 
says Mommsen, "mercantile selfishness had shown itself 
more powerful than all philhellenism." Such authoritative 
statements cannot be disregarded, and we have only post- 
poned consideration of them for the sake of gathering the 
scattered evidence together and reviewing it in the light of 
related facts. 

In the first place, the reasons for assuming an extensive 
Roman maritime commerce during the early republic do 
not bear examination. They are usually based upon Livy's 
statement that in the seventh century b.c. a maritime 
colony was planted at Ostia to serve as a Roman port, and 
upon inferences drawn from Rome's early commercial 
treaties with Carthage. The historian should have been 
warned by the nature of Ostia's position, its government, 
and its cults that it could not have been as old as Livy 
would have it ; as a matter of fact, the excavator ^ is proving 
that its earliest remains do not date before the third cen- 
tury B.C. We know that the Tiber so loaded its lower 
course with silt that transmarine merchandise bound for 
Rome had to be transferred from the larger ships into 
barges or warehouses at the mouth of the river, and for 

277 



278 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

this a well-equipped harbor was necessary. The establish- 
ment of a late date for the Ostian port, therefore, compels 
us to revise our conception of Rome's shipping. 

The usual inferences drawn from the early Punic-Roman 
treaties also need revision.^ The date and substance of the 
first treaty, given by Polybius (III, 22), are still under 
dispute, but the second treaty (Pol. Ill, 24), which dates 
from about 348 b.c, can safely be used. This treaty forbids 
the Romans to traffic or found cities in any part of northern 
Africa, southern Spain, and Sardinia ■/ in fact, it pronounces 
all the Carthaginian ports, except those of Sicily and Car- 
thage proper, as mare clausum. And yet it stipulates for 
Carthage unlimited trading rights on all Roman territory 
and forbids the Carthaginians nothing except acquisition of 
land in Latium. Finally, it requires that injuries done to 
individual citizens of either party while trading shall be 
referred for settlement to the government of the injured 
person. 

There is not the slightest doubt that this treaty is one- 
sided, securing full privileges for the Punic trader while 
affirming the old doctrine of mare clausum against Rome. 
Apparently it was drawn up by the old trading state ^ in her 
own interests, and was accepted by the then insignificant 
Roman state because the latter had little concern in foreign 
trade. It is not reasonable to suppose that the Romans 
would have signed away an equity in the Mediterranean 
trade if they either had or cared to have any. In fact, at 
about this same time Rome, with similar negligence, promised 
Tarentum that no Roman ships should sail as far as the 
Tarentine Gulf. In short, the treaty shows Rome to be 
the merest novice in commercial politics, ready to accept 
for the sake of friendly relations any and every limitation 
upon whatever Roman commerce might arise. 

If fiu-ther evidence of the fact that the early Romans 
avoided the seas were needed, there is the additional testi- 
mony of archcBology. It has been found, for example, that 
although the early tombs of the Etruscan towns near by are 
store chambers of Oriental and Egyptian wares, Roman 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 279 

tombs ^ of the same period show no such evidences of exten- 
sive trading. The foreign articles found in these Roman 
tombs were brought by Sicilian and Massaliot passers-by. 
And this evidence agrees with the fact * so often pointed out 
that none of the technical naval terms employed by the 
Romans except those relating to the simplest parts of small 
craft are of Latin extraction. They have all been] borrowed 
from the Doric Greek and were picked up from the vocabu- 
lary of Sicilian merchants. Apparently the passages in later 
Roman historians which refer to an early seaport at Ostia 
and to an extensive commerce are to be attributed to patriotic 
megalomaniacs who represented the state and pomp of 
Romulus and King Marcius in terms more appropriate to 
Augustus' day. Even Ostia remained only a small village 
throughout the republic. \_Not till 42 a.d. was the sand bar 
in front of the Tiber's mouth dredged and jetties built so that 
laden seafaring vessels could anchor in still water. In the 
meantime the most serviceable port of Rome was Puteoli, 
nearly 150 miles away." Does this imply that shippers had 
a strong lobby in the Roman senate ? 

Let us now examine a number of political measures 
adopted during the last two centuries of the republic which 
have frequently been interpreted as implying the existence 
of a mercantile policy in the Roman senate, for it is largely 
upon these that historians have relied in blaming commer- 
cialism for deeds like the subjection of Greece, the destruc- 
tion of Corinth, and the annexation of Carthage. 

I. "The senate passed a bilF defining the status of the 
Ambracians after their subjection in 189 in which the stipu- 
lation was made that Romans and Italians should have free 
entry at the port of Ambracia. It is usual to infer from this 
sole instance that the senate regularly included a clause in 
its treaties Avith subject allies requiring exemption from port 
dues in order to gain advantages for Roman trade. There 
are, however, several specific facts militating against this 
generalization and none, to my knowledge, favoring it. 
There are in existence several treaties, including the very 
important ones with Carthage (201 B.C.), Philip ^196 B.C.), 



28o ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

and Antiochus (189 b.c), none of which contain this clause. 
Egypt quite certainly did not grant any such privilege, for 
the Ptolemaic system of monopolies would preclude such a 
practice. The treaty with the Termessians,^ 71 B.C., which 
explicitly grants transit to tax collectors, says nothing of 
others ; and from a passage in Cicero ^ it is certain that not 
even the governor of Sicily enjoyed the freedom of the 
Sicilian port either in Roman cities or in allied towns Hke 
Messana and Halaesa. It is safe to say, therefore, that 
the early treaty with Ambracia contained an exceptional 
rather than a "normal stipulation. But even granting that 
such a stipulation may have been inserted in several other 
treaties, it is difficult to imderstand how it would aid Roman 
commerce to any appreciable extent, since it would grant 
the same privileges to the traders of a score of other ItaUan 
towns, partly Latin, partly Greek. 

2. In Cicero ^° we hear of another peculiar measure which 
has also been used in support of the view that the senate 
was swayed by a commercial policy. I Some time before 130 
B.C. Rome seems to have specified in her dealings with a 
Transalpine tribe that the latter should refrain from the 
cultivation of wine and oil. The younger Africanus is repre- 
sented as saying that the purpose of this measiire was to aid 
the Roman fruit-grower. Modem writers ^^ have added 
that it would also aid the Roman carrier. Now, before 130, 
a Roman army had fought battles in Transalpine Gaul only 
once, and that was at the request of Rome's most loyal ally, 
Marseilles. When the war had been successfully ended and 
a treaty signed, — the terms of which were naturally dictated 
by Marseilles, — the Romans withdrew. Marseilles was a 
wine-growing state, and if a market for wine was created in 
Gaul, she natiu-ally profited. A copy of the treaty was of 
course carried to Rome, since her legions had secured the 
victory, and its purpose may well have been misunderstood 
by later Romans, but we need not doubt that Marseilles 
and the Gauls were the real contracting parties. Had the 
Romans intended to create a market for their own produce 
by legislation, why did they never pass measures affecting 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 281 

Spain, Greece, Africa, and Asia, which were actual rivals in 
such products ? 

3. The clause ^2 in the Macedonian constitutions of 167 
forbidding the importation of salt and the exportation of 
timber has also no reference to Roman commerce. We 
know from several sources ^^ that the Macedonian kings had 
regularly supported a timber monopoly, forbidding all ex- 
portation without special consent. Apparently the chief 
forests, like the mines, were crown-lands. Now, when 
Rome fell heir to these royal forests and mines in 167, the 
senate was not at once ready to decide what final disposition 
to make of them. It hesitated to take full possession and 
place state contractors in charge, since their presence, as a 
visible indication of overlordship, would cause undue trouble.^* 
It therefore permitted the Macedonian contractors to work 
the iron and copper mines at half the former revenue, closed 
the other mines for the time being, and simply — also for 
the time being — reenacted the old royal prohibition on the 
exportation of timber. In 158 it sent state contractors to 
open and work the closed mines, and probably at the same 
time leased the royal timber lands. The provision against 
the importation of salt can, in the light of this, only mean 
that the senate foimd a royal monopoly of salt also, and, in 
behalf of the Macedonian state treasuries, reestablished the 
monopoly and gave it over to the new states. The senate 
then protected its gift by continuing the stiptdation against 
imports. To be sure, we have no direct reference to a pre- 
vious monopoly in salt in Macedonia, but the assumption 
that there was one seems justifiable, since we know that all 
the other Hellenic powers ^^ which succeeded Alexander 
established such monopolies. 

4. There is one more regulation which bears, in the view 
of some authorities, the earmarks of mercantilism. From 
the fact that, in 169 e.g., Rhodes asked the senate's permis- 
sion to buy grain in Sicily ,^^ it is usual to draw the inference 
that the senate somehow controlled the Sicilian grain market. 
Was this supervision imdertaken so as to control the import 
that might flood the markets needed by Roman landlords, 



282 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

or was it undertaken in order to secure shipping for Roman 
merchants ? Both suggestions have been made, but neither 
is in accord with the senatorial policy of this time. The 
real purpose of this supervision so far as it existed was 
political, not commercial, and is best illustrated by Hellenic 
precedents. When we remember that Rome, when hard 
pressed for food during the Hannibalic war, was compelled 
to ask Ptolemy's permission before com could be bought 
in Egypt, we can understand where the senate found its 
precedent and why it adopted the regulation. Ptolemy ^^ 
had accumulated great stores of com from his tribute and 
was therefore able by controlling the Egyptian markets not 
only to secure a market for the royal stores, but also to gain 
a certain amount of political prestige through his power to 
aid friends and injure enemies. From an inscription we may 
infer that the Seleucids in Syria pursued the same policy, 
and we have recently learned that the little repubHc of 
Samos bought for public use the semipublic temple-tithes 
of the island. Of all these practices the senate doubtless 
had heard, and of others besides, concerning which we now 
know nothing. It could see that a real political power lay 
in so controlling the com market that the purchaser must 
ask the sovereign's permission to buy. It could see that 
com production was dwindhng in Italy and that the state 
might be made helpless in times of war, unless, like the Eastern 
monarchs, it coiild control a surplus. In the East the con- 
trol had been estabHshed partly for the personal profit of 
the king ; when the practice was adopted at Rome, it served 
a poHtical purpose only, for the state never attempted to 
sell the grain at a profit. Nor are we justified in drawing 
very sweeping conclusions from one passage. We know 
only that the Sicilian grain market was controlled by Rome 
in 169, a year of war. Since we have no other reference to 
such closure, we may well doubt whether the regulation was 
continued for an extended time. In Cicero's day Sicilian 
ports were apparently open to all traders.^^ 

We have now reviewed all the evidence that can be cited 
in favor of commercial influences in republican politics. In 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 283 

the several treaties of the early part of the second centiiry 
we find that there is no special privilege for the Roman 
trader. CThe treaty with Antiochus safeguards the commer- 
cial privileges of the Rhodians, but asks nothing more. In 
167 the royal monopoly of salt is confirmed to the Mace- 
donian republics. In 154 Marseilles was able by the aid of 
Roman support to free her wine market from the competition 
of a hostile Gallic tribe. Rome guaranteed the strength of 
the treaty by her signature, but the wording of it was dic- 
tated by the Greek city. The Ambracian treaty is the only 
one in which special commercial privileges were exacted, 
and these were accorded to the numerous Italian rivals of 
Rome as fully as to the Roman traders. On the other hand, 
the Termessian treaty and the Sicilian regtdations men- 
tioned by Cicero sustain the view that Rome seldom asked 
subject-allies for the freedom of the port in behalf of her 
merchants. 

Supporting this positive evidence, there is the solid au- 
thority of the republic's failure to adopt a number of meas- 
ures that might effectively have aided her merchants if she 
had desired to favor them. Rome might, for instance, have 
put an end to Carthage's policy of closing Punic ports either 
in 241 or in 201. But nothing of the kind was done. Africa 
remained closed ground until Carthage fell in 146, if we may 
believe Fenestella.^^ Furthermore, during the republic we 
hear of no export and import prohibitions regarding Italy 
such as are shown by the occasional enactments of Athens, no 
differential tariffs such as appear during the empire, no 
new commercial monopolies such as were at times created 
in the Hellenic world, no direct encouragement of harbor 
improvements by subsidies and insurances such as the Em- 
peror Claudius later introduced. In view of these facts the 
historian can hardly continue to hand on the conventional 
statements that the commercial lobby of Rome directed the 
foreign policies of the senate in the second century B.C., 
much less that it secured the destruction of Corinth and 
Carthage. 

When Carthage fell, no Roman harbor was provided in 



284 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Africa. Utica, a free city, inherited Carthage's commerce, 
and even handled the produce of the ItaHan farmers who 
settled in Africa. When Corinth was destroyed, the Delian 
harbor profited, to be sure, but, as we shall presently see, 
Delos was a port already filled with Greek, Syrian, Egyptian, 
and South-Italian merchants, and these enjoyed the full 
privileges of the port as much as did the Romans. Caesar was 
the first Roman statesman who formed comprehensive plans 
to further Roman commerce; but, as he fell before these 
plans could be executed, the task had to await the patronage 
of Claudius. Then first can one speak of state encourage- 
ment of commerce at Rome. 

The supposed mercantilism of the last two centuries of the 
republic thus disappears under examination. Apparently 
the state was not greatly interested in foreign trade. Can 
we determine the extent and importance of this trade? 
There is no ancient estimate now in existence, and yet we 
are not left wholly to conjecture. The best indications are 
to be found in the recently excavated inscriptions of the 
famous island-city of Delos. Since the city was never rebuilt 
after its destruction by Mithradates in 88, its nimierous 
inscriptions have lain undisturbed in the ruins until the 
present day ; and since Strabo informs us that it was the 
center of the Roman foreign trade during the republic, we 
may in some measure restore the history of that commerce 
from these inscriptions. 

Now, these inscriptions at once prove that the Romans 
were late comers at Delos, that in fact they were not at all 
a vital element in the .^gean trade during the days when the 
Roman state was spreading its political influence through 
the East. During that period the mercantile associations 
of the Orient predominate at Delos. Syrian cults had en- 
tered the island early in the second century ,2*^ and Syrian 
mercantile societies erected dedications there from i6o on. 
No. 2271 of the Corpus of Greek Inscriptions is a decree of 
the "synod of Tyrian merchants" dating from 153, and 
Roussel 2^ gives a collection of inscriptions of the merchants' 
association (Poseidoniastae) of Beirut, Syria, from the second 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 285 

half of the century. Egyptians entered Delos even earlier. 
Temples to their deities existed there in the third century, 
and their inscriptions, some of which go back to the third 
century ,22 have come to light by the score. In the latter 
half of the second century, when Alexandrian merchantmen 
came in even greater numbers, new temples were raised to 
Egyptian gods.^^ Other tablets recording honors and gifts 
show an influx of Easterners from a dozen different cities 
soon after Delos was made a free port in 167. The cities 
most frequently mentioned are Alexandria, Antioch, Tyre, 
Sidon, Beirut, Aradus, Ascalon, Heraclea, and other cities 
of the Pontic sea. It is the peoples from these places who 
gained most when in 167 Rome declared Delos a free port 
and when in 146 Corinth fell. 

Occidentals, however, are by no means absent. In fact, 
before the end of the second century they seem to predomi- 
nate, and though they are called "Romans" by the Greeks 
("Italici" by themselves), a close examination of their 
names ^* reveals the fact that a very small percentage of 
them were Romans. The greater number of those whose 
birthplace is indicated on inscriptions came from Naples, 
Velia, Syracuse, Heraclea, Tarentum, and Ancona ; that is, 
from Greek cities allied to Rome. The Italian names that 
occur are very largely such as are found, not at or near Rome, 
but in inscriptions of Campania and southern Italy. ^ In 
other words, the merchants and shippers, the bankers and 
money lenders, who followed the Roman flag eastward, were 
men who came from the old mercantile cities of southern 
Italy, cities which, when allied to Rome, were able to extend 
their field of operation under the protecting power of this 
all-dominating ally. No clearer evidence could be needed 
to prove that Roman citizens had very little interest in mari- 
time commerce, or to confute the oft -repeated statement 
that it was the Roman commercial interests engaged in 
Eastern trade which brought about the humiliation of 
Rhodes and the destruction of Carthage and Corinth. 

These conclusions are supported by the distressing record 
of the state's neglect to keep the seas clear of pirates. Rhodes 



286 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

had formerly policed the Eastern seas to protect her com- 
merce, but found herself unable to bear this burden after 
the loss of her independence. Piracy flourished disgrace- 
fully at the end of the second century e.g., and the senate 
then made a half-hearted effort to suppress it. This work, 
however, was not thoroughly done until the year 67, when 
Pompey was assigned to the task. Meanwhile, even the 
Roman port of Ostia had been sacked by these Eastern buc- 
caneers. One can hardly luiderstand this remissness except 
upon the assumption that the traders in the provinces were 
looked upon at home as a somewhat low class of adventurers ^* 
who had little connection with the vital interests of the state, 
and it is certainly incorrect in view of the slight attention 
paid to this most pressing of their needs to suppose that they 
exerted any considerable influence upon the policies of the 
senate. 

If one is inclined to wonder why trade was slow to "follow 
the flag" during the century of growing political prestige, 
a reference to census statistics may be of interest. The 
following record of citizens is taken from Livy, the estimate 
of acreage of piu^ely Roman territory from Beloch's ^^ careful 
reckoning : — 

Year Citizens Acreage 



203 


B.C. 


214,000 


6,700,000 


193 




243,000 


9,200,000 


173 




269,000 


13,700,000 


168 




312,000 




163 




337,000 




153 




324,000 




141 




327,000 




135 




317,000 





It will be seen that in the thirty years after Zama the number 
of citizens increased only 25 per cent, while the Roman acre- 
age in Italy increased over 100 per cent. Whence could 
the capital have come in the poverty-stricken state to develop 
this enormous increase of land ? We know now that neither 
sufficient men nor funds were forthcoming. The first in- 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 287 

crease of about 2,500,000 acres resulted from the state's 
appropriation of the South-ItaUan country which had been 
so thoroughly devastated by the last years of the war. Along 
the coast of this territory the state planted a string of small 
citizen-colonies as a military measure when an invasion by 
Antiochus seemed imminent. But except for these settle- 
ments, little was done in the south. Even the fertile Cam- 
panian land which fell to the state in 210 was so neglected 
that squatters seized large portions of it.^'' The north needed 
more immediate development. Along the Po the state was 
busy punishing Gallic tribes that had aided Hannibal. As 
fast as the offenders were pacified or driven out, it was nec- 
essary to plant citizen-colonies in order to assure permanent 
success. The lands of the north were far richer and more 
inviting to settlers than those of the south, and they could 
not easily be held unless colonized. We cannot doubt that 
for thirty years all the available capital and colonists were 
sent northward. What became of the southern public lands 
we may infer from the agrarian legislation proposed by the 
Gracchi later. Since the state could find no buyers or renters 
for them, it simply permitted chance squatters and ranchers 
to use them, asked no uncomfortable questions, and even 
neglected the records. Some cattle grazers who had gone 
through the formality of leasing the five hundred jugera al- 
lowed by law gradually increased their holdings when they 
discovered that the adjacent lands were still imoccupied. It 
will be remembered how in Gracchan days the descendants 
of these same squatters were compelled to surrender the 
surplusage, despite their appeal to vested rights, and how 
the democrats who then wanted lands for colonization could 
not understand why the senate had ever pursued so reckless 
a policy as to disregard the state's titles to its public lands. 
The explanation, of course, lies in the fact that from 200 to 
about 160 the land market was so enormously glutted that 
the senate saw no reason for asserting its title. From this it 
will readily be understood why with all the available capital 
thus invested in lands for at least half a century after the 
Pimic war there was so little at hand for commerce. In 



2SS ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

fact, it is generally tnie that Rome's rapid territorial expan- 
sion throughout the republiciui period constantly opened up 
a mai-ket for real-estate investments in advance of capitalis- 
tic needs and as constantly attracted Roman capital away 
from industry and commerce. 

It is interesting to note that at the end of the republican 
period when the Mediterranean commerce finally began to 
be concentrated in the hands of Roman citizens, these citizen- 
tradesmen were chiefly of foreign extraction, not members 
of the old Rotnan stock. Very many of them bear Greek 
and Gra^co-S}Tian cognornina, which means that ex-slaves 
and their sons had become the mercliants of Rome.-^ The 
explanation of this fact is not far to seek. We Icnow that the 
enormous loss of life throughout Italy during the Hannibalic 
war depleted both shop and fann to such an extent that a 
great many Eastern slaves were imported to work the indus- 
trial machincr}- of Italy. When later the exploitation of 
provincial resources invited thousands of Roman citizens 
to emigTate, the economic vacuum was again filled by new 
importations of slaves. These clever Easterners were em- 
ployed by their masters in all kinds of lucrative occupations 
at which the slaves might make their o^\^^ profits. They were 
placed in bakeshops, shoeshops, and wne booths, in the 
stalls of the vegetable and the fisli markets. There was 
nothing they could not do. It is not surprising to find that 
a thrifty slave could save enough to buy his liberty in eight 
years. Slaves in personal service were frequently set free 
by generous owners who put them into business and shared 
profits AN-ith them on a partnership basis. These are the 
people who were handling Rome's mercliandise at the sea- 
ports of Italy. They came originally from trading and sea- 
fciring people. Thrift, cleverness, and fidelity were the 
qualities which gained them their liberty, and these were 
the same qualities which soon turned them into successful 
merchants and shipowners. They had little ditficulty in 
outstripping the Romans in these occupations, for the Roman 
was always a landlubber. In the late empire the only rivals 
with whom they disputed tlie traffic of the seas were the 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 289 

descendants of their own ancestors, the Syrians of the 
East.2» 

In reviewing the status of Roman commerce during the 
last two centuries of the rcpubHc, then, we have found that 
at first the ItaHans who Hved near the Greek seaport towns 
of southern Italy were actively engaged in the Mediterranean 
trade. Roman citizens did not gain importance there until 
after 130, when they began to exploit their new province of 
Asia. These citizens, however, always lovers of terra firma, 
gradually drifted into capitalistic enterprises on land, leaving 
the freedmen of Oriental and Greek stock in Italy and their 
sons to gain control of the shipping. In the light of these 
facts we can readily comprehend the attitude of indifference 
that the senate regularly assumed toward commerce. 

Thus far we have dealt only with the commercial classes 
that were concerned in carrying Rome's imports and exports. 
Quite apart from these, there grew up a strong group of capi- 
talistic firms that acted indirectly as the state's agents in 
many of its financial transactions. These were the associa- 
tions of publicani, whose members were usually equites, the 
nobility of wealth at Rome. Because of its theory of magis- 
tracies, Rome could not well create a permanent treasury 
department capable of collecting all the state revenues and 
directing the execution of public works ; accordingly, it had 
to let contracts to firms of private citizens for the performance 
of all such tasks. Obviously the firms that thrived upon 
these works were directly interested in the size of Rome's 
revenues and disbursements, and accordingly in the growth 
of the empire that necessarily increased their profitable 
operations. The question arises whether this interest con- 
verted itself into an effort to influence the state in favor of 
expansion, and if so at what period. 

The locus classicus for a discussion ^^ of this question is a 
passage in Polybius' description of the Roman constitution, 
which was written about 140 b.c^^ 

" In like manner the people on its part is far from being 
independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its wishes 
into account both collectively and individually. For con- 



290 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

tracts, too ntunerous to count, are given out by the censors 
in all parts of Italy for the repairs or construction of public 
buildings ; there is also the collection of revenue from many 
rivers, harbors, gardens, mines, and land — everything,^^ in 
a word, that comes under the control of the Roman govern- 
ment : and in all these the people ^ at large are engaged ; so 
that there is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not inter- 
ested either as a contractor or as being employed in the 
works. For some purchase the contracts from the censors 
themselves ; and others go partners with them ; while others 
again go secvirity for these contractors, or actually pledge 
their property to the treasury for them. Now over all these 
transactions the senate has absolute control.' It can grant 
an extension of time ; and in case of unforeseen accident 
can relieve the contractors from a portion of their obligation, 
or release them from it altogether, if they are absolutely un- 
able to fulfil it." 

Without belittling the importance of this passage, one must 
nevertheless indicate the inadequacy of the historian as a 
witness in the matter. Polybius left his native Greek village 
at a time when the wealthiest man in Greece was not worth 
$300,000 and when the state budgets of the several Greek 
states were mere bagatelles. Nothing so astonished him at 
Rome as the sums of money dealt with there. Rome's 
budget — in his day about $5,000,000 — now seems a trifle 
for a world-state, but to him it was enormous, and it is 
not surprising that he shotdd have overemphasized the 
importance of the state's operations. Moreover, Polybius 
in this passage is developing his favorite political philosophy 
that the ideal constitution is composed of a system of "checks 
and balances." He is attempting to prove that Rome's 
great success is due to her possession of a Polybian consti- 
tution, and he accordingly strains his material to fit his 
system. To make the three sides of his triangle exert an 
even pull, not only must the consuls check the senate, but 
the senate must check the people. It is very doubtful, 
however, whether any one unacquainted with Polybius' 
theory of this endless chain of control would have discovered 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 291 

the enormous dependence of the people on the senate that 
so impressed him. 

As an indication of the amount of influence exerted by 
capital and its interests, let us try to measure the extent of 
the operations in which they were engaged. Before the 
Pimic wars puhlicani were needed at Rome for the collec- 
tion of port and pasture dues and perhaps of the rent of 
public lands when any existed. The citizen-tribute was ap- 
parently paid to the treasury without intermediary. In 
those days puhlicani were necessary to the state, but they had 
no control over any large funds. The conquest of Sicily 
extended their field of operation to the collection of port 
and pasture dues upon the island, but it is noteworthy that 
they made little or no effort to bid for the tithe-gathering 
there. In 214, during the Hannibalic war, they were pub- 
licly asked to supply — on credit — provisions for the army 
in Spain. Nineteen publicans, members of three firms, 
responded to this request, making the condition that the state 
insure their cargoes.^* Later several firms offered to execute 
on credit the public works that wotdd be needed until the 
war should end.^^ These are the first references we possess 
to firms of publicans. After the war we do not often hear 
of them, although we know that expensive pubHc works were 
occasionally let. 

In order to form an estimate of the amount involved in the 
annual operations of these firms, we must try to determine 
what part of the annual budget passed through their hands 
in dues and contracts. In the year 63 B.C. we hear that the 
treasury had an income ^^ of about $10,000,000. In 150 B.C. 
we may fairly estimate it at half of that, or less, since the 
state had not then acquired its most profitable provinces of 
Asia and Africa nor the tribute of several Greek cities which 
became stipendiary during the Mithradatic war. Of this 
hypothetical $5,000,000, the Roman publicans did not collect 
half, for the Spanish, the Sardinian, and the Macedonian 
stipends were paid directly, while the Sicilian tithes were 
still gathered by native collectors. There probably passed 
through the hands of the publicans at this time in port and 



292 "ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

pasture dues, fishing licenses, and occasional mining con- 
tracts an average of about $2,000,000 per annum. Further- 
more, some of the firms also engaged in public works, road 
building, the construction of walls, sewers, aqueducts, and 
the like. For such matters the senate of the second century 
usually appropriated a fifth ^' or a tenth of the year's income ; 
that is, from $500,000 to $1,000,000. In the rest of the 
expenditures — practically all for military purposes — the 
publicans seldom had any share, for the military quaestor 
usually managed the finances of the army, receiving the req- 
uisite appropriation directly from the treasury. 

We may safely conclude, therefore, that the annual stun in 
the hands of the puhlicani both for collections and contracts 
did not on the average reach $4,000,000. If we estimate ^^ 
that there were about 20,000 equites in the year 150, with an 
average census of $20,000 each, — a low estimate, — we have 
a private capital of $400,000,000 in the hands of the equites 
alone. In other words, the pubHc contracts at that time 
involved only i per cent of the possessions of the equites. 
The total area of ager Romanus at this time was about 
14,000,000 acres, which at the average price of unimproved 
lands given by Columella ^® (fifty dollars per jugera) would 
mean a thousand million dollars in soil value alone, even if 
we take no account of investments in land of the allies. 
It must be evident that throughout the middle of the century 
the one all-absorbing field for investment was Italian land, 1 
and that in proportion to the amount devoted to this field 
the capital engaged in state contracts before the Gracchan 
legislation was insignificant. Had the tax-farming firms 
been looking for a more extended field of operation, they 
could readily have competed for the collection of Sicilian 
tithes, and the slight inconvenience of employing an agent 
in Sicily would scarcely have deterred them from doing so 
if they had been very eager for such state contracts. We 
must conclude, therefore, that before the Gracchan period 
the equites were hardly so deeply involved in public finances 
as to be seriously concerned about the problem of territorial 
expansion. The attempt so persistently made to explain 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 293 

second-century wars by reference to the supposed machina- 
tions of the knights has no foundation in our sources or in 
any accurate understanding of the knights' position in the 
economic world of that day.^" 

It cannot be denied, however, that the knights did become 
a strong poHtical power in the first century, and it was the 
Gracchan revenue law of 123 which opened the way for 
their ultimate high position. This law gave them contracts 
which at once doubled the amount of their operations for 
the state. But what benefited them even more were the 
incidental profits derived from these new contracts. After 
collecting the Asiatic grain, for example, they could hold it 
for winter prices and thus double their gains. They could 
carry the taxes of delinquent cities at usurious rates of in- 
terest. Individuals engaged in these operations in Asia 
found rich opportunities for investing in lands and industries. 
And the lessons they learned in Asia they applied elsewhere. 
Not only did they now enter the Sicilian field of tithe-gather- 
ing, but individual investors connected with the public 
firms overran all the provinces in search of bargains and 
profits. Furthermore, Gracchus had given dignity to the 
firms by bestowing political privileges upon the class as a 
whole. Henceforth the economic interests of the firms found 
a respectable champion in a compact, ennobled body that 
occupied a definite place in the state's machinery. Within 
a few years the voice of the knights can be heard favoring 
the suppression of devastating wars. In the days of Pompey, 
they even went one step farther. Then they demanded that 
the Great General be put in charge of the Eastern war, be- 
cause they had reason to believe that he favored the forcible 
annexation of Syria and would be willing to expose it to the 
tender mercies of the lucrative contract system. 

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV 

* See Mommsen, Rom. Hist. (Eng. tr. 1900) III, 238, 274, 295, 415, 
421 ; Colin, Rome et la Grece, p. 90 et passim; Wilamowitz, Staat und 
Gesell. der Griechen, p. 182 : die perfide Kaufmannspolitik der Romer; 
Mommsen, Rom. Prov. (Eng. tr.) I, p. 279 ; see also, Heitland, The 



X 



294 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Roman Republic, II, pp. 156, 157, 165 ; Ferrero, The Greatness and 
Decline of Rome, I, pp. 20 and 38 ; Speck's very unreliable Handels- 
geschichte des Altertums, passim. One welcome exception to the gen- 
eral belief is found in Kalirstedt, Geschichte der Karthager von 218-146, 
p. 616: Nirgends in der gitten antiken Literatur ist das bezeugt, was 
die Modcmen, selbst Mommsen, als Grand der Zerstoning Karthagos 
angoben, die merkantile Eifersucht der italischen Grosskaufmannschaft. 
A part of the present chapter is reprinted from the Am. Hist. Review, 
XVIII, p. 233 ff. 

2 Taylor, C tilts of Ostia, p. 2. 

3 See Mommsen, Rom. Hist. (Eng. tr.), II, 48. 

* Taubler, Imperium Romaniim, p. 264, lends support to this inter- 
pretation of the treaty by observ-ing that its fomi is Carthaginian, not 
Roman. The clauses requiring the surrender of the site of a plundered 
city and the submission of private disputes to public settlement do not 
elsewhere occur in Roman treaties. 

' Monument i Antichi, vol. XV (1905). 

* Saalfeld, Italograeca. 

'' Livy, XXXVIII, 44. The phrase socii nominis Latini of course 
includes all Italian allies (Mommsen, Staatsrecht, III, 661). Ac is 
understood. The inferences usually drawn from this passage are 
found in Moninisen, Staatsrecht, III, 691. 

* Bnins, Fo>itcs, p. 94. 
'Cicero, TVrr., II, 1S5. 
^°DeRep. Ill, 16. 

" Mommsen's view of this passage, expressed in Roman History, 
III, 415, is usually adopted, but Polybius, XXXIII, 11, saj'^ that the 
Gauls gave their hostages to Marseilles, not to Rome. Speck {Handels- 
geschichte) enumerates similar prohibitions tliat are mentioned in the 
late imperial codices, but they cannot be used as evidence for the 
republic. Neither sliould he use the testimony of the Plautine comedy 
which is translated from the Greek. Rome's temporary prohibition 
of interstate trade in Macedonia and Acha'-a was imposed in order to 
break up political unity. As soon as this purpose was accomplished, the 
prohibition was withdrawn. This old practice never had an economic 
purpose. 

*^ Li\'y, XLV, 29. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und make- 
donischen Staaten, III, 181, says: "Der Sinn dieser Bestimmung ist 
unklar." Heitland, II, 120, "Perhaps it in some way favored opera- 
tions of Roman capitalists." Speck has no doubts about the purpose 
of the prohibition, vol. Ill, pt. 2, p. 349. 

^' Diodonis, XX, 46 ; Andocides, Return, 11. 

" This is the meaning of Livy's original, which he, in the spirit of his 
own time, puts thus (XLV, 18) : "Ubi publicanus esset, ibi . . , 
libertatem sociis nuUam esse." 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 295 

" See Rostowzew, "Staatspacht," Philologus, Suppl. IX, p. 411. 

" Polyb. XXVIII, 2. For the usual interpretation, see Rostowzew, 
art. Frumentum, 130, in Pauly-Wissowa. 

" On Egypt, see Rostowzew in Pauly-Wissowa Reallex. s.v. Fru- 
mentum VII, 139; on Syria, Kohler, Sitz. Akad. Berlin, 1898, p. 841. 
The Samian decree is discussed by Wilamowitz in Sitz. Akad. Berlin, 
1904, p. 917. 

** Cicero, Verr. V, 145, quaecumque navis ex Asia, quae ex Syria, quae 
Tyro, quae Alexandria venerat. Cf. ibid. 157. 

1* Peter, Hist. Rom. Fr. p. 273, nullo commercio inter Italicos et Afros 
nisi post deletam Karthaginem coepto. 

^ Bulletin de Corr. HelUnique, VI, 295. 

21 Ibid. XXXI, 335-377 (1907). 

^Ibid. XXXII, 397 (1908). 

28 Ferguson, Klio, VII, 226 (1907) ; id. Hellenistic Athens, ch. IX. 

^ Fortunately the complete list of Italic inscriptions at Delos is now 
available in Hatzfeld, Les Italiens residant d Delos {Bull. Corr. Hell. 
19 1 2). It bears out the argument set forth in the Classical Journal, 
1910, p. 99, that the Romans had but a small part in the trade of Delos 
before 130 B.C., and corrects once and for all the erroneous conclusions 
of HomoUe (Bull. Corr. Hell. VIII). 

Some of the important facts now proved by the four or five hundred 
Italic names listed from Delos are as foUows : There was no conventus 
civium Romanorum at Delos so far as we know. There were only 
clubs of Italici. The club of Hermaistse dates from about 150 B.C. ; 
a club of Poseidoniastae and one of Apolloniastas date from about 130. 
These three clubs contained freebom men and freedmen, Romans, 
Latins, Italic allies, and southern Greeks alike, that is to say, all Italici. 
There was also a club of Competaliastae consisting of Italian slaves 
and freedmen. We know, furthermore, of a club of oil merchants, 
olearii, the members of which came mainly from Velia, Heraclea, and 
other cities of Magna Graecia. 

No inscription bears the Latin title Romanus; the title Italici is 
the regular one on the Latin inscriptions. About twenty names on 
Greek inscriptions bear the designation 'Pw/xatos, but this word is 
loosely used by the Greeks as a 'ranslation of Italicus; several who 
bear the name are demonstrably not Roman citizens, e.g. 'Ax'XXei's 
'Hpo/cXefSijs n^TTios, Maraius Gerillanus, ^^pdwv and ^wtIujv. Only 
one of the twenty can be proved to be a citizen of Rome, and that by 
the fact that on one inscription he gives his birthplace as Lanuvium, 
a Roman municipality. Most of the rest have names which, like 
BabuUius, Pactumeius, Sehius, and Staius, point to the south of Italy. 
Only two names at Delos attest Roman citizenship by the addition of 
the Roman tribus, — these are Orbius and Attiolenus, both on rela- 
tively late inscriptions. 



296 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

Hatzfeld also dates the building of the Italian Agora at about lOO 
B.C., instead of 130 B.C., which was Homolle's date. 

^ Among the occupations called illiberales et sordidi is mercatura, si 
tenuis est, Cic. de Off. I, 150; if conducted on a large scale it is not so 
discreditable, non est admodum vituperanda. 

^ Italische Bund (1880), and Bevolkerung der Griech.-Rom. Welt 
(1886). The hectare = almost 2| acres; the acre is a trifle over i| 
jugera. 

The decrease in population between 160 and 130 is partly due to a 
new standard of living that accompanied the influx of wealth and 
Greek ideas, and partly to the fact that after the public lands had been 
occupied, the small farmer who was giving way to the plantation owner 
did not attempt to preempt a new homestead, but sought his fortune in 
the provinces. With the Gracchan reallotments the census figures 
took a decided bound upwards again. 

27Livy, XLII, 19. 

28 Parvan, Die Nationalitat der Kaufleute (1909). 

^ Scheffer-Boichorst, Zur Geschichte der Syrer im Abendlande. 

^^ See especially Heitland's index under "Capitalists, influence of, 
on Roman policy," with his forty-one references ; Deloume, Les Ma- 
nieurs d' Argent A Rome, passim; Greenidge, A History of Rome, pp. 44 ff, ; 
Ferrero, passim; et al. Most writers have exaggerated the influence 
of the capitalist of the second century. 

^iPolybius, VI, 17. 

'2 This is of course not quite correct. The tributes and tithes of 
Sicily, Spain, Sardinia, Macedonia, and Africa were collected by the 
natives in various ways and paid directly to the treasury. 

3' Here again Polybius is misleading. In the public works the firms 
employed little free labor. Slaves did most of the work, and they of 
course had no political influence. We should also note that the most 
extensive piece of work in the days of Polybius, the great Marcian 
aqueduct, was not let out to these firms. The aediles took charge of 
the work and assigned it in some 3000 small lots to individuals. It 
would seem that the regular contracting firms were not capable of han- 
dling so large a task. 

'"'Livy, XXIII,49,3. 

«5 Ihid. XXIV, 18. 

^ This figure is assured by a combination of Plutarch, Pompey, 45, 
and Cicero, Pro Sestio, 55. Ptolemy's income from Egypt about the 
same time was about three fourths this sum (Diodorus, XVII, 52). 
For the sake of comparison we may note that the Gallic tribute was 
about $2,000,000 under Augustus, that of Asia about $1,500,000 under 
Hadrian. SicUy's tithe in 70 B.C. was worth about $450,000, if we 
accept from Cicero, Verr. Ill, 163, the average price of three sesterces 
per modius of wheat, or about sixty cents per bushel. 



COMMERCIALISM AND EXPANSION 297 

^ Marquardt, Slaalsverwaltung, II, 87. 

3* The knight's minimum census was probably lower in 150 than the 
400,000 HS. required by law in the first century. But our estimate is 
hardly too high for an average. Crassus, the consul of 130, considered 
the richest man of his day, was worth 100,000,000 HS. I have also 
estimated the number of knights. In the census of 234, there were 
19,000 Roman knights in a citizen-population of 270,000. Since the 
citizen-census of 153 showed a population of 324,000, our number is 
probably fair. 

'8 Columella, III, 3. Land was doubtless cheaper in 150 B.C., espe- 
cially since so much colonization had recently taken place then. Some 
of the Roman land was of course not arable, yet on the whole it included 
the choicest parts of Italy. The estimate may go for what it is worth. 
Columella, at any rate, doubles the value when the land is planted with 
vines. 

*° Of the many Italians that Mithradates found in Asia in the year 88, 
the greater part were doubtless from southern Italy, if we may draw 
inferences from the situation at Delos. There, at least, five of the six 
rpaire^hai were from Magna Graecia. See B. C. H. (1912), p. 142. 



CHAPTER XV 

CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 

In the j-ear go the Italian alHes of Rome attempted to 
secede from the federation, and Rome had to pay in costly 
bloodshed for her long neglect of those who had supported 
her so loj-ally in the great wars. The Itahan, or so-called 
" Social," war involved no new acquisitions of territory, but 
it was itself an effect of Rome's expansion, and it indirectly 
resulted in wars which ultimatel)'- led to further expansion. 

The federal scheme devised after 340 contemplated, at 
least in posse, a progressive Romanization of the central 
part of Italy. For a centurj^ and a half the senate followed 
that scheme in the most liberal spirit imtil most of the Au- 
runci, Hemici, .-Equi, Picentes, Sabines, and parts of other 
tribes were full citizens of Rome, Incorporation seems to 
have progressed as rapidly as the Italians desired it, perhaps 
in some instances even more rapidly, for there were cities 
near Rome which took pride in remaining legalh' the ''equals" 
of the great imperial city.^ It is well-nigh amazing that Tibur 
and Pr^neste, for instance, only twenty miles from the walls 
of Rome, were "independent states" when Rome was su- 
preme from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea ! 

However, the ever increasing growth of the state led to 
an impatient disregard of the rights of weak Italian allies. 
The consuls, the senate, and the populace, grown accustomed 
to rule vast dominions, meted out imperious decrees to their 
old friends in the Italian federation, as they did to slippery 
princes on the borders of the empire. The just grievances 
of the Italians accumulated rapidly during the second cen- 
tury. Their officers and soldiers were often assigned to the 
more disagreeable military duties. Their proportion of 
troops frequently outnumbered the fair quota. The 
meaner or smaller portions of conquered land and booty 

298 



CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 299 

often fell to them. With the settlement of Mutina, Parma, 
and Satumia in 183, the senate definitely adopted the cus- 
tom of allotting conquered territory to Roman citizens ^ \y^ 
instead of to all Italians, as had previously been the custom. 
This disregard of old privileges seemed the more unjust since 
foreign wars were now fought, not in the common defense of 
Italy, but in accordance with the political purposes of the 
senate and people of Rome. Rome, moreover, irritated the 
Italians by various other domineering acts. The senatorial 
decree directed against the worshipers of Bacchus,^ which 
has accidentally been preserved, shows clearly how Rome, 
as early as 186, presumed to exercise police supervision in 
the religious concerns of the allies. The cities involved 
doubtless sympathized with Rome's desire to suppress an 
outburst of fanaticism at home, but they could hardly have 
looked complacently upon senatorial interference within 
their own jurisdiction. They had a legal right to adopt an 
insane cult if they so desired. Worse than this interference 
in their rights of autonomy was the imperious behavior of 
certain Roman magistrates toward them. Gaius Gracchus, 
when pleading the cause of the allies, was able to point to 
several instances * where magistrates had applied martial 
law for the most trivial offenses. In the army, conditions 
were even harder to bear, for, although citizen soldiers of 
the ranks had by law the right of appeal to the people from 
a commander's decision, neither soldiers nor officers of the 
allied contingent had any redress when unjustly punished 
by Roman generals.'^ 

Demands for the alleviation of all these abuses began early, 
and since the socii soon foimd that it would be futile to refer 
back to their treaty rights, they decided to urge their full 
incorporation in the Roman state. After the battle of 
Cann«e, Carvilius, a highly respected senator of democratic 
sympathies, had actually proposed that each "Latin" city 
be represented by two members in the Roman senate.^ The 
motion, though conceivably based upon purely pro-Roman 
considerations, doubtless accorded with the expressed wishes 
of the "Latins." It met, however, with Httle attention: 



^... 



300 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

naturally the senate, jealous of its prerogatives, felt itself 
capable of administering affairs of state alone. After the 
passage of the agrarian laws of Tiberius Gracchus, the allies 
took aggressive steps toward gaining a hearing, for they 
had reason to fear that the Roman populace might infringe 
upon their possessory right in the pubHc lands. They came 
to Rome to lobby for favorable legislation in such numbers 
that their opponents, despite the vigorous opposition of 
Gains Gracchus, passed an alien exclusion act. Flaccus,' 
a friend of Gains, then proposed to grant citizenship to all 
who desired it and at least the right of appeal against martial 
law to the rest, but he found little enthusiasm for his measure. 
What government has ever volunteered to give away a part 
of its powers? But some of the Italians were in bitter 
earnest. The Latin colony of Fregellse openly revolted, 
only to be crushed by force and severely punished. The 
senate even instituted an inquiry to find out what Romans 
had encouraged the revolters, and Gracchus among others 
was forced to submit to trial on a charge of treason. He 
secured an acqmttal, and in 122, after he had carried through 
his agrarian reforms, staked his all on an enfranchisement 
bill.^ There is reason to think that many senators sympa- 
thized with the allies, but they treated the bill purely as a 
party measure. Obviously here was a proposal in which the 
Roman populace was not personally interested, and which 
might afford an opportunity to defeat the tribtme and break 
his prestige. And Gracchus, as was to be expected, fell, 
deserted by the populace in the first proposal which did not 
convey them a gift. 

After this the allies appealed to Rome from time to time, 
only to be met with new alien exclusion acts,^ xmtil, in 91, 
Drusus,^" a senatorial, constituted himself their champion. 
This man, it seems, thought it possible to break the factional 
strife which was crippling the state by skillfully realigning 
the parties so as to form a new bloc. By proposing to trans- 
fer the court juries from the control of the knights to that 
of the senators, and by offering the populace com and land, 
he hoped to combine the senate and the people in a success- 



CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 301 

ful party against a minority of the middle-class rich. An 
important part of his program contemplated the enfranchise- 
ment of the Italians, whether from S5mipathy for their cause, 
or in order to allay their opposition to a new colonial scheme. 
At any rate, the Italians entered into his plans with un- 
bounded enthusiasm, which turned to despair and rage when 
Drusus met his death, apparently at the hands of a poUtical 
assassin. They had formed an organization throughout 
Italy in order to support Drusus, and this they now employed 
in planning a future campaign. In their bitterness they 
turned to drastic means, eventually deciding to ask Rome for 
no more favors, but instead to form a republic of their own 
wholly independent of Rome. The Marsi, Paehgni, Vestini, 
Picentes, Marrucini, Samnites, and Lucanians — the soimd- 
est stock in Italy — formed the new state. Their con- 
stitution,^^ if we may trust Diodorus' brief accoimt, must 
have been one of the most interesting of ancient times, com- 
bining ideas from Rome, the Hellenic federations, and their 
own municipal governments in such a way that the resultant 
constituted a unicameral representative government. From 
Rome they adopted the biconsular magistracy and a senate 
of about 500. From the Greek federations came the prin- 
ciple of representation which allowed each municipality to 
have its own deputies in the senate. A select committee of 
the senate, apparently chosen from and by the senate, con- 
stituted a preparatory council to shape and propose bills 
to that body — a plan also practiced in many Greek cities 
and leagues. Finally, from the custom in vogue in a large 
number of the Italian cities where the ordo decurionum man- 
aged city affairs without reference to the assemblies, they 
borrowed the idea of placing legislation in the hands of the 
senate rather than in the popular assembly. In other 
words, these state builders adopted practically the same 
measures that ^milius Paullus had embodied in the con- 
stitution for the Macedonian republics some seventy-five 
years before. 

The struggle of the allies resulted in a compromise, most 
of the seceding tribes laying down their arms in 89 when Rome 



302 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

promised citizenship to those who would sign the citizen 
rolls witliin a given period. The cit}' of Rome extended 
henceforth over the whole length of the peninsula. The 
contest had, however, continued so long that Mithradates 
tlie Great, whose ambitions had fonnerly been checked by 
senatorial commands, had had time to ally liimself ^^'itll the 
secessionists and, in conformity to a common plan, had swept 
over the Roman pro\dnce of Asia. And since Asia is the 
center of Roman imperial polities during the next generation, 
it may be well to re\T[ew the situation which Mithradates 
created. 

At the end of the second centm-}' the principalities of 
AnatoHa were, for the most pait, at peace. Bithynia had 
long been faithful to Rome. Paphlagonia consisted of a 
group of insigiiiticant principalities inmiediately beyond. 
Galatia, wliicli had been liberated from Pergamene rule by 
Rome, was now governed by a dozen princelings and was 
being rapidly Hellenized. Cappadocia, east of Galatia, 
alone was unsettled, having lost its king, who had fallen in a 
contest with Aristonicus, undertaken at the request of Rome. 
Pontus, after the death of its Idng in 120, had been iiiled by 
a weak queen; the boy heir — destined to become famous 
under the title of Mithradates the Great — had recently 
returned from adventuring in Greece and Asia, where he had 
gained much worldly wisdom which he later turned to good 
use. Tigi-anes the Annenian was building for himself a 
strong kingdom out of the eastern WTCckage of S>Tia. The 
Armenian plateau remained his stronghold, but he soon added 
to it a considerable portion of Mesopotamia, and (to antici- 
pate) b}^ S3 he had seized the whole of SjTia. At the end 
of the second centtuy the Roman protectorate extended 
over the provinces of Bith5mia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, and 
Cappadocia, all aniici of Rome : within this territory the 
senate preferred to see no important political changes. Wliat 
happened beyond was of little concern, pro\dded it did not 
disturb the peace of these useful buffer-states. 

Now in 105, Mithradates ^- invited Nicomedes of Bithynia 
to share in a partition of Paplilagonia. The senate was asked 



CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 303 

to intervene, but was too busily engaged with the Cimbri to 
heed, and the two kings divided their spoils without moles- 
tation. A few years later they invaded Cappadocia also, 
and, in fact, fell out over the [partition of their prize. The 
senate now (96 n.c.) ordered the two bandits to give up both 
Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, and they felt constrained to 
obey. Mithradates, however, made an alliance with the 
young and am?jitious king of Armenia, promising to support 
him if he would seize Cappadocia. Tigranes did so, but in 
92 the senate sent Sulla, the governor of Cilicia, to restore 
the kingdom its autonomy. The senate even suggested 
that the Cappadocians create a republic and live "at liberty." 
But they knew their inexperience in self-government and 
elected a king. When in 90 the Social war threw the whole 
of Italy into a life-and-death struggle that required Rome's 
utmost strength, Mithradates encouraged the allies with 
promises of help and then on his own account quickly pos- 
sessed himself of Cappadocia, Galatia, and Bithynia, and 
with a victorious force invaded Roman Asia. 

Here he had the wisdom to observe what Philip and Per- 
seus had seen in Greece, that Rome's adherents belonged 
chiefly to the propertied classes, and that, therefore, an appeal 
to the democratic parties of the cities and the promulgation 
of a socialistic program would be most effective in bringing 
him support. He accordingly announced himself the advo- 
cate of the financially and politically downtrodden, and 
visited effective punishment upon any who withstood him. 
The propertied classes, of course, were in the minority, and 
the Asiatic populace had been rendered more than normally 
dissatisfied by the exactions of the taxgatherers. More- 
over, Mithradates was at hand with his efficient army, 
whereas the Roman armies were far away fighting what 
might prove to be their last battle. Most of the cities 
accordingly opened their gates to the king ; and when, in 
the year 88, he had come into complete possession, he issued 
an edict ordering all Italians to be put to death on a fixed 
day. He was apparently obeyed with a will. Eighty thou- 
sand Italians are said to have fallen by that decree. 



304 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

This is not the place to describe the war that followed. 
The story is well known how a democratic plebiscite directed 
Marius to conduct the war, although Sulla was consul ; how 
Sulla marched upon Rome with his army, drove his opponents 
out of the city, and secured the command for himself from the 
senate; how he then defeated the Pontic forces in Greece, 
made terms with Mithradates, reorganized the Asiatic prov- 
ince, returned home with his army, crushed his enemies in 
a fearful civil war, and made himself dictator. 

Considering the havoc the king had wrought in Asia, we 
are surprised that Sulla could dismiss him upon his promise 
to pay an indemnity of a mere 2000 talents and to withdraw 
to his kingdom. Evidently Sulla was more concerned about 
his own future position at Rome than about the outposts of 
the state. With the province, however, he dealt most 
sternly. A large number of Greek cities and states that 
had been free before had during this crisis been compelled 
to declare for Mithradates. All these cities were now at- 
tached to the Roman province. From this time on we hear 
of very few civitates immune s et liber ae or civitates foederatae on 
the coast of Asia Minor. Rhodes ^^ and Chios retained their 
freedom. Iliimi was favored for having withstood Sulla's 
personal enemy. Fimbria. The cities of Caria and Lycia 
had apparently lain so far from the road of Mithradates' 
army that they had been able to remain neutral, and thus 
keep their former status. Inscriptions ^* prove that some 
minor cities like Laodicea and Stratonicea also succeeded 
in withstanding the king and were rewarded by Sulla. But 
aside from these, the cities of Asia Minor were henceforth 
subjected to Rome. 

Stdla dealt with the province in a peculiarly selfish maimer. 
Receiving no funds from the senate, — the Marian party had 
gained control during his absence, — he fell into financial 
straits, and since the indemnity he could secure from the 
king was wholly insufficient for his needs, he chose to exact 
a heavy sinn from the province under the pretext that it 
had been guilty of revolt. The provincials probably re- 
torted that they had best served the interests of the state 



CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 305 

by speedily submitting to Mithradates, since they had no 
means of defense and Rome was so tardy with aid. But 
excuses were of no avail. Sulla placed his "indemnity" — 
which included a cash prepayment of five years' tribute — 
at the enormous sum of 20,000 talents. The cities had little 
ready money, for Mithradates had also scoured the province 
for gold, but they mortgaged their public buildings to money- 
lenders at usurious rates ^^ and paid the sum. Much of the 
later distress that is usually charged to the unlawful exac- 
tions of taxgatherers had its root in the unexcusable demand 
of this aristocratic governor. Nor was this the last time 
that the provincials had to suffer in consequence of a Roman 
civil war ; again, in the days of Brutus and Cassius they 
experienced the truth of the Horatian maxim : quicquid 
delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi. 

One wise regulation, however, is accredited to Sulla. Hp 
apparently organized the province into taxing districts, 
apportioned the annual tribute among them,^® and stipu- 
lated the exact amount each was to pay, thus removing the 
illegal exactions of the Roman publicans. In doing this he 
seems to have grasped the idea that if he succeeded in becom- 
ing dictator at Rome, he would then be able to establish a 
permanent fiscal biireau dependent upon himself alone which 
would do away with the employment of middlemen firms 
and the contract system. To be sure, Sulla's arrangement 
disappeared a few years ^^ after his death, and the publicans 
regained their field of operation, but he had at least found a 
fruitful idea which Caesar successfully adopted as soon as 
he became dictator. 

That Sulla was little concerned with the extension of 
Rome's empire is apparent in all his acts. An imperialist 
would have assumed control of the principalities that Mith- 
radates had conquered and been forced to evacuate. Sulla, 
on the contrary, restored the former regime. In fact, as 
soon as he turned his back on Asia, Tigranes took possession 
of the whole of Syria, which had long been a Roman protec- 
torate, and Sulla, though supreme at Rome, looked on in 
silence. He seems not even to have made a protest. This 

X 



3o6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

attitude toward imperialism is exactly what one would ex- 
pect of a thorough senatorial chiefly concerned with his own 
welfare. Sulla incurred a civil war with Marius for the sake 
of securing the command against Mithradates in 88, and 
when he had overcome Marius, he immediately abandoned 
Rome to his enemies in order to drive back the Eastern 
aggressor, but an interest in the imperial boundaries seems 
at no time to have been the mainspring of his action. It 
is not too harsh a criticism of Sulla to assume that he at- 
tacked Marius solely for the sake of political self-preservation 
and that he personally conducted the war against the Eastern 
invader because he dared not intrust a strong army to any one 
else. The time had come when the drift toward a military mon- 
archy was apparent to all. The safety of the frontier was 
more and more becoming, not a primary political duty, but 
rather a pretext for some ambitious leader to grasp control- 
ling power. The clever politician, Crassus, betrayed the 
trend of events in a remark ^^ that the Romans often quoted 
as particularly shrewd: "No man with political ambitions 
is now sufficiently wealthy unless he can support an army on 
his own income." It was the concurrence of the civil disorder 
and his own self -centered temperament that made Sulla the 
anomaly in Roman history that he is. That he, a senatorial, 
should have been the first to avail himself of the democratic- 
monarchical lessons taught by the careers of the Gracchi 
and Marius simply testifies to the overweening self-interest 
of the man. That he stopped short of the natural conse- 
quences of his acts and failed to establish an aggressive mili- 
tary monarchy as Cagsar did, must be attributed to his 
lifelong association with advocates of the senatorial doc- 
trine. Sulla left the empire very much as he had found it 
in extent, but he had weakened it both at home and abroad, 
and he revealed to Caesar how to apply the lessons of Marius. 
Sulla died in 79, and with him Mithradates' fear of Rome : 
the Eastern tyrants, themselves individualists, were always 
disposed to think in terms of personalities. When, there- 
fore, the king of Bithynia died in 74 and bequeathed his 
kingdom to Rome, — this is the third inexplicable bequest, — 



CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 307 

the Pontic king invaded the land and placed his own ap- 
pointee upon the throne. The old Marian leader, Sertorius, 
who was now resisting Rome in Spain, sent him encourage- 
ment — and Roman drillmasters. To reclaim Rome's 
inheritance, the senate dispatched the consul Lucullus, a 
noble who had done excellent service upon the seas under 
Sulla, to Bithynia. This skillful governor pushed the Pontic 
king back slowly but doggedly. In two years the king was 
so thoroughly beaten that he was compelled to abandon his 
country and take refuge in Armenia. The next two years 
Lucullus used in establishing Rome's foothold in Pontus 
and in relieving distress in Asia. He found that the cities 
had borrowed money at usurious rates to meet Sulla's ex- 
actions and had so completely fallen into arrears that in 
14 years the debt had risen to about sixfold the original 
sum. Not only had Lucullus no love for money lenders, 
but he also realized that the province could not long remain 
faithful in such distress. By way of relief he resorted to 
very drastic measures : with one edict he canceled two- 
thirds of the public debt, and levied a tribute of 25 per cent 
of the harvest for the next four years, so that the old debt 
would be completely cleared off in a short time.^^ From 
private debts he annulled all the outstanding interest still 
due, reestabHshed the legal rate of 12 per cent, and made 
arrangements for annual payraents of installments out of 
yearly incomes. There was, of course, an outburst of ob- 
jections from the Roman money-lending firms and their 
shareholders, and, henceforth, a vigorous campaign was 
carried on at home to blacken the general's reputation and 
effect his recall. In the field he had also made enemies: 
he was a strict disciplinarian, far from affable, and, to the 
disgust of his troops, he habitually accepted the peaceful 
capitulation of cities that had been besieged, without ob- 
serving the old custom of abandoning them as loot to his 
soldiers. He was particularly kind to Greeks, and even 
after a town had been stormed, the Greeks, who would most 
likely have 5nielded the richest booty, were allowed to depart 
unmolested with their possessions. 



3o8 ROIVL\N BIPERIALISM 

After the settlement of Asia's finances he turned his atten- 
tion to Annenia, where Mithradates had taken refuge. He 
requested Tigi*anes to surrender Rome's enemy. The 
Annenian refused, and Luculkis "'^'ith a small picked army 
set out through hundreds of miles of mountains and deserts 
to find his enemy. According to a report which probably 
has come from his autobiography, the forces of Mithradates 
and Tigranes outnmnbered his o\\-n small anny twenty to 
one.-° He won his battle, however, with small loss, and 
succeeded in taking the capital of Armenia, the newly founded 
Tigranocerta, for the population of wliicli Asia Minor had 
been scoured b}^ Tigranes. The inhabitants were directed 
to go back to their former homes. Tigranes raised a new 
army, but Lucullus felt that Ms work was so nearly done 
that he could safely sever Syria ^^ from Armenia and give 
it back to Antiochus. His fortunes, however, soon changed 
for the worse. The enemj^'s forces grew, even Phraates, 
of the far-distant Parthian kingdom, sending encourage- 
ment to the fugitive longs, and when Lucullus undertook 
to follow his eneni}^ farther into the interior, his soldiers 
refused to accompany him. In fact, the best of his troops 
had been in the East almost 20 years and had outserved 
their term. Lucullus retreated, only to find that Mithra- 
dates had proceeded to Pontus and was recaptming his 
kingdom. Before the Roman could recover it, he received 
the news that he had been superseded.-- Pompe}^, who for 
personal reasons had become the champion of the popular, 
capitalistic party, received the command of Lucullus and 
was destined to reap the fruits of that general's long and 
weary work. 

Lucullus has been called the "creator of the new imperial- 
ism" of Rome,-^ and has been compared to Alexander and 
Napoleon, because he followed Mithradates into Armenia. 
This characterization gains some plausibility from the charge 
bandied about among his many enemies at Rome that he 
prolonged his command needlessly by not forcing the issue 
with Mithradates on a field nearer home. The charge may 
be false, or it may be based upon an accurate knowledge of 



CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 309 

the general's ambition to continue in command. It does 
not, however, in the face of definite proof to the contrary, 
stamp Lucullus as an expansionist. One very significant 
fact stands out as irrefutable proof of his policy : he gave 
the vast and opulent empire of Syria back to Antiochus, 
who not only had lost it to Tigranes, but had even been 
abandoned by his own subjects. Rome had never had an 
easier opportunity to acquire a rich province than when 
Syria fell to her disposal by the defeat of Tigranes, and 
Pompey's subsequent revocation of Lucullus' cession of 
Syria is good evidence that the Roman people were not ready 
to subject themselves to such self-denial. Lucullus, how- 
ever, was only following the ancient doctrine of his party in 
the senate, a doctrine which aimed at keeping the empire 
within bounds. His pursuit of Mithradates and Tigranes 
so far afield was nothing but the performance of a plain 
duty that any conscientious magistrate must have assumed. 
If Rome were willing to leave Mithradates unpimished after 
the Asiatic "vespers" of 88 and the attempt to grasp Bi- 
thynia in 74, she could never again hope to meet with respect. 
If Tigranes were allowed to rob Roman amici with impunity, 
as he had robbed Antiochus, the senate's policy was mani- 
festly a failure. It must be evident that Lucullus had no 
choice but to visit appropriate penalties upon the offenders 
who had so persistently crossed the Roman frontier. His 
work of reorganization in Pontus ^ in 70 indicates that he 
intended to add Mithradates' own kingdom to the newly 
inherited Bithynia and thus create one province of the two, 
but this clearly was a political necessity, since the king could 
no longer be tolerated as a neighbor. 

The period between 90 and 70, during most of which men 
of aristocratic training were in control at Rome, provides 
the last opportimity of gauging the work of the senate in 
imperial matters. The period began with a thoroughgoing 
revolt of the Italian allies induced chiefly by the senate's 
failure to follow the liberal course its predecessors had mapped 
out. The worst results of the senate's timid and hesitating 
foreign poHcy emerged when Mithradates, encouraged by 



3IO ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the past vacillation of the sovereign state, crossed the Ro- 
man frontier and devastated Asia, and when Sulla left his 
Eastern task less than half done because this latter-day weak- 
ness of the senate no longer concerned itself with making 
Rome respected abroad. However, the good old traditions 
of the third century senatorial poUcy emerged in Lucullus, 
who fought once more to establish law and order, irrespective 
of territorial acquisition, and who organized the subject 
peoples with reference to the empire's stability and general 
prosperity, rather than to the state's immediate material 
advantages. Unfortunately, the senate had been compelled 
to grant both Sulla and Lucullus a long and extraordinary 
imperium, a fact that soon served the opposition — who 
were willing enough to draw the logical inference — as prec- 
edents upon which a military regime was finally established. 

NOTES TO CHAPTER XV 

1. During the Punic war, when it was oflfered, Prseneste had refused 
incorporation in the Roman state. The last grant of full citizenship 
of which we have a record was made to Formias, Fundi, and Arpinum 
in 1 88 ; Livy, XXXVIII, 36. 

2. Livy, XXXIX, 55. 

3. The senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus, C. I. L. I, 196 : 1. 7, 
nequis ceivis Romanus, neve nominus Latini neve socium quisquam. 
The existing copy was found in Calabria. 

4. Aul. GeU. X, 3. 

5. Sail. Jug. 69, condemnatus verberatusque capite poenas solvit, 
nam is civis ex Latio erat. 

6. Livy, XXIII, 22. 

7. Appian, Bell. Civ. I, 21 and 34; Val. Max. IX, 5 ; the revolt of 
FregeUae; Livy, Epit. 60. 

8. Veil. II, 6 ; App. Bell. Civ. I, 23 ; Plut. C. Gracch. 5 ; the authori- 
ties vary between Italians and Latins. The speech of Fannius against 
the proposal was entitled "de sociis et nomine Latino," Cic. Brut. 99. 
It is not unlikely that Gracchus proposed progressive incorporation. 

9. The first restrictions upon immigration were made at the request 
of the allies themselves, who wished to prevent their own citizens from 
emigrating to Rome : Livy, XXXIX, 3 ; XLI, 8. The later exclusion 
acts were passed partly to prevent undue lobbying on enfranchisement 
bills, partly to keep down the nimiber of recipients of pubhc com. 

10. The sources are gathered in Greenidge and Clay, pp. 99-106. 



CONSEQUENCES OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 311 

11. Diodorus, XXXVII, 2, says that the senate chose the consuls, 
while Strabo, V, 241, implies that the people voted for them. Since 
Diodorus generally follows Posidonius in this section (Schwartz, s.v. 
Diodorus, 690, in Pauly-Wissowa), he is to be accepted in preference to 
Strabo. Kiene, Der rotn. Bundesgenossenkrieg, 1845, long ago pointed 
out that the Italic constitution seemed to be based upon the represen- 
tative system, but Mommsen (Rom. Hist. Ill, 506, Eng. tr.) set the 
fashion of preferring Strabo. When we consider that Carvilius had in 
216 proposed to make the Roman senate representative, and that 
.^milius PauUus adopted this system for Macedonia, we can hardly 
hesitate any longer to accept the logical inferences that follow from 
Diodorus' account. 

12. For this period the full collection of references in Drumann- 
Groebe under Sulla and Lucullus is very useful ; also, Greenidge and 
Clay, Sources for Rom. Hist. 133-70 B.C. See also Reinach, Mithridate 
Eupator; Chapot, La province rom. d'Asie; Bevan, The House of 
Seleucus; Stahelin, Gesch. der Galater^; Niese, Rhein. Mus. 1883, 
p. 577 ; Eckhardt, Die Armenischen Feldzuge des Lucullus, Klio, 1910. 
For a keen analysis of the political movements of this period, see Heit- 
land. The Roman Republic. 

13. Chapot, op. cit. p. 37. 

14. C. I. L. I, 587, and B. C. H. 1885, p. 462. 

15. Brutus is found receiving 48 per cent in Cyprus later, although 
the legal rate was 12 per cent. Since the debt of 20,000 talents incurred 
by the exaction of Sulla quadrupled in about fifteen years, one might 
estimate that the money lenders were charging about 24 per cent com- 
pound interest. However, Cicero intimates that the province fell into 
arrears with the tribute also, and the debt may have increased from 
this source, Cic. ad Quint, I, i, 33. Hatzfeld, Bull. Corr. Hell. 1912, 
p. 132, has recently pointed out that the money lenders of the East in 
the early part of the century did not belong to the class of Roman 
knights to the extent that has hitherto been supposed. They were 
largely Greeks, even South-Italian and Sicilian Greeks. 

16. Cic. ad Quint. 1, i, 33, quod aequaliter Sulla discripserat. This 
may possibly refer to the war indemnity, but Cicero says "vectigal." 

17. In the year 70 Asia was again subject to the locatio censoria of 
the Gracchan law, Cic. Verr. Ill, 12. Pompey apparently restored the 
Gracchan system when he reinstituted the censorship in 70. This would 
explain why the censorship was so keenly desired by the democratic- 
plutocratic bloc which elected Pompey; Cic. in Caec. 8. 

18. Cic. de Off. I, 25. 

19. This seems to be the meaning of App. Mith. 83, and Pint. L«c. 
20. See also Cic. Acad. pr. II, 3. 

20. Memnon, a native of Heraclea, gives the number as 80,000 
(F. H. G. 57). Lucullus apparently counted noncombatants. 



312 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

21. Justinius, XL, 2, 2. 

22. At first Lucullus had an extensive command : the charge over 
both Asia and Cilicia, as well as the war over the Bithynian bequest. 
Apparently his powers were curtailed gradually. In 68, the consul 
Marcius Rex was assigned to Cilicia, and in 67, by the Gabinian law, 
Bithynia was given to the consul Glabrio, who, however, did not reach 
the army before Pompey was given supreme command over the whole 
East by the Manilian law of 66. See Drumann-Groebe, IV, p. 173. 

23. Ferrero, Eng. tr. I, 200. He also supposes that Lucullus in- 
tended to invade Parthia, but this is disproved by Eckhardt in his 
account of the Armenian campaign; Klio, 1910. 

24. Memnon, fr. 45, in Frag. Hist. Graec. and Appian, Miih. 82. 



CHAPTER XVI 

' pompey's army in the service of capitalists 

The senatorial regime which Sulla left in fuU control at 
Rome upon his resignation of the dictatorship in 79 was 
overthrown in 70 by Pompey, Sulla's most highly trusted 
lieutenant. Pompey, like Sulla, was one of those military 
commanders whom the senate, despite all constitutional 
objections, had to employ in order to hold together the over- 
grown empire. Under Sulla he had proved himself an able 
officer, so that the senate was eager to use his services in 77 
against a threatening democratic revolution. Then since 
the Marian refugees under Sertorius seemed to be on the 
point of conquering Spain, despite the efforts of the Roman 
consul, Pompey was again called upon to save the state. 
He refused to go unless he were given full proconsular power, 
although he had held none of the subordinate offices which 
legally preceded the consulship. To grant his wish was to 
confess senatorial government bankrupt. But Rome sorely 
needed Pompey, and he was sent on his own terms. By 
71 he had cleared Spain, and, returning home with his strong, 
victorious army, he announced his candidacy for the consul- 
ship. The senate was in a quandary, for its own creature 
and servant was demanding legal exemptions that would 
have surprised even a Gracchus or a Marius ; but it dared 
not suggest forceful opposition, since the candidate had his 
army with him, eloquently encamped outside the gates. 

Pompey, however, disliked bloodshed, and when he dis- 
covered that his party would exert all possible influence 
against him, he made overtures to the democrats. He 
found that Crassus, an old-time rival who was influential 
with the knights, the middle-class nobility of wealth, was 
eager to unite with him in a common canvass. Together 

313 



314 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

they issued a program which promised to gain a heavy vote : 
the populace was offered a restitution of the tribunate, and 
the knights, a restoration of their former position on the jury 
panels. The democratic-plutocratic bloc carried the day, 
the two new consuls kept their election pledges, and popular 
sovereignty again held sway in Rome. 

At the end of his consulship, Pompey retired to private 
life, since no proconsulship worthy of his efforts seemed 
available : the only war within the empire was apparently 
nearing an end under Lucullus. Two years later, however, 
pirates were again afflicting the shipping of the East, and 
Gabinius, a tribune, introduced a bill to grant Pompey an 
extraordinary command ^ over all the seas and seacoasts 
of the empire. This the senate attempted to oppose on 
constitutional grounds. A friendly tribune was foimd to 
interpose his veto, but Gabinius answered by applying the 
Gracchan discovery of "the recall" against the undemo- 
cratic tribune, and the senate once more had to confess de- 
feat. Pompey, with a decent show of reluctance, responded 
again to the stimmons of the state, and every schoolboy knows 
how brilliantly he performed the difficult task described by 
Cicero in his "Manilian law." Pompey not only drove the 
pirates from the seas, but, to insure the permanency of his 
work, he colonized them in Cilicia and in Greece, and even 
placed some of them on state lands in southern Italy. It 
is a pleasant commentary on this wise colonization that 
Vergil, a generation later, found the inspiration for one of 
his most memorable descriptions of nature in the garden 
plot of one of these ex-pirate farmers.^ Pompey's imperial- 
istic tendencies revealed themselves in a very significant 
manner on this occasion. He bluntly took possession of 
eastern Cilicia for several of the colonies that he foimded, 
although that region had belonged to Syria, since i88 and 
had recently been given back to Antiochus, with the rest 
of Syria, by Lucullus.^ To the Romans this act proved 
unmistakably that Pompey had no sympathy with Lucullus' 
moderate arrangements and that, if he had been sent East 
in the place of that general, Ro;iie would have gained an 



POMPEY AND THE CAPITALISTS 315 

extensive province. There can be little doubt that the 
knights quickly grasped the significance of his act. 

While Pompey was still engaged in the maritime war, news 
reached Rome that LucuUus had again lost ground to his 
enemy, and immediately the people and the traders in- 
terested in Asiatic investments began demanding that Pom- 
pey be placed in command of all the provinces of the East 
with whatever forces he might need to end the war. The 
senate once more opposed his appointment on constitutional 
grounds. It desired its own consuls and proconsuls to hold 
all commands regularly and in due order. If the work were 
serious and lasted more than a year, it desired to reserve to 
itself the privilege of extending commands. Various motives 
inspired the faction supporting Pompey. No doubt many 
of the populace — always impatient of slow and far-distant 
campaigns — looked with favor upon a general who had 
proved his efficiency and who had, moreover, shown his good 
wiU toward their party by restoring the tribunate. The 
investing public which held shares in Asiatic taxing corpora- 
tions and Eastern investment companies naturally wished to 
see the war speedily ended, so that dividends on their stocks 
might be renewed. Their losses for twenty years had been 
very heavy. In 88 Mithradates had killed the agents of 
the companies and had swept away all portable property, 
and then for three years he had been in active possession 
of the province. When Sulla reached Asia, he had abolished 
the most profitable features of the taxing system. To be 
sure, the companies then attempted to profit by lending 
money at usurious rates to the debt-burdened cities, but 
presently Lucullus cut off, at one stroke of the pen, the 
greater part of the accumulated interest. There can be no 
question that for a score of years, Asiatic stocks must have 
yielded very poor retiuns on the capital invested in them. 
Investors desired a governor more likely to establish per- 
manent peace and to respect vested interests than Lucullus 
had been. 

This support of Pompey was, of course, entirely legiti- 
mate, but the evidence seems to indicate that the capitalistic 



3i6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

clique was working for a much greater prize than its spokes- 
man, Cicero, has mentioned, — a prize which he, in his 
lofty idealism, did not pause to consider. These people 
were expecting nothing less than that Pompey would annex 
several new provinces in the East and would in his settle- 
ment extend the lucrative contract system over all of them. 
This is, of coiu-se, what he ultimately did, and historians 
have freely inferred that the knights may have had reason 
to expect such a course from Pompey when they supported 
his appointment. We may do more than infer this, how- 
ever : we may accept it as a certainty that Pompey had made 
his policy absolutely clear in at least two acts of his which 
preceded the Manilian law.* In the first place, it was 
Pompey ^ who, during his consulship in 70, restored the 
Gracchan tax system to Asia after Sulla ha4_ replaced it by 
the more merciful Attalid system. And the knights had 
every reason to think that since Pompey had given them 
Asia to exploit, he would also turn over to them whatever 
new provinces he might acquire. In the second place, 
Pompey had shown by his seizure of Syrian Cilicia ^ in 67, 
that he did not believe in the anti-expansionistic policy 
of Lucullus and the senate, but was ready to assert the 
principle that Roman conquest implied Roman ownership. 
And if this principle were logically applied, Rome might 
annex at least S5ma, Cappadocia, Galatia, Pontus, and 
Paphlagonia. Such was the backgroimd of the knights' 
program in giving Pompey a free hand in the East. 

We need not, of course, go so far as to infer that Pompey 
made a bargain with the knights, openly paying for his 
command by a betrayal of the empire's best interests. Pom- 
pey was himself a knight, and had imbibed their doctrines 
from youth. He never had a political policy of his own ; in 
fact, he never in the least understood the art of politics. He 
simply adopted the doctrines of his associates, carrying them 
through by means of his military prestige — and so came to 
look upon himself as a statesman and leader. Later on, 
when circumstances threw him into close association with 
the senate, he gradually, and unwittingly, absorbed sena- 



POMPEY AND THE CAPITALISTS 317 

torial doctrines till he became the same kind of passive leader 
and figurehead in the aristocratic party. If ever he swerved 
in the least from the direct course of his borrowed convictions, 
it was perhaps when tempted by the lure of a military com- 
mand, for he felt at home only at the head of his legions, and 
sincerely believed that he could serve his country better than 
any other man as commander of its armies. But it must 
be admitted that he always made some effort to follow the 
stolid sense of honor he possessed to the extent of disregard- 
ing even this bribe. 

However, whether or not there was a bargain between 
Pompey and his supporters, the knights were at any rate 
relying upon a certainty in securing the great general, and 
he obtained the kind of command that had always been 
the ambition of his life, — a command made all the more ex- 
tensive in its powers because his supporters knew that his 
settlements would secure more empire for Rome and, there- 
fore, more profitable arrangements for them than any sena- 
torial commission would ever propose. He seems, in fact, 
to have obtained unlimited power ^ to make war or peace 
as he liked and to proclaim nations friends or enemies ac- 
cording to his own judgment. No Roman had ever been 
granted such authority before. It is not surprising that 
many Romans expressed the fear that Pompey would rettun 
from the East in the same way that Sulla had, and that 
the republic was nearing its end. 

Pompey's first act in the East was to annul the arrange- 
ments of Lucullus. He served notice that he would recog- 
nize none of the agreements of his predecessor. Pompey 
knew well enough that the gift of S3aia to Antiochus, and 
the senatorial taxing system which Lucullus and the senate's 
commission had planted in Bithynia and Pontus did not 
meet with the approval of the present home government. 

His military task proved to be easy, for his reputation was 
such that neither Mithradates nor Tigranes dared oppose 
him. The former, after warily retreating for a time, finally 
fled precipitously to the Crimea, where he later died. The 
latter surrendered voluntarily and begged for merciful 



3i8 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

treatment. Thus Pompey reaped the fruits of a brilliant 
military career. Tigranes was allowed to retain Armenia, 
becoming a "friend" of Rome, but was asked to surrender 
Syria to her — as though Lucullus had not already received 
it from Tigranes and given it to Antiochus. Despite criti- 
cism, Pompey tiuned his back on his real enemy, Mithra- 
dates, in order to take full possession of Syria, fearing ap- 
parently that if he disposed of Mithradates first, the senate 
would urge his recaU before he could go farther afield. To 
Pompey the most important business was the gathering in of 
provinces. 

In claiming Syria, Pompey desired full measure : nothing 
less than the well-rounded kingdom of the earlier Seleucids 
which extended from the Taurus Mountains to the Red Sea. 
To be sure, the later Seleucids had long ago lost the southern 
portion of the kingdom: the Nabatasi had seldom been 
thoroughly subdued, and the temple-state of Judea had main- 
tained its independence for over half a century. Such 
trifles, however, mattered little to Pompey. Tigranes was 
willing to claim that he possessed the whole of Syria, even 
though he had never seen the southern portion, and he 
therefore ceded to Pompey the whole of it : Syria,^ Phoenicia, 
and even, humorously enough, Cilicia, of which Pompey had 
taken possession two years before. With this deed of ces- 
sion Pompey marched southward to prove Rome's title. 
Cilicia and Syria proper caused no difficulties. The temple- 
state at Jerusalem probably disliked being given away in 
this high-handed manner, but Pompey shrewdly explained 
that Rome's title had already been established and that his 
only purpose was to settle the civil war between their high 
priests. Forttmately for him, the two claimants to the high 
priesthood were more concerned in attaining office than in 
asserting their nation's liberty. He accordingly aided the 
elder, who seemed to have the better claim — besides showing 
a marked readiness to serve Rome. The opposing claimant 
and his faction fortified themselves in the great temple at 
Jerusalem, and it took Pompey three months to dislodge 
them. Pompey, to be siure, committed the indiscretion of 



POMPEY AND THE CAPITALISTS 319 

entering the sanctum, but he proved his contention that he 
had not undertaken a war of conquest by leaving the rich 
temple treasure undisturbed.® South of Judea he also met 
with some opposition; nevertheless he quickly established 
his power as far as the desert. Thus, by the annexation of 
the whole of the Seleucid Syria, Rome obtained a new prov- 
ince. However, Pompey proved at this time that even his 
imperiaHsm recognized certain limits, for he refused a re- 
quest of Ptolemy's to enter Egypt and aid in repressing 
a rebellion there, — a request which might readily have 
led to the annexation ^^ of that very wealthy kingdom 
also. 

In reorganizing the province of Syria, Pompey seems to 
have adopted many practices of the Seleucids. The king- 
dom ^^ consisted of many different peoples living under vary- 
ing conditions. There were numerous autonomous cities 
with wide domains of their own — for the older Seleucids 
had been vigorous city builders. Pompey favored such 
cities as much as possible. He severed a great number of 
them from the princes and petty tyrants to whom they had 
fallen subject, and made them directly dependent upon 
Rome, thus at least saving them the payment of an extra 
domestic tribute. In this way, for instance, the coast cities 
of Palestine which the Maccabees had subjected were ele- 
vated to their former status, and a nimiber of old foundations 
on the Jordan River dated a new era of autonomy from 
Pompey's day. He also built a number of new cities, em- 
plojang perhaps the royal domains for this purpose, even 
as the Seleucids had done in days past. We can hardly 
suppose, however, that he exempted these cities from tribute. 
In the old days of philhellenism, the Romans had been very 
ready to grant that, whatever happened to others, Greek 
cities shotild be free and, as a matter of course, exempt from 
tax. But more and more the distinctions between Greek 
and ethne were breaking down. Pompey left the cities 
autonomous as before. In fact, Rome much preferred that 
they look after their own internal economy, but she was 
growing increasingly chary of losing any portion of her 



320 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

tribute. By Pompey's time, most of the cities of the Asiatic 
province were paying tithes, and it is possible that few cities 
of Syria escaped this burden. In the interior, petty princes 
ruled most of the tribes, but there were also some temple- 
states or theocracies like Judea. Rome brought both these 
types of states under her sovereignty with as little disturb- 
ance of old customs as possible, for their princes and priests 
served the same purposes as the municipal machinery of 
the cities in keeping order and carrying out her desires. 
The stipend due Rome from these states probably averaged 
about a tithe, though there was no uniform rule. In Judea, 
for instance, she recognized the institution of the Sabbatical 
year, and seems to have remitted the tribute for that year. 
The regular stipend at Judea was, in any case, very low at 
first, being apparently about one-third of the seed.^^ Since 
the seed is usually estimated at about one-tenth of the har- 
vest, the tribute must have been only about one-third of the 
usual tithe. Unfortunately, the native high priest — and 
later the ethnarch, who inherited the political position of the 
high priest — exacted for himself a full tithe of the harvest, 
according to the Levitical law, so that the combined burden 
became extremely hard to bear. 

It may be interesting to note that the hatred of the "pub- 
licans," ^^ so noticeable in the Gospel narratives, is not all 
to be charged to Roman oppression. The contract system 
of collecting direct revenues did not exist in Judea during 
the New Testament period, for Caesar had abolished it there 
the last year of his life. But the Roman dues proved burden- 
some, because, in addition to them, the ethnarchs, who had 
fallen heir to the powers of the high priests, continued to 
levy a full tithe for themselves. Moreover, since the Jewish 
state claimed to be a theocracy, the priests interpreted 
obedience to Rome as a mark of religious disobedience; 
religious zeal and patriotism were accordingly so interrelated 
that hatred of Rome's agents became a duty. Now, since 
the contract system had been abolished, the "publicans" 
involved could not have been Romans. They were, in fact, 
natives like Zacchsus and Matthew, employed by the local 



POMPEY AND THE CAPITALISTS 321 

authorities to gather in the stipend which the individual 
communities paid Rome. But the people hated them all the 
more because they were natives, regarding them as renegades 
who served the interests of the heathen. And it is there- 
fore not altogether surprising that in ordinary parlance 
"publicans" were classed with "sinners." 

Pompey at once appointed Scaurus as governor over the 
whole province of Syria (in 63) and left him two legions 
with which to preserve peace. In Asia Minor he completed 
the arrangements he had begun. Bithynia ^^ was at once 
made a province, which had, in fact, been the original inten- 
tion ten years before when the Roman people inherited it. 
To this was now added Pontus and the whole southern coast 
of the Black Sea, the former kingdom of Mithradates. The 
three Galatian ^^ tetrarchs who had survived the sword of 
Mithradates were confirmed in their possessions, but became 
princes tributary to Rome. After a few years, however, we 
find Deiotarus in possession of the whole territory. Cap- 
padocia was also given back to its king as a tributary pos- 
session, and since Tigranes had herded off some 300,000 of 
its inhabitants ^^ to Armenia a few years before, Pompey 
founded eight cities within the kingdom to start it on the 
road to a dignified existence. He even seems to have lent^^ 
the much-harassed king some money with which to set up 
a respectable court, so that presently the Cappadocian 
throne became a synonym for bankrupt display. Tigranes 
received better terms, for he remained a non-stipendiary 
amicus; his state now served the same purpose as the others 
had before : protecting Roman possessions against the un- 
known tribes beyond. Between the province and this ally 
existed about a dozen minor princes and high priests of 
temple-states, all of whom were confirmed in their offices 
upon the payment of an indemnity and submission to tribute. 
The new annual tribute ^^ that Pompey acquired for the state 
from all these provinces and princes amounted to 35,000,000 
drachmas, whereas the whole annual revenue of the state 
before his arrival in the East had been only 50,000,000 drach- 
mas all told. We may fairly estimate that the acquisitions 



322 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

of Pompey about quintupled the amount of revenue that the 
province of Asia had hitherto yielded. 

Although, as we have seen, most of the tribes in the Ana- 
tolian principalities continued to serve the same kings and 
princes as before, Pompey's coming instituted important 
internal changes. Formerly, these kings and princes were 
"friends" of Rome, but paid no tribute. Their kingdoms 
served chiefly as buffer-states. Rome might ask them for a 
contingent when hard pressed, and, in return, she was sup- 
posed to give them aid upon request. Now, however, they 
became practically vassals after the Persian type and had to 
pay tribute. The inhabitants therefore not only had to 
contribute to Rome like the provincials of Asia and Syria, 
but they had, in addition, to support their own — frequently 
very expensive — courts. It may be thought that the double 
burden was tinreasonable and that Rome should have abol- 
ished these courts at once, making provinces of the princi- 
palities. But the fact is that these Eastern peoples needed 
their princes even as the natives of India need the client 
princes who serve England to-day. Pompey simply foimd 
the system established and, like Alexander and his successors, 
adopted it as a necessary element in the government of the 
Orientals. It was an expensive luxury, but the natives were 
not yet ready for local self-government, and it would ob- 
viously have been imprudent for the sovereign to force its 
own officials into every required position. These princes, 
then, served as Rome's local governors for the present, but 
they naturally would not need to be kept in that service 
after the people could organize local city governments capa- 
ble of taking care of their domestic concerns. And, as a 
matter of fact, during the empire one after another of these 
states was absorbed into provinces and thenceforth dealt 
directly with Rome. 

The most striking and the most beneficial work accom- 
plished by Pompey was his organization of village groups 
into self-governing cities, and his building of new cities at 
important points. Among the records of his achievements, 
carried somewhat too ostentatiously in his triumph,^^ was 



POMPEY AND THE CAPITALISTS 323 

a list of 39 cities fotmded by him. This work, continuing 
the policy of Alexander and his marshals, became a fruitful 
example for Augustus and the later emperors. By inviting 
Greeks to settle at fertile points in the interior and thus 
form a nucleus of civilization for the native Anatolians, 
Pompey gained many desirable objects: the institution of 
better methods of cultivating the soil, the inculcation of 
civic lessons where most needed, the preservation of peace 
and order, the spreading of Hellenic culture into the hinter- 
land, and, what was of greatest moment to the home govern- 
ment, the creation of a machinery for collecting tribute in 
the least offensive way by the city's own officials. Perhaps 
it was this last advantage — the good points of which he had 
doubtless observed in the Asiatic cities already in existence 
— which Pompey particularly strove to attain. 

The references showing how greatly the equites benefited 
by Pompey's arrangements for revenue collecting are in- 
cidental, and, to some extent, inadequate, but they suffice 
to establish the main point. The historical works still 
extant unfortunately do not deal with the more prosaic parts 
of Pompey's work, and, since Caesar revised the provincial 
taxing system within twelve years of Pompey's return, a 
comparatively short period exists from which to expect 
inscriptional references. However, regarding Syria there 
can be but little doubt. Cicero in a speech 2° delivered in 
56 says that the Roman publicans gathering taxes in Syria 
had sustained heavy losses, not because of reckless over- 
bidding {non temeritate redemptionis) , but because of the 
adverse rulings of the Syrian proconsul Gabinius. The gov- 
ernor had in fact annulled several of their contracts {pac- 
tiones) with cities of Syria and exempted from tribute other 
cities upon whose revenues the publicans had reckoned in 
submitting their bids. This gives us all the evidence we 
need. It proves that Pompey combined the Gracchan with 
the Sullan revenue system. In other words, he organized 
the taxing districts of the new provinces as Stdla had done in 
Asia, and he laid upon their native organizations the burden 
of bringing in the tax. But he left the stipend to be paid a 



324 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

proportionate ratio rather than a fixed amount, so that the 
state required contractors who would bargain with the taxing 
districts for the amoimt to be collected. The system pro- 
tected the provincials from some of the worst abuses that 
had grown up under the Gracchan law, but there is Httle 
reason why any loopholes for publican oppression should 
have been left, since a half century of experience had revealed 
all the possible evils of the method. It must be apparent 
that the equites exerted undue influence in the shaping of the 
new system. 

That Pompey extended the system as far as possible, there 
can be little doubt. It was in vogue until Cassar's day in 
the temple-state at Jerusalem,^^ where it might readily have 
been avoided by the simple method of estimating revenue on 
the basis of the temple-tithe. The same method, which 
bears the hybrid character of Pompey's works, is in vogue 
in the province of Cilicia a few years later. Here also the 
Roman puhlicani are found bargaining with bankrupt cities 
for their tribute.^^ Pompey had no excuse for interfering in 
the financial organization of this province, since it had been 
established forty years before his coming. There happens 
to be no information regarding the tithes of Bithynia,^^ but 
the great expansionist undoubtedly favored the capitalists 
there as elsewhere. 

Pompey, then, stands out as the first prominent figure in 
Roman imperialism. He may well have insisted that he 
never violated the fetial rules, which forbade aggressive wars. 
In point of fact, he generally confined his activities to terri- 
tory already acquired in a defensive war. When rounding 
out the Syrian boundaries, he based his claims upon the 
cession of Tigranes, and, whenever he felt himself on dubious 
ground elsewhere, he asstmied the r61e of arbiter and reor- 
ganizer, rather than that of conqueror. However, his pur- 
pose in the East was confessedly to end the confining policy 
of the senate and to extend the boundaries of the empire as 
far as a liberal interpretation of civilized international prac- 
tice would permit. Up to his day expansion that was in 
any sense intentional had been merely sporadic and unsup- 



POMPEY AND THE CAPITALISTS 325 

ported by any definite policy. The democratic leaders of 
282 and 264 followed a natural tendency in accepting avail- 
able invitations to extend Rome's boundaries, but in neither 
instance had they been actual aggressors, and the impulse 
toward growth soon died out when the cost in bloodshed and 
suffering was coimted. The Scipionic regime aggressively 
entered a wider sphere of political activity, but it consist- 
ently shunned territorial acquisition. The succeeding anti- 
Scipionic government proved not unwilling to extract mate- 
rial profit from the political influence acquired abroad by its 
predecessors, but it, too, had checked the native impulse for 
new possessions. Occasionally, also, an ambitious proconsul 
had invited border quarrels in order to earn himself a triumph. 
But Pompey seems to be the first general frankly sent out 
for the purpose of extending Rome's boundaries. Pompey 
himself may have adopted his policy without comprehending 
its real significance ; perhaps he simply followed an instinct 
that grew naturally out of a long, one-sided military training, — 
an instinct bred of the habit of acquiring possessions by force 
of arms and strengthened by an impulse to justify the use of 
force by a show of positive returns. But, after all, Pompey 
was merely the figurehead of this expansionistic movement. 
The real impetus came from the desire of the capitalists at 
Rome who employed the vote of the impulsive and megalo- 
maniac populace to gain immediate profits for themselves 
and to widen the field of their lucrative activities. In order 
to secure their prize, they were willing to ride roughshod over 
the constitution and to risk the imposition of a military 
monarchy on Rome ; and it was only due to Pompey 's self- 
restraint that the logical conclusion of his extraordinary 
command awaited the good will of his younger rival, Caesar. 

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI 

I. The Gabinian law gave him proconsular power for three years 
over the whole Mediterranean and fifty miles inland over all shores ; 
and it also empowered him to caU upon allies for aid. It granted ships, 
to the number of 500, and troops and money as needed. For sources, 
consult the convenient collection in Dnimann-Groebe, IV, p. 415. 



326 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

2. See Vergil, Georg. IV, 127, and Servius' commentary on the line. 
It has been suggested that Vergil saw the colony on the tour which 
Horace describes in Sermones, I, 5. 

3. Plut. Pomp. 28. This portion had never belonged to Rome. 
The Seleucids had governed it, and of late Tigranes had held sway there 
(Appian, Syr. 48, Mith. 118). Rome did not obtain formal possession 
until Pompey took the title of it from Tigranes two years later ; see 
Livy, Epit. loi. 

4. For a fuller statement of the case, see Classical Philology, IX, 
No. 2. 

5. The evidence for this seems to be clear: Sulla abolished the 
Gracchan system in Asia in 84 (Cic. ad Quint. I, i, 33) ; it was restored 
before 69 (Cic. Verr. Ill, 12), but not before 75, for the consuls were 
then letting the usual censorial contracts {Verr. Ill, 18). Since the 
equites did not secure any favors from the senatorial government after 
75 until the consulship of Pompey in 70, we are forced to the conclusion 
that Pompey's restoration of the censorship in 70 (Cic. in Caec. 8) 
brought with it the censoria locatio and the restoration of the tax- 
contract system. 

6. See note 3. 

7. Appian, Mith. 97. This statement has been questioned because 
Pompey insisted upon having his acts confirmed by the senate when he 
returned ; but it is probable that Pompey desired this confirmation — 
even though the Manilian law did not require it — because, accord- 
ing to time-honored practice, the senate considered itself as the final 
authority in foreign affairs. See also Plut. Pompey, 30 ; Cassius Dio, 
XXXVI, 42 ; Livy, Epit. 100. No authority quotes the Manilian law 
in extenso. 

8. Livy, Epit. loi : eique ademptis Syria, Phoenice, Cilicia. 

9. Marquardt seems to be right in assuming that Judea fell tmder 
the Syrian governor's control at once ; Staatsverw. I ; 405. Schiirer 
follows the more usual view that it was not incorporated with Syria 
till some eight years later, i.e. in 55. Unger holds that even Gabinius 
failed to incorporate it (Sitzb. bayr. Akad. 1897). The evidence is not 
conclusive, nor is the date important, since Judea certainly became 
tributary to Rome when Syria did. The Syrian governor supervised 
it, and Roman publicans dealt with its tribute as early as 56. 

ID. Of the same nature is Pompey's somewhat slipshod way of 
avoiding a definite understanding with the aggressive and independent 
Parthian king for fear of being involved in a troublesome contest. This 
neglect of his duty caused Rome no little trouble presently. Just ten 
years after Pompey's settlement of Syria the Roman legions under 
Crassus sustained one of the worst defeats in Roman history at the hands 
of these people. 

II. Rostowzew, Gesch. d. rom. Kolonates, section III, contains an 



POMPEY AND THE CAPITALISTS 327 

admirable analysis of the social and political conditions of Asia Minor 
and Syria. See also id. Staatspacht, p. 356. 

12. This is a moot point. In 47, after Cassar had been saved from 
perilous straits in Alexandria by a contingent from Palestine, he decreed 
that in the future the Jews should pay a fourth of the seed (instead of the 
usual third ?) in the second year of the lustrum. He seems to confirm 
this in 44 when he says that in the second year they shall have an exemp- 
tion amounting to one corus (about ten bushels, but we do not know what 
proportion of the whole this forms), and that no one shall contract for 
the tribute in the future (Josephus, Antiq. XIV, 10, 5, 6). Now it is 
usual to interpret this passage in the light of Antiq. XIII, 2, 3, which 
implies that the Jewish tribute to the Seleucids was one-third the harvest. 
This seems to me impossible. Caesar, who was so grateful to the Jews 
of Alexandria as to secure them Roman citizenship outright and to 
confer great favors upon their people in Palestine, could hardly have 
left them under a heavier burden than all other peoples. Nor had 
Pompey any reason to be severe with them, else he would have taken 
some part of their rich temple treasure. 

13. Cf. Rostowzew, Staatspacht, p. 475. 

14. An incidental reference in Pliny's letters {ad Trajan. 79), shows 
that Pompey gave new municipal charters to the cities of Bithynia. 
Curiously enough, he seems to have copied the form of the Italian 
municipal charters, which was too conservative to suit the political 
ideas of the eastern Greeks. Pompey did not always remember which 
party he belonged to, and he seldom showed a capacity to think for 
himself. 

15. Stahelin, Gesch. der] Galater^, and Brandis, in Pauly-Wissowa, 
s.v. Galati. These Hellenized Celts were soon among the most pros- 
perous people of Asia. 

16. In the year "jj, App. Mith. 67. Strabo, who was a Cappadocian, 
vouches for the fact that Tigranes depopulated twelve cities ; Strabo, 

XI, 532. 

17. In the year 51, when civil war was imminent and Pompey was 
collecting all his resources, we find him dunning the impecunious Ario- 
barzanes (Cic. ad Att. VI, 1,3). The debt probably dates from a loan 
made in 63. This mingling of business and war may appear indelicate, 
but Pompey was not a man who would extort moneys for his own use, 
which seems to be the implication of Drumann's words : mit Schuld- 
scheinen beladen kehrte er nach Italien zuriick (Drumann-Groebe, IV, 

479)- 

18. Plut. Pomp. 45. That is, the state's income before 63 was about 
ten million dollars. The sum coming from the Asiatic province had 
been about i| millions. Pompey 's three new provinces and the many 
subject-states brought in a sum of about 7f million dollars. For the 
sake of comparison, we may note that Pompey's new revenue was about 



328 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the same as the annual budget of Egypt. Wheat was at the time worth 
about 60 cents per bushel, but labor was very much cheaper in propor- 
tion. 

19. Plut. Pomp. 45; Zon. X, 5; App. Mith. 117. 

20. Cic. prov. cons. 10. 

21. Josephus, Antiq. XIV, 10, 6; Cic. prov. cons. 10; publicanos — 
tradidit Judaeis et Syris. 

22. Cic. ad Att. V, 13, I, confectae sunt pactiones; V, 16, 2, wj/As 
omnium venditas; that is, the cities had mortgaged their revenues in 
order to procure funds with which to pay the publicans the tributes due. 

23. See Brandis, s.v. Bithynia in Pauly-Wissowa. We hear of pub- 
licans engaged in gathering the pasture dues in Bithynia, but this 
does not show how the grain tithes were collected. 



CHAPTER XVII 

CiESAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 

The imperialism of Pompey bore the stamp of his charac- 
ter. Naturally distrustful of his own understanding of gov- 
ernmental matters, he readily yielded to the opinion of men 
of more positive temper, and yet a stolid respect for law and 
order, bred perhaps of his very diffidence, restrained him from 
following his advisers beyond the pale of justifiable proce- 
dure. Thus it is that Pompey, in the service of the capitalistic 
party, pushed Rome's expansion as far as a very liberal inter- 
pretation of the mos maiorum permitted, but that in the end 
he stopped short of frank aggression. 

With Cassar, however, we come to a man of an entirely 
different character, a man who was a law unto himself and 
who cared for ancient formtdas only in so far as wise policy 
dictated obedience to them. Ceesar was the first candid 
imperialist of Rome, and though his policy found expression 
in deeds rather than in words, there can be little doubt that 
the Gallic war is the clearest instance of deliberate expansion 
in the history of the Roman republic. 

Few books have been studied as intensively as Caesar's 
Bellum Gallicum and yet with as little gratification of the 
reader's curiosity regarding the author's motives of action. 
Caesar gives merely the cold facts : regarding intentions he 
generally prefers to remain silent, and Caesar's silences are 
well-nigh impenetrable. Why did he choose Gaul as his 
field of activity? What was his purpose in asking for an 
extraordinary term of five years ? Did he proceed into 
Gaid with a view to the best interests of the state or to his 
own advancement? Was he convinced that the Gallic 
situation required a war, or did he create pretexts for the 
sake of conquest ? The questions one might raise are end- 
less, and they have been answered in all possible ways, but 

329 



33© ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the terse, matter-of-fact commentaries, although insisting 
at every step that Caesar's actions are based on legal groimds, 
absolutely avoid every question of the author's main purposes. 

Considering the objectivity of the narrative, one is some- 
what surprised at the care with which the author seeks to 
justify each new advance in Gaul, This diligence is not 
always rightly interpreted. It was probably not begotten 
of a scrupulous conscience, ever eager to accord full justice 
to the enemy, for even as prstor Csesar had created a war 
in Spain for personal ends. It probably did not arise from 
a desire to soothe the feelings of anti-imperialists at Rome. 
There was never any strong opposition to Pompey's and 
Crassus' modes of conquest. Nor could Csesar have been 
attempting to pacify any scruples which the Romans might 
entertain regarding the rights ^ of barbarous tribes. Triiunph 
himting at the expense of such peoples had come to be looked 
upon as legitimate game. No, Caesar felt obliged to justify 
his procedure only because in those times of revolution the 
whole state was watching to see whether the man with the 
army would grow overdangerous. Few men at Rome 
thought of asking what advantages the accession of Gaul 
might bring the state, much less whether Roman civilization 
would benefit Gaul. What did interest them was Cesar's 
growing power. They remembered that during his consiil- 
ship he had played the revolutionary, that he had imprisoned 
obstructing tribunes, disregarded the constitutional rights 
of his colleague, and insulted the senate ; and now when he 
was illegally adding legion after legion to the army voted 
him, and advancing from one victory to another, they were 
chiefly concerned to know how Caesar would use his cumulat- 
ing power. Caesar, of course, thoroughly appreciated the 
nervous tension at Rome, and it was only to prevent its 
reaching a breaking point that he took pains to justify his 
course of action. 

Can we penetrate beneath Caesar's tactfiil silence regarding 
his motives into the real purpose of his action ? Estimates 
of Csesar vary incredibly ; not only because his capacity was 
so great and his genius so many-sided that critics are in 



C^SAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 331 

danger of grasping merely half of his program, but for other 
reasons as well. C^sar lived in a time of such lawlessness 
that strong traits which would have begotten constructive 
forces if exercised in a well-ordered state frequently spent 
themselves in prodigal waste. In his earlier days, when he 
was still thinking the thoughts of his own time, he devoted 
his extraordinary powers to the game of demagoguery, a 
game which later, after he had outstripped his contempora- 
ries, he scorned to play. Now the conquest of Gaul falls 
between these two periods, and one is tempted to believe 
that it was conceived in the spirit of his earlier days and 
carried out in that of his best years. Had Cassar been born 
into an era like that of the Punic war, when the struggle for 
the state's very life fostered ideals of patriotism, when the 
welfare of the nation became man's chief interest by very 
inheritance, his wide sympathies, his clear vision, and his 
scientific efficiency would have placed him at once in the 
front ranks of constructive statesmen. He would then have 
been spared the years wasted in currying favor with the 
voters, and we should now know by what standard to judge 
his proconsular schemes. As it is, his efficiency and foresight 
are not questioned, but of his purposes we cannot be sure, 
for he, like his fellows, must have been tempted at this time 
pregnant with monarchy to think and act in terms of self. 
Men of force become individualists of necessity at such times. 
Mommsen,^ in a strong protest against Drumann's ^ 
cynical estimate of Caesar's purpose, affirms "that it is an 
outrage upon the spirit dominant in history to regard Gaul 
solely as the parade ground on which Cassar exercised him- 
self and his legions for the impending civil war." To be 
sure, Drumann's view is not tenable, but, on the other hand, 
Mommsen's Hegelianism fails to take into account the hu- 
man foibles and weaknesses apparent in Csesar's early 
career. / Caesar must have seen that the empire had already 
outgrown the state's capacity to govern well, that inner 
reforms were needed far more than new burdens of govern- 
ment. For undertaking the addition of Gaul to Rome at 
such a time he must be convicted of indifference about con- 



332 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

sequences to his state or of an overweening ambition to live 
out his own career. In cither case, the conquest of Gaul 
must be viewed as incidental to Caesar's ambition. 

The fact is patent to any one who reviews Cci^sar's career 
up to this point. His career is that of a man whoso political 
ideals were molded by the revolutionary spirit of Sullan 
days, days when individual ambitions displaced principles as 
the mainspring of party activities. The best that Sallust,* 
his partisan and apologist, could — or at least did — say 
for him was that he sought office and power and the com- 
mand of anuies that he might thereby gain distinction. One 
might suspect that Sallust lacked the capacity to grasp the 
finer qualities in the gi'cat man's character, were it not for 
the fact that he shows himself able to appreciate the rigid 
disinterestedness of Cato and the sincere patriotism of 
Cicero. In accepting the judgment of this friend of Caesar 
we cannot be charged ^vith imfaimess. Sallust 's estimate 
certainly provides the most consistent explanation of Caesar's 
course of action u[) to the time of his consulship. His 
prodigality with borrowed money during his a^dilcship reveals 
how early he was aiming at the popularity that would bring 
office. His support of the Manilian law in 67, we are plau- 
sibly told by a writer who closely follows Livy,^ was based 
upon a desire to create a precedent which he himself might 
use when the appropriate time should come. His close 
association in 65 with the lawless element suiTOunding 
Autronius and Sulla, his endeavor, in the same year, to have 
himself appointed commissioner to annex Egypt, and his 
long-continued support of Catiline, reveiil him as a reckless 
and unscrupulous demagogue during the earlier part of his 
career. Perhaps the most significant act of this period is 
his attempt to force through the Rullan bill ^ in 63 . That 
bold measure proposed to give a board of ten men (and 
practically, of course, the leader of the ten) the power during 
five years to carry on unlimited colonization. In order to 
accomplish this purpose they were to have the disposal of 
all property throughout the empire which had accrued to 
the state since the year 89. Judicial power was to be 



C^SAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 333 

granted them to decide what constituted public land, as 
well as a sufficient army to enforce their decisions. Cicero 
submitted the bill to a thorough analysis and came to the 
apparently well-founded conclusion that its real purpose 
was to permit Caesar to declare Egypt a Roman domain, to 
muster an army with which to seize it, and to assume and 
dispose of Pompey's recent acquisitions. In a word, Ca:sar 
hoped by this bill to become the arbiter of Pompey's con- 
quests and to place himself at the head of an army in Egypt, 
whereby he would be equal in power to Pompey. Thus the 
bill, which on the surface appeared to be only a popular 
renewal of the Gracchan land commission, in reality har- 
bored one of the most dangerous of revolutionary measures. 
Thanks to the persistent warnings of Cicero, its real meaning 
was revealed, and it had to be withdrawn. 

As propraetor in Spain in 61, Caesar, though he proved 
that he could sympathize with the best interests of the pro- 
vincials, did not fail to create a war by which to gain military 
experience and a claim to military honors. His consulship 
in 59 reveals very little statesmanship. He spent the year 
mainly in paying his political debts to his fellow triumvirs, 
Pompey and Crassus, who had helped him to office, and in 
paving the way for his own future progress. Perhaps his 
legislation during the year was no worse than that of other 
recent consuls, but his methods of procedure were subver- 
sive of all constitutional safeguards. That he insulted the 
senate was to be expected of a consistent democrat : the 
Hortensian and Gracchan constitutions intended to dispense 
•with that body in general legislation in any case. That he 
took no notice of his colleague's augural vetoes showed that 
he had the courage to lop off obsolete obstructional ma- 
chinery. That he disregarded a tribune's opposition only 
revealed his acceptance of the theory originated by Tiberius 
Gracchus and established by Gabinius that the populace 
had the right to "recall" any tribune who undertook to 
veto a measure desired by the sovereign people. But when 
he turned his back upon all constitutional checks and ap- 
pealed for support to the armed force of private citizens ' 



334 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

in order to carry out his program, he clearly showed that he 
considered his own career paramount to law and constitu- 
tion. The time was to come when Cassar would prove him- 
self more than an unequaled politician and a military 
genius ; when, in fact, he would reveal himself as a states- 
man of unparalleled insight, sympathy, and effectiveness. 
But that was only after he had worked his way out of the 
slough of partisan politics into a sphere of sole responsibility. 
He was a man who towered above his work when he could 
face it squarely and alone. But prior to his proconsulship 
he rarely exhibited either the power or the will to labor for 
anything but his own aggrandizement. Up to that time 
Sallust's characterization does him full, and perhaps over- 
ftill, justice : magna imperia, exercitus, helium novum exopta- 
bat ubi virtus enitescere posset. 

Such was the man who in 59 demanded and secured for 
himself an extraordinary command of five years over the 
two Gauls ^ and Ill5nicum. The large field of activity at 
the head of Italy would furnish his legions a training ground 
and enable him to become the predominant force at Rome 
if he chose. How inclusive his conscious ambitions were at 
this moment we do not know, but his course of action from 
his sedileship to his proconsulship, and the fact that in the 
revolutionary epoch in which he lived the desire "to gain 
distinction" must express itself in terms of a strong army 
warrant the assertion that the conquest of Gaul represents 
)/ an incident in the history of Cassar's personal ambition 
rather than an expansionistic movement emanating from 
Rome. 

The situation ^ in Gatd which Cassar well knew would offer 
a desirable pretext for conquest was as follows. Beyond 
the Transalpine province that for 60 years had included a 
strip along the Mediterranean coast and the eastern bank 
of the Rhone as far as Lake Geneva, the Gallic tribes were 
in a turmoil because of the pressure of the Germans then 
crossing the Rhine. These Germans had first come at the 
bidding of the Sequani and Arvemi and had recently, under 
their king, Ariovistus, subdued the .^dui, a large tribe 



\/ 



C^SAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 335 

which had been recognized as an amicus by Rome during the 
wars of the previous century. Other Germans were press- 
ing upon the Helvetians Hving around Lake Geneva and had 
made them so uncomfortable that they had decided to seek 
new homes farther west. Since it was a clan of these very 
Helvetians which had defeated a Roman proconsul diuing 
the Cimbric migration in 107, the report of the new move- 
ment in 60 caused such concern at Rome ^^ that a levy with- 
out exemptions was ordered throughout Italy. Then matters 
quieted down for a while, probably because of the death of 
the Helvetian prince, Orgetorix. However, the Romans 
soon learned that the tribe still entertained their plan of 
migrating, and Csesar, who was now constd, doubtless sent 
scouts to keep him informed regarding the tribe's movements. 
It is a significant fact that during Csesar's consulship Rome 
formally recognized ^^ Ariovistus as a "friend." That Rome 
should have recognized as a friend the prince who was 
oppressing her other "friends," the ^dui, woiild seem to 
indicate that Csesar was promoting compHcations in Gaul 
in order to pave the way for Roman intervention at the 
appropriate moment. 

As surely as Caesar observed these Gallic movements with 
care, so surely did he propose to become the Marius who 
would check the migrating Gauls. He refused to accept 
the province over "highways and pastures" that the senate 
assigned to his proconstdship. He asked the assembly to over- 
ride this assignment of the senate, and give him Gaul for a 
term of five years, — which they promptly did. His deter- 
mination to have a free hand with the Gatds shows itself 
particularly in the very unusual clause of this bill which 
gave him the province even diiring the remainder of his 
consulship. Obviously Caesar intended to prevent the senate 
from sending an interloper for a few months who might 
pacify the tribes and avert the possibility of interference 
before his own term should commence. This provision be- 
trays a very serious conception of the task that Cassar 
thought Gaul might offer, and indicates that he was measur- 
ing all the possibihties involved and reckoning those possi- 



336 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

bilities on a very liberal scale. In view of his extraordinary 
meastires for securing the Gallic province, of his habit of 
laying his plans with the greatest care, and of his purpose, 
held for years, to outstrip Pompey, whose chief glory lay 
in his far-reaching conquests, it is highly probable that 
Caesar had planned the conquest of Gatil before he ever set 
out from Rome. 

It would be imgenerous not to add that his commentaries 
reveal a sane appreciation of the country. The fact that 
Gaul, unlike the Eastern kingdoms, had no rich cities to 
plunder might make it seem contemptible to some, but 
Caesar had better judgment. He perceived from the first 
that the Gaul would make a good soldier,^^ and he had 
reason to know that Italy could no longer raise the legions 
it had in former days. On his way to Spain he had noted 
the richness of the soil of Gaul, as frequent references in the 
commentaries prove. A relative of Marius and a student 
of his career, he knew that Rome's most dangerous enemy 
was sure to come from the north. His references to the 
Cimbri ^^ show what a vivid impression the Marian story 
had made upon him. Caesar, in fact, was one of the first to 
appreciate the barbarian of Europe and rate him above the 
Oriental. The call of the East never possessed the fascina- 
tion for him that it had for so many Romans. He made 
the Cisalpine Gauls his friends and, as soon as he became 
dictator, granted citizenship to the whole province and 
Latin rights to all the inhabitants of Narbonese Gaul. Dur- 
ing his campaigns it mattered little to him whether his 
trusted helpers were citizens or Gauls ; both received equal 
recognition. It is apparent that his final goal was a Roman- 
ized Gaul, a Gaul which should be not merely a source of 
revenue and a field for commercial exploitation, but rather 
an integral part of the citizen-state of Rome. 

Caesar's methods in conquering Gaul seem to betray the 
caution and orderHness of a deep-laid plan. He did not 
risk his chances for a war by commanding the Helvetians 
to remain at home, but waiting until the tribe had com- 
mitted an act of war by trying to force a way into the province, 



CvESAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 337 

he followed his moral advantage to the full. Even before 
receiving any invitation from the ^dui, he ordered all his 
legions to the front and, without senatorial permission, en- 
rolled two new legions and crossed the frontier to drive the 
migrants back. When he had disposed of the Helvetians, 
he penetrated northward on the strength of the senatus 
consuUum of 61, which, by its provision that the Gallic 
governor should protect the ^dui,^* served as a blank order 
to proceed against Ariovistus at his own discretion. After 
the Germans had been driven across the Rhine, he did not 
withdraw to his province, but quartered his legions for the 
winter in the territory of the Sequani. This he had the 
formal right to do, since the sovereignty over the Sequani 
had, by his victory, passed from Ariovistus to Rome. He 
probably did not at once assert that he intended to make 
his conquest permanent, and he may have mollified the in- 
habitants by assigning as his purpose a desire to stem further 
German migrations. The actual effect of the act, however, 
was probably exactly what he wished. The Belgas drew the 
plausible conclusion that Cassar was in Gaul to stay, and 
they accordingly banded together to drive him out. When 
one tribe, the Remi, refused to act with the rest and allied 
itself with Caesar, it was attacked, and then Caesar secured 
a legitimate pretext upon which to advance. As a result 
of the ensuing victories over the Belgae, most of the other 
scattered tribes of the West sent envoys offering to submit 
to Caesar's dictation. Thus in an orderly advance of two 
years, every step of which could be justified by the rules of 
civilized warfare, practically the whole ^^ of Gaul was brought 
to acknowledge the sovereignty of Rome. Of course the 
conquest was not yet complete, but Caesar had gained the 
immense moral advantage of having secured the formal 
submission of the tribes. Henceforth, if any tribe arose 
against him it stood convicted of "rebellion," and a breach 
of treaty. Such rebellions inevitably came as soon as the 
burdens of subjection began to be felt, but Caesar usually 
managed to keep the discontented tribes separated in pur- 
pose as well as in position until at last the entire country 



338 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

came to understand the necessity of obedience to the all- 
conquering power. 

The direction and manner of Caesar's advance also give 
some interesting clews regarding the scope of his expan- 
sionistic designs. There is a certain consistency in the 
successive campaigns which suggests that he formed the 
main plan of action early in the first year. It will be remem- 
bered that before his second year he had, at his own expense 
and without legal authority, enrolled four legions, in addition 
to the four legally provided him. This act, which brought 
upon him such severe criticism from the senate, and was 
sure to arouse the jealousy even of Pompey and Crassus, 
would hardly have been committed had he not already 
determined upon a vigorous and far-reaching war. It is 
also significant that he chose his line of aggression along the 
Rhine, boldly securing the frontier first, and leaving the 
southern tribes, the Arvemi and Aquitani, for a later day. 
The ordinary adventurer and triumph himter would have 
begun near the province and gradually pushed northward. 
It was not any legal necessity that induced Csesar to spare 
the south, for the southernmost tribe, the Arvemi, had 
recently made war on the -^dui, Rome's "brothers," and 
even the Aquitanians had repeatedly given the Roman pro- 
consuls of Spain severe trouble {B.G. Ill, 20). But he dis- 
regarded these tribes wholly at first and created complica- 
tions ^^ along the length of the Rhine. The ptuport of this 
maneuver seems to be that Cassar had determined very early 
in his term of office to extend Rome's boundaries to the 
Rhine. We reach the same conclusion if we note his in- 
sistent distinction between Gauls and Germans. In the 
very first book of his commentaries he lays down the rule 
that Germans should not have any consideration south of 
the Rhine. He sends the Helvetians back to their home ne 
Germani, qui trans Rhenum incolunt . , . in Helvetiorum 
fines transirent (I, 28). He refuses to treat with Ariovistus 
on any other terms except that he surrender his conquests 
in Gaul, for, paulatim Germanos consuescere Rhenum transire 
. . . populo Romano periculosum videbat (I, 33), and in the 



C^SAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 339 

victory over the Germans he pursues them to the Rhine 
with a harshness that contrasts strikingly with the clemency 
he usually showed the conquered Gallic tribes. It is notice- 
able also that the only sale of captives recorded in the cam- 
paigns of the first two years is that of the Atuatuci, who 
were the descendants of the Cimbri (II, 29). The impor- 
tance that Caesar attached to the question of boundary is 
strikingly shown in his relentless, not to say treacherous, 
treatment of the Usipetes and Tencteri (IV, 6-15). These 
German tribes entered Gaul in the year 55, at the very 
northwestern part, which had not yet acknowledged sub- 
mission to Rome. Caesar's attack upon them, therefore, 
could not be justified on the ground of defending Roman 
possessions. He no sooner heard of their arrival, however, 
than he bluntly ordered them to withdraw across the river, 
telling them that there were no lands to be had in Gaul. 
When they hesitated to obey, Ceesar for once disregarded 
all the rules of civilized warfare. He lured their chieftains 
into his camp, and then, while the people were without re- 
sponsible leaders, attacked them and cut them down. His 
attempt to gloss ^^ over the affair only heightens the impres- 
sion of treachery, but it also discloses the lengths to which 
Caesar would go in a crisis in order to establish the Rhine as 
the frontier line between Roman and German empire. 

Taken all in all, then, the commentaries seem to reveal a 
plan of campaign, even though the author does not deign 
to mention it. This plan was apparently formed early in the 
first year's work, if not — as is more likely — even before 
Caesar approached Gaul. In the main it contemplated a 
rapid conquest of the whole of Gaul up to the river Rhine. 
The method of procedure was to push boldly through and 
define the frontier at once, then to conciliate the Gauls so 
far as possible, gaining their good will and submission by a 
show of clemency, and by granting power and influence to 
all who submitted; on the other hand, the Germans were 
to be driven back with severity, not only for the sake of 
definitely outlining the frontier, but also in order to furnish 
terrifying examples to the Gauls in a way that would awaken 



340 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

the least animosity on their part. When this had been done, 
Caesar apparently hoped to secure the accession of the 
southern tribes without a dangerous struggle. 

The work proved more difl&cult than Caesar had expected, 
however, and, after the first two years, he perceived that 
the remaining two years of his term would not suffice to 
finish it. He therefore renewed his secret understanding 
with Pompey and Crassus in order that his term as pro- 
consul might be extended an additional five years. Thus, 
although Caesar entered the work with a view to his own 
advancement, when once the task lay before him, he meas- 
ured its full significance in terms of the state's welfare, and 
determined to bring it to absolute completion. 

Caesar himself was recalled from the task of organizing 
the new province by the quarrel with the senate that led 
to the civil war and the monarchy. The temporary regula- 
tions which he laid down, however, became the basis for the 
reorganization of the territory which Augustus made in the 
year 27 b.c. In these regulations the liberal spirit of the 
best days of Roman rule is in evidence. Caesar revealed no 
tendency to impose the Oriental principle of dominium in solo 
provinciali upon Gaul : so far as we know, not a foot of soil 
was claimed as Roman public land. The natives were left 
in possession everywhere, apparently with full rights of 
ownership. A fixed tribute was imposed upon most, if not 
all, of the tribes, but this tribute was small — about one and 
one half million dollars — and seems to have represented 
the government tax which the natives had formerly paid 
their rulers. Caesar, though avowedly the successor of the 
Gracchi, distingmshed himself by rejecting the Gracchan 
system of taxgathering which Pompey had reimposed in the 
East at the behest of the equites. The Gallic tribes were 
allowed to collect and pay their own stipendium without the 
interference of greedy Roman middlemen. 

Caesar left the native governments unchanged.^^ The 
civic units were the tribes (civitates), of which there were 
about sixty. At first he was inclined to favor the aristo- 
cratic form of government, a form quite generally prevalent 



C^SAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 341 

in Gaul, but later he avoided showing partisanship, and 
accepted whatever form of government prevailed, whether 
democratic or monarchical, in order to gain the adherence 
of the natives without hostility. In fact, Csesar proved un- 
mistakably by his ordinances in Gaul as well as by his 
bestowal of citizenship and even high offices of state upon 
individual Gauls, that he looked upon the new provincials 
not as subjects to be exploited for the profit of the conqueror, 
but as possible candidates for full Roman civilization in the 
near future. His attitude was that of the early Roman 
statesman towards conquered peoples, an attitude that had 
long since fallen out of fashion. Even now the state was 
not ready to grasp the idea, and Augustus was forced by the 
objections of the conservative element at Rome to reject it. 
But Caesar's precedent of liberality bore good fruit later. 
The emperor Claudius, reverting to Caesar's policy, freely 
accorded citizenship to Gauls. Galba, Otho, and Hadrian, 
each in turn, extended the privilege to new tribes, and in 
the fourth century Gaul was the soundest and, probably, 
the most highly civilized portion of the whole empire. 

It is one of the many paradoxes of Cesar's strange career 
that although he proved himself Rome's most aggressive 
expansionist while still under the republican constitution, 
he brought no new acquisitions to the state after he became \/ 
sole monarch.^^ This fact is of course due wholly to the 
accident that he was so completely occupied during his 
short reign with the task of suppressing his opponents and 
establishing his regime within the state. It is more than 
probable that if he had reigned a score of years, he would 
have extended Rome's boundaries to the Euphrates and the 
Danube, through Egypt and Germany and Britain, in a word, 
to the limits of the world then known. This supposition 
may seem overbold in view of the scant literary references 
to proposed conquests, but the close student of Caesar's 
career is inevitably drawn to the conviction that the mili- 
tary monarchy directed by a leader endowed with such 
irrepressible energy, ability, and ambition could not, and 
would not, have stopped at less. We have no authentic 



342 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

statement from Csesar regarding the nature of his proposed 
scheme of government or of his foreign policy. But a re- 
port ^° arose — whether derived from a knowledge of his 
character or from some indiscreet betrayal of the secrets 
of the council chamber — that he intended to declare him- 
self king and establish at least a temporary throne in Alex- 
andria or at Troy, the reputed ancestral home of the Julian 
family. The advantages to an absolute monarch of an East- 
em capital were obvious. At Rome Caesar could not over- 
come the ingrained love of liberty which refused to bear 
the yoke of a king. Alexander the Great, whom he recog- 
nized as a kindred spirit, had already demonstrated ^^ the 
facility of overriding constitutional forms and European 
democracy by accepting divine homage from servile Orientals. 
Alexander had proved that by assuming the position of a 
demigod, a being in which credulous Asiatics were ready 
to believe, he covld rid himself of the necessity of respecting 
past treaties and time-honored customs. As divinity he 
would be exempt from the obligations entailed by human 
institutions. Caesar had already invited divine honors at 
Rome in order to elevate himself above the need of observ- 
ing constitutional requirements which obstructed his way 
toward needed reforms. When, however, such honors came 
grudgingly and only incited the populace to hatred, he saw 
the obvious advantage of proclaiming his position in the 
more submissive East, whence the spirit and forms of obedi- 
ence might in time permeate the West. That these rumors 
correctly reported Ceesar's intentions may be inferred from 
the behavior of Antony after Caesar's death, for this second- 
rate emulator of Caesar, who knew more of Caesar's secret 
plans than any other man, assimied the position and dignity 
of an Oriental monarch-god, establishing his court with 
Cleopatra in Alexandria and even contemplating, it would 
seem, the maintenance of a second court at Troy.^^ 

If this view of Cesar's projected monarchy is correct, he 
must be looked upon as a new Alexander, the foimder of a 
military absolutism of the Oriental type which, by its very 
nature, had to live and justify itself by military success and 



CiESAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 343 

world-wide imperialism. It is then not difficult to under- 
stand why, in the last year of his life, C^sar raised the enor- 
mous army of sixteen legions for his proposed Parthian cam- 
paign, a campaign obviously intended to match Alexander's 
in extensiveness and brilliancy in the East, and to invite by 
its very success a recognition of heaven-sanctioned absolu- 
tisan throughout the Orient and thence tdtimately through- 
out the West. Perhaps he also hoped by means of a brilliant 
campaign in the East to justify a marriage with Cleopatra, 
which would in turn secure the annexation of Egypt and the 
legitimization of the new Julian djmasty whose throne 
wotild then remain in Alexandria or Troy until its claims 
had been accepted by the West. In the light of such inten- 
tions we can also accept as well founded the report ^^ that 
Csesar planned later to push forward the European bound- 
aries of Rome, advancing as far as the Danube in the east 
and into Germany in the west. It will be remembered that 
the conqueror of Gaul had shown his unwonted interest in 
far-distant Germanic and Celtic peoples by twice crossing 
the Rhine and the Channel during his Gallic campaign. 

If we turn from intentions and plans of conquest to the 
acts of reorganization which a few months' respite from war 
permitted Caesar to carry out, we find that all these regula- 
tions were formulated in the spirit of a world-ruler rather 
than that of a Roman patrician. The methods of coloniza- 
tion which he used during his dictatorship differed widely 
from those which he adopted as consul in settUng Pompey's 
soldiers. Then he had appropriated public lands in Italy 
after the time-honored fashion ; now he chose promising 
sites throughout the length and breadth of the empire.^* 
From far-off Pontus to the Atlantic Ocean his colonies 
extended. Seville and Tarragona in Spain began life at 
this time, and the farthermost Greek colonies of Sinope and 
Heraclea were repopulated. Carthage he rebuilt ; Corinth 
in Greece and Urso in Spain he founded as homes for freed- 
men of the city. The famous tenth legion was given allot- 
ments in Narbonne, the sixth at Aries. Eighty thousand 
Romans, proletariate from the city as well as Caesar's sol- 



344 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

diers, were placed in well-chosen colonies throughout the 
empire. 

The same inference must be drawn from Cassar's edicts 
abolishing the Graccho-Pompeian tax system in the East.^^ 
A part of the tribute he commuted, the rest he fixed at a 
definite amoimt, giving the cities and districts the privilege 
of collecting this sum without the intervention of extortion- 
ate middlemen. In short, Cassar determined that the province 
should no longer be a field of exploitation for favored citizens, 
but an integral part of his empire : the rights of provincials 
must be respected, and they themselves must be given every 
opportunity of gaining even the most favored position in the 
state whenever they should prove worthy of it. 

The meaning of all this can only be that Caesar was shap- 
ing a world-wide territorial state with an absolute monarch 
at its head, whose edicts should be unquestioned law, whose 
instnmient of rule should be the army, and whose subjects 
— of whatever race or color — should eventually find fair 
and equal treatment so long as they were obedient. 

Thus the logical conclusion of Rome's long period of ex- 
pansion was reached in the projected plans of Caesar. That 
expansion had sprung from the natural activities of a sound 
and law-abiding people who had endeavored to extend the 
domain of law and order as they imderstood law and order. 
Their efforts had led to the inclusion within the state of 
peoples that could not be assimilated in a homogeneous 
federation, peoples that must, therefore, be held by force of 
arms. The necessary military force which depended for 
its efficiency upon single leadership created the military 
monarchy, and the monarch, choosing the path of least 
resistance, tried to legalize his absolutism on the basis of 
"divine rights," and set out to justify his position by world- 
conquest. Only the tragedy of the Ides of March post- 
poned the realization of the natural consequences. After 
Caesar's death the state reverted for a while to play with 
the meaningless forms of a republican constitution. But a 
true Republic was henceforth impossible, and Cassar's form 
of empire was bound to come at last. 



C^SAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 345 



NOTES TO CHAPTER XVII 

1. Apparently Cato did not accuse Caesar of disregarding the jus 
gentile before Csesar's treachery to the Usipetes in the fourth campaign. 
Even then it is not probable that Cato found many friends to support 
his protest. 

2. Eng. ed. V, p. 5. However, few would follow the great historian 
when he adds : "It was a brilliant idea, a grand hope, which led Cassar 
over the Alps, the idea and the confident expectation that he should 
gain there for his feUow burgesses a new boundless home, and regenerate 
the state a second time by placing it on a broader basis." Such a 
reformer as little portrays the Caesar of 59 as the stupid fumbler posited 
by Ferrero. 

3. Er kam um Gallien zu erobem und er eroberte GaUien um das 
romische Reich zu besitzen, Drumann-Groebe, III, 210. The sane 
estimate of Heitland, The Roman Republic, vol. Ill, is a good antidote 
against the exaggerated characterizations of Drumann, Mommsen, 
and Ferrero. 

4. Sail. Cat. 54, 4, in a comparison of the characters of Caesar and 
Cato: magna imperia, exercitus, bellum novum exoptabat ubi virtus 
enitescere posset. The whole passage deserves study. Cicero, in de 
prov. cons. 32 ff., gives a more favorable view of Caesar's designs, but he 
is there justifying his own recantation. The various estimates of 
Cassius Dio, Plutarch, and Appian come originally from prejudiced 
sources and are colored in addition by rhetorical purposes and vitiated 
by a lack of insight into Roman conditions. They can hardly be taken 
into account. Suetonius' own judgment of character is seldom worth 
repeating. 

5. Cassius Dio (XXXVI, 43) is here generally following Livy: 
see Schwartz in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Cassius. However, we cannot be 
sure that he is giving Livy's view. 

6. Cic. leg. agr. 1,6; I, 22 ; II, 23 ; II, 65, refer unmistakably to 
Caesar and Crassus. 

7. Plut. CcBs. 14 ; Pomp. 47 ; Cassius Dio, XXXVIII, 4. 

8. Ferrero suggests that Metellus Celer, who was proconsul of Cisal- 
pine Gaul, probably died early in the year and that Cassar accordingly 
had the plebiscite passed at once giving him that province for five years. 
Caesar doubtless felt that any danger threatening Italy from a migra- 
tion of Gauls would justify his marching northward, even if he did not 
as yet have command of Narbonese Gaul. The two provinces were 
usually governed by the same man. The senate presently gave him 
the Narbonese province also, since it was not assigned for the year 
58 and since Caesar would doubtless ask the people for it as soon as the 
place became vacant (Suet. Jul. 22). It is significant that Caesar in- 
cluded lUyricum in his demands, which, although not a province, might 



346 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

serve as a field for expansion. Some fears must have been entertained 
regarding the peace of that region, for the three Cisalpine legions were 
stationed at Aquileia (B. G, I, lo). Note also that at the end of the 
second year of office, when practically the whole of Gaul had formally 
submitted to Caesar, he made a tour through lUyricum (II, 35). Was 
he looking for new worlds to conquer in case Gaul should cause no 
further trouble ? 

9. T. Rice Holmes, Conquest of Gaul, 2d ed. ; Sthler, The Annals of 
Casar; Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, III. 

ID. Cic. ad Alt. I, 19 (March 15, 60 B.C.). Haedui fratres nostri 
pugnam nuper malam pugnarunt et (Helvetii) sine dubio sunt in 
armis excursionesque in provinciam faciunt. Senatus decrevit ut . . . 
dilectus haberetur, vacationes ne valerent, legati cum auctoritate mitte- 
rentur qui adirent Galliae civitates darentque operam ne eae se cum 
Helvetiis conjungerent. What was feared was a new invasion like 
that of the Cimbri and Teutoni. See also ad Alt. I, 20, and Caes. 
Bell. Gall. I, 4. 

11. Cass. B. G. I, 35, in consulate suo rex atque amicus a senatu 
appellatus esset, and I, 43, 4-6. 

12. The Gallic legion, the Alauda, seems to have been the first legion 
consisting of provincials to receive the same standing as any citizen 
legion. 

13. B. G. I, 33, 40 ; II, 4, 29 ; VII, 77. 

14. Senatus censuisset uti quicumque GaUiam provinciam obtineret 
. . . Aeduos ceterosque amicos p. R. defenderet ; B. G. I, 35. 

15. Only the far northwest and some southern tribes were still inde- 
pendent. He apparently hoped that the latter would soon submit when 
they saw themselves completely closed in. Ferrero even holds that 
Caesar organized Gaid into a new province at the end of the second 
year, but there is no definite proof of this. 

16. Caesar did not advance against Ariovistus because of the request 
of the Gauls. He does not tell us that the Gauls who requested his 
interference were official representatives of their various states. They 
came as individuals and probably at his invitation ; 5. G. 1, 30-32. The 
first oflScial invitation came from the ^Edui after Csesar had decided to 
act ; I, 37. Caesar, however, is careful to mention that he had the right 
to advance upon the basis of a senatus consultum (I, 35). Csesar also 
had a right to station his legions among the Sequani for the winter, 
since the lands which Ariovistus had seized there fell by right of war 
to Rome. Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, III, 243, seems to overlook this 
point when he says : Ce fut . . . le plus grand scandale de sa politique 
gauloise. 

17. Caesar felt called upon to give some kind of excuse to men like 
Cato. Of course, his pretext that the enemy's cavalry was treacherous 
is wholly inadequate. He takes so little trouble to conceal the real 



C^SAR AND WORLD CONQUEST 347 

fact as to admit that the chieftains came to him at his own request 
(IV, 11,5). Apparently his conscience did not trouble him much. He 
doubtless excused the act to himself on the ground of necessity. He 
was in the extreme end of Gaul with an enemy outnumbering his army 
three to one, and surrounded by disaffected tribes. Cato would have 
played fair, but Caesar was not Cato. 

18. Caesar shifted his policy during the war for the sake of gaining 
the good will of the GaUic populace. At first he dealt through the 
nobles, who generally represented the pro-Roman factions here as 
elsewhere. Later, he showed himself eager to make friends with the 
chieftains and kings, who represented the populace and the nationalistic 
party. He wished, of course, to gain the support of the controlling 
element. 

19. Juba, the king of Numidia, was removed from office for aiding 
Pompey, and his kingdom was formally annexed to Rome, but Numidia 
had long been wholly a dependency of Rome. 

In view of the fact that Caesar had twice before his consulship 
attempted to annex Egypt, it is strange that he did not annex it in 47, 
when it lay in his power. Its governmental revenues were very large, 
since the whole kingdom was crown-land. Had Cleopatra been less 
seductive, Csesar doubtless would have remained a consistent impe- 
rialist in 47. 

20. Nicolaus of Damascus, 20, and Suetonius, Julius, 79. Both 
are well-informed writers and draw upon contemporaneous sources. 
See also Horace, Ode, III, 3. 

21. A fact first brought out by Eduard Meyer, see Kleine Schriften, 
p. 283. He too first attributed the same policy to Caesar; ibid., p. 331, 
n. 2 ; and p. 468. Ferguson, Legalized Absolutism, etc., in Am. Hist. 
Review, XVIII, p. 29, has drawn some interesting deductions regarding 
the effects of this theory upon Roman government. Is Cic. ad Att. 
XV, 4 (numquam revertisset) a reference to Caesar's intention to remain 
in the East ? The context seems to imply as much. 

22. Horace, Ode, III, 3, if referring to contemporary events, must 
be read as praising Augustus for overturning Antony's Oriental power. 

23. See Drumann-Groebe, III, p. 611, for the numerous references. 

24. See Komemann in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. coloniae, and Reid, Mu- 
nicipalities of the Roman Empire. 

25. Appian B. C V, 4; Plut. Cas. 48; Cic. ad Fam. XV, 15, 2; 
Ditt. Syll.^ 347 (a decree of thanks from Ephesus) ; Josephus, Antiq. 
XIV, ID, 5; Cassius Dio, XLII, 6, 3; Chapot, La province romaine 
d'Asie, p. 329. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

CONCLUSION 

Augustus, moved by Caesar's apparent failure to gain recog- 
nition of his regal position, and also by dread of the enormous 
burdens of sole responsibility, refused to accept absolute 
power. Assuming the position of foremost citizen and of 
commander of the armies of the frontier, he reinstated the 
old governmental machinery of the republic over Italy and 
the pacified provinces, and thus created what Mommsen 
has well called a dyarchy. This was, to be sure, not a 
restoration of the ancestral constitution, as Augustus chose 
to assume, but it made possible and, in fact, encouraged the 
pursuit of a foreign poHcy which resembled that of the 
conservative senate rather than that of Cassar. The em- 
peror indeed consulted the senate freely regarding foreign 
affairs and often adopted the practices of the old aristocracy ^ 
if only for the sake of gaining the senate's adherence and 
good will. Senatorial influence, as in days past, told strongly 
in favor of peace, especially since the aristocracy could no 
longer hope for a share in the military glories following a 
progressive program. 

Opposed to this conservatism there seems to have existed 
a more or less strong demand on the part of the populace 
for spectacular deeds and aggressive wars, — if we may 
believe Horace ^ and his poet friends. We need not go so 
far as to suppose that in the ode Caelo tonantem Horace 
acted as the spokesman of the jingoes in goading the reluc- 
tant emperor into a militaristic policy,^ nor, on the other 
hand, that in Justum et tenacem he attempted to explain to 
the populace why their chief had forsaken Cesar's program * 
in favor of the senate's. The former course Horace would 
hardly have had the presumption to follow ; the latter he 
coiild scarcely have imdertaken while so far removed from 

348 



CONCLUSION 349 

the secret councils of the state. However, his glowing 
prophecies of imminent conquests in Britain and Persia, of 
promised triumphs over the Medes, Indians, and Chinese, 
surely mirror a popular expectation of his day that Augustus, 
like Caesar and Alexander, would naturally wish to gain 
mihtary glory. ^ These expectations did not necessarily 
emanate from any deep-seated desires. Obviously, the 
people of the city liked successful foreign wars in a general 
way. As a rule, they were not levied for service unless they 
wished, while they always shared in the games and dona- 
tions after a victory. Yet it would be attributing too much 
brutality even to the Roman mob to suppose that considera- 
tions of this nature could keep it in a state of chauvinism. 
Perhaps the phrases caught up and passed on by Horace 
were, in the main, the thoughtless expressions of a hero- 
worshiping people who had fallen into the habit since 
Caesar's day of expecting success in arms. Poets, like the 
rabble, found military victories easy to estimate and praise. 
In his public utterances ^ Augustus accepted the popiilar 
point of view and freely enlarged upon the list of his vic- 
tories. He was always careful, however, to insist that he 
had never been the aggressor — nulli genti hello per iniuriam 
inlato. 

We cannot now tell whether this general militarism of the 
populace actually affected the emperor's course in deeds as 
well as in words. We may well doubt it, for in the very 
days when the call seemed loudest that he should wipe out 
the disgrace of Carrhae and follow up Caesar's work in Britain, 
he set himself the far less spectacular tasks of organizing 
Gaul and subduing the last resistance of Spain. He knew 
by experience that he was neither a magnetic leader of men 
nor a brilliant strategist. He realized that wars of conquest 
which would have cost the incomparable Caesar few men and 
little time would, under his generalship, require resources 
quite beyond his command. So he disregarded Britain 
entirely and postponed the Parthian affair to await the 
effects of secret diplomacy. 

He even had the courage to "haul down the flag" in Nu- 



3SO ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

midia in order to save the expense of occupation. This 
kingdom Caesar had annexed to the province of Africa be- 
cause its king had supported Pompey, but after Actium, 
Augustus restored the deposed king's son, the learned Juba. 
A few years later, however, Augustus changed his mind, 
transferred Juba to Mauretania, which had recently lost its 
king, and placed Ntimidia imder a Roman governor again.'' 
Doubtless the cession to Juba had displeased the people and 
called forth criticism, for the Romans from time immemorial 
considered territpry once subjected to the domain of the 
Senaius populusque .R.omanus inalienable. Nevertheless, the 
incident is signifcant of Augustus' indifference to any pro- 
gram of aggrandizement. 

The boundaries of the empire, however, were pushed for- 
ward in three directions during Augustus' reign. Egypt 
was annexed, and an effort was made to establish the Danube 
as the frontier line on the northeast, and the Elbe in the 
northwest. The annexation of Egypt was not only desir- 
able, but had come to be an absolute necessity, since Antony 
had proved how easily it could be made the base of supplies 
for any ambitious Roman who chose to raise up an inde- 
pendent monarchy in the East. Accordingly, when Antony 
and Cleopatra had been defeated at Actium the whole state 
entertained the conviction that annexation was an imme- 
diate political necessity. Thus the last of Rome's possible 
rivals fell. 

Egypt was so peculiarly conditioned that it could not 
readily be converted into an ordinary province. Its whole 
territory, unlike that of any other state, constituted a royal 
domain,^ from which its kings collected, not taxes, but 
actual rents. This circumstance was due, of course, to the 
dependency of the populace upon a consistent plan of utiliz- 
ing the Nile, and as the government alone could maintain 
the requisite system of canals and dams, a kind of feudal 
system had arisen with the king as national landlord. Ob- 
viously such a system could not be changed in a day. A 
single responsible head must be the successor of the Egyptian 
king, and that place Augustus naturally assumed. Hence- 



CONCLUSION 35 1 

forth all Egyptian rents and other revenues flowed directly 
into the imperial treasury, and Augustus exercised his right 
as overlord to forbid the entrance of any senator into Egypt 
without special permission, so serious did he consider the 
poUtical dangers that might arise from an unfriendly in- 
fluence there. The effects of this occupation were far- 
reaching. The system of serfdom existing in Egypt could 
not readily be abandoned, and it was not modified to any 
great extent. Its adoption furnished a precedent for later 
emperors, who used it at least in the management of other 
imperial estates. Egypt, then, furnishes the chief, though 
not the only, link between the feudal system of the ancient 
Orient and that of medieval Europe. 

The advance of Roman arms as far as the Danube was 
also a political necessity. An intermittent border warfare 
had been kept up on the frontier of Illyricum for two cen- 
turies, and Csesar had planned to bring it to an end by pacify- 
ing the whole Balkan peninsula. Even before Actium, Augus- 
tus had invaded Dalmatia in person, apparently for the sake 
of clearing the roads to Greece before opening the struggle 
with Antony. Later he met the barbaric raids by a series 
of attacks which finally brought the pax Romana to the 
banks of the Danube. In this territory Augustus formed the 
new provinces of Pannonia and Moesia,^ and welded together 
the several Thracian tribes there into a client state which 
he held responsible for the peace of what was imtil recently 
the main part of European Turkey. Similarly, the Alpine 
tribes of the modem Engadine and Tyrol were met by Drusus 
in a dashing raid over the Brenner Pass, and attacked in the 
rear by Tiberius, who marched through upper Switzerland 
from the Rhone. The new provinces ^"^ of Noricum and 
Rsetia were added to the empire as a result. The 
"Romansch," still spoken by the people near St. Moritz, 
and the ''Ladin," heard to-day in the country of the Dolo- 
mites, hark back to the language introduced by these con- 
querors. 

The acqtiisition of Egypt and the Danube frontier followed 
wars which neither Augustus nor the senate considered wars 



352 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

of aggression and which, in fact, might be justified on the 
ground that the frontier could not otherwise have had 
peace. The provocation for war on the Rhine frontier was 
equally strong, but here Augustus drove much farther than 
was necessary, actually adopting Caesar's policy of conquest 
for a brief period. The Transrenane Germans had made 
frequent efforts to cross into Gaul, and in the year i6 B.C. 
they thoroughly routed the Roman army of occupation. 
When, therefore, they returned to the attack foiu: years 
later, Augustus thought it time to reciprocate.^^ The re- 
ports that have survived of the remarkable campaigns con- 
ducted by his step-son Drusus are so meager that we cannot 
now say whether Augustus gave orders for the complete 
subjugation of the whole of Germany as far as the Elbe, 
or whether it was the early success of his general that en- 
couraged the emperor to enlarge his plans and go farther 
than was at first contemplated. The fact that Drusus 
began with the elaborate task of building a fleet and cutting 
a canal for it from the Rhine to the Zuyder Zee would indi- 
cate that serious measures were planned from the first. It 
implies that troops were to be sent by ship to the mouths 
of the rivers Ems, Weser, and perhaps the Elbe, thence 
advancing up the rivers to cooperate with the main army 
which was to strike directly inland. This supposition is 
borne out by the fact that during his second year's cam- 
paign (ii B.C.) Drusus safeguarded his conquests by a series 
of strong forts which he connected by a military road with 
the Rhine headquarters. In the fourth campaign Drusus 
pushed as far as the Elbe, but he succumbed to a fatal acci- 
dent that same year, and after his death Augustus showed 
no inclination to carry on an aggressive war, though he per- 
mitted Tiberius to hold as much of the country as had been 
well pacified. ^2 However, some ten years later (about 4 a.d.), 
when Tiberius had been definitely designated as Augustus' 
successor, he was sent to Germany to complete the work of 
Drusus. In his second campaign he secured the apparent 
submission of all the coimtry up to the Elbe, and in the next 
year set out to subject the last remaining ^^ German tribe 



CONCLUSION 353 

of importance, the Marcomanni, living in the country now 
called Bohemia. However, a widespread revolt south of, 
the Danube called him back, and, before this was fully sup- ^'( 
pressed, the German tribes united and destroyed the Roman 
army of occupation in the Teutoburg forest. Augustus then 
confessed his error in having yielded to militaristic ambitions, 
and for the futtue adopted the Rhine as the frontier line. 
There the boundary remained throughout the empire except 
for some minor changes along the upper course of the river. 
Of far greater importance to the Hfe of the empire than 
the occasional extensions of its limits was the orderly gov- 
ernment now given it.^^ The provinces especially profited 
by the responsible rule inaugiurated ^^ by Augustus. With the 
'pax Romana ended not only the ravages of civil war, and 
the irresponsible exactions of partisan leaders, but also the 
extortions of taxgatherers and of conniving governors, and 
the petty pilfering of the pr^tor's stafif. Henceforth the • 
governors of Augustus' provinces had to render strict account 
of their stewardship to a watchfid and jealous master, who 
had the welfare both of the provincials and of the exchequer 
constantly in mind. He gave stated and liberal salaries to 
his procurators and praefects so that he could abolish the 
mischievous fee system, and rewarded honest and able 
agents by long terms of office and promotion in the civil 
service. He also continued Cassar's policy of fixing the 
amount of the provincial tribute so that the operations of 
the publicans would be limited to the collection of only the 
poll and port dues. Needless to say, the senate hardly 
dared disregard the example set by the emperor. It gradually 
adopted his reforms in the provinces under its supervision, 
and if at any time it was inclined to connive at abuses, the 
prince, as master of morals, was ready to call attention to 
them. This wise reform of the civil service and the peaceful 
organization of the outer Hne of provinces established an 
imperial system which could not be wholly wrecked, even 
by the maddest and most tyrannous of his successors. Even 
rulers Hke Caligula and Nero usually realized the personal 
advantage of having conscientious provincial governors who 



\^ 



354 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

labored for peace and an honest collection of revenues. It is 
not a mere accident that men like Vespasian, Corbulo, 
Virginius Rufus, Nerva, Agricola, Tacitus, and Pliny were 
advanced in the civil service by the very worst emperors. 

True to his deep conviction that Rome could not bear a 
heavier burden of occupation than she now had, Augustus 
urged in his last message to the senate that no further 
efforts at expansion be made.^^ His successor, Tiberius, 
who knew the state of the frontier even better than Augus- 
tus, perceived the wisdom of the advice, and, brilliant soldier 
though he was, heartily subscribed to the pacific course. 
Accordingly, when the enthusiastic and ambitious Ger- 
manicus burned to repeat the career of his father Drusus 
in Germany, Tiberius permitted him to advance only far 
enough to wipe out the Teutobtirg disgrace. Then he 
called the young general back and sent him to a peaceful 
province. The Emperor Claudius, who, in lieu of policies 
of his own, studied how to carry out the suggestions of the 
great Julius, borrowed from him the idea of subjugating 
Britain. His campaign lasted only eighteen days, however, 
and he accomplished nothing except to reintroduce the legions 
into the island. Under succeeding emperors the conquest was 
advanced until the larger part of Britain became a province. 

Vespasian, who came into power after the civil wars which 
followed the tyranny of Nero, was one of the best generals 
of the empire, but he was also a wise administrator, and 
realized that his first duty was to reestablish a sane civil 
government. For this he needed revenue, and the one 
advance of boundaries that he permitted bears the charac- 
teristic stamp of his indomitable taxgathering. In southern 
Baden, between the falls of the Rhine and the River Neckar, 
there lay a rich but thinly settled district which he incor- 
porated in the empire. A large part of this he apparently 
settled with farmers, who were required to pay a rent to the 
state. Then he built roads through it to the frontier towns 
at Strassburg and Windisch.^^ His son, Domitian, followed 
Vespasian's policy so far as to add to the district a portion 
of the valley of the Main and the ore-bearing Taimus ridge 



CONCLUSION 355 

beyond, protecting these new possessions with a line of forts. 
Thus originated the idea of connecting the Rhine with the 
Danube by means of the frontier Hne of barricades, a Hne 
which has been so carefully traced by recent excavators. 
In another venture, a campaign against the Dacians beyond 
the Danube, Domitian was less successful. In fact, he was 
compelled to give up the contest and promise the barbarian 
king an annual "present" as the price of peace. After the 
emperor's death, men made free to call it a tribute. 

This disgrace to Roman arms was removed, however, by 
Trajan, who punished the Dacians severely. He drove out 
or destroyed a large number of them, resettling their land ' ""^ 
with veterans and with colonists drawn from the Orient. ^^ 
Trajan, of course, broke completely with the cautious advice 
of Augustus by this act, for the new province projected into 
open and indefensible country, but in the East he went even 
farther : there his successes over the invading Parthians seem 
to have awakened in him the ambition to outdo Alexander. 
He shaped Arabia into a province in io6 ; a few years later, 
he drove the Parthians from Armenia, which they had taken, 
and annexed this also as a province, thus reducing Parthia 
to the position of a client kingdom. Advancing still farther, 
he created a province even in the far-distant Mesopotamian 
valley. His conquests reached to the Persian Gulf, and, if 
we may believe his biographers, he intended to march upon 
India. 

But Trajan was the last of a long line of conquerors. :^ 
Hadrian,^^ his successor, though a man of no mean military 
talent, measured the needs of the empire more wisely, and 
abandoned, in the face of severe criticism, all the territory 
that had been annexed beyond the Euphrates. Even Ar- 
menia he gave back to a client prince. He had ideas of his 
own for the empire, which he translated into deeds by raising 
the famous wall of northern England and the barricades 
with which he connected the Hne of forts in southern Ger- 
many, extending from the Rhine beyond Coblenz to the 
Danube near Regensburg. His method of fortifying and 
walling the weak spots of the frontier was henceforth em- 



3S6 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

bodied in the regular policy of the empire. Thus the long 
history of Roman expansion, which had, from the beginning, 
rested upon defensive rather than aggressive tactics, ended 
in a poHcy of seclusion and self-defense. 

The end was not wholly out of character. At the dawn of 
history the Latin tribe appeared — unambitious, peacefiil, 
home-staying men, characterized above all by a singular 
respect for orderly procedure. The early expansion of Rome 
within the tribe resulted chiefly from the gradual absorption 
of villages whose inhabitants sought the fortified city for 
safety, and perhaps, too, for a more congenial life. But 
such expansion brought the rising power into contact with 
many tribes and cities imder conditions which occasionally 
involved disputes and armed contests. A dogged persistence, 
a demand for thoroughness, a willingness to submit to galling 
discipline, a refusal to bear the disgrace of defeat — Roman 
education emphasized gloria as the supreme prize — these 
qualities developed a military machine which secured a 
large proportion of victories for Rome whenever intertribal 
disputes arose. After the victories were won, the efficiency 
of Rome's political organization, her reputation for fair 
dealing, and her liberal treatment of conquered foes and 
allies gained for her a widespread respect that invited ac- 
cretions to her federation and proportionally weakened the 
cohesive force of her enemies. 

With the emergence of popular sovereignty in the early 
third century, a mild form of imperialism came into evidence : 
popular leaders began to dwell upon the advantages of em- 
pire and the glories of great power, inducing the populace, 
against the advice of the more sober senate, to accept the 
entangling alliances offered by Thurii and Messana. The 
new impulse, however, died out in the sufferings of the en- 
suing wars — but not until it had secured Rome a foreign 
empire in Sicily which she was obliged to rule as a thing ex- 
traneous to the federation, and which, before long, entailed 
the harrying war of vengeance directed by Hannibal. That 
war, fought out with the characteristic obstinacy that re- 



CONCLUSION 357 

fused to admit defeat, brought more empire beyond the sea, 
and raised Rome to the position of a strong world-power 
whose interests in every question of Mediterranean politics 
were manifest. 

The Uberal-minded men of the state accepted the new 
burdens, but accepted them in the generous spirit of a new 
diplomacy, which met with Httle favor among the more 
practical-minded men of Rome. The influence which Rome's 
victories had established over the East imder the Scipionic 
regime invited interference for the sake of material gains 
imder the more prosaic senate of Cato's day: for it was 
patent to all that Rome cotdd now rule the Mediterranean 
world to her own advantage, if she chose. Choosing to 
rule, the senate removed Carthage and Corinth, the last 
barriers in the way of complete supremacy; and now, rid 
of the healthy criticism of rivals, no longer egged on by com- 
petition, the monopolistic state succumbed to a stagnating 
satisfaction with itself and its half-complete ideals of govern- 
ment. It gradually acquiesced in a policy of holding its 
own and drawing in the parasitic profits from its possessions. 
The classes within the state aUgned themselves on new 
programs of division of spoils and profit-bringing power. 
Under Marius the discovery was made that that power lay 
in the army, upon which the life of the empire depended, 
and, accordingly, an era of civil wars ensued, in which the 
party leaders fought for long and extensive commands. 
Sulla employed his victory to gain ascendency and the 
consequent benefits of honor and office for the aristocratic 
party. Pompey threw the advantages of empire to the com- 
mercial classes which had supported him, Cassar used his 
control over the democratic vote to win the command of the 
army for himself, and, eventually, by its aid, he established 
an absolute monarchy which was intended to embrace a 
world empire tinder a Julian dynasty. Despite the sacred 
rules that forbade aggression, despite the republican con- 
stitution that compelled the ruling populace to assume the 
burdens and sufferings entailed by their decisions to expand, 
despite the obstruction of the aristocracy, whose self -inter- 



358 ROMAN IMPERIALISM 

ests manifestly urged a policy of domesticity, the free Roman 
people stimibled on falteringly and imwittingly into ever in- 
creasing dominion, until finally the overgrown empire im- 
posed a burden of rule upon the conquerors that leveled the 
whole state to a condition of servitude. 



NOTES TO CHAPTER XVIII 

1. In his Res Gestae, c. 27, Augustus says of Armenia : Cum possem 
facere provinciam, malui maiorum nostrorum exemplo regnum id 
Tigrani . . . tradere. 

2. Hor. Carm. I, 2, end; 12, end; III, 5 at al. ; Propertius in his 
fourth book, and Ovid everywhere. 

3. Ferrero, Vol. IV, p. 149. 

4. See E. Meyer, Kleine Schriften, p. 472, 

5. One must remember that even Cicero was ready to admit that 
the chief recommendation to fame was derived from military deeds; 
de Off. II, 45 ; ad Fam. XV, 4. 

6. See Res Gestae, 26-8. 

7. Cassius Dio, LIII, 26, 5 ; Tac. Ann. IV, 5. 

8. Rostowzew, Gesch. Rom. Kolonates, p. 85 flE. 

9. See Stout, Prov. Governors of Moesia. 

10. See Peaks, Prov. Governors of Raetia and Noricum. 

11. Velleius Paterculus, II, 97, so explains the war, and I see no 
reason for doubting him. 

12. Veil. Pat., who is somewhat inclined to overstate the merits of 
Tiberius, says of him (II, 97) in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret 
provinciae. 

13. See Veil. Pat. II, 109, who also reveals the fact that the Mar- 
comanni were to be attacked, not because of any mischief done, but 
simply because they were growing into a strong state. 

14. See the just estimates of Augustus' work in Reid, Municipalities 
of the Roman Empire; see Hirschfeld, Die kaiserl. Verwaltungsbeamten\ 
on the imperial civil service. 

15. The provinces freely acknowledged a preference for the mon- 
archy; Tac. Ann. I, 2. 

16. Tac. Ann. I, 11, addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos 
imperii ; cf . I, 9, where Tacitus holds that Augustus had only sought for 
natural boundaries in his wars. 

17. Pelham, The Roman Frontier in Germany (p. 179 of his Essays), 
and the monumental publication of Sarweg and Hettner, Der oberger- 
manische und rhdt. Limes des Romerreichs. 

18. Peterson, Trojans dakische Kriege. 

19. Schulz, Leben des Kaisers Hadrian, and Komemann, Hadrian. 



INDEX 



Abydos, 148, 164. 

Accius, 54. 

Achoean league, 140, 157, 184, 192 ff., 
198, 204, 207, 214, 225 S. 

Adherbal, 263. 

Administration of subjects, 34, 72, 94 £F., 
156, 218 fif., 24s, 319. 

Adriatic Sea, Romans first cross, 117. 

JEdm, 334, 337- 

M. /Emilius Lepidus, 148. 

L. /Emilius Paullus, 218; defeats Per- 
seus at Pydna, 208 ; establishes repre- 
sentative government in Macedonia, 
209; policy of, 218. 

iEnus, 176, 196. 

JEqm, 18, 52. 

/Esernia, 74. 

/Esium, III. 

^tolian league, 138, 140, 170, 172, 180, 
214. 

Africa, 128, 237, 350. 

Agathocles of Syracuse, 62. 

Ager Falernus, 35. 

Ager Gallicus, 61, 70, 115. 

Ager publicus, 80, 87, 95 ff., 130, 228, 237, 

245. 

Agrarian laws, 115, 253, 270, 343. 

Agriculture, i, 6, 81, 105, 131, 237, 
269, 287. 

Alba Fucens, 52. 

Aletrium, 53. 

Alexander the Great, 342. 

AlUances, 30, 38, 95 ff., 126, 131, 146, 299. 

Allobroges, 255. 

Alsium, 82. 

Ambracia, 180. 

American homestead system, 37. 

Amicitia, Theory of, 146, 190, 302. 

Anagnia, 53. 

Ancona, 71. 

Andriscus, see Pseudo-Philip, 223. 

Aniensis {Tribus), 57. 

Anti-imperialism, 91, 145, 186, 190, 268, 
274, 305, 308. 

Antiochus III of Syria, 142, 155; his 
conquests, 164; controversy with 
Rome, 168 ; secret treaty with Egypt, 
169 ; his policy, 173 ; invades Greece, 
173; war with Rome, 174; defeated, 
175. 



Antiochus IV, Epiphanes, 205, 221. 

Antium, 17, 35. 

Appropriation of land, 56, 74, 80, 86, 130, 

236, 276. 
Apulia, 49, 75. 
Aquae Sextise, 255. 
Aquileia, 197. 

Ariarathus, of Cappadocia, 178. 
Aricia, 17, 34. 
Ariminum, 70, 79. 
Ariovistus, 334, 337. 
Aristocratic charters, 156, 229. 
Aristonicus, 245. 
Armenia, 302 ff., 321. 
Army, 3, 48, 132, 269. 
Arpinum, 50. 
Arretium, 50, 60. 
Arverni, 255, 334. 
Aryan race, i. 
Asculum, 71. 
Asia, 246, 302. 

Asia Minor, 165, 176, 188, 244. 
Asisium, 83. 
Athamania, 184. 
Athens, 138 ff., 184, 208, 226. 
Attalus I of Pergamum, 138 ff. 
Attalus II (Philadelphus), 221, 
Attalus III, 243. 
Augustus, not an expansionist, 349; 

surrenders Numidia, 349; annexes 

Egypt, 350; policy in Thrace, 351; 

in Germany, 352 ; government of 

Empire, 353. 
Aurunci, 25, 53. 
Autonomy, 34 ff., 73, loi, 243. 

Balearic Islands, 253. 

Bastarnae, 200. 

Belgae, 337. 

Bellum Gallicum of Caesar, 329. 

Beneventum, 74. 

Bithynia, 272, 302, 321. 

Bocchus, 266. 

Boeotian league, 155, 185, 204. 

Boii subdued, 117. 

Bovianum captured, 50. 

Britain invaded, 354. 

Brundisium colonized, iii. 

Bruttians, 76. 

Brutus, 17. 



359 



360 



INDEX 



Buxentum, colony, 188. 
Byzantium, 140. 

Q. Csecilius Metellus, 196. 

Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, 265. 

Caere, 17, 43, 68. 

Cales, 36, 54. 

Callicrates, 199, 225. 

L. Calpurnius Bestia, 264. 

Camertum, 83. 

Campanians, 31, 50. 

Cannae, battle at, 126. 

Capitalists, policies and influence, 249 ff ., 

251, 268, 289, 291, 307, 315. 
Cappadocia, 302, 321. 
Capua, alliance with, 41; revolt of, 127. 
Caria, 212. 
Carsioli, a colony, 52. 
Carthage, and Rome, 24, 26, 88 ; foreign 

policy, 90, 119 £E., 283; First Punic 

war, 88; loses Sardinia, 112 ff. ; 

Second Punic war, 119; a socius, 129; 

destroyed, 233, 285 ; lands settled, 

253; rebuilt, 343. 
Caste-system, 5. 

Castnmi, a colony in Etruria, 82. 
Castrum, a colony in Picenum, 83. 
Catilinarian conspiracy, 332. 
Caudine Forks, battle at, 47. 
Caunos, 212. 
Censoria locatio, 95. 
Censorim (civitates), 251. 
Centuripae, 95 ff. 
Cephallenia, i8o. 
Chalcis, 155. 

Chauvinism, 66, 89, 106, 120, 250. 
Chios, 140. 
CiUcia, 163, 272, 318. 
Cimbri, 268. 
Citizenship, grant of, 34, 72, in, 302, 

336, 341- 
City-building, 322. 
City-charters, granted by Rome, 156, 

208, 229. 
City-state, origin of, 3, 13. 
Civitates sine suffragio, 34, 43, 53. 
Ap. Claudius Caecus, 63, 65, 82. 
M. Claudius Marcellus (Consul, 155), 

238. 
Claudius (Emperor), 354. 
Cleopatra, 343. 
Client-princes, 322. 
Coalition of Greeks and Romans, 147, 

151. 157- 
Ccele-Syria, 163, 168. 
Coinage, 37, 41, 80, loi, 209. 



Colonies, Latin (in chronological order) : 

Signia, 19; Velitrae, 19; Norba, 19; 

Ardea, 34; Circeii, 34; Satricum, 22; 

Nepet, 24; Sutrium, 24; Setia, 22; 

Cales, 36; Fregellae, 47; Luceria, 49; 

Suessa, 53; Pontiae, 58; Saticula, 54; 

Interamna, 54; Sora, 53; Alba, 52; 

Narnia, 58; Carsioli, 52; Venusia, 54; 

Hadria, 58; Castnmi, 72; Cosa, 68; 

Paestum, 75 ; Ariminmn, 79 ; Beneven- 

tum, 74; Firmum, 71; iEsernia, 74; 

Brundisium, in; Spoletium, 112; 

Cremona, 118; Placentia, 118; Copia, 

130; Vibo, 130; Aquileia, 197. 
Colonies, citizen : Antixmi, 35 ; Tarra- 

cina, 36 ; Ostia, 36 ; Minturnae, 53 ; 

Sinuessa, 53 ; Sena, 61 ; Castrum, 82 ; 

^sis, in; Alsium, 82; Fregenae, 82; 

Pyrgi, 82; Voltumum, 188; Litemum, 

188; Puteoli, 188; Salernum, 188; 

Buxentum, 188; Sipontxmi, 188; 

Tempsa, 188; Croton, 188; Satumia, 

82 ; Graviscae, 82 ; Tarentum, 260 ; 

Scolacium, 260 ; Narbo, 255 ; Epor- 

edia, 276; Julian colonies: Seville, 

Tarragona, Sinope, Heraclea, Car- 
thage, Corinth, Urso, Narbo, Aries, 343. 
Commerce, of Rome, Early, 3, 277; of 

second century, 283 ; at Delos, 285 ; 

at end of repubUc, 288, 295. 
Commercial policy of Rome, 234 ff. 
Commercial treaties, 279. 
Commercialism and expansion, 277 ff. 
Commercium, restrictive, 35, 102, 208. 
Concert of powers, 119, 138 ff., 187. 
Conquest, effects of, upon Romans, 106, 

131- 
Contract system of taxgathering, 247. 
Copia, 130. 
Corcyra, 116. 
Corinth, 152, iss; destroyed, 228, 285; 

rebuilt, 343. 
P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus ^milianus, 

218, 236, 261. 
P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus, 128, 150, 

174- 
L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, 174. 
P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (Corculum), 

234, 238. 
P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica (Serapio), 

246. 
L. Cornelius Sulla, 303, 304, 305. 
Corsica, 92. 
Cosa, 68. 
Crafts, 3. 
Cremona, 118. 



INDEX 



361 



Croton, 77, 188. 

Crown-lands, 94, 245. 

Culture at Rome, 59, 105. 

Ciunae, 30, 38. 

M' Curius Dentatus, 61, 63. 

Cynoscephalse, battle at, 154. 

Cyprus, 222. 

Cyrene, 222, 273. 

Cyretiae, inscription from, 162, 

Dacians, 355. 

Danube river, 351. 

Debts, public, 145. 

P. Decius Mus, 54. 

Decutnanae {civitates), 251. 

Deforestation, 19. 

Deification of emperors, 342. 

Delos, 239, 284 &., 295. 

Demetrias (in Thessaly), 155, 173. 

Demetrius of Pharos, 117, 143. 

Demetrius I, of Syria, 222. 

Democratic foreign policy, 42, 59, 65, 

89-92, III, 14s, 191, 243, 250, 256, 

267. 
D6tenus of 1000 Achaeans, 214, 225. 
Devastation of southern Italy, 129 £E. 
Diaeus, 226 ff. 
Di indigetes, 4. 
Diodorus, 56. 
Dionysius of Syracuse, 77. 
Diplomacy, Roman, 49, 168-173, 197, 

220 fi. 
Divine rights of kings, 342. 
Dominium in solo provinciali, 97, 251, 

340. 
Domitian, the emperor, 354. 
DuiUus, 92. 

Economic conditions in Rome, 6, 59, 

127, 130, 14s, 277-297. 
Egypt, 138 fi., 222; annexed, 350. 
Ennius, 91. 
Ephesus, 164, 166. 
Epirotes, 154. 
Equites, 267, 289, 323. 
Equity, 7, 39, 55- 
Ethne, 319. 
Etruscans, 3, 14 ff., 25, 30, 50, si. S4i 

61, 67. 
Eimienes II of Pergamum, 154, 176 ff., 

182, 186, 196, 204; unfriendly to 

Rome, 207; punished, 212, 221. 
Extortion, 109, 248, 305, 353. 

Fabricius, 65. 
Falerii, 24. 



Federation, 33, 65, 66 ff., in, 301. 

Fetial institution, 8 ff. 

"Fetters of Greece," 155. 

Feudal system, s, 83, 351. 

G. Flaminius, 115, 126. 

Foedus aequum, 35, 78. 

Formiae, 34. 

Free cities, 95 ff. 

Freedmen colonization, 343. 

Fregellae, 47, 48, 300. 

Fregenae, 82. 

Frentani, 71. 

Frusino, 53. 

M. Fulvius Nobilior, in ^tolia, 180. 

Fundi, 34. 

L. Furius Camillus, 42. 

Gabinian law, 314. 

Galati, of Asia, 166; pacified, 177, 212, 
302 ff., 321. 

Gauda, 266. 

Gauls (Celts), invasions, 21, 30, 54, 60, 
117 ; Narbonese Gaul a province, 254; 
Transalpine Gaul conquered, 334-340. 

Genomani, 118. 

Germanicus, 354. 

Germans, 334, 337, 350, 352. 

Governors of provinces, duties, 104. 

Gracchan land laws, 243 ff . ; revolution, 
262; tax-system, 247, 293, 316. 

Grain from Sicily, 105. 

Graviscae, 82. 

Greeks, of southern Italy, 30, 62, 77; 
Greek character, 158, 201 ; liberation 
of Greeks, 155, 213 ; Greek democ- 
racies anti-Roman, 202 ; relations 
with Rome, 192, 220. 

Hadrian, emperor, 355. 

HaUartus, 205. 

HaUcarnassus, 166. 

Hamilcar Barcas, 92, 122. 

Hannibal, 123; his policy, 125 ff.; in 

Syria, 170, 173. 
Hasdrubal, 122. 

Hellenic coaUtion, 147, 157, 190. 
Helvetians, 335. 

Heraclea, in Italy, 77 ; in Pontus, 140. 
Hernici, 52. 
Hiempsal, 263. 

Hiero II of Syracuse, 88; an amicus. 92. 
Hirpini, 75. 
Horace, 348. 
C. Hostilius Mancinus, 230. 

Iber River, 123. 
Iguvium, 83. 



362 



INDEX 



IKum, league of, 166. 

lUyrian war, 116. 

Illyricum ceded to Philip V, 143. 

Immunes (civitates), of Sicily, 95 ff. 

Imperial cult, 342. 

Imperialism, 93, 119, 120, 134, 308, 

314 £f., 329, 343. 
Inheritance, of Pergamum, 243; of 

Cyrene, 273; of Bithynia, 306. 
Insubres subdued, 118. 
Intervention in Greek afEairs, 193, 198, 

222, 227. 

Isthmian games of 196 B.C., 155, 158. 
Istri, 197. 
Italian war, 298. 
Italici, 78, 285, 295. 

Jerusalem, 318. 

Juba, 350. 

Judea, 318. 

Jugurthiue war, 263 S. 

C. Julius Caesar, 329 ff. ; purposes in 

GaUic conquest, 332; policy in Gaul, 

336; organization of Gaul, 340; 

nature of his absolutism, 344; method 

of colonization, 343. 
Jupiter, 2, 9. 
/m5 belli, 8. 
Jus f elide, 14s. 

Lampsacus, 166, 168. 

Latifundia, 102, 130, 287. 

Latin league, 4, 13, 23, 32. 

Latin (Cassian) treaty, 23, 28. 

Latin war, 32. 

Latium, 4 ff. 

Laurentum, 17. 

Lautulae, defeat at, 58. 

Liberation of Greeks, 152, 154 ff., 229. 

Licinian-Sextian laws, 87, 136. 

M. Licinius Crassus, 306. 

M. Licinius Lucullus, 307 ff., 315. 

Limes, 355. 

Liternum, 188. 

M. Livius Drusus, 300. 

Locri, 77. 

Lucanians, 62, 75. 

Luceria, 49. 

C. Lucretius, 205. 

Lycia, 212. 

Lycortas, of Achaea, 193. 

Macedonia, First M. war, 127, 143; 
Second, 138 ff.; Third, 205; divided 
into four repubUcs, 208; a province, 

223, 272, 281. 



Magnesia, battle at, in Asia, 197. 

Magnesia, in Thessaly, 175. 

Maladministration, no. 

Malaria, 19. 

Mamertini, 88. 

Mamilian investigation, 265. 

ManiUan law, 314. 

C. Manlius, in Asia, 176. 

Q. Marcius Philippus, 199, 206, 216. 

C. Marius, defeats Jugurtha, 265 ff.; 

reorganizes army, 269 ff. 
Marrucini, 52, 71. 

Marseilles (Massilia), 121, 254, 280. 
Marsi, 52, 71. 
Masinissa, 128, 233. 
Mastama, 15. 
Mauretania, 350. 
Mediterranean race, i. 
Memmian bill, 264. 
Mercantile policy denied, 277 ff. 
Messana, 88, 95 ff. 
Militarism, 219, 271, 274, 325, 344, 
Mines of Macedonia closed, 209. 
Mintumae, 53. 
Mithradates Eupator (the Great), 246, 

302 ff., 317. 
Mitylene, 140. 
Moesia, 351. 
Monarchy, 342, 344. 
MonopoUes, 210, 280, 281. 
L. Mvunmius, 228. 
Municipal government, loi. 
Municipia, 34, 42. 

Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, 154, 157, 170, 

172. 
Naevius, 198. 
Naples, 30, 38, 47. 
Narbo, 255 
Namia, 58. 

Navy of Rome, 92, 127, 152, 174. 
Negotiations with Philip, 152; with 

Antiochus, 169. 
Nepet, 24. 
Nequinum, 70. 

Nicaea, peace conference at, 152. 
Nola, so, S3. 
Norba, 18, 26. 
Noricum, 3S1. 
Numantia, 230. 
Numidia, 236, 263 ff., 350. 

Organization of provinces, 93 ff., 247 ff., 

319 ff., 340. 
Oriental cults, 284. 
Oriental theory of land tenure, 94, 244. 



INDEX 



363 



Oriental trade, 284 ff. 
Orientals at Rome, 28& 
Ostia, 27, 36, 44. 

Paeligni, 52, 71. 

Paestum, 75. 

Panajtius, 261. 

Pannonia, 351. 

Paphlagonia, 302 ff. 

Parthia, 355. 

Particularistic policies, 138 ff., 157, 190. 

Paternalism, 103, 279 ff. 

Patricians, S> 42- 

Pax Romana, 353. 

Pergamum, 176 ff.; given to Rome, 243. 

Perseus, king of Macedonia, 199; his 
policy, 201-03 ; war with Rome, 205 ; 
defeated and deposed, 208. 

Philhellenism, 149 ff., 187, 191, 220. 

Philip V of Macedonia, attacks Rome, 
127; early successes, 138 ff. ; charac- 
ter, 144; agreement with Antiochus, 
144; war with Rome, 151; defeat, 
154; later relations with Rome, 183, 
195 ff. 

Philopoemen, 193. 

Picentes, 71. 

Pile-dwellings, i. 

Piracy, 116, 272, 314. 

Placentia, 118. 

Plebeians, 5, 21. 

Polybius, 261. 

Gn. Pompeius Magnus, 308, 313 ff., 315, 
319 ff. 

Pomptine marshes, 19, 37. 

Pontiae, 58. 

Pontus, 321. 

Popular sovereignty, 60, 252, 262. 

Population, 286. 

M. Porcius Cato, 190 ff. ; his policy, 192- 
214; attack upon the Scipios, 194 ff.; 
218, 230, 234. 

Practical politics, 191 ff. 

Praeneste, 17, 21, 34. 

Price of land, 292. 

Proletarians, 269, 343. 

Promagistrates, 100, 132. 

Protectorate over Greece, 171, 183, 219. 

Provincial government, 93, 99, 213. 

Prusias, 154, 204. 

Pseudo-Philip, 224. 

Ptolemies of Egypt, 142; Euergetes 
(Physcon), 222; Philometor, 222. 

Publicani, 99, 247, 289, 315, 320, 323. 

Public land, 80, 87, 95, 130, 228, 237, 
245- 



Public works, 292. 

Q. PubliUus Philo, 42% 

Punic war. First, 88 ff.; Second, 119 ff.; 

Third, 233 ff. 
Puteoli, 188. 
Pydna, battle at, 208. 
Pyrgi, 82. 
Pyrrhic war, 61, 64. 

T. Quinctius Flamininus, 150, 152 ff., 
157, 173, 193, 198. 

Race amalgamation, 2, 5, 12, 14. 

Raetia, 351. 

Rainfall, 6. 

Regal period, 15. 

Religion, 2 ; Greek cults at Rome, 151. 

Representative government, 45, 209, 
299, 301. 

Revenues, 97-99, 291, 321. 

Revolt of allies, 298. 

Revolution of 509 B.C., 17. 

Rhegium, 77. 

Rhine frontier, 337. 

Rhodes, 138 ff., 164 ff., 176 ff., 182; 
unfriendly to Rome, 206; pxmished, 
212 ; 304. 

Rome: situation, i; regal period, 16; 
sack of Rome, 21 ; growth, 22 ; com- 
pared with Sparta, 39 ; a republic, 17 ; 
a democracy, 60, 247 ; an oligarchy, 67, 
190; appearance in third century, 
59 ; constitution, 60, 247, 261 ; mod- 
eration, 55 ; defeated, 48, 49, 63, 92, 
126, 127, 143, 230, 246, 264, 268; 
peace policy, 112 ; treatment of friends 
and allies, 221, 255, 299; fear of rival, 
234; favors oligarchic forms in prov- 
inces, 66, 201, 303; foreign policy, 
146, 171 ; policy toward Sabellic 
tribes, 47, 55, 71, 73 ; toward Etrus- 
cans, 68 ; toward Umbrians, 69, 73 ; 
toward Bruttians, 76 ; toward Greeks, 
77, 182-7, 213; in Asia Minor, 177, 
211, 213. 

Royal estates, 94, 245. 

Royal Peace of 387 B.C. (of Antalcidas), 
138, 159- 

RuUan bill, 332. 

P. Rupihus, 104. 

Sabellic tribes, 17, 30, 73. 
Sabines, 54, 72, 73, iii. 
Saguntum, 123. 
Salemum, 188. 



364 



INDEX 



Samnites, first treaty, 24; "first S. 

war," 32; second S. war, 46 ff.; 

methods of expansion, 46 ; 30 ff., 62, 

74- ^ 
Sardinia, g2 ; Rome's seizure of, 112 ff. 
Satricum, 22. 
Scipionic foreign policy, 150, 186, igo- 

195, 213, 246. 
Scylaceum, 253. 
Segesta, 95 ff., 104. 
Seleucid Kingdom (see Syria), 141, 165, 

221 ff. 
C. Sempronius Gracchus, 247 ff., 300. 
Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (the elder), 

19s, 218, 230; (the yoimger), 243. 
Senate, its power, 67, 190, 191. 
Senatorial foreign policy, 66, 89-92, 145, 

I9S, 218, 220, 232, 237, 250, 257, 266, 

300, 306. 
Senones, 61. 

Sentimental politics, 150 ff., 157. 
Sentinum, battle at, 54. 
Sequani, 334. 
Serfdom, in Egypt, 351 ; in the Orient, 

94, 244. 
Setia, 22. 
Seville, 343. 
Sicily, 93, 281. 
Signia, 18, 26. 

Sinuessa, battle at, 33 ; a colony, 53. 
Sipontum, 188. 
Slavery, 7, 39, 272, 288. 
Slaves enrolled in army, 127. 
Smyrna, 166, 168. 
Social war, 298. 
Societas, theory of, 146. 
Socii, 34, 147 ; J. navales, 45, 86. 
Socius et amicus, 147. 
Soil, of Latimn, i, 10; of Campania, 10. 
Sora, so, 53. 
Spain, 121, 129, 230. 
Sparta, 157, 185, 192 ff., 227. 
Sphere of influence, 47, 124, 171. 
Spoletium, 70. 
State control of grain, 281. 
State loans, 127. 

State ownership, 94, 97, 251, 340. 
State rents, 97. 
Suessa Aurunca, 53. 
Sutrium, 24. 
Synedrion, 209. 
Syria, 165, 239, 302 ff., 308, 318. 

Tabulae Caeriium, 43. 
Tarentum, 62, 78 ; colonized, 253. 
Tarquinii (Corneto), 68. 



Tarquin the Proud, 17. 

Tarracina, 17, 36. 

Tarragona, 343. 

Tauromenium, 95 ff. 

Taurus Mts., 174. 

Taxes and taxgathering, 95-7, 98, 127, 
14s. 30s, 323, 340. 344- 

Telamon, battle at, 118. 

Telesia, 75. 

Tempsa, 188. 

Teretina, tribus, 57. 

Terramara, i. 

Teuta, queen of Illyricum, 116. 

Thermopylae, battle at, 174. 

Thisbe, 205. 

Thurii, 62 ff. 

Tiberius, emperor, 352, 354. 

Tibur, 17, 34. 

Tigranes, of Armenia, 302 ff., 308. 

Tithes, 94 ff., 291, 320 ff. 

Trajan, emperor, 355. 

Trasimene Lake, battle at, 126. 

Treaties, nature of Rome's, 146; with 
Capua, 31 ; with Samnites, 24, 48, 
51; with Latins, 23, 28; with Car- 
thage, 24, 92, 123, 128, 278, 279; with 
PhiUp, 154, 279; with Antiochus, 175, 
280; with Ambracians, 279; with 
Termessians, 280; between Hannibal 
and Philip, 143. 

Trebia, battle at, 126. 

Tribute, 40, 129 (Spanish), 208 (Mace- 
donian), 230, 24s, 321, 340. 

Triumph hunting, 219, 272. 

Triumvirate, 340. 

Troy, 343- 

M. Tullius Cicero, 314. 

Tusculiun, 17, 34. 

Umbrians, 54, 69. 
Usipetes, 339. 

Vacillation of Roman government, 222, 

237- 
Vadimon, battle at Lake, 61. 
Value of ager Romanus, 292. 
Veii, 17, 20 ff. 
Velina, tribus, 71. 
VeUtrae, 18, 34. 
Veneti, 118. 
Venusia, 54. 

Vespasian, emperor, 3S4. 
Vestini, 52, 71. 
Vibo (Hipponium), 130. 
Village communities, 4. 
Villanova sites, 2, 14. 



INDEX 



36s 



Viritane assignments, 21, 24, 37, 79, 115. 
Void, 61, 68; painting at, 13. 
Volsci, 18 flf. 
Volsinii, 61, 68. 
Voltumum, 188. 

War, with Volsci and M,q\n, 18; with 
Latins, 32 ; with Samnites, 48 ff. ; 
with Gauls, 54, 60, 117, 254, 334; with 
Pyrrhus, 61; with Carthage, 88, 119, 



233 ; with Macedonians, 127, 138, 205, 
223 ; with Achaean league, 225 ; with 
Jugurtha, 263; with Cimbri, 268; 
with Italian allies, 300; with Mith- 
radates, 302, 317 ; with Germans, 352, 
War indemnity, 92, 114, 128, 154, 175. 

ZacjTithus, 185. 
Zama, battle at, 128. 



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